People v. Minniefield , 2014 IL App (1st) 130535 ( 2015 )

2014 IL App (1st) 130535
No. 1-13-0535
Opinion filed December 31, 2014
FIFTH DIVISION
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of Cook County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 03 CR 1284
)
GREGORY MINNIEFIELD, ) The Honorable
) Maura Slattery Boyle,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Palmer and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Gregory Minniefield was found guilty after a jury trial of first-
degree murder and sentenced to 25 years for murder, plus a 25-year
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enhancement for personally discharging a firearm, for a total of 50 years with
the Illinois Department of Corrections.
¶2 At his jury trial, defendant testified: that he walked with a gun at his side
toward the victim's parked vehicle, that the victim said "Oh, s***!" and reached
toward something on the floor, that defendant reached his gun inside the
victim's vehicle and fired two shots in self-defense toward "whatever" the
victim was reaching for, that the victim's vehicle moved forward, and that the
driver's window frame hit defendant's gun, causing it to discharge multiple
times accidentally. Thus, there was no dispute at trial that defendant was the
shooter or that the shots from defendant's gun killed the victim. The only issues
at trial concerned self-defense and accident and, at defense counsel's request,
the jury received second-degree murder instructions and a self-defense
instruction. However, the jury rejected these options and convicted defendant
of first-degree murder.
¶3 On direct appeal, defendant claimed that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to request an involuntary manslaughter instruction because his testimony
demonstrated that he acted recklessly when he shot the victim. The appellate
court held that, since the record did not disclose whether counsel and defendant
discussed this option, "the basis of defendant's ineffective assistance claim
wholly relies on matters not of record," and "the claim must be raised in a
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collateral proceeding," such as a postconviction proceeding. People v.
Minniefield, No. 1-05-2792, slip op. at 6 (2007) (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶4 Defendant then filed a pro se postconviction petition in December 2007,
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel's alleged failure
both to request an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction and to investigate
witnesses. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition on February 6,
2008, finding his claims frivolous and patently without merit. On May 28,
2010, this court reversed the trial court's summary dismissal holding that, on the
record before it, defendant's "allegation that counsel failed to investigate or
present witnesses has an arguable basis in law and fact." People v. Minniefield,
No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 4 (2010) (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23) (remanding the case for second-stage proceedings). After remand and
appointment of counsel, counsel filed a supplemental petition, which the trial
court dismissed on January 15, 2013.
¶5 It is this January 15, 2013, second-stage dismissal which is the subject of
the current appeal. On this appeal, defendant argues: (1) that he has made a
substantial showing that he acted in self-defense and thus is actually innocent;
and (2) that his counsel was ineffective (a) for failing to ask for an involuntary
manslaughter jury instruction and (b) for failing to investigate or call
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occurrence witnesses. At the second-stage proceeding which we are reviewing,
the State conceded that the two affidavits which defendant submitted in support
of his actual innocence claim are newly discovered. Defendant requests this
court to remand for a third-stage evidentiary hearing.
¶6 For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶7 BACKGROUND
¶8 I. The Evidence at Trial
¶9 A. The Events
¶ 10 On direct appeal, we summarized the evidence at trial as follows:
"The trial evidence demonstrated that, on December 17, 2002,
defendant fatally shot the victim, Theopolis 1 Ransberry. Immediately
prior, defendant was driving a car with two passengers, his girlfriend and
cousin. The victim was simultaneously driving his car with three
passengers. Although defendant admitted that he shot the victim, the trial
testimony conflicted regarding the exact chain of events leading to the
victim's death. The State's witnesses, including the victim's passengers
and defendant's cousin, testified that defendant instigated the exchange
with the victim by shooting at the victim's car. Then, after the victim
1
The victim's first name is spelled several different ways in the appellate
record and we are not certain which spelling is correct.
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subsequently pulled his car over, defendant approached on foot and shot
the victim several more times absent provocation. Contrarily defendant
testified that he did not shoot the victim until, after approaching the
victim's car to merely talk, he thought the victim was reaching for a gun,
and thus responsively shot the victim's hand twice. Then because the
victim began to drive away while defendant's hand remained partially
inside the car, defendant's hand hit the window causing the handgun to
fire several more times." Minniefield, No. 1-05-2792, slip op. at 2.
¶ 11 B. Defendant's Pretrial Confession
¶ 12 We further described defendant's pretrial confession as follows:
"At trial, Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) John Brady testified that
defendant agreed to have his statement videotaped, and it was published
to the jury over defense counsel's objections. In the statement, defendant
admitted that he chased the victim's car on the day in question because
they were engaged in an ongoing feud over money. Defendant further
admitted that, while chasing the victim's car, he fired two gunshots into
the air. Defendant additionally admitted that he approached the victim's
car, grabbed the chain around his neck and demanded money that the
victim owed him. The victim moved and defendant fired his handgun
toward the victim's leg. Then, while defendant's handgun remained
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inside the car, the car moved approximately two feet causing defendant to
shoot the victim four additional times. Defendant admitted that no one
was armed in the victim's car. Defendant knew that bullets hit both the
victim and Roshawn Adams, one of the passengers; however, he fled the
scene and disposed of his handgun. Defendant stated that he merely
intended to scare the victim, not to hurt him." Minniefield, No. 1-05-
2792, slip op. at 2.
