People v. Johnson , 2023 IL App (5th) 200308-U ( 2023 )

NOTICE
2023 IL App (5th) 200308-UNOTICE
Decision filed 01/13/23. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0308 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Jefferson County.
)
v. ) No. 19-CF-493
)
ADREANNA N. JOHNSON, ) Honorable
) Jerry E. Crisel,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Welch and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where there is no potentially meritorious argument regarding the circuit court’s
denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea, we grant defendant’s appointed
counsel on appeal leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶2 Defendant, Adreanna N. Johnson, appeals the circuit’s denial of her motion to withdraw
her guilty plea. Defendant’s appointed attorney, the Office of the State Appellate Defender
(OSAD), concluded the appeal lacks merit, filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel (see
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)) and a memorandum in support thereof, and provided
defendant with a copy of both. This court provided defendant with an opportunity to file a
response; however, none was filed. Having reviewed OSAD’s Anders motion and memorandum,
and the entire record on appeal, this court concludes the appeal lacks merit. As such, we grant
OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
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¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On September 4, 2019, defendant, Adreanna N. Johnson, was charged by information with
aggravated battery in violation of section 12-3.05(c) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2018)), mob action in violation of section 25-1(a)(1) of the Code (id.
§ 25-1(a)(1)), and resisting a peace officer in violation of section 31-1(a-7) of the Code (id. § 31-
1(a-7)). On September 20, 2019, defendant was indicted by a grand jury on all three charges. On
September 25, 2019, defendant waived formal arraignment and pled not guilty to the indictment.
An agreed order reducing her bail, with the added condition that defendant have no contact with
the victim, was filed.
¶5 On September 26, 2019, the State presented a negotiated plea. The State recited the terms
of the agreement, stating defendant would plead guilty to the aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(c))
charge and the remaining two counts would be dismissed. Defendant would also be sentenced to
time served and placed on 24 months of conditional discharge. After the State read the proposed
negotiated plea, defendant and her counsel agreed the State accurately stated the terms of the plea
agreement. Defendant further confirmed she had an opportunity to review the plea agreement with
her attorney and was able to read and write.
¶6 The circuit court admonished defendant that she was presumed innocent of the charges
against her and had the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to a trial.
The court explained that defendant could be tried by a jury comprised of 12 members of the
community, or a bench trial before a judge. In either situation, either the jury or the judge would
listen to both sides’ witnesses to determine whether the State proved its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. The court advised defendant she had the right to remain silent, to present witnesses, and to
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cross-examine the State’s witnesses, but by entering a guilty plea, she was giving up those rights,
and was basically “convicting” herself. Defendant stated she understood.
¶7 The court next asked whether defendant wanted the court to accept the plea and defendant
said, “Yes.” The defendant acknowledged her signature on the plea agreement, admitted she signed
the document, and denied being threatened or coerced in any way. She denied any promise, other
than those contained in the terms of the plea agreement, induced her to plead guilty. The court
asked defendant if she was pleading guilty because she was guilty, and defendant answered, “Yes.”
¶8 The court found the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made and entered into freely by
defendant and asked for a factual basis. The State advised that, on September 2, 2019, a witness
observed defendant batter Natikah Nabors on a public way in Mount Vernon, Illinois. Plea counsel
stated he discussed the matter with defendant and believed the State could “substantially prove”
the factual basis at trial. The circuit court found the factual basis sufficient to support the guilty
plea and, upon agreement of the parties, waived the presentence investigation.
¶9 The court confirmed the plea was for aggravated battery. It then advised defendant that the
charge’s incarceration range was from two to five years in the Illinois Department of Corrections
(IDOC), but the sentence could include only a judgment of conviction, an order of conditional
discharge, or an order of probation. The court advised defendant that if she was eligible for
extended term, it would be up to 10 years in IDOC, but “standard terms for this Class 3 felony
would be two to five years followed by a one-year period of mandatory supervised release and
also *** up to $25,000 fine.” When queried by the court as to whether she understood the possible
penalties for the offense, defendant said, “Yes.” The court then explained conditional discharge
and asked defendant if she understood the sentence. Defendant said, “Yes.” After ensuring
defendant was aware of her rights and the facts related to her sentence, the court asked if defendant
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still wished to plead guilty and have the court approve the agreement. Defendant replied, “Yes.”
The court approved the plea agreement and informed defendant of her appeal rights.
¶ 10 The court directed the parties to return on January 27, 2020. When asked if she had any
questions, defendant asked, “So[,] when I come back on the court date on January 27, 2020, can
[I] have my witness come in here?” The court called the attorneys to the bench and defendant’s
counsel asked to speak with his client off the record. The parties returned and the court asked if
defendant still wanted to go forward with the case. Defendant replied, “Yes.” The court again
confirmed that defendant wished to plead guilty, and defendant replied, “Yes.”
