Willie Curvin v. Carolyn Colvin , 778 F.3d 645 ( 2015 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 13-3622
    WILLIE MAE CURVIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    CAROLYN COLVIN, ACTING
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 13-CV-00123— J. P. Stadtmueller, Judge.
    ARGUED OCTOBER 2, 2014 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 11, 2015
    Before FLAUM, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
    MANION, Circuit Judge. Willie Mae Curvin applied for
    disability insurance benefits. Her claim was denied initially,
    upon reconsideration, and after a hearing before an administra-
    tive law judge (“ALJ”). The district court held that the ALJ
    erred in denying Curvin benefits and vacated and remanded
    the decision. We conclude that the ALJ properly applied our
    precedent as well as the agency rules and regulations. Because
    2                                                   No. 13-3622
    the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, we
    reverse the judgment of the district court.
    I. Background
    In March 2010, Curvin applied for disability benefits under
    Title II of the Social Security Act, 
    42 U.S.C. § 401
    , et seq. She
    alleges she became disabled beginning in January 2009 from
    glaucoma, overactive thyroid, high blood pressure, difficulty
    sleeping, and knee pain. The ALJ held a hearing in August
    2011 at which Curvin appeared, represented by an attorney.
    The ALJ denied her claim by a written decision issued in
    October 2011.
    After applying the five-step sequential evaluation process
    mandated by the Social Security Administration, the ALJ
    determined that she was not disabled and denied her claim. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    (a). At step 1, the ALJ found that Curvin had
    not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged
    onset of her disability. At step 2, the ALJ determined that
    Curvin’s glaucoma in her right eye was a severe impairment,
    and that the objective medical evidence showed that her
    remaining impairments were not severe. At step 3, based on
    the conclusions of Curvin’s treating and examining physicians
    and the objective medical evidence, he found that Curvin did
    not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
    met the severity of a listed impairment. The ALJ then deter-
    mined that Curvin had a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
    to perform a full range of work at all exertion levels, but with
    a nonexertional limitation of no peripheral vision on her right
    side due to her glaucoma. The ALJ considered all the objective
    medical evidence, Curvin’s statements regarding her abilities
    No. 13-3622                                                         3
    and disabilities, the opinions of two treating physicians, and
    the determinations of state agency examining physicians. He
    found that although Curvin’s medically determinable impair-
    ments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged
    symptoms, her allegations regarding the intensity, persistence,
    and limiting effects of her symptoms were not credible. The
    ALJ gave great weight to Curvin’s treating ophthalmologist’s
    assessment that her only work-related limitation was a loss of
    peripheral vision in her right eye that prevented her from
    working around machinery. He found that her remaining
    impairments were either mild or controlled with medication
    and therefore non-severe. Finally, at step 4, the ALJ found that
    Curvin had the RFC to perform her past work as a personal
    care worker, which was a medium exertional job. Thus, the ALJ
    found that Curvin was not disabled at step 4. Although not
    required at this point, the ALJ made an alternative finding at
    step 5 of no disability. Specifically, given her age, education,
    work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Curvin could
    perform other jobs at the medium exertion level then-existing
    in the national economy.
    The district court vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded
    the case after concluding that the ALJ committed error at step
    2 and step 3 of the process. The district court held that the ALJ
    neglected to determine Curvin’s credibility and discuss her
    symptoms1 at step 2 even though he found her right-eye
    glaucoma to be a severe impairment on the basis of the
    objective medical evidence alone. According to the district
    court, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–7p and SSR 96–3p
    1
    The regulations define symptoms as an individual’s own description of
    his physical or mental impairment. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1528
    (a).
