Cedarhurst of Bethalto Real Estate, LLC v. Village of Bethalto , 2018 IL App (5th) 170309 ( 2019 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2019.02.06
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Cedarhurst of Bethalto Real Estate, LLC v. Village of Bethalto,
2018 IL App (5th) 170309
Appellate Court CEDARHURST OF BETHALTO REAL ESTATE, LLC, Plaintiff-
Caption Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF BETHALTO, ILLINOIS; ALAN
WINSLOW, in His Official Capacity as Mayor of the Village of
Bethalto; GERALD BOURLAND, in His Official Capacity as Trustee
of the Village of Bethalto; PERRY WITHERS, in His Official
Capacity as Trustee of the Village of Bethalto; JEFF MULL, in His
Official Capacity as Trustee of the Village of Bethalto; GARY BOST,
in His Official Capacity as Trustee of the Village of Bethalto; BRADY
DUGGER, in His Official Capacity as Trustee of the Village of
Bethalto; and DAN McRAE, in His Official Capacity as Trustee of the
Village of Bethalto, Defendants-Appellees.
District & No. Fifth District
Docket No. 5-17-0309
Filed October 12, 2018
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, No. 17-MR-118;
Review the Hon. Philip B. Alfeld, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Gregory C. Mollett, Clark W. Hedger, and Tali L. Katz, of
Appeal Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for
appellant.
Robert L. Jackstadt and Charles P. Watkins, of Tueth, Keeney,
Cooper, Mohan & Jackstadt, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Cates and Moore concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Cedarhurst of Bethalto Real Estate, LLC (Cedarhurst), is a corporate entity located in the
Village of Bethalto (Village) that operates a local residential nursing home. Unique Homes
Properties, Inc. (Unique Homes), had plans to develop a new senior citizen residential,
nursing, and memory care facility in Bethalto. Cedarhurst filed suit against the Village and its
mayor and trustees (collectively, defendants), alleging that the defendants must regulate
development near the St. Louis Regional Airport and that the permission defendants granted
Unique Homes violates the Village’s 2000 comprehensive plan because the tract of land is too
geographically close to the airport. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Cedarhurst’s
complaint, alleging that Cedarhurst had no standing. On July 20, 2017, the trial court granted
defendants’ motion. In its detailed order, the court found that because Cedarhurst was
complaining about a third party’s planned land usage, it was required to plead direct personal
special injury or damages. Cedarhurst was not able to plead personal damages connected to
Unique Homes’ planned development, and so the court held that it lacked standing. For the
reasons that follow in this opinion, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing Cedarhurst’s
complaint.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 Cedarhurst alleges that Unique Homes is constructing a senior citizen residential and
memory care facility in the Village and claims that the proposed site is in the flight path of the
main runway of the St. Louis Regional Airport. The tract allegedly abuts the airport’s runway
protection zone. Cedarhurst cites to the Village’s 2000 comprehensive plan, which Cedarhurst
alleges required the Village to create an airport overlay district. The 2000 comprehensive plan
serves as “a general plan to guide the future development and redevelopment of [Bethalto]”
and is to be utilized by the Village trustees in reviewing all applications for development.
Specifically, the 2000 comprehensive plan contains the following statement:
“The creation of an airport overlay zoning district is perhaps the best technique to
encourage compatible land uses around the airport. *** The FAA guidelines for land
use compatibility are used to determine the permitted land uses and related
development standards within the overlay district. Land uses that are sensitive to
certain noise levels are not permitted within the overlay district, or portions thereof, in
order to protect the public health, safety and welfare.”
The defendants adopted a comprehensive plan in 2014 that no longer contains the quoted
provision.
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¶4 Cedarhurst asked for a meeting with the Village mayor in February 2017 to express its
concerns that the planned location for the Unique Homes retirement facility “would be putting
seniors’ health and safety at risk.” In addition, Cedarhurst complained that Unique Homes
“was unfairly manipulating the development approval process—through political clout or
otherwise.”
¶5 Ultimately, on March 31, 2017, Cedarhurst filed its complaint seeking declaratory,
mandamus, and injunctive relief. In its declaratory judgment and mandamus counts,
Cedarhurst asked the trial court, in part, to order the Village to comply with its 2000
comprehensive plan, mandate that the Village create an airport overlay district, and prohibit
the Village from taking any action on Unique Homes’ development applications. Cedarhurst
also sought injunctive relief, asking the court to enjoin the defendants from allowing Unique
Homes to proceed with its proposed senior living facility development.