¶ 13 C. Defendant's Testimony at Trial
¶ 14 We described defendant's trial testimony as follows:
"Defendant testified that, in April 2002, he and the victim had a
conversation during which the victim denied involvement in an incident
with defendant's girlfriend. He further testified that, early in the
afternoon on the day in question, defendant was driving with his two-
year[-]old son when the victim opened fire at defendant's car. Defendant
found a police officer in the area and reported the incident; however, the
officer was forced to leave on an emergency call. At some point during
the day, defendant purchased a loaded handgun for protection.
Later in the evening, defendant was driving with his girlfriend, Nicole
Saunders, and his cousin, Erica Simmons, when he recognized the
victim's car pass him and stop. Defendant approached the victim's car on
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foot, armed with his handgun, to talk to him about a misunderstanding
involving Sanders. Defendant, however, saw the victim reach for what
he thought was a handgun, and as a result, shot inside the car in an
attempt to shoot whatever the victim was trying to retrieve. After firing
two shots, the victim began to drive away. Defendant's hand, however,
was still inside the car. As a result, the window frame hit defendant's
hand causing the gun to fire several more times. Defendant testified that
he did not intend to fire the handgun and he did not think that he shot
anyone.
Defendant further maintained that he was mistreated while in police
custody, and despite expressly invoking his rights to an attorney and to
remain silent, his Miranda rights were violated.[2] Defendant claimed
that he told Detective Ron Lewis and Timothy Nolan that the victim
threatened him and that he shot the victim because he thought the victim
was reaching for a weapon. Defendant, however, admitted that he did not
make the same claims in his videotaped statement.
On cross-examination, defendant stated that he thought the victim
initially shot at his car because the victim mistakenly thought that
defendant was involved in a prior attack on the victim, which was
2
Prior to trial, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the
statements he made while in police custody.
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actually instigated by defendant's girlfriend. He admitted, however, that
during the incident the victim did not make any threats." Minniefield, No.
1-05-2792, slip op. at 2-4.
¶ 15 D. The State's Rebuttal Evidence
¶ 16 We described the State's rebuttal case as follows:
"In rebuttal, Detective Lewis testified that defendant did not report
that the victim shot at him while he was driving his son or that he thought
the victim was reaching for a handgun. On cross-examination, however,
Lewis admitted that defendant told him that the victim had threatened
defendant. Also, in rebuttal, Detective Nolan reiterated that defendant
did not report that the victim shot at him. On cross-examination,
however, Nolan admitted that defendant requested that he only shot
inside the victim's car because the victim was reaching for something."
Minniefield, No. 1-05-2792, slip op. at 4.
¶ 17 E. Jury Instructions
¶ 18 At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel requested instructions
on both second-degree murder and self-defense, which the trial court gave over
the State's objection.
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¶ 19 The jurors were instructed that, in order to sustain the charge of first-
degree murder, the State had the burden of proving that "the defendant was not
justified in using the force he used."
¶ 20 As to when force is justified, the jurors were instructed:
"A person is justified in the use of force when and to the extent that he
reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself
against the imminent use of unlawful force.
However, a person is justified in the use of force which is intended or
likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes
that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself."
¶ 21 With respect to second-degree murder, the jury was instructed:
"You may not consider whether the defendant is guilty of the lesser
offense of second degree murder until and unless you have first
determined that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of
the previously stated propositions.
The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a mitigating factor is present so that he is guilty of the
lesser offense of second degree murder instead of first degree murder.
By this I mean that you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence
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in this case, that it is more probably true than not true that the following
mitigating factor is present: that the defendant, at the time he performed
the acts which caused the death of Theopulous Ransberry, believed the
circumstances to be such that they justified the deadly force he used, but,
his belief that such circumstances existed was unreasonable."
Thus, the jurors were also instructed to consider, if they first found that the
State had proved that "the defendant was not justified in using the force he
used" and he was guilty of first-degree murder, whether he had an unreasonable
belief in the need for the use of deadly force.
¶ 22 After receiving its instructions, the jury convicted defendant of first-
degree murder, and defendant was sentenced to 50 years of imprisonment, and
his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
¶ 23 II. Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 24 Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition on December 27, 2007,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which the trial court summarily
dismissed as frivolous on February 6, 2008.
¶ 25 A. Reversal of First-Stage Dismissal
¶ 26 On appeal, we reversed the summary first-stage dismissal. Minniefield,
No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 7. Since "[t]he law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the
reconsideration of issues that have been decided by a reviewing court in a prior
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appeal" (In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 363 (2005)), we provide here our
prior holding and reasoning:
"We find defendant's claim should have survived first-stage review
because his allegation that counsel failed to investigate or present
witnesses has an arguable basis in law and fact. [Citation.] As a
threshhold matter, we note that defendant appended his own affidavit as
well as one from Ratliff. A claim that trial counsel failed to investigate
and call a witness must be supported by an affidavit from the proposed
witness. [Citation.] Therefore, we do not consider the proposed
testimony from Knighton in our determination. [Citation.]
