Strong v. City of Peoria ( 2010 )


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  •                          No. 3-09-0709
    _________________________________________________________________
    Filed June 9, 2010
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    THIRD DISTRICT
    A.D., 2010
    TODD A. STRONG,               )    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    )    of the Tenth Judicial Circuit
    Plaintiff-Appellant and )     Peoria County, Illinois
    Cross-Appellee,          )
    )
    v.                       )    No. 08-L-72
    )
    THE CITY OF PEORIA,           )
    )    Honorable
    Defendant-Appellee and   )    Joe Vespa
    Cross-Appellant.         )    Judge Presiding.
    _________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
    _________________________________________________________________
    Plaintiff, Todd A. Strong, filed a negligence action against
    defendant, City of Peoria, seeking monetary damages from defendant
    for   demolishing   a    residential   dwelling   without   providing   him
    notice.    Following a bench trial, the court awarded plaintiff
    $2,238.01.   Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s award of damages.
    Defendant cross-appeals, arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to
    damages.   We affirm.
    On November 1, 2004, plaintiff paid $720.56 for the delinquent
    2003 real estate taxes for the property commonly known as 717 W.
    Columbia Terrace in Peoria and received a tax lien certificate for
    the property.     He later paid $1,517.45 for the delinquent 2004 and
    2005 real estate taxes on the property.
    On January 18, 2007, plaintiff filed a petition for tax deed.
    On January 24, 2007, plaintiff served a notice of expiration of
    period of redemption on the city clerk’s office.                On January 26,
    2007, plaintiff published the notice in the Peoria Journal Star.
    On May 1, 2007, the redemption period expired.                  On May 7,
    2007, the circuit court held a hearing on plaintiff’s petition for
    tax deed.    The court ordered that the tax deed be issued to
    plaintiff.   On June 22, 2007, the county clerk issued a tax deed to
    plaintiff and Becky S. Mansfield for 717 W. Columbia Terrace.                The
    tax deed was filed in the county recorder of deeds on July 23,
    2007.
    Meanwhile, on April 25, 2007, defendant had entered into a
    written agreement with Nguyen Linh, the record owner of 717 W.
    Columbia Terrace, to demolish the house located there. On or about
    May 30, 2007, defendant demolished the house.
    On   March   3,   2008,   plaintiff    filed     a    complaint     against
    defendant,   claiming   that   he   was    entitled       to   damages   because
    defendant failed to notify him prior to demolishing the house. The
    case proceeded to a bench trial.
    At trial, plaintiff called Diana Joseph, a certified real
    estate appraiser, to testify. She prepared a real estate appraisal
    report at plaintiff’s request.      According to her report, the fair
    market value of 717 W. Columbia Terrace, including the house that
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    was located thereon, immediately before demolition was $24,000.
    Her   report    did   not   provide   a   value   of   the   property   after
    demolition, but she testified that the value of the property in its
    present state is about $2,200.
    Glenda Williams, a City of Peoria code enforcement inspector,
    testified for defendant.        In October 2006, she conducted a lien
    search of the property.      A report of lien search was introduced as
    evidence.      The report listed Nguyen Linh as the owner of the
    property.      The report stated that 2003, 2004 and 2005 taxes were
    sold to "Todd Strong/Becky S. Mansfield" and provided an address
    for them.      After receiving the report, Williams contacted Linh.
    Linh agreed to allow defendant to demolish the house on the
    property. Williams never sought or received consent from plaintiff
    to demolish the property.
    The trial court found that plaintiff was "an interested person
    *** entitled to notice."      It further found that the proper measure
    of plaintiff’s damages was the property taxes that he paid for
    2003, 2004 and 2005.         The court entered an order in favor of
    plaintiff and against defendant for $2,238.01, plus costs.
    I
    Plaintiff argues that the trial court should have awarded him
    damages in the amount of $21,800, the difference between the value
    of the property before and after demolition.
    "When a challenge is made to a trial court’s ruling following
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    a bench trial, the proper standard of review is whether the trial
    court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence."
    Carey v. American Family Brokerage, Inc., 
    391 Ill. App. 3d 273
    ,
    277, 
    909 N.E.2d 255
    , 259 (2009).   "To reverse a finding of damages,
    a reviewing court must find that the trial judge ignored the
    evidence or that the measure of damages was erroneous as a matter
    of law."   
    Carey, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 277
    , 909 N.E.2d at 259.
    Compensatory damages are those that are awarded to a person as
    compensation, indemnity or restitution for a wrong or injury
    sustained by him.   Gambino v. Boulevard Mortgage Corp., 398 Ill.
    App. 3d 21, 
    922 N.E.2d 380
    , 417 (2009).    "The purpose of awarding
    compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole and restore
    him to the position he was in before the loss, but not to enable
    him to make a profit or windfall on the transaction."   
    Gambino, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 61
    , 922 N.E.2d at 417.
    The general rule for determining damages for real property
    that has been totally destroyed is the difference between the
    market value of the property before and after demolition.    Hudlin
    v. City of East St. Louis, 
    227 Ill. App. 3d 817
    , 835, 
    591 N.E.2d 541
    , 553-54 (1992).    However, this rule only applies when the
    person seeking damages holds title to the property at the time of
    the demolition.   Schwartz v. City of Chicago, 
    21 Ill. App. 3d 84
    ,
    95, 
    315 N.E.2d 215
    , 224 (1974).
    The Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/22-5 et seq. (West
    4
    2006)) sets forth the procedure for obtaining title to property
    through a tax deed.    Pursuant to section 22-30 of the Code, the
    purchaser of a tax deed may file a petition three to five months
    prior to the expiration of the redemption period, "asking that the
    court direct the county clerk to issue a tax deed if the property
    is not redeemed from the sale."       35 ILCS 200/22-30 (West 2006).
    Section 22-40 of the Code provides that if the property has not
    been redeemed within the redemption period and the petitioner has
    complied with all provisions of law entitling him to a deed, the
    court shall enter an order directing the county clerk to issue a
    tax deed.   35 ILCS 200/22-40(a) (West 2006).   Section 22-65 of the
    Code provides that a tax deed executed by the county clerk "vests
    in the grantee, his or her heirs and assigns, the title of the
    property therein described."   35 ILCS 200/22-65 (West 2006).
    The plain language of the above statutes provides that the
    purchaser of a tax certificate does not acquire title until the
    county clerk issues the tax deed.     In re Application of the County
    Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 
    373 Ill. App. 3d 679
    , 685,
    