¶6 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Cedarhurst lacked standing to bring
any claim because it did not plead special injury or individualized harm and, alternatively, that
there was no actual controversy between the parties in this case. More specifically, the
defendants asserted that the Village had no obligation to create the airport overlay district. The
defendants explained that the 2000 comprehensive plan was replaced by the 2014 plan, and
thus Cedarhurst could not allege an actual controversy regarding the 2000 plan. Furthermore,
the defendants stated that the plan was advisory in nature and did not constitute law, and thus
the Village was under no obligation to implement any part of the plan. Finally, the defendants
claimed that Cedarhurst had no interest in the alleged controversy because it had no personal
claim, status, or right capable of being impacted by the development planned by Unique
Homes.
¶7 The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on July 20, 2017. The court concluded that
Cedarhurst lacked standing to complain about the use of someone else’s property, as it did not
and could not allege a special personal damage different from any potential damage that the
general public might suffer. Garner v. County of Du Page, 8 Ill. 2d 155, 158-60, 133 N.E.2d
303, 304-05 (1956); Bullock v. City of Evanston, 5 Ill. 2d 22, 33-34, 123 N.E.2d 840, 846
(1954). In addition, the trial court found that even if Cedarhurst had standing to maintain this
suit, the Village did not violate any ordinance that could result in a legitimate claim.
¶8 Cedarhurst timely filed its appeal from the trial court’s order.
¶9 LAW AND ANALYSIS
¶ 10 Our review of this issue is de novo. The underlying motion denied by the trial court was
based upon sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, both of which mandate
de novo review. 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2016); Paul v. County of Ogle, 2018 IL App
(2d) 170696, ¶ 34, 103 N.E.3d 585 (review of ruling on section 2-615 motion to dismiss is
de novo); Glasgow v. Associated Banc-Corp., 2012 IL App (2d) 111303, ¶ 11, 980 N.E.2d 785
(review of ruling on section 2-619 motion to dismiss is de novo). When ruling upon either a
section 2-615 or section 2-619 motion to dismiss, the court should accept all well-pleaded facts
in the complaint as true and make reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the
nonmoving party. Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 338 Ill. App. 3d
156, 164, 788 N.E.2d 740, 747 (2003).
¶ 11 Combined motions may be filed together but must be in separate parts pursuant to the two
different sections of the Code of Civil Procedure utilized. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016).
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Each section must contain the points or grounds upon which the argument to dismiss is based.
Id. In a properly filed combined motion to dismiss, the court must first look to dismissal under
section 2-619, which requires courts to view the complaint for its legal sufficiency in light of
the raised defects, defenses, or other affirmative matters that may defeat or bar the claim.
Edelman, Combs & Latturner, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 164.
¶ 12 Here, Cedarhurst and Unique Homes are in a similar line of business—senior residential
homes. Cedarhurst claims that it filed this suit, in part, to protect the future residents of the
Unique Homes development, as the planned development is located geographically close to a
local regional airport. It alleges that the defendants have a nondiscretionary common law duty
to protect community health and safety; that they must enforce all laws and ordinances
prescribed by law; and that the 2000 comprehensive plan obligates the Village to regulate land
use to ensure the health, public safety, and welfare of the community.
¶ 13 We first review the issue of Cedarhurst’s standing to file its action against the defendants
because the issue would be dispositive.
¶ 14 Cedarhurst was not obligated to establish its standing in its complaint. However, once the
defendants raised standing as an affirmative defense in their motion to dismiss, the burden
shifted to Cedarhurst to establish that it has standing. Village of Willow Springs v. Village of
Lemont, 2016 IL App (1st) 152670, ¶ 29, 70 N.E.3d 210.
¶ 15 Standing in General
¶ 16 The doctrine of standing serves to bar persons who have no interest in a controversy from
filing suit. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (1999). Lack
of standing is an “affirmative matter” that can be raised under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code
of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2016); Greer v. Illinois Housing
Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 494, 524 N.E.2d 561, 575 (1988).