    4                                                         No. 13-3622
    required the ALJ to determine Curvin’s credibility at step 2 so
    that he could consider Curvin’s symptoms when deciding
    whether her remaining impairments were severe or not. The
    district court then decided that the ALJ should have provided
    more detail at step 3 to show that he took into account all of
    Curvin’s impairments. Finally, the district court concluded that
    the ALJ should have specifically determined at step 3 that
    Curvin had a “missing or deficient sign or laboratory finding”2
    according to 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1529
    (d)(3). The district court
    believed the ALJ needed this finding to “build an ‘accurate and
    logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion’” that
    Curvin’s symptoms need not be considered at step 3. McKinzey
    v. Astrue, 
    641 F.3d 884
    , 889 (7th Cir. 2011). The district court
    concluded that either of the ALJ’s errors at step 2 or step 3
    were sufficient to warrant reversal. The Commissioner appeals.
    II. Discussion
    We review a district court’s ruling on a social security
    disability determination de novo; we review the administrative
    law judge’s decision for substantial evidence. Shideler v. Astrue,
    
    688 F.3d 306
    , 310 (7th Cir. 2012). We “reverse an ALJ’s determi-
    nation only where it is not supported by substantial evidence,
    which means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” McKinzey,
    
    641 F.3d at 889
     (quoting Skinner v. Astrue, 
    478 F.3d 836
    , 841 (7th
    Cir. 2007)). “The ALJ must adequately discuss the issues and
    must build an ‘accurate and logical bridge from the evidence
    2
    What is meant by “signs” and “laboratory findings” is objective medical
    evidence, i.e., observable abnormalities or phenomena shown by medically
    acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1528
    (b) & (c).
    No. 13-3622                                                                5
    to his conclusion.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart,
    
    336 F.3d 535
    , 539 (7th Cir. 2003)).
    A. Step 2
    Regarding step 2, “[a]s long as the ALJ determines that the
    claimant has one severe impairment, the ALJ will proceed to
    the remaining steps of the evaluation process. … Therefore, the
    step two determination of severity is ‘merely a threshold
    requirement.’” Castile v. Astrue, 
    617 F.3d 923
    , 926–27 (7th Cir.
    2010) (citation omitted; quoting Hickman v. Apfel, 
    187 F.3d 683
    ,
    688 (7th Cir. 1999)). See also Bowen v. Yuckert, 
    482 U.S. 137
    ,
    149–50 (1987) (disability insurance benefit payments require a
    “threshold showing of medical severity”). The ALJ correctly
    applied this rule. He found that Curvin had one severe
    impairment, viz., the glaucoma in her right eye, and proceeded
    to the remaining steps in the evaluation process.
    SSR 96–7p does not require an ALJ in every case to make a
    credibility determination at or before step 2.3 As the ruling
    3
    When taken out of context, the following passage of SSR 96–7p appears
    to always require a credibility determination at step 2:
    Once the [ALJ] has determined the extent to which the
    individual’s symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do
    basic work activities by making a finding on the credibility of
    the individual’s statements, the impact of the symptoms on
    the individual’s ability to function must be considered
    along with the objective medical and other evidence, first
    in determining whether the individual’s impairment or
    combination of impairments is “severe” at step 2 of the
    sequential evaluation process for determining disability
    and, as necessary, at each subsequent step of the process.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added). However, a full reading of the ruling reveals that this
    6                                                              No. 13-3622
    states, its purpose is to emphasize that an ALJ “must carefully
    consider the individual’s statements about symptoms … if a
    disability determination or decision that is fully favorable to
    the individual cannot be made solely on the basis of objective
    medical evidence.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added). A fully favorable
    decision can only be made at step 3 or step 5, the only steps at
    which a claimant can be found disabled. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    (a)(4)(iii) & (v). But to get to those steps, a claimant
    must pass through step 2. In Curvin’s case, the ALJ made as
    favorable a determination as can be made at Step 2—that
    Curvin met the threshold by having a severe impairment—on
    the basis of the objective medical evidence, so an evaluation of
    Curvin’s symptoms and the requisite credibility determination
    were not necessary at that step.
