In Re: S.E.-R., a Minor Appeal of: B v. Mother ( 2015 )

J-A02024-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.E.-R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: B.V., MOTHER
No. 2413 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered July 17, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000287-2013
CP-51-DP-0123503-2009
FID: 51-FN-471006-2009
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED JANUARY 30, 2015
B.V. (“Mother”) appeals the July 17, 2014 order that involuntarily
terminated her parental rights to her daughter, S.E.-R. (“Child”), born in
June 2008. After review, we affirm.
The trial court, per the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko, J., summarized
the procedural history of this case and made the following findings of fact:
On August 25, 2009, [Child] was admitted to St. Christopher’s
Hospital for Children due to feeding aversion, gastroenteritis,
and failure to thrive. [Child] was discharged from the hospital
on September 17, 2009.
On December 1, 2009, the Department of Human Services
(“DHS”) received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) Report
stating that [Child] had a significant history of failure to thrive
and had been hospitalized at least 12 times. [Child’s] medical
team was unable to determine the cause of her failure to thrive.
The report further stated that on December 1, 2009, Mother was
contacted regarding [Child’s] tolerance for food and her speech
was slurred. Mother at the time was manic, quoting Bible
verses, and read letters from previous doctors. According to the
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report, there were concerns regarding Mother’s mental stability
and her ability to properly care for [Child]. It was determined
that [Child’s] condition worsened due to Mother’s lack of care.
On December 7, 2009, DHS met with Mother at her home, where
she informed DHS that her speech was slurred and she was
manic because a family member died. Mother has a history of
using drugs and alcohol.
On December 14, 2009, [Child] was admitted to St.
Christopher’s Hospital for Children. [Child] began to gain weight
while hospitalized and was discharged to Mother’s care. Mother
failed to keep follow[-]up medical appointments.
On December 22, 2009, DHS obtained an Order of Protective
Custody (“OPC”) for [Child.] DHS placed [Child] in a medical
foster home. Mother was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit
(“CEU”) for a dual diagnosis assessment and screen.
At the shelter care hearing on December 24, 2009, the OPC was
lifted and the temporary commitment to DHS was ordered to
stand.
At the adjudicatory hearing on December 29, 2009, held before
the Honorable Flora Barth Wolf, the temporary commitment to
DHS was ordered to stand. The court deferred adjudication with
DHS supervision. The court referred Mother to CEU for a dual
diagnosis assessment and a forthwith drug and alcohol screen.
The [court] further ordered weekly two[-]hour supervised visits
at the agency, which could be modified by agreement of the
parties.
The initial Family Service Plan (“FSP”) Meeting was held on
January 4, 2010, at which time the goal for [Child] was
reunification. The FSP objectives for Mother were stated as: 1)
to participate in a dual diagnosis assessment and comply with all
treatment recommendations; 2) to participate in drug and
alcohol screening; 3) attend parenting classes; 4) keep all visits
and maintain regular contact with [Child]; 5) participate in
[Child’s] medical appointments; and 6) to avoid interfering with
the provision of medical supplies to [Child’s] foster parents.
Mother participated in the meeting.
On June 8, 2010, DHS held an FSP meeting, and the goal for
[Child] remained reunification. The FSP objectives remained the
same. Mother participated in the FSP meeting.
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At the adjudicatory hearing on June 29, 2010, held before the
Honorable Flora Barth Wolf, the temporary commitment to DHS
was discharged, and [Child] was adjudicated dependent and
committed to DHS.
At the permanency review hearing on October 21, 2010 held
before the Honorable Flora Barth Wolf, the court ordered Mother
be referred to CEU for a dual diagnosis assessment and urine
drug screens. The court also ordered Mother to submit to three
drug screens prior to the next court hearing and to comply with
recommended drug and alcohol and mental health services.
In February 2011, [Child] was reunified with Mother and court
supervision was terminated.