¶ 17 This case is distinctive in that Cedarhurst is complaining about actions and/or inactions by
the defendants about property being developed by a third party, Unique Homes. The supreme
court addressed the issue of standing in Garner v. County of Du Page, 8 Ill. 2d 155, a case
structurally similar to this one and cited by the trial court as authoritative. In Garner, a
taxpayer filed a suit against the county, seeking a declaration about the constitutionality of the
county’s amendment to a zoning ordinance and also seeking injunctive relief. Id. at 157. The
Du Page County Board had unanimously voted to amend an ordinance that reclassified a
120-acre tract of land from farming to industrial. Id. Taxpayers, who were residents of
Du Page County and owners of real estate in and around Naperville, filed suit. Id. The
taxpayers alleged that their real estate was contiguous and in the general vicinity of the rezoned
tract. Id. They argued that the rezoning was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious; that the
rezoning would result in decreased property values; and that the rezoning was detrimental to
the welfare of Naperville because there would likely be an increase in population due to the
planned industrial use and the increase would overtax Naperville’s facilities for housing,
education, water, sewage disposal, and traffic. Id. at 157-58. The facts included in the
complaint revealed that none of the concerned taxpayers’ properties were contiguous to or in
proximity of the rezoned tract. Id. at 158. The only evidence about property values was
provided by a realtor who concluded that the rezoned tract was too distant from the taxpayers’
properties to affect a value change. Id. To establish standing in a case where the complaining
party alleges that corporate authorities have wrongfully allowed a use on someone else’s
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property, one “has the burden of proving that he has suffered a special damage by reason of
such use which differs from that suffered by the general public.” Id. at 158-59. The supreme
court concluded that if the rezoning posed some sort of threat to the complaining taxpayers, the
threat would be no different than that posed to the general public. Id. at 159-60. In support, the
court quoted a New York court’s opinion as follows:
“ ‘As one may not assume the role of champion of a community to challenge public
officers to meet him in courts of justice to defend their official acts, *** so one having
only a general interest may not adopt the part of an advocate of municipal welfare ***
to promote a judicial enforcement or interpretation of zoning regulations.’ ” Id. at 160
(quoting Blumberg v. Hill, 119 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1953)).
See also Swain v. County of Winnebago, 111 Ill. App. 2d 458, 250 N.E.2d 439 (1969) (holding
that Swain, individually as owner of a shoe store in downtown Rockford, and Central City
Council, a downtown business council, were unable to establish that they would personally
suffer special damage (alleged increase of vehicular traffic and overtaxed area services) as a
result of Winnebago County’s planned rezoning of property to permit development of a
regional shopping center, and therefore they lacked standing to proceed with the declaratory
judgment suit); Bullock, 5 Ill. 2d at 33-34 (holding that city residents failed to prove that they
suffered a special damage by the city’s granted variation of use for a tract of land from
single-family residential to commercial in an area with no development in the past 40 years);
Koehler v. A Century of Progress, 354 Ill. 347, 349-50, 188 N.E. 445, 446 (1933) (holding that
the complaining party lacked standing to seek injunctive relief to stop the use of public funds
for a Chicago exposition because she had no special injury).
¶ 18 Our supreme court provided additional guidance on the requirements of standing in the
case of Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462. In Greer, a complaint
was filed by neighborhood residents who owned property near a planned rehabilitation
development housing project for low income tenants in Chicago. Id. at 470. At issue was the
legitimacy of mortgage funding by the Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA). Id.
The IHDA alleged that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 487. The court held that, provided
that the complaining parties could establish “some injury in fact [whether actual or threatened]
to a legally cognizable interest,” then the parties established standing. Id. at 492 (citing
Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co., 108 Ill. 2d 243, 254, 483 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (1985), and
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). The actual or threatened injury needs to be
“ ‘distinct and palpable,’ ” “ ‘fairly traceable’ ” to the defendant’s actions, and “substantially
likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief.” Id. at 492-93 (quoting
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376 (1982) (“distinct and palpable”), and
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261
(1977) (“fairly traceable”), and citing Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 936 (1983) (substantial likelihood that if the relief is provided, the injury will be
prevented or remedied)).
¶ 19 In deciding Greer, the supreme court did not mention or specifically overrule the Garner
court’s “special damages” requirement to establish standing. The court began with the
principle that standing in Illinois requires “some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest.”