    Neither does SSR 96–3p always require a credibility
    determination at step 2.4 The rule requires a careful evaluation
    of symptoms when making “[a] determination that an
    passage only comes into effect “if a disability determination or decision that
    is fully favorable to the individual cannot be made solely on the basis of
    objective medical evidence.” 
    Id.
    4
    The relevant portion of SSR 96–3p is as follows:
    A determination that an individual’s impairment(s) is not
    severe requires a careful evaluation of the medical findings
    that describe the impairment(s) (i.e., the objective medical
    evidence and any impairment-related symptoms), and an
    informed judgment about the limitations and restrictions
    the impairment(s) and related symptom(s) impose on the
    individual’s physical and mental ability to do basic work
    activities.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    No. 13-3622                                                     7
    individual’s impairment(s) is not severe.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    In other words, if an individual’s impairment does not appear
    from the objective medical evidence to be severe, the ALJ must
    then consider the limitations and restrictions caused by the
    individual’s symptoms. If these additional considerations cause
    “more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to do
    basic work activities, the [ALJ] must find that the impair-
    ment(s) is severe and proceed to the next step in the process even
    if the objective medical evidence would not in itself establish
    that the impairment(s) is severe.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added). The
    consideration, therefore, of an individual’s symptoms at step
    2 is done in the context of step 2’s threshold nature. “Deciding
    whether impairments are severe at Step 2 is a threshold issue
    only; an ALJ must continue on to the remaining steps of the
    evaluation process as long as there exists even one severe
    impairment.” Arnett v. Astrue, 
    676 F.3d 586
    , 591 (7th Cir. 2012).
    Thus, the ALJ applied neither SSR 96–7p nor SSR 96–3p at
    step 2 because he need not do so. The objective medical
    evidence was enough to find Curvin’s glaucoma to be a severe
    impairment and allow her to cross Step 2’s threshold. The ALJ
    did not err at step 2 by finding that Curvin’s remaining
    impairments were not severe without first evaluating her
    symptoms and assessing her credibility. What is more, even if
    there were such an error at step 2, it would have been harmless
    because the ALJ properly considered all of Curvin’s severe and
    non-severe impairments, the objective medical evidence, her
    symptoms, and her credibility when determining her RFC
    immediately after step 3. So, “even if there were a mistake at
    Step 2, it does not matter.” Arnett, 
    676 F.3d at 591
    .
    8                                                     No. 13-3622
    B. Step 3
    The ALJ’s determination at step 3 that Curvin’s impair-
    ments did not equal the severity of a listed impairment, see 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    (a)(4)(iii), was limited to one paragraph. The
    ALJ noted that neither Curvin’s treating or examining physi-
    cian nor the objective medical evidence indicated that Curvin
    met the standard at step 3. Although the ALJ stated that he
    considered Curvin’s impairments under the appropriate
    listings, he did not specify which impairments he considered
    and did not specifically discuss the evidence.
    Nevertheless, as mentioned, the ALJ provided the discus-
    sion of Curvin’s severe and non-severe impairments, the
    objective medical evidence, and her credibility directly after
    step 3 when he determined her RFC. This discussion provides
    the necessary detail to review the ALJ’s step 3 determination in
    a meaningful way. We do not discount it simply because it
    appears elsewhere in the decision. To require the ALJ to repeat
    such a discussion throughout his decision would be redundant.
    See Rice v. Barnhart, 
    384 F.3d 363
    , 370 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004) (“it is
    proper to read the ALJ’s decision as a whole, and . . . it would
    be a needless formality to have the ALJ repeat substantially
    similar factual analyses at both steps three and five”); see also
    Orlando v. Heckler, 
    776 F.2d 209
    , 213 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e
    examine the [ALJ]’s opinion as a whole to ascertain whether he
    considered all of the relevant evidence, made the required
    determinations, and gave supporting reasons for his deci-
    sions.”). The ALJ’s discussion of Curvin’s RFC is similar in its
    level of detail to that done in Pepper v. Colvin, 
    712 F.3d 351
     (7th
    Cir. 2013), which discussion we concluded was “consistent
    No. 13-3622                                                      9
    with our repeated assertion that an ALJ’s adequate discussion
    of the issues need not contain a complete written evaluation of
    every piece of evidence.” 