On May 12, 2011, Mother received a comprehensive
biopsychosocial evaluation though Intercommunity Action, Inc.
Mother was diagnosed with cocaine dependence, mood disorder
NOS, post[-]traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, and
generalized anxiety disorder. Mother admitted to using alcohol
and cocaine and reported that she was receiving inpatient
substance abuse treatment at least three times in the past five
years.
On June 4, 2011, [Child] was admitted to Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia (“CHOP”) for feeding intolerance and constipation.
[Child] gained weight and thrived while hospitalized.
On June 13, 2011, DHS received a Child Protective Services
report providing that Mother stated that [Child] had been
vomiting for the past one to two weeks and refusing to be fed by
mouth. The report further stated that [Child] did not vomit while
in the presence of staff at CHOP, and that there was no medical
reason for [Child’s] vomiting. In addition, it was reported that
Mother failed to attend an intensive feeding program offered by
CHOP and that she missed nine appointments for [Child] to be
seen at the CHOP Care network.
DHS obtained an OPC on June 15, 2011 for [Child.]
On June 28, 2011, DHS held an FSP meeting, and the goal for
[Child] was reunification. The FSP objectives for Mother were
stated as: 1) to attend a psychiatric evaluation and comply with
recommendations; 2) to complete a parenting capacity
evaluation; 3) to meet with a therapist on a regular basis; 4) to
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comply with previously developed FSP objectives; and 5) to
meet regularly with [Child’s] agency social worker.
At the adjudicatory hearing on August 29, 2011, held before the
Honorable Donna M. Woelpper, the court ordered Mother to have
supervised visitation, and to have a forthwith drug screen, drug
and alcohol assessment and monitoring by CEU.
At the adjudicatory hearing on September 16, 2011, held before
the Honorable Donna [M.] Woelpper, the temporary commitment
to DHS was discharged, and [Child] was adjudicated dependent
and reunified with Mother. In-home protective services were
implemented in Mother’s home to monitor [Child’s] safety. The
court further ordered Mother to continue with the mental health
treatment plan, comply with feeding programs at CHOP, comply
with all evaluations and appointments, and complete all FSP
objectives.
At the permanency review hearing on November 1, 2011, held
before the Honorable Donna M. Woelpper, the court referred
Mother to BHS for psychiatric evaluation and any other
necessary psychological evaluations.
On November 21, 2011, DHS held a FSP meeting, and the goal
for [Child] remained reunification. The FSP objectives for Mother
[were] stated as: 1) to attend a mental health evaluation and
comply with recommendations; 2) to meet with a therapist on a
regular basis; 3) to provide [Child] with nutritious meals; and 4)
to comply with previously developed FSP objectives. Mother
participated in the meeting.
On December 21, 2011, the case aide responsible for
transporting [Child] to medical day care at Lauren’s House
reported that Mother had a bleeding cut on her face that she
wiped off while talking to her.
On January 5, 2012, the case aide reported that Mother
appeared to be under the influence, slurred her words, and kept
repeating herself.
On January 11, 2012, pursuant to DHS’s emergency relist
request, the case was held before the Honorable Donna M.
Woelpper. The court ordered Mother to produce a urine drug
screen. The court further ordered that DHS place [Child] if
Mother did not ensure she attended medical day care daily at
Lauren’s House, or if her urine screen was positive. The court
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also ordered Mother to have three random drug screens prior to
the next court hearing, and to comply with [Child’s] feeding
clinic.
At the permanency review hearing on March 26, 2012 held
before the Honorable Edward C. Wright, the court removed
[Child] from Mother’s care. In addition, the CHOP feeding
program reported Mother missed 23 of 48 mandatory meals with
[Child].
On May 17, 2012, DHS requested Mother submit a urine drug
screen within one day. Mother submitted a urine screen on May
25, 2012.
On May 24, 2012, Mother was referred to the Achieving
Reunification Center.
On June 4, 2012, Mother tested positive for cocaine.
