Com. v. Muhammad, M. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
MUAAWIYA MUHAMMAD :
:
Appellant : No. 1647 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 12, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-23-CR-0004256-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2018
Appellant, Muaawiya Muhammad, appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed on April 12, 2017, following his jury trial conviction of
persons not to possess a firearm, and firearms not to be carried without a
license.1 Specifically, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress the firearm, and the court’s admission of testimony of one of the
officers on scene. We affirm.
We take the factual and procedural history in this matter from our
review of the certified record and the trial court’s November 21, 2017 opinion.
On June 14, 2015,2 at approximately 12:15 a.m., Chester City Police Officer
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106, respectively.
2 Some documents in the certified record denote the incident date as June 15,
2015. However, the transcribed notes of testimony from trial, and the police
criminal complaint both state June 14, 2015, therefore, we use that date.
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Patrick Flynn observed trash being thrown out of the driver’s side rear window
of a white Chevrolet Lumina in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501, which
prohibits discarding rubbish. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/06/16, at 14,
16; N.T. Trial, 11/03/16, at 29, 32). Officer Flynn activated his flashing lights
and siren and attempted to stop the vehicle. Instead of pulling over, the
vehicle accelerated through a red light, made a right turn, and approached a
park. All four doors of the vehicle opened, and while it was still coming to a
stop all four occupants got out of the car and ran in different directions. (See
N.T. Suppression Hearing, at 17-20). Officer Flynn chased an individual, later
identified as Laron Chandler, who exited from the passenger side rear door of
the vehicle. (See id. at 22).
Officer Arthur Grenier, also of the Chester Police Department, heard
Officer Flynn make a radio call about the stop, and responded to it. He saw
the vehicle come to a stop, and the occupants run, observing Appellant and
one other occupant run toward him, both clutching their waistbands. (See id.
at 40-41). Suspecting that Appellant might be holding a firearm, Officer
Grenier ordered him to stop. After Appellant did not respond, Officer Grenier
deployed a Taser. Appellant continued running and Officer Grenier gave
chase. Soon thereafter, Appellant tripped on a curb and fell to the ground.
As he was falling, he pulled a firearm from his waistband, which firearm fell
from his right hand, and slid across the asphalt. (See id. at 45, 48). Appellant
got up from where he fell and continued running. He was eventually
apprehended about a block and a half away; once he was secure, Officer
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Grenier returned to where the firearm landed and retrieved it. (See id. at 48-
49).
Appellant was arrested and charged with felon in possession of a
firearm, firearms not to be carried without a license, resisting arrest,3
tampering with evidence,4 and disorderly conduct.5 (See Information,
8/12/15, at 1-2). On September 11, 2015, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-
trial motion seeking, among other things, to suppress evidence of the handgun
recovered during pursuit. (See Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 9/11/15, at
unnumbered pages 2-3). The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on
July 6, 2016. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the
suppression motion, concluding that “Officer Grenier acquired probable cause
when he saw [Appellant] fleeing the car and with [Appellant] holding his
waistband in the way that he did. As he testified, the probability that there
was something there that [Appellant] was trying to protect from falling or
concealing was great.” (N.T. Suppression Hearing, at 73-74).
A one-day jury trial commenced on November 3, 2016. At trial, the
Commonwealth offered the testimony of Officer Flynn who described the initial
summary code violation for discarding rubbish, and ensuing chase. The trial
court overruled Appellant’s objection, and permitted Officer Flynn to describe
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3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104.
4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4901(1).
5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(b).
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the incident. Officer Flynn testified that after he attempted to pull over the
vehicle it fled and eventually drove into a park wherein all four car doors
opened and the occupants began to flee. (See N.T. Trial, at 42-43). He stated
that
The back right passenger had a black and red hoodie on and he
was almost right in front of me when I got out of the car. As I got
out, I saw him and when I looked at him, he started pulling a gun
out of his waistband so I chased him. So we went running this
way, up this alley. . . .
(Id. at 43). Officer Grenier also testified, consistent with his testimony at the
suppression hearing, that he chased and apprehended Appellant, who fled
from the drivers’ side rear of the vehicle.
After the Commonwealth completed its case in chief, the trial court
granted Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charges of
tampering with evidence and resisting arrest. (See id. at 165-68).
Thereafter, the jury found Appellant guilty of person not to possess a firearm,
and firearms not to be carried without a license. (See id. at 208; Verdict
Sheet, 11/03/16).