    Id. at 362
     (quotations omitted). The
    ALJ’s discussion at step 3, when considered in light of his
    discussion of Curvin’s RFC, sufficiently met his “duty to
    articulate.” Scheck v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 697
    , 700 (7th Cir. 2004).
    To determine whether an individual is disabled at step 3, an
    ALJ must follow 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1529
    (d)(3), which describes
    how the agency decides whether the individual’s impairment
    or combination of impairments are medically equal in severity
    to an impairment on the list of pre-determined disabling
    impairments. The regulation explains that the agency will
    consider whether an individual’s symptoms and objective
    medical evidence are equal in severity to those of a listed
    impairment. It includes a caveat: “However, we will not
    substitute your allegations of pain or other symptoms for a
    missing or deficient sign or laboratory finding [i.e., objective
    medical evidence] to raise the severity of your impairment(s)
    to that of a listed impairment.” 
    Id.
     The ALJ did not explicitly
    find that Curvin was missing objective medical evidence before
    he excluded a discussion of her symptoms and concluded she
    was not disabled at step 3.
    The regulation, however, does not require such an explicit
    finding, and it was not necessary to “build an ‘accurate and
    logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.’” McKinzey,
    
    641 F.3d at 889
    . The regulation provides that an ALJ will not
    consider the individual’s own allegations if the medical
    evidence demonstrates a lack of severity. It is a straight
    prohibition against substituting an individual’s symptoms for
    objective medical evidence. Nowhere is there a requirement
    10                                                  No. 13-3622
    that the ALJ make a specific finding of missing or deficient
    medical evidence prior to concluding that he need not consider
    an individual’s allegations of pain or other symptoms. As we
    have said, an ALJ “need not provide a complete written
    evaluation of every piece of testimony and evidence.” Shideler,
    688 F.3d at 310. In sum, the ALJ did not err in making his Step
    3 determination.
    C. Credibility and RFC
    Finally, we address an issue not addressed by the district
    court, but raised by Curvin on appeal. She contends that the
    ALJ’s RFC and credibility determinations were legally insuffi-
    cient. As we stated previously, when determining Curvin’s
    RFC, the ALJ discussed her severe and non-severe impair-
    ments, the objective medical evidence, her symptoms, and her
    credibility. The ALJ’s discussion was similar in all pertinent
    respects to the RFC discussion in Pepper, which we found to be
    adequate. See Pepper, 712 F.3d at 362–67. Although the ALJ
    gave great weight to Curvin’s treating ophthalmologist’s
    assessment that her only work-related limitation was that she
    could not work around machinery, none of the opinions of her
    treating or examining physicians supported her claim for
    disability. This meant that her claim of disability rested mainly
    on her allegations concerning her symptoms, and thus her
    credibility. This makes her burden difficult. So long as an ALJ
    gives specific reasons supported by the record, we will not
    overturn his credibility determination unless it is patently
    wrong. Pepper, 712 F.3d at 367. “Credibility determinations can
    rarely be disturbed by a reviewing court, lacking as it does the
    opportunity to observe the claimant testifying.”Sims v.
    No. 13-3622                                                 11
    Barnhart, 
    442 F.3d 536
    , 538 (7th Cir. 2006). Here, the ALJ
    discussed various inconsistencies between Curvin’s alleged
    symptoms and the other evidence. For example, the eye exam
    performed by her treating physician did not support her
    allegations of vision loss in both eyes. Additionally, her
    testimony that her sleeping disorder prevented her from
    working was inconsistent with her testimony that she worked
    for many years with the disorder and that medication kept it
    under control. The ALJ’s credibility determination was not
    patently wrong, and he provided specific reasons supported by
    the record, so we will not overturn it. See Pepper, 712 F.3d at
    367.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court
    erred by not holding that