On June 22, 2012, Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from
her drug treatment program at Interac.
On October 2, 2012, Mother appeared under the influence of
drugs at DHS.
On November 9, 2012, Mother tested positive for drugs.
At the permanency review hearing on December 20, 2012, held
before the Honorable James Murray Lynn, the court referred
Mother to CEU for monitoring and 12 random screens prior to
the next court hearing. The court ordered Mother to have
supervised visits at the agency for one hour, and that if she
misse[d] one visit, visits [would] be decreased to bi-weekly for
one hour, and to be suspended if she misse[d] two visits.
Mother reported to CEU in March 2013 to produce a screen on a
date of her own choosing. She did not submit to three random
screens.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 9/15/2014, at 2-11 (citations to record
omitted; modifications to capitalization).
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On May 9, 2013, DHS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental
rights.1 The trial court (per Judge Tereshko) held hearings on the petition
on November 21, 2013 and February 19, 2014. On July 17, 2014, the trial
court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Also on July 17, 2014, the trial court
changed Child’s goal from reunification with Mother to adoption.
On August 15, 2014, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On September 15, 2014, the trial court filed its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Mother raises four issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental
rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), where the evidence
showed that [Mother] substantially complied with the Family
Service Plan goals established by the Department of Human
Services of the City of Philadelphia (DHS), and further that
DHS failed to provide adequate services to assist [Mother] in
remedying the conditions that brought [Child] into care?
2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating [Mother’s] parental
rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) and (b), where [DHS]
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
involuntar[ily] terminating [Mother’s] parental rights would
best serve the emotional needs and welfare of [Child]?
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1
DHS also petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the unknown
father. The trial court’s July 17, 2014 order terminated the unknown
father’s parental rights.
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3. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental
rights without fully considering the impact of termination of
the emotional needs and welfare of [Child]?
4. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of
discretion by changing the permanency goal of [Child] from
reunification to adoption where [DHS] failed to provide
sufficient evidence that such a goal change would be best
suited for [Child’s] needs and welfare?
Mother’s Brief as 2-3 (citations modified).
In her first three issues, Mother challenges the termination of her
parental rights. We address those issues together. Our scope and standard
of review for the termination of parental rights are as follows:
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our
scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Further, we have stated:
Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by competent
evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even
though the record could support an opposite result.
We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have
adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not
evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible
evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of
the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
Though we are not bound by the trial court’s inferences and
deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve
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errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial
court’s sustainable findings.
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
Mother’s rights were terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In pertinent part, these statutory
provisions provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the
parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable
period of time and termination of the parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
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an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date
of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need
only agree that grounds to do so have been established pursuant to any one
subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, although the trial court found grounds
to terminate pursuant to multiple subsections, we will only address section
(a)(8). In doing so, we must consider that:
In a proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights, the
burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to
establish by “clear and convincing” evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so. The standard of “clear and convincing”
evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty,
and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.
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In re Adoption of Dale A., II, 683 A.2d 297, 299 (Pa. Super. 1996)
(citations omitted).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1)
the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or
more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child. Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time
frame for a parent to remedy the conditions that led to the
[child’s] removal by the court. Once the 12-month period has
been established, the court must next determine whether the
conditions that led to the child’s removal continue to exist,
despite the reasonable good faith efforts of [the child welfare
agency] supplied over a realistic time period. Termination under
Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a
parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions
that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of
[the child welfare agency’s] services.
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (some citations
omitted).
Mother argues that she has stopped her drug use, offering evidence in
the form of clean drug screens. Mother contends that the evidence did not
support the trial court’s conclusion that she did not comply with the drug
screening requirements. Mother also argues that she was compliant with
her mental health goals and that she, in fact, attended outpatient therapy.