¶ 11 The record on appeal contains a printed form titled “Plea of Guilty,” dated September 26,
2019, signed by defendant. The record also contains a judgment of conditional discharge, dated
September 26, 2019, signed by defendant, which states defendant was “found guilty” of the Class
3 felony of aggravated battery.
¶ 12 On October 12, 2019, correspondence dated October 8, 2019, from defendant directed to
the court was filed with the court. The correspondence stated defendant had never been in trouble
before, took a plea deal she “was unsure about,” and had no knowledge it was for an aggravated
battery felony charge. She stated she was unaware of the severity of the charges and that it would
damage her entire career, life, and background, when she did nothing. The correspondence
contended defendant thought she was taking a plea for a high misdemeanor charge and requested
she be allowed to withdraw her plea and fight her case. The correspondence also requested a
meeting with the state’s attorney and the court to see if an agreement could be made for a lesser
charge since she was only 19 years old, and this would ruin her future.
¶ 13 The record also contained correspondence dated October 11, 2019, that contained no file-
marked date, from defendant to the court stating she was scared and confused on the day of the
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plea hearing. She stated that she only took the plea deal so she could get out and knew she could
not come up with the bond money. She further asserted that she did not realize the plea would
follow her for the rest of her life, ruin her future career, and that she was innocent of the charges
of which her counsel was aware. She stated her counsel was unhelpful in resolving this issue, asked
to withdraw her plea, and requested different counsel as well.
¶ 14 On October 18, 2019, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea asserting that
defendant’s plea was “not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Defense counsel also
moved to withdraw citing a conflict. On February 26, 2020, defendant’s trial counsel, Scott Quinn,
was allowed to withdraw and new counsel, Jaye Lindsay, was appointed. Thereafter, Mr. Lindsay
moved to withdraw due to a conflict and on March 11, 2020, Jason Barnhart was appointed to
represent defendant.
¶ 15 On September 24, 2020, Mr. Barnhart filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), stating that (1) he consulted with the defendant in person to
ascertain her contentions of error, (2) he examined the court file and the reports of proceedings
from the plea and sentencing hearings, (3) no amendments to the defendant’s pro se document
were necessary, and (4) the defendant could present testimony to support her contentions of error.
¶ 16 On September 24, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea. Defendant testified that when she pled guilty, she was 19 years old, had been in jail
for three weeks, and made the plea “to get out.” She wanted to withdraw the plea because she did
not know she “was pleading out to a felony.” She “thought it was a misdemeanor” and did not care
if the misdemeanor was on her record. She stated her plea counsel told her “he had the fight on
video.” She said she was going to plead out on her first court date, but she did not because her
counsel said to wait. Defendant believed she had a defense but did not present that evidence to her
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counsel, stating he “already had the video,” but it was not the “right video.” Defendant testified
that her release from jail once she entered the plea did not impact her decision to make the plea.
¶ 17 On cross-examination, defendant disputed her prior correspondence advising the court that
her “only focus” was release from jail or telling the circuit court at the plea hearing that she was
pleading guilty because she was guilty. She stated she did recall the judge going through the range
of penalties, specifically referencing a Class 3 felony, and thereafter stating she still wanted to
enter the plea. She recalled the remainder of the questioning by the circuit court and her statements
that she wanted to resolve her case with the plea. Thereafter, defendant’s postplea counsel rested.
¶ 18 The State called defendant’s plea counsel, Scott Quinn, who testified that he first met with
defendant 2½ to 3 weeks after her arrest. At that point, the State had tendered the police reports
and made an offer of “felony” conditional discharge or probation. He told defendant that the offer
would result in immediate release but recommended that she “hold off” so that he could speak to
the State to negotiate it “down to a misdemeanor.” When he reviewed the plea offer with defendant,
he told her it was not a “good deal,” and that if she gave him time, he could negotiate. However,
the defendant accepted the plea over his recommendation. He believed defendant wanted to leave
jail and that was her motivation for taking the plea. He tried to dissuade her from immediately
pleading guilty, because he believed he could negotiate a misdemeanor plea in a few days.
¶ 19 Following closing argument, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion, noting the plea
hearing transcript confirmed the court “went over everything in detail,” including that the charge
was a Class 3 felony, and defendant indicated “at every turn” she wanted to enter a guilty plea.
Defendant appealed.