Id. at 492 (citing Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 254). The court then cited to several Illinois and
United States Supreme Court cases to outline the precise meaning of “injury in fact to a legally
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cognizable interest.” Id. Based upon this careful analysis, we conclude that Greer explained
and outlined what is required to establish standing and should be the standard used by courts.
¶ 20 While Garner and other similar cases required “special injuries” that are unique to the
complaining party and different from what the general public would experience, we find
common ground between those “special injuries” and the “injury in fact to a legally cognizable
interest.” In Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co., 108 Ill. 2d at 254, the court did not rule on
the standing issue but found that the plaintiffs, who alleged fraud against an insurance
company, had no dealings with and had not purchased insurance from the defendant insurance
company and, “therefore, have not alleged any actual injury in reliance on their conduct.”
Essentially, the court found that the plaintiffs had no personal injuries resulting from the
alleged frauds committed by the insurance company. Like the “special injuries” in Garner, the
Glazewski plaintiffs were faulted for not having any direct relationship and injuries with the
defendant. Similarly, in Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d at 222, a taxpayer filed suit
against the municipality that constructed a dam and reservoir that allegedly violated the Illinois
Endangered Species Protection Act (520 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 1998)) and resulted in the
elimination of two species from the area. At issue was whether the taxpayer had standing to file
a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Glisson, 188 Ill. 2d at 223. The
supreme court concluded that the taxpayer did not have standing, as he did not have a legally
cognizable interest based upon the constitution’s right to a “ ‘healthful environment’ ” as that
term was used in the Illinois Constitution. Id. at 231 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. XI, § 2). The
taxpayer also argued that he had standing as a naturalist who used the creek at issue for “food
gathering, recreation, spiritual and educational activities, and on his lifestyle which he
claim[ed] [was] ‘dependant on’ ” the creek. Id. The court disagreed, stating “that a party
cannot gain standing merely through a self-proclaimed interest or concern about an issue, no
matter how sincere.” Id. (citing Landmarks Preservation Council v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill.
2d 164, 175, 531 N.E.2d 9, 13 (1988)). We conclude that the terms “legally cognizable
interest” and “injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest” require a distinct injury to the
complaining party, even though the use of the term “special injury” is no longer commonplace.
The injury must be either actual or threatened and must be distinct and palpable. Greer, 122 Ill.
2d at 492-93. To establish standing, there needs to be a connection between the complaining
party and the defendant involving an injury to a legally cognizable interest.
¶ 21 Cedarhurst filed its complaint seeking three different forms of relief: declaratory,
injunctive, and mandamus. As the rules regarding each type of relief vary somewhat, we will
address each separately.
¶ 22 Declaratory Relief
¶ 23 To establish standing in a declaratory judgment suit, there must be an actual controversy
between the parties. Underground Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375,
362 N.E.2d 298, 300 (1977); Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493. An actual controversy is defined as
being “a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the
parties’ rights, the resolution of which will aid in the termination of the controversy or some
part thereof.” Adkins Energy, LLC v. Delta-T Corp., 347 Ill. App. 3d 373, 376, 806 N.E.2d
1273, 1276 (2004); Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493. In addition, the party seeking declaratory relief
must possess a personal claim, status, or right that could be affected if relief would be granted.
Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493 (citing Underground Contractors Ass’n, 66 Ill. 2d at 375-76).
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¶ 24 In this case, Cedarhurst cites to two supreme court cases as authority for all three forms of
relief sought—People ex rel. Faulkner v. Harris, 203 Ill. 272, 67 N.E. 785 (1903), and County
Commissioners of Pike County v. People ex rel. Metz, 11 Ill. 202 (1849). The plaintiffs in both
of these cases sought writs of mandamus to compel a public officer to take action on matters of
public concern. Faulkner, 203 Ill. 272 (citizen allowed to proceed against the mayor and
alderman of the city of Champaign who were allegedly shirking official duties mandated by
ordinances to keep and maintain all streets, alleys, and sidewalks clear and free from
encroachments and obstructions); County Commissioners, 11 Ill. 202 (Pike County received
funds appropriated for public works but then diverted some of the money to the general fund,
and although relator had no individual interest in mandating compliance with the specified
appropriation, the court found that he could do so because the matter was of public concern in
having the public works improvements completed). Essentially, both mandamus cases did not
require the complaining party to have any personal interest in the case and held that it was
enough that the subject matter of the claims was of public concern. Faulkner, 203 Ill. at 277;
County Commissioners, 11 Ill. at 208. Although these two cases allow the complaining party to
bring a claim about a public matter, the plaintiffs in both cases were pursuing a writ of
mandamus requiring a public official to act. Even though the cases could have some
application to Cedarhurst’s mandamus count, nothing in these cases suggests application to
declaratory judgment cases, and thus both cases are distinguishable.