Mother asserts that she “substantially complied with her visitation plan” and
attended fifty-five out of seventy-four visits between March 2012 and
November 2013. Further, Mother argues that Child does not suffer from the
same medical issues that led to the dependency and, therefore, there is no
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evidence that Mother could not care for Child. Finally, Mother argues that
the record did not support the conclusion that Mother and Child do not share
a strong bond. Rather, Mother asserts that the evidence demonstrated that
Mother and Child share a bond and a loving relationship. Mother’s Brief at
11-19, 21-26.
There is no question that Child had been out of Mother’s care for more
than twelve months prior to the hearing. Further, in assessing Mother’s
conduct, the trial court could not consider any post-petition conduct. 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Therefore, like the trial court, we may not consider
Mother’s conduct after May 9, 2013.2 The trial court found that Mother had
failed to comply with her drug and alcohol treatment, had failed to comply
with random drug screens, had failed to attend Child’s medical
appointments, and had failed to comply with her mental health treatment.
T.C.O. at 13. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the conditions that
led to Child’s placement had not been remedied. Id. at 14. Our review of
the record finds that there is sufficient evidence to support those findings
and conclusions.
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2
Most of the progress that Mother relied upon in her brief occurred after
the petition was filed. See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 11/21/2013, at 63-
64 (citing November 21, 2013 report that Mother was complying with mental
health treatment and had a clean urine screen); N.T., 2/19/2014, at 14
(discussing negative drug screens).
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Cathy Rosber, the current DHS social worker, testified that, when she
was assigned the case in November 2011, Child was living with Mother.
Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 11/21/2013, at 6. A safety plan was in place
that required Child to attend a medical day care and a feeding program
without any absences. Id. at 7. However, Child had absences from both
programs. The bus drivers reported that, on various occasions, Mother was
erratic, had slurred speech, and cursed at the bus drivers. Id. at 8-9.
Although Mother sometimes took Child to the CHOP feeding clinic, Mother
and Child missed half of the appointments and Mother missed the parenting
training provided. Id. at 56. Mother had been discharged from her drug
and alcohol treatment due to non-compliance with the program. Id. at 16.
Ms. Rosber testified that Mother never completed her FSP goals and
objectives. Id. at 18. Mother did not participate in all of the random
screens ordered by the court. Often she was difficult to reach for screens
because her phone number kept changing or messages could not be left on
her phone. Id. at 34-37. Ms. Rosber opined that there was no reasonable
prospect that Child would be reunited with Mother at that point due to
Mother’s “non-compliance with the [drug and alcohol] program or inability to
remain in contact with DHS and comply with the order for the random
screens.” Id. at 39. Ms. Rosber admitted that Mother had attended some
visits with Child. Id. at 38. Between March 2012 and December 2012,
Mother attended twenty-four of thirty-seven visits, and December 2012
through May 2013, Mother attended nine of twelve visits. Id. at 86-87.
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Karen Wells, Mother’s therapist, testified that Mother’s attendance at
therapy was inconsistent. N.T., 2/19/2014, at 47. Although Mother’s drug
and alcohol treatment groups were scheduled every weekday, Mother only
attended one or two per week. Id. at 47-78. Mother was discharged in May
2013 without completing the drug and alcohol component of treatment. Id.
at 50. Mother was referred to a mental health treatment program that met
less often. Id. at 52. Thus, based upon this record, the trial court had
sufficient support for its conclusions that Mother had not met her FSP goals,
and that the conditions that led to placement continued to exist.
Next, we must review the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in
Child’s best interest. Both subsections (a)(8) and (b) require an analysis of
Child’s needs and best interest. However, the trial court must be satisfied
that termination serves a child’s needs pursuant to (a)(8) before engaging in
a best interest analysis pursuant to subsection (b). In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d
999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008). The trial court concluded that termination
was in Child’s best interest. T.C.O. at 17. From the record developed, and
as we have discussed above, we find no abuse of discretion.