On April 12, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to not less than
sixty, nor more than 120 months of incarceration for possession of firearm
prohibited, and imposed a concurrent sentence of not less than forty-two, nor
more than eighty-four months of incarceration for firearms not to be carried
without a license. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on April 21, 2017,
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which the trial court denied on April 25, 2017. Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal on May 22, 2017.6
Appellant raises two questions on appeal:
A. Whether the [h]onorable [t]rial [c]ourt committed [an] error of
law and abuse of its discretion, and denied Appellant his rights
under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article 1 Sections 8 and 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution when it denied Appellant’s pre-trial
motion to suppress the firearm recovered by police during foot
pursuit of the Appellant, where the pursuit by police constituted a
seizure of the Appellant, and where the pursuit was undertaken
without probable cause, reasonable suspicion or any other lawful
justification whatsoever[?]
B. Whether the [h]onorable [t]rial [c]ourt committed [an] error of
law and abuse of its discretion in admitting into evidence at trial,
testimony by police that another person, one Laron Chandler, ran
from the automobile at the same time as the Appellant, that
Chandler was also pursued by police and that Chandler discarded
a firearm during the pursuit, where Appellant was not charged
with conspiring with Chandler to possess either the handgun
Appellant had or the one that Chandler had, so that evidence that
Chandler discarded a handgun was irrelevant and therefore
inadmissible[?] . . .
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5) (some argument omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress the firearm he dropped while fleeing. (See id.
at 13-23). Specifically, Appellant claims that Officer Grenier lacked
reasonable suspicion that he was engaging in criminal activity, and therefore,
the chase constituted an unconstitutional seizure. (See id.). We disagree.
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6 Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal on July 3, 2017. The trial court entered its
opinion on November 21, 2017. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an
appellate court is required to determine whether the record
supports the suppression court’s factual findings and whether the
inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression court
from those findings are appropriate. Where the record supports
the factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by
those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are in error. However, where the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
legal error, the suppression court’s conclusions of law are not
binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Commonwealth v. Foglia, 979 A.2d 357, 360 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc),
appeal denied, 990 A.2d 727 (Pa. 2010) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
It is well-settled that
A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct
an investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the
individual is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v.
Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (1999). “This standard,
less stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as
reasonable suspicion.” Id. In order to determine whether the
police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the
circumstances must be considered. [See] In re D.M., 566 Pa.
445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001). In making this determination,
we must give “due weight to the specific reasonable inferences
the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Also, the
totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
conduct. Rather, “even a combination of innocent facts, when
taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
officer.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676.
Id.“Flight by the suspect can be considered suspicious activity, but flight
alone does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.” Commonwealth v.
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Taggart, 997 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 17 A.3d
1254 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). However, “nervous, evasive behavior
such as flight is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. 2000) (citation
omitted). Additionally, a suspect grabbing his waistband, a movement that
police know is often associated with hiding a weapon, is another relevant
factor in determining reasonable suspicion. See Foglia, supra at 361.
Furthermore, “a combination of circumstances, none of which taken alone
would justify a stop, may be sufficient to achieve a reasonable suspicion.”
Commonwealth v. Riley, 715 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal
denied, 737 A.2d 741 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted); see also
Commonwealth v. Moore, 446 A.2d 960, 962 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“Though
flight alone will not justify a stop, a combination of circumstances, none of
which taken alone would justify a stop, may be sufficient.”) (citations
omitted).
In the instant case, the evidence at the suppression hearing
demonstrated that Appellant fled from the police, while holding his waistband,
after police observed him throwing trash out the drivers’ side rear window of
the automobile, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501. Given the totality of these
circumstances, and considering the specific reasonable inferences made by
the police at the time, we conclude that reasonable suspicion existed to detain
Appellant. See Foglia, supra at 360; Riley, supra at 1135. Appellant’s first
issue does not merit relief.
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In his second issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it
denied his motion in limine and admitted evidence that another occupant of
the vehicle, Laron Chandler, was in possession of and discarded a handgun.
(See Appellant’s Brief, at 23-27). He claims that the evidence was irrelevant
to the charges against him, that it did little to show the complete story of the
case, and that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. (See id.). Thus, he argues the trial court abused its discretion.
We disagree.
Our standard of review is well settled.
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial
court clearly abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.
Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 357–58 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
banc), appeal denied, 128 A.3d 220 (Pa. 2015) (citations omitted).