    869 N.E.2d 1065
    , 1074 (2007); see also Illinois Ry. Museum, Inc. v.
    Siegel, 
    132 Ill. App. 2d 77
    , 82, 
    266 N.E.2d 724
    , 727 (1971) (a
    certificate of sale does not pass title to the purchaser until the
    redemption period expires and the tax deed is issued).
    Here, the county clerk issued plaintiff a tax deed for 717 W.
    Columbia Terrace on June 22, 2007. Plaintiff acquired title to the
    5
    property on that date.         He did not hold title to the property on
    May 30, 2007, when the home was demolished.              Thus, he was not
    entitled to damages equal to the difference in market value of the
    property before and after the demolition. See Schwartz, 21 Ill.
    App. 3d at 
    95, 315 N.E.2d at 224
    .
    Instead, plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages that
    would restore him to the position he was in before the loss.             See
    
    Gambino, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 61
    , 922 N.E.2d at 417.           In this case,
    that loss can only be measured by the taxes paid, that is,
    plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenses.            The evidence showed that
    plaintiff spent $2,238.01 for taxes on the property. Thus, the
    trial court’s award of $2,238.01 was not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    II
    In its cross-appeal, defendant argues that plaintiff was
    entitled   to   no   damages    because   he   failed   to   establish   that
    defendant had a duty to provide him with notice of the demolition.
    To prove a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must
    establish that defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, that
    defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate
    cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Strickland v. Kotecki, 392 Ill.
    App. 3d 1099, 1101, 
    913 N.E.2d 80
    , 83 (2009).                Whether a duty
    exists is a question of law, which we review de novo.             Thomas v.
    Town of Cicero, 
    307 Ill. App. 3d 840
    , 843, 
    719 N.E.2d 187
    , 189
    6
    (1999).
    Section 21-410 of the Code provides that the holder of a tax
    lien certificate "shall be made a party to any action or proceeding
    to demolish or destroy improvements on property where the property
    has been sold for failure to pay taxes and the period of redemption
    has not expired."    35 ILCS 200/21-410 (West 2006).        Additionally,
    section 11-31-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code provides: "All
    persons having an interest of record in the property, including tax
    purchasers *** shall be named as defendants in the [demolition]
    petition and shall be served with process."         65 ILCS 5/11-31-1(d)
    (West 2006).    Finally, the Peoria city code requires notice to be
    served upon "all owners of record or persons having an interest ***
    as shown by documents recorded in the office of the county recorder
    of deeds" when a building is found to be dangerous and subject to
    demolition.    Peoria Municipal Code §5-404(a) (1995).
    Under both state law and the city’s code, defendant had a duty
    to   notify   plaintiff,   a   tax   lien   certificate   holder,   of   the
    impending demolition of the house at 717 W. Columbia Terrace.            See
    
    Schwartz, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 87
    , 315 N.E.2d at 219.         Defendant was
    made aware of plaintiff’s identity and address by the report of
    lien search.     Nevertheless, defendant never notified plaintiff.
    Defendant breached its duty to notify and was liable to plaintiff
    for damages.
    CONCLUSION
    7
    The order of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    CARTER and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur.
    8