We find that defendant's allegation has an arguable basis in fact. At
trial, defendant's testimony presented an 'imperfect self-defense' theory:
that he fired his gun at the victim after believing he saw the victim reach
for a gun. However, the State's testimony established that police did not
recover a gun from the victim's automobile. In his petition, defendant
alleged that Ratliff would testify that an unknown man removed a silver
gun from the automobile before police arrived on the scene. Defendant
appended an affidavit in which Ratliff averred as such, and also that
counsel never investigated his statement. In his own affidavit, defendant
averred that he told counsel about Ratliff and Knighton. Taken as true at
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this stage [citation], Ratliff's affidavit lends support to defendant's theory
of defense and defendant's affidavit establishes that counsel knew of the
witnesses. Therefore we cannot find the facts in defendant's allegations
'fantastic or delusional.' [Citation.]
We also cannot find defendant's allegation presented an indisputably
meritless legal theory. A constitutional claim that a defendant did not
receive effective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that it is
arguable that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and the defendant was arguably prejudiced as a result.
[Citation.] Defendant testified at trial that he believed the victim was
reaching for a gun and that based on this belief, fired one or two shots
toward the victim. Testimony presented by the State established that the
police did not recover a gun from the victim's automobile. The
allegations related to Ratliff's testimony corroborate defendant's belief
that the victim was reaching for a gun. We find this failure to investigate
could arguably demonstrate that counsel's performance was objectively
unreasonable. [Citation.] Finally, the affidavits support the allegation
that counsel failed to investigate Ratliff's testimony. Although the
evidence against defendant was strong, it is at least 'arguable' that
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No. 1-13-0535
evidence of a gun in the victim's car could have changed the outcome."
Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 5-7.
Thus, it is the law of the case that "it is at least 'arguable'," based on the record
then before the appellate court, "that evidence of a gun in the victim's car could
have changed the outcome." Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 7.
¶ 27 The prior appellate panel did not reach defendant's second allegation
concerning ineffectiveness based on a failure to ask for further jury instructions,
since it was already reversing on the first issue. Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649,
slip op. at 7. The court stated that, because the law "does not permit partial
summary dismissals, we need not consider whether defendant's second
allegation has an arguable basis in law and fact." Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649,
slip op. at 7.
¶ 28 B. Trial Court's Order on Remand
¶ 29 1. Petitions Under Consideration
¶ 30 On remand, counsel was appointed and filed a supplemental petition,
supplementing the claims and allegations that defendant already made in his pro
se petition. Since counsel's Rule 651(c) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Dec. 1,
1984)) certificate states that he "amended, supplemented and adopted the
arguments of the pro se petition," we describe first the pro se petition and the
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affidavits attached to it, and then counsel's supplemental petition and the
affidavits attached to it.
¶ 31 a. Defendant's Pro Se Petition
¶ 32 In his pro se petition, filed December 31, 2007, defendant alleged that
"prior to trial, I informed my trial attorney that Michelle Knighton and Thomas
Ratliff were present[] after the shooting and saw an unknown male take a silver
gun off the front passenger floor and [leave] with it before the police came" and
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call these two witnesses to
testify. Defendant also alleged that "defense counsel was ineffective for not
requesting an involuntary manslaughter instruction where there was sufficient
evidence to support it."
¶ 33 In support, defendant swore in his own "Affidavit," that "I informed my
lawyer *** about the two witnesses on behalf of my defense and I also asked
my attorney to put in a[n] involuntary manslaughter instruction to the jury."
¶ 34 The two affidavits submitted with defendant's petition are signed but the
signatures are not dated or notarized. They are certified by the affiant under
section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2006)).
¶ 35 In support, defendant also submitted the "Affidavit" of Thomas Ratliff,
which stated:
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"On December 17, 2002[,] I was coming out [of] a friend['s] house
after we heard gun fire and saw [the victim] in a tan or brown car crashed
into another car. I walked up 44th Place and saw three guys and two
females in [the victim's] car. One female was crying. She was shot and
one of the guys by the car took a silver looking gun off the front
passenger floor and left with it before the police came. I informed
[defendant's] attorney and he took my information down and he was
going to contact me before trial but never did so?"
¶ 36 Defendant also attached a sheet of what appear to be a police officer's
investigation notes, and his pro se petition also referred to a "police report."
The report did not mention Ratliff but stated the following concerning Michelle
Knighton: "Heard approximately five shots. Saw a female black with a beig[e]
jacket, blond and black braids standing near the victim's auto. Saw three
unknown males leaning into victim's car." Defendant did not include an
affidavit from Knighton.
¶ 37 b. Counsel's Supplemental Petition
¶ 38 Counsel's supplemental petition argued (1) that trial counsel was
ineffective for not calling Ratliff, who indicated prior to trial that the victim was
armed; and (2) that the newly available testimony of Noah Redic and Antoine
Nash that the victim was armed with a gun would have changed the outcome at
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No. 1-13-0535
trial, resulting in an acquittal or reducing the conviction to second-degree
murder. The supplemental petition states that Ratliff is not a newly discovered
witness and that his affidavit is submitted to support defendant's ineffective
assistance claim.