“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence [ ] and . . . the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). “All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence that is
not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice[.]” Pa.R.E. 403. “[A]ll evidence in a criminal proceeding is
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prejudicial to the defendant, and . . . relevant evidence is to be excluded only
when it is so prejudicial that it may inflame the jury to make a decision based
upon something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case.”
Commonwealth v. Colon, 846 A.2d 747, 753 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 870 A.2d 320 (Pa. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Initially, we note that Rule 404(b) prohibits admission of other crimes
or acts to show a defendant’s bad character. Here, in contrast, the evidence
in question regarded the crimes or acts of Mr. Chandler. See Pa.R.E. 404(b);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 160 A.3d 127, 146 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 508 (2017) (concluding that Rule 404(b) was not implicated where
the subject testimony was “not evidence of any particular ‘crime, wrong or
act’ by [Appellant].”). Thus, we consider Appellant’s arguments about the
relevance and unfair prejudice concerning the evidence of Mr. Chandler’s
crimes, not whether admission of the testimony complied with Pa.R.E. 404(b).
Appellant claims that Mr. Chandler’s fleeing from the vehicle while
possessing a handgun “bore no relationship to the charges against [him,]” and
therefore should not have been admissible. (Appellant’s Brief, at 26; see id.
at 25-26). He contends that because he was not charged as an accomplice to
Mr. Chandler, evidence that he possessed a handgun was irrelevant. (See id.
at 26). We disagree.
Rule 401 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provides a broad
definition of relevant evidence, as evidence is relevant if it logically
tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact
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at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference
or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact. Even
evidence that merely advances an inference of a material fact may
be admissible. . . .
Johnson, supra at 146 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Officer Flynn’s statement about chasing the back right passenger
(Chandler) after the occupants fled into the park, was relevant to the jury’s
understanding of the events that took place after the occupants of the vehicle
fled. The fact that Officer Flynn saw that the back right passenger had a gun
was relevant to explaining why he decided to chase that passenger as opposed
to the other occupants of the vehicle. (See N.T. Trial, at 46). Additionally,
evidence of the conduct of one of the other passengers in the same vehicle is
part of the same sequence of events and, therefore, forms part of the natural
development of facts. Thus, we conclude that Officer Flynn’s statement was
relevant. See Commonwealth v. Cole, 135 A.3d 191, 196 (Pa. Super.
2016), appeal denied, 145 A.3d 162 (Pa. 2016) (finding evidence relevant
when it increased jury’s understanding of events).
Appellant next claims that the statement should not have been admitted
because its probative value was outweighed by its undue prejudice in violation
of Pa.R.E. 403. Specifically, he contends that the “evidence tended to
demonstrate some other plan on the part of all the occupants of the car, a
matter that was not of concern to the jury,” and that “[t]he jury could easily
infer[] guilt on the part of Appellant based on the possession of a handgun by
one of the other occupants of the vehicle.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 27).
Appellant’s argument does not merit relief.
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Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it harms a
defendant’s case, rather Rule 403’s bar “is limited to evidence so prejudicial
that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based upon something other
than the legal propositions relevant to the case.” Commonwealth v. Foley,
38 A.3d 882, 891 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 60 A.3d 535 (Pa. 2013)
(citation omitted). While evidence that Mr. Chandler possessed a gun could
possibly support an inference that Mr. Chandler committed a crime, there is
no reason to believe that it would improperly inflame the jury to find Appellant
guilty. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the evidence. See Tyson, supra at 357-58.
Moreover, we would conclude that the admission of this evidence, if
error, would constitute harmless error. The harmless error doctrine “reflects
the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.”
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 164 (2014) (citation omitted). Harmless error exists if the error
did not prejudice the defendant (or prejudice was de minimis), if the evidence
was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence, or if the properly admitted
evidence was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of error so
insignificant that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. See id.Here, the properly admitted evidence of Appellant himself being in possession
of a firearm overwhelmingly established his guilt of persons not to possess a
firearm and firearms not to be carried without a license, as to render any error
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in the admission of evidence that Chandler possessed a firearm insignificant
by comparison and therefore harmless. See id.Thus, we conclude that Officer Flynn’s statement was relevant to the
jury’s understanding of events, and did not cause unfair prejudice. Therefore,
we discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in admitting Officer Flynn’s
testimony. See Tyson, supra at 357-58. Appellant’s second issue does not
merit relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/21/18
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