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¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 In its motion to withdraw, OSAD identifies two potential issues which could be raised on
appeal and concludes neither has arguable merit. First, OSAD considered whether the circuit court
abused its discretion by denying defendant leave to withdraw her guilty plea. Second, OSAD
considered whether postplea counsel’s filed certificate complied with the requirements of Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 22 Due process requires that a guilty plea be affirmatively shown as voluntary and intelligent
before it can be accepted. People v. Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 443 (1989) (citing Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969)). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) was adopted to ensure this standard was
met (id.) and requires that, prior to accepting a guilty plea, the circuit court admonish the defendant
in open court and determine defendant understands: (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the minimum
and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, any penalty due to prior
convictions or consecutive sentences; (3) that defendant has the right to plead not guilty; and
(4) that if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty
the defendant waives the right to a trial by jury and the right to confront witnesses against her. Ill.
S. Ct. R. 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012). “Substantial compliance with Rule 402 is sufficient to establish
due process.” People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308, 323 (2002).
¶ 23 Once the requirements of Rule 402 are met, and the plea is accepted, the defendant does
not have the “automatic right” to withdraw the guilty plea. People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 520
(2009). Leave to withdraw a guilty plea is granted if “a manifest injustice under the facts involved”
is shown. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 163 (2001). A
defendant is allowed to withdraw a guilty plea and plead not guilty if
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“ ‘it appears that the plea *** was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law,
or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel or the State’s Attorney or someone else
in authority, or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where
the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice
will be better served by submitting the case to a jury *** .’ ” People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d
240, 244 (1991) (quoting People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 531-32 (1952)).
¶ 24 “[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the sound
discretion of the circuit court” and, on appeal, that decision “is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32. “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the
court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the trial court.” Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d at 519.
¶ 25 Defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea alleged that her plea was not knowing and
voluntary, because she believed she was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, not a felony. However,
the record reveals that the circuit court explained at the plea hearing that aggravated battery was a
Class 3 felony punishable with two to five years in prison, probation, or conditional discharge, and
asked whether the defendant understood, and she answered yes. Defendant also signed the
judgment of conditional discharge, which stated she was found guilty of a Class 3 felony. Where
the record refutes assertions that a plea was not knowing and voluntary, the court may deny a
motion to withdraw the plea, as the “proper and meticulous admonition” of a defendant “cannot
simply be ignored.” People v. Artale, 244 Ill. App. 3d 469, 475 (1993). Additionally, plea counsel
testified that he recommended defendant not accept the plea offer because he believed, with
additional time, he could negotiate an offer for a misdemeanor, but defendant wanted to be released
from jail and accepted the State’s offer over his recommendation.
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¶ 26 The circuit court substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 402, and we agree
with OSAD that no meritorious argument could be raised regarding the admonishments. As
defendant cannot meet her burden “to establish that the circumstances existing at the time of the
plea, judged by objective standards, justified the mistaken impression” about the class of the
offense to which she pled guilty (Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 244), we also agree that no meritorious
argument may be made that the circuit court abused its discretion when denying the defendant
leave to withdraw her guilty plea.
¶ 27 OSAD also considered whether the certificate filed by postplea counsel complied with the
requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d). Rule 604(d) provides that the defendant’s
attorney “shall file” a certificate stating that the attorney
“consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to
ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty,
has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and
the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the
motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct.
R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 28 The certificate ensures that counsel reviewed defendant’s claims and considered all
relevant bases for the motion to withdraw the guilty plea or reconsider the sentence. People v.
Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 361 (1998). Strict compliance with Rule 604(d) is mandatory. People v.
Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 19. The remedy for noncompliance is a remand to the circuit court to
ensure compliance. Id.¶ 29 In the case at bar, postplea counsel filed a certificate stating he consulted with defendant
in person to ascertain her contentions of error, examined the court file and the reports of
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proceedings from the plea and sentencing hearings, that no amendments to the defendant’s pro se
documents were necessary, and defendant could present testimony to support her contentions of
error. This certificate, which closely tracks the language of Rule 604(d), demonstrates strict
compliance with the rule. People v. Shirley, 284 Ill. App. 3d 734, 738 (1996). Accordingly, we
agree with OSAD that, because postplea counsel complied with the requirements of Rule 604(d),
no meritorious argument could be raised on appeal regarding the certificate filed in this case.
¶ 30 CONCLUSION
¶ 31 The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw
the guilty plea and the certificate filed by postplea counsel strictly complied with Rule 604(d). Any
argument to the contrary, on either point, lacks merit. Therefore, OSAD’s motion for leave to
withdraw as defendant’s appointed appellate counsel is granted, and the judgment of the circuit
court of Jefferson County is affirmed.
¶ 32 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.
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