¶ 39 Attached to counsel's supplemental petition were (1) two additional
affidavits from defendant, dated August 9, 2011, and August 25, 2011; (2) the
prior "Affidavit" from Thomas Ratliff; (3) an affidavit from Noah Redic, dated
May 14, 2010; and (4) an affidavit from Antoine Nash, dated May 14, 2010.
¶ 40 In his August 9, 2011, affidavit, which is not notarized but is sworn to
under penalty of perjury, defendant stated: "I asked my attorney why Mr.
Ratliff wasn't called to testify and my attorney said the investigator never got
the chance to interview him before my trial." His August 25, 2011, affidavit
realleges this information and is dated and notarized. Thomas Ratliff's affidavit
contains substantially the same information as the affidavit attached to
defendant's pro se petition and is also sworn to under penalty of perjury but the
Ratliff affidavit attached to the supplemental petition is dated September 6,
2007.
¶ 41 Noah Redic's affidavit is dated and notarized, and it states:
"On December 17, 2002, I was waiting outside between 44th and 45th
[and] Lavergne [Avenue] on my brother to pick me up so we could go
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out to eat. While I was waiting a tan car pulled up with people in it.
Once I realized it was [the victim] I walked up to the car to see what he
was up to. He had three females in the car and we all started talking
when twan [sic] walked up and all of a sudden [defendant] pulled up
behind [the victim's] car and got out. [The victim] looked back and said
oh s*** as [defendant] approached the driver[']s side door. I thought
nothing of it until I saw [the victim] grab[] a silver gun from between the
armrest and [defendant] upped a black gun[,] stepped back and let off a
shot. I pushed twan out my way so I wouldn't get hit and heard about
four or five more shots and cars driving away. At that time, my brother
rode up and I jumped in his car and we left the neighborhood. I'm
coming forward now because [defendant's] mother reached out to my
mother and told her that I knew what happened that night and I should
have come forward with this information, so I wrote up this affidavit and
gave it to [defendant's] mother ***. "
Thus, in Redic's affidavit, he admits that defendant's mother knew that he knew
what happened that night and believed that he should have come forward
earlier. He also admits that defendant's mother knew how to reach him, which
was by contacting Redic's own mother. Redic offers no reason in his affidavit
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either why he did not come forward earlier or why defendant did not try to
contact him earlier.
¶ 42 Antoine Nash's affidavit is also dated and notarized, and it states:
"On December 17, 2002, myself and my girlfriend was standing in
front of my house when it started getting dark outside, so I decided to
walk her halfway home. I walked her to 44th and Lavergne [Avenue], so
I started walking. I saw Noel talking to [the victim] and a car full of
females. I walked up to the passenger side of the car where Noel was
standing, when all of a sudden a white car driven by [defendant] pulled
up behind [the victim's] car. [Defendant] jumped out and approached the
driver[']s side of [the victim's] car. I heard the victim say 'Oh s***,' and
[defendant] said something. That's when [the victim] grabbed a silver
gun from between the armrest and [defendant] stepped back and let off a
shot. Noel pushed me between a parked car and I heard a lot more shots.
Once the shooting stopped I ran back home because I knew my house
arrest box was going off. I didn't come forward that night because I
didn't want to get locked up for not being where I was supposed to be. I
did come forward but [defendant] had already went to trial and once I
saw everybody from the neighborhood there, I got scared and left
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because I didn't want people to think I was a trick. Now that I'm moved
out of the neighborhood I'm willing to testify if called to do so."
While Nash's affidavit explains why he did not want to come forward, it does
not explain why defendant or defendant's family did not approach him.
¶ 43 Both Redic and Nash swear in their affidavits that defendant "stepped
back" from the victim's vehicle immediately before firing the first shot. These
statements contradict defendant's trial testimony that he reached his hand inside
the victim's vehicle to fire the first couple of shots at whatever the victim was
reaching for on the floor.
¶ 44 2. The Trial Court's Second-Stage Ruling
¶ 45 The State then moved to dismiss defendant's pro se petition as
supplemented by counsel.
¶ 46 At the second-stage hearing, the parties acknowledged that, in order to
show actual innocence, defendant had to show that his evidence was: (1) newly
discovered; (2) material and not merely cumulative; and (3) of such a
conclusive character that it would probably change the result on trial. People v.
Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333-34 (2009). The State conceded that Redic and
Nash's affidavits, which were submitted in support of defendant's actual
innocence claim, were newly discovered. The assistant State's Attorney (ASA)
stated that Redic's and Nash's affidavits are "reportedly newly discovered and I
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have no doubt that they are newly discovered." The ASA repeated: "[T]he case
law requires that actual innocence claims be supported by newly discovered
information which I grant exist[s] in this case."