Pursuant to subsection (b), the trial court must also consider whether
termination would best serve “the developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare of” Child. “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security,
and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the
child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation
omitted). The trial court also must consider the nature and status of the
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parent-child bond, particularly the effect upon the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id.
The court may prioritize the safety needs of the child. See In re
K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (affirming involuntary
termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where
placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A]
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her
child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the
child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential
in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847,
856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).
In making its decision, the trial court considered the following. Ms.
Rosber testified that Child is bonded with her foster family and foster
siblings. N.T., 11/21/2013, at 41. Anne Schloneker, the foster care agency
social worker, testified to the same effect. Id. at 80-81, 85. Child calls her
foster parents “Mom” and “Dad.” Id. at 41, 80-81. However, she also calls
Mother “Mommy.” N.T., 2/19/2014, at 108. At the time of the November
2013 hearing, Child had been in her foster placement for nineteen months.
N.T., 11/21/2013, at 41. Ms. Schloneker testified that the foster family
meets all of Child’s needs and that Child is healthy. Id. at 81-82. Child was
enrolled in kindergarten and was involved in extracurricular activities in the
foster family’s community. Id. at 42. Ms. Rosber opined that, because
Child considers herself part of the family, she would be harmed if removed
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from her foster family. Id. at 44. Ms. Schloneker concurred with Ms.
Rosber’s opinion. Id. at 82-83. Leslie Archer, a Child Advocate social
worker, also testified that she believed that Child would be harmed if she
were removed from the foster family because she had bonded with her
foster parents and the foster siblings in the home. Id. at 100-01.
Ms. Schloneker testified that, although Child’s visits with Mother go
well, Child usually has no trouble separating from Mother or going back to
her foster family. Id. at 84. Child is excited to return to her foster family
after visits with Mother. Id. at 85. Ms. Archer testified that Child is hesitant
with Mother during visits and is less comfortable with Mother than with her
foster family. Id. at 101-02.
Stephen Miksic, Ph.D., performed a parenting capacity and bonding
evaluation. N.T., 2/19/2014, at 58. Dr. Miskic opined that there was a
positive, but insecure, bond between Mother and Child. Id. at 64-65. Dr.
Miskic believed that Child had a strong bond with her foster family. Id. at
65-66. Dr. Miskic opined that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if
Mother’s rights were terminated. Id. at 69-70.
While there was evidence that Mother and Child had a bond, and that
Child would miss Mother should the visits end, the trial court is free to
believe all, some, or none of that evidence and to give that evidence the
weight that the trial court believes that it deserves. See In re M.G., supra.
Based upon the record, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s conclusions that termination was in Child’s best interest.
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Finally, Mother argues that the trial court erred in changing Child’s
goal from reunification to adoption. Mother contends that the goal must be
in Child’s best interest and argues that adoption is not in Child’s best
interest, because Child will be adversely affected by the termination of a
beneficial relationship between Mother and Child. Mother’s Brief at 26-27.
At each permanency hearing, the trial court must consider, among
other things, whether the current placement goal for the child is still
appropriate. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). In making that determination, the trial
court must consider the following:
In a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child,
and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court,
and the parent’s rights are secondary. The burden is on [DHS]
to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s best interests.
In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1173 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).
[T]he focus of all dependency proceedings, including change of
goal proceedings, must be on the safety, permanency, and well-
being of the child. The best interests of the child take
precedence over all other considerations, including the conduct
and the rights of the parent. . . . [W]hile parental progress
toward completion of a permanency plan is an important factor,
it is not to be elevated to determinative status, to the exclusion
of all other factors.
In re M.T., 101 A.3d at 1175 (citation omitted; modifications in original).
Here, as discussed above, although there was evidence of a bond
between Mother and Child, the evidence also indicated that Child’s primary
bond was with her foster family. Thus, there was ample evidence from
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which the trial court could conclude that adoption was in Child’s best
interest. We find no abuse of discretion in the goal change.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/30/2015
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