¶ 25 Cedarhurst also cites to one case involving a declaratory judgment suit as authority. In the
cited case, Tanner v. Solomon, 58 Ill. App. 2d 134, 135, 206 N.E.2d 528, 529 (1965), one
member of a local fire and police board sought a declaratory judgment against the other
members of the same board. The issue involved appointment of allegedly ineligible applicants
to the police force. Id. The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff did not have standing
but stated in dicta that it had no problem in concluding that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff
to have been directly impacted by the appointments. Id. at 138. As the citation to this aspect of
the case was not part of the court’s holding, we do not find Tanner persuasive.
¶ 26 Cedarhurst makes no attempt to claim that it would be directly injured from the planned
development of a competing residential facility, i.e., it raises no actual or threatened injury that
is distinct. Instead Cedarhurst raises safety concerns for the prospective new tenants of the
planned development. Furthermore, Cedarhurst has no actual controversy with the defendants
in that it does not allege that it possesses a personal claim, status, or right capable of being
rectified if declaratory judgment was granted. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 493. The three cases
Cedarhurst cites do not support its claim of standing. We find that the analysis in Garner,
coupled with the specific definition of the injury required for standing in Greer, establishes
that Cedarhurst does not have standing. As the supreme court in Garner stated, “[t]his case is
not the normal one where an owner of land is complaining of restrictions placed upon its use,
but is the comparatively rare case in which it is claimed that corporate authorities have
wrongfully permitted a use on the property of someone else.” Garner, 8 Ill. 2d at 158. Because
the plaintiffs in Garner had no direct, personal injuries resulting from the rezoning of someone
else’s property, the court held that they did not have standing to complain. Id. at 159. Similarly,
Cedarhurst has no direct personal injuries, i.e., no injury in fact. Id. at 158-59; Greer, 122 Ill.
2d at 492. Cedarhurst’s property is not located near the tract of land at issue, and any claimed
violations cause no direct impact to Cedarhurst. Although Cedarhurst is a citizen of the
Village, none of the problems and/or violations it claims would occur if the development is
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allowed to proceed have any direct link to or impact upon Cedarhurst. We affirm the trial court
court’s conclusion that Cedarhurst did not have standing to seek declaratory judgment against
the defendants.
¶ 27 Injunctive Relief
¶ 28 To establish standing in a suit seeking injunctive relief, the complaining party must
establish that he has a “clearly ascertainable right or interest which needs protection.” Village
of Lake in the Hills v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 143 Ill. App. 3d 285, 292, 492 N.E.2d 969,
974 (1986). The party must claim injury to a “substantive interest he possesses which is
recognized by statute or common law.” Id. (citing Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 254). The injury
must directly impact his property or rights and cannot be abstract. Id. “The doctrine is designed
to insure that the courts are accessible to resolve actual controversies between parties and not
address abstract questions, moot issues, or cases brought on behalf of others who may not
desire judicial aid.” Id. (citing Illinois Municipal League v. Illinois State Labor Relations
Board, 140 Ill. App. 3d 592, 598, 488 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (1986)).
¶ 29 Cedarhurst only cites to Faulkner and County Commissioners as authority for its claim that
it has standing to seek an injunction against the defendants. Again, as both cases involved writs
of mandamus, they are not authoritative on the issue of standing to seek injunctive relief. Here,
Cedarhurst has not established a personally substantive interest recognized by statute or
common law that must be protected. Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 254; Garner, 8 Ill. 2d at 159. We
affirm the trial court court’s conclusion that Cedarhurst did not have standing to seek
injunctive relief against the defendants.
¶ 30 Mandamus
¶ 31 To establish standing in a suit seeking a writ of mandamus, the complaining party must
establish that there is a “sufficiently protectable interest pursuant to statute or common law
which is alleged to be injured.” Hill v. Butler, 107 Ill. App. 3d 721, 725, 437 N.E.2d 1307,
1311 (1982) (citing Retail Liquor Dealers Protective Ass’n of Illinois v. Schreiber, 382 Ill.