¶ 47 However, the State argued that "it's not material" and that it would not
have changed the result at trial. The State argued that Redic's and Nash's
testimony would not have changed the result at trial because, at most, their
affidavits showed mutual combat 3 not self-defense by defendant. Defendant
testified that he was armed when he approached the victim's vehicle. Redic and
Nash both swore in their affidavits that the victim said "Oh, s***" when he
observed defendant's approach and then reached for a gun. At most, this chain
of events shows aggression by defendant, a self-defense response by the victim,
and then shooting by defendant toward the seated victim. The State argued that
this chain of events could not possibly serve as the basis for a self-defense
claim by defendant.
3
"Mutual combat" has been defined by our supreme court as a "fight or
struggle which both parties enter willingly or where two persons upon a sudden
quarrel and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal terms and where death results
from the combat." People v. Austin, 133 Ill. 2d 118, 125 (1989). See also People
v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶ 152 (the offense of first-degree murder may be
"mitigated" to second-degree murder if the defendant "killed while under the
influence of a sudden, intense passion engendered by mutual combat"); 720 ILCS
ILCS 5/9-2(a)(1) (West 2002) (a "mitigating factor" for second-degree murder
occurs if defendant is "acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from
serious provocation by the individual killed *** but he negligently or accidentally
causes the death of the individual killed").
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¶ 48 The trial court again dismissed the petition, ruling (1) that trial counsel
was not ineffective for allegedly failing to investigate; and (2) that defendant
had failed to make a substantial showing of actual innocence.
¶ 49 The trial court did not rule on whether trial counsel was ineffective for
allegedly failing to offer an involuntary manslaughter instruction. In his
appellate brief, defendant concedes that: "post-conviction counsel did not argue
this error at the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss and did not say
anything in his reply to the State's motion to dismiss, when the State failed to
address the claim. *** In addition, counsel did not attempt to obtain a ruling on
its merits during oral arguments." This appeal followed.
¶ 50 ANALYSIS
¶ 51 On this appeal, defendant claims: (1) that he has made a substantial
showing that he acted in self-defense and thus is actually innocent; and (2) that
his counsel was ineffective (a) for failing to ask for an involuntary
manslaughter jury instruction and (b) for failing to investigate or call
occurrence witnesses. For the following reasons, we do not find these claims
persuasive.
¶ 52 I. Stages of a Postconviction Petition
¶ 53 Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act), individuals convicted of a
criminal offense may challenge their convictions if there was a violation of their
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No. 1-13-0535
constitutional rights (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)). See also People v.
Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 32. The Act provides for three stages of review
by the trial court. At the first stage, the trial court may summarily dismiss a
petition that is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2)
(West 2012); Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 32.
¶ 54 If the trial court does not dismiss a petition at the first stage, the petition
advances to the second stage, where counsel is appointed if a defendant is
indigent. After counsel determines whether to amend the petition, the State
may file either a motion to dismiss or an answer to the petition. 725 ILCS
5/122-4, 122-5 (West 2012); Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33. At the second
stage, the trial court must determine whether the petition and any accompanying
documents make a "substantial showing of a constitutional violation." People
v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001).
¶ 55 If the defendant makes this showing at the second stage, then the
petition advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. At a third-stage
evidentiary hearing, the trial court acts as fact finder, determining witness
credibility and the weight to be given particular testimony and evidence, and
resolving any evidentiary conflicts. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34.
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No. 1-13-0535
¶ 56 II. Standard of Review
¶ 57 In this appeal, the trial court dismissed defendant's postconviction
petition at the second stage. During a second-stage dismissal hearing, the
defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35.
¶ 58 At this stage, the trial court accepts as true all well-pled facts that are not
positively rebutted by the record. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35 (citing
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998)). There is no fact finding or
credibility determination at this stage. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35 (citing
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 385). As a result, the State's motion to dismiss raises
solely the issue of whether the petition is sufficient as a matter of law.
Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35 (citing Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 385). The
question before the court is whether the petition's well-pled allegations, if
proven, would entitle the defendant to relief. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35.
Since this is a purely legal question, our review at the second stage is de novo.
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-89 (1998). De novo consideration in
the case at bar means that we perform the same analysis that the trial judge
would have performed, if we had been sitting during the second-stage dismissal
hearing. See Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011).
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¶ 59 III. Actual Innocence
¶ 60 In this appeal, defendant claims that he is actually innocent of the
underlying offense, which is first-degree murder. The wrongful conviction of
an innocent person violates due process under the Illinois Constitution of 1970
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2) and, thus, a defendant can raise in a postconviction
proceeding a freestanding claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence. People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 334 (2009); People v. Parker, 2012
IL App (1st) 101809, ¶ 80. See also People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 489
(1996).
¶ 61 In Ortiz, our supreme court held that, to assert a claim of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that the
evidence was: (1) newly discovered; (2) material and not merely cumulative;
and (3) of such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result
on trial. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333-34; People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 450-51
(2001) (citing People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128 (1984)). See also Parker,
2012 IL App (1st) 101809, ¶ 81.
¶ 62 The Ortiz court defined newly discovered evidence as "evidence [(1)]
that has been discovered since the trial and [(2)] that the defendant could not
have discovered sooner through due diligence." Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 334.
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No. 1-13-0535
¶ 63 Defendant claims that Redic's and Nash's affidavits are newly discovered
evidence, and the State conceded at the second-stage hearing that the affidavits
were newly discovered. On appeal, the State admits in its brief that it made this
concession at the second-stage hearing, which is the proceeding we are now
reviewing. Relying on the State's representation at the second-stage hearing,
the trial court also stated that "these affidavits *** are newly discovered."
Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 7.
¶ 64 In addition, a prior panel of the appellate court also held, based on the
record before it, that "it is at least 'arguable' that evidence of a gun in the
victim's car would have changed the outcome." Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip
op. at 7. However, the prior panel had before it only Ratliff's affidavit, and not
Redic's and Nash's affidavits which are the subject of defendant's present
actual-innocence claim.
¶ 65 The State argued that Redic's and Nash's affidavits would not have
changed the result at trial, and the trial court agreed, and so do we. Defendant
testified at trial that he was armed when he approached the victim's vehicle.
Defendant testified: "I had my gun on the side of me." Redic and Nash both
swore in their affidavits that the victim said "Oh, s***" when he observed
defendant's approach and then the victim reached for a gun. At most, this chain
of events shows aggression by defendant, a self-defense response by the victim,
25
No. 1-13-0535
and then shooting by defendant toward the seated victim. This chain of events
could not possibly serve as the basis for a self-defense claim by defendant;
otherwise, every time a victim responded in self-defense, the aggressor could
then claim self-defense and fire.
¶ 66 In addition, Redic's and Nash's affidavits contradict defendant's trial
testimony in a crucial respect. Both Redic and Nash swore that defendant
"stepped back" from the victim's vehicle and then fired the first shot. By
contrast, defendant testified that he reached his gun inside the vehicle to fire the
first shots, in order to shoot at what the victim was reaching for. Defendant
argues that it was this act, of reaching inside the vehicle, that resulted in his gun
being caught by the window frame when the vehicle moved forward and that
caused his gun to accidentally discharge multiple times. Defendant testified
that, when the victim "pressed on the gas pedal, *** my hand was still in the car
shooting at what I seen him reaching at ***. As he took off, the frame hit the
gun and the gun went off." However, if defendant "stepped back" as both Redic
and Nash swore under penalty of perjury, then defendant's hand was not inside
the vehicle and was not caught by the window frame.
¶ 67 Since defendant's proposed witnesses contradict his trial testimony in key
respects, we agree with the trial court that the proffered evidence was not of
26
No. 1-13-0535
such a conclusive character that it would probably change the result at trial.
Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333-34.
¶ 68 IV. Strickland and Ineffectiveness of Counsel
¶ 69 On this appeal, defendant also claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective.
¶ 70 Every Illinois defendant has a constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. Claims of
ineffective assistance are judged against the standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 (citing
People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984) (adopting Strickland for
Illinois)). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must
show both: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that this
deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
¶ 71 To establish the first prong, that counsel's performance was deficient, a
defendant must show "that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable
under prevailing professional norms." Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. To
establish the second prong, that this deficient performance prejudiced the
27
No. 1-13-0535
defendant, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694). "[A] reasonable probability that the result would have been different is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome – or put another
way, that counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial
unreliable or fundamentally unfair." People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220
(2004); People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 135 (2007).
¶ 72 Although the Strickland test is a two-prong test, our analysis may
proceed in any order. Since a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the
Strickland test in order to prevail, a trial court may dismiss the claim if either
prong is missing. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 283 (1992). Thus, if a court
finds that defendant was not prejudiced by the alleged error, it may dismiss on
that basis alone without further analysis. People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476
(2003); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 527 (1984).
¶ 73 V. Jury Instruction
¶ 74 Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: (1)
by allegedly failing to offer a jury instruction; and (2) by allegedly failing to
investigate or call a witness.
28
No. 1-13-0535
¶ 75 Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction. As a preliminary matter,
it is not clear whether defendant waived this issue by failing to obtain a ruling
on this particular claim from the trial court which considered his petition during
the second-stage proceedings. However, even if the claim was not waived, it
would not succeed. Since the prior appellate court which considered
defendant's petition after its first-stage dismissal never reached this claim
(Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 7), there is no law of the case with
respect to this claim.
¶ 76 It is well established in Illinois that a counsel's choice of jury
instructions, and the decision to rely on one theory of defense to the exclusion
of another, is a matter of trial strategy. People v. Falco, 2014 IL App (1st)
111797, ¶ 16; People v. Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3d 231, 267 (2007). Our supreme
court has stated: "Such decisions enjoy a strong presumption that they reflect
sound trial strategy, rather than incompetence," and therefore are "generally
immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." People v. Enis, 194
Ill. 2d 361, 378 (2000).
¶ 77 Nonetheless, the failure to request a particular jury instruction may still
be grounds for finding ineffective assistance of counsel, if the instruction was
so critical to the defense that its omission denied the accused the right to a fair
29
No. 1-13-0535
trial. Falco, 2014 IL App (1st) 111797, ¶ 16; People v. Johnson, 385 Ill. App.
3d 585, 599 (2008) (citing People v. Pegram, 124 Ill. 2d 166, 174 (1988)).
¶ 78 In addition, the State concedes in its appellate brief that defendant is
correct that the decision whether to request an instruction on a lesser included
offense is one for the defendant to make. People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224,
229-30 (1994). Defendant submitted an affidavit in which he states that he
asked his counsel to request an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
¶ 79 Defendant argues that, although his counsel asked for and received both a
self-defense instruction and a second-degree murder instruction based on
unreasonable-belief self-defense, counsel's performance fell below that of a
reasonably competent attorney because counsel failed to also request an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
¶ 80 However, a court may give an involuntary murder instruction only if the
instruction is supported "by some credible evidence in the record that would
reduce the crime of first-degree murder to involuntary manslaughter." People
v. Sipp, 378 Ill. App. 3d 157, 163 (2007). "[A] manslaughter instruction should
not be given where the evidence shows that the homicide was murder, not
manslaughter." Sipp, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 163. " '[A] defendant is not entitled to
reduce first degree murder to [involuntary manslaughter] by a hidden mental
state known only to him and unsupported by the facts.' " People v. Sipp, 378 Ill.
30
 No. 1-13-0535
App. 3d 157, 164 (2007) (quoting People v. Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d 605, 614
(2007)).
¶ 81 The Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) defines involuntary manslaughter,
in relevant part, as:
"A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful
justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful
or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or
great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly
***." 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2002).
¶ 82 "Recklessness" is defined as follows in the Code:
"A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result
will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a
reasonable person would exercise in the situation. An act performed
recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using
the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning." 720
ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2002).
¶ 83 "Illinois courts have consistently held that when the defendant intends to
fire a gun, points it in the general direction of his or her intended victim, and
31
No. 1-13-0535
shoots, such conduct is not merely reckless and does not warrant an
involuntary-manslaughter instruction, regardless of the defendant's assertion
that he or she did not intend to kill anyone." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
People v. Sipp, 378 Ill. App. 3d 157, 164 (2007).
¶ 84 Here, defendant testified at trial: that he fired two shots inside the
victim's vehicle in an attempt to shoot something that the victim was trying to
retrieve; that, after firing these two shots, defendant's hand was inside the
window of the victim's vehicle; and that, when the victim's vehicle moved
forward, the frame in between the driver's window and the back passenger seat
hit defendant's gun which then discharged several times.
¶ 85 However, defendant's testimony was contradicted by the physical
evidence at trial. At least five bullet casings were found outside the vehicle and
on the street, and the casings were all fired from defendant's gun. Police found
bullet holes in the driver's side of the vehicle where the victim was sitting. If
defendant's gun had discharged inside the vehicle, then there would be no bullet
holes in the door or cartridge cases on the street. In addition, the back window
behind the driver's seat was shot out. Although the medical examiner made no
determination about which bullet was the fatal one and concluded only that the
victim died of multiple gunshot wounds, the examiner specifically determined
that there was no evidence of close-range firing when he examined the bullet
32
No. 1-13-0535
wound on the victim's upper back and that this bullet struck the victim's
pulmonary artery and lungs, causing massive bleeding. If defendant's hand
was caught by the frame of the driver's window, then this would have been in
close range to the driver.
¶ 86 In response, defendant argues in his brief that the fact that defendant's
"hand was hit by the window frame when the car moved indicates that it was
almost outside the car" and thereby explains the lack of close-range firing. This
makes no sense. For defendant's hand to be hit by the window frame as the
vehicle moved forward, the hand would have to be inside the driver's window
and very close to the driver. Defendant further argues "that the car moved,
which would mean that his hand would have been outside the car for the
subsequent shots that hit the car's exterior" and which thereby explains why the
shots hit the vehicle's exterior and the cartridges were found outside the vehicle.
However, if defendant's hand was outside the vehicle for the subsequent shots,
then the vehicle's movement could not have been causing the gun to
accidentally discharge, thereby contradicting defendant's claim of accidental
and reckless discharge.
¶ 87 Since the record lacked credible evidence supporting defendant's claim of
merely reckless conduct, defendant suffered no prejudice from trial counsel's
alleged failure to request an involuntary manslaughter instruction. To establish
33
No. 1-13-0535
the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36.
Since the record lacks credible supporting evidence, there is not a reasonable
probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Since we
conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the alleged error, we may
dismiss on that basis alone without further analysis. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d at 476;
Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 527.
¶ 88 However, we find, in addition, that counsel's performance did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness "under prevailing professional
norms." Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. For example, in People v.
Shamlodhiya, 2013 IL App (2d) 120065, the appellate court held that a trial
counsel's decision to focus on self-defense instead of involuntary manslaughter
during closing argument did not render his performance ineffective. In
Shamodhiya, counsel argued in closing that he considered involuntary
manslaughter to be " 'a compromised verdict,' " and he did " '[not] want a
compromised verdict,' " because this was solely " 'a case of self defense.' "
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shamlodhiya, 2013 IL App (2d) 120065, ¶
6. In Shamlodhiya, the appellate court found that "[c]ounsel credibly
explained" why he did not argue for involuntary manslaughter in the alternative.
34
No. 1-13-0535
Shamlodhiya, 2013 IL App (2d) 120065, ¶ 22. Counsel explained "that arguing
for involuntary manslaughter would have undermined the credibility of his
attempt to secure an acquittal based on self-defense, which *** would have
been the best possible result for defendant." Shamlodhiya, 2013 IL App (2d)
120065, ¶ 22. The Shamlodhiya case does differ from our case because, in
Shamlodhiya, the appellate court found that the involuntary manslaughter
instruction was still before the jury (Shamlodhiya, 2013 IL App (2d) 120065, ¶
23), whereas in our case counsel took this same strategy one step further and
chose not to ask for the instruction at all.
¶ 89 However, this decision, to not request the instruction at all, does not
make the decision less of a strategy decision; and reasonable strategy decisions,
even if ultimately unsuccessful, do not make an attorney's performance fall
below prevailing norms. People v. Odie, 151 Ill. 2d 168, 172-74 (1992) (a
defense strategy is not constitutionally defective if unsuccessful); People v.
Chapman, 262 Ill. App. 3d 439, 451 (1992) ("the fact that a defense tactic was
unsuccessful does not retrospectively demonstrate incompetence").
¶ 90 Thus, even if defendant did not waive his claim of ineffectiveness based
on the failure to request an involuntary manslaughter instruction, we would not
find it persuasive, because it does not satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.
35
No. 1-13-0535
¶ 91 VI. Failure to Investigate
¶ 92 Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate and call a witness, Thomas Ratliff, who swore that he observed a
silver gun on the floor of the victim's vehicle. "The law-of-the-case doctrine
prohibits the reconsideration of issues that have been decided by a reviewing
court in a prior appeal" (In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 363 (2005)), and
thus it is the law of the case, based on the record then before the appellate court,
that it was "at least 'arguable' that evidence of a gun in the victim's car could
have changed the outcome." Minniefield, No. 1-08-0649, slip op. at 7.
However, there are differences between the case that was before the prior panel
and the case that is before us. First, the burden of proof on defendant is
different. At the first stage, all he had to show was that his claim was not
frivolous. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2012); Domagala, 2013 IL 113688,
¶ 32. By contrast, at the second stage, the burden is on defendant to make a
"substantial showing of a constitutional violation." Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246.
¶ 93 Second, the record before us includes documents that were not before the
prior panel, namely, Redic and Nash's affidavits and Ratliff's second affidavit,
and we may consider those in addition. In conducting a second-stage review,
we must consider both "the petition and any accompanying documentation"
(Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33), and "[w]e may affirm the dismissal of a
36
No. 1-13-0535
postconviction petition on any basis supported by the record" (People v. Rivera,
2014 IL App (2d) 120884, ¶ 8). Thus, the record before the prior panel is not
the same as the record before us.
¶ 94 The record contains two handwritten "Affidavit[s]" signed by "Thomas
Ratliff." The first, which was submitted by defendant with his pro se petition,
is undated; and the second, which was submitted by counsel on April 25, 2012,
is dated September 6, 2007. Although the two documents relate substantially
the same information, they are not the same, since the first has more detail than
the second.
¶ 95 The first undated "Affidavit" states that defense counsel obtained Ratliff's
information and "said he was going to call me before trial but never did so?" In
this first document, Ratliff wrote a question mark which does not appear in the
second document. It is unclear whether this first question mark means that
Ratliff was unsure of this fact.
¶ 96 In the first "Affidavit," Ratliff states that he heard gunfire and observed
the murder victim in a vehicle which had crashed into another vehicle. Ratliff
observed that a female passenger "was shot" but his affidavit does not state that
the murder victim was shot. Ratliff then relates that "one of the guys by the
car" removed a silver gun off the front passenger-seat floor before the police
arrived.
37
No. 1-13-0535
¶ 97 By contrast, the second affidavit makes no reference to the murder victim
and describes the crashed vehicle by its color rather than as the victim's vehicle.
Without any reference to the victim, the second affidavit, if read by itself, could
be describing any "tan or brown car" that "crashed into another car" near 44th
Place on December 17, 2002. Unlike the first affidavit, the second affidavit
does not mention that a female passenger had been shot. The second affidavit
also does not mention a "guy[] by the car." Instead it states that Ratliff "saw
three guys *** in the tan car while one of the guys took a silver looking gun off
the front passenger floor."
¶ 98 Defendant has not made a substantial showing that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's alleged failure to call Ratliff, the result of his
trial would have been different (Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)) where, as we explained above, defendant's
testimony was contradicted by the physical evidence at trial. Supra, ¶ 85. In
addition, defendant's own proposed witnesses also contradict his version of
events. Supra, ¶¶ 66-67.
¶ 99 CONCLUSION
¶ 100 For the foregoing reasons, and after a de novo review, we affirm the trial
court's second-stage dismissal of defendant's pro se postconviction petition as
supplemented by counsel. We do not find persuasive defendant's claims: (1)
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No. 1-13-0535
that he has made a substantial showing that he acted in self-defense and thus is
actually innocent; or (2) that his counsel was ineffective (a) for failing to ask for
an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction or (b) for failing to investigate or
call occurrence witnesses.
¶ 101 Affirmed.
39