454, 459, 47 N.E.2d 462, 464 (1943)); see also People ex rel. Cermak v. Emmerson, 323 Ill.
561, 566, 154 N.E. 474, 476 (1926) (stating that a Cook County resident who was not affected
by legislation regarding judicial nomination by party conventions in counties with fewer than
300,000 inhabitants “has no right to complain” but that he did have standing with respect to
legislation regarding Cook County judicial nominations). The claim must be specific and
cannot be abstract. Hill, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 725. More recently, in McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL
App (1st) 141291, ¶ 16, 30 N.E.3d 468, the complaining citizen claimed that, as a lifelong
Illinois resident, he had standing to bring his mandamus suit. In response, the court stated that
the right of a citizen to bring a mandamus action against a public official does not exist in a
vacuum. Id. “ ‘Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy traditionally used to compel a public
official to perform a purely ministerial duty.’ ” Id. (quoting Bremen Community High School
District No. 228 v. Cook County Comm’n on Human Rights, 2012 IL App (1st) 112177, ¶ 14,
981 N.E.2d 369). To establish the right to a writ of mandamus, the complaining party must
establish the following: “(1) a clear, affirmative right to relief; (2) a clear duty of the public
officer to act; and (3) clear authority in the public officer to comply.” Id. The court concluded
that the plaintiff’s brief on appeal did not contain allegations supportive of standing because he
did not allege a personal injury or legally cognizable interest. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
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¶ 32 Although there are situations where a complaining party is able to act for the public at large
in seeking a writ of mandamus to compel some action by a public official or body as detailed in
the two cases Cedarhurst cites, the facts in this case do not support Cedarhurst’s request.
Faulkner, 203 Ill. at 277; County Commissioners, 11 Ill. at 208. Both cases stand for the theory
that a concerned citizen can seek a writ of mandamus to compel a public official to perform a
ministerial act. But, that potential ability to obtain a writ is only possible if the concerned
citizen can also establish: “(1) a clear, affirmative right to relief; (2) a clear duty of the public
officer to act; and (3) clear authority in the public officer to comply.” McCann, 2015 IL App
(1st) 141291, ¶ 16.
¶ 33 Cedarhurst is not able to establish that there is a sufficiently protectable interest pursuant to
statute or common law that would be damaged because the defendants were not in violation of
any zoning ordinance or comprehensive plan then in effect. The Illinois Municipal Code
provides that an official comprehensive plan and any amendment or addition to the plan is only
effective if it is formally adopted by the municipality’s corporate authorities. 65 ILCS
5/11-12-6 (West 2016). Without the municipality’s formal adoption, the plan is advisory only
and “shall not be construed to regulate or control the use of private property in any way” unless
a part of the comprehensive plan was implemented by a duly-enacted ordinance. Id. Cedarhurst
contends that the mayor is in violation of his obligations to follow and enforce all laws and
ordinances and to perform duties prescribed by law.1 Specifically, Cedarhurst argues that the
mayor did not enforce and follow the 2000 comprehensive plan, which obligated the
evaluation of developments near the regional airport. However, the 2000 comprehensive plan
is no longer valid, as a revised version was adopted in 2014. Although Cedarhurst
acknowledges these facts, it still argues that the mayor should have complied with his “duties”
pursuant to the 2000 version. Cedarhurst’s argument lacks sound reasoning. The
comprehensive plan is an advisory document and is not mandatory. Further, the 2000
comprehensive plan at issue is no longer in effect. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that
Cedarhurst did not have standing to seek a writ of mandamus against the defendants.
¶ 34 CONCLUSION
¶ 35 Cedarhurst did not have standing to pursue its claims against the defendants. As this issue
is dispositive, we do not reach the question of whether or not the defendants had a duty to act or
whether Cedarhurst’s pleadings set forth potential viable causes of action. To the extent that
our analysis varies from that of the trial court, as our review is de novo, a reviewing court may
affirm the trial court’s decision on other grounds. Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial
Hospital, 119 Ill. 2d 496, 502, 520 N.E.2d 37, 39 (1988).
¶ 36 For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing
Cedarhurst’s complaint.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
1
Cedarhurst does not appear to claim that the Village or any of the trustees is/are in violation of the
cited ordinances and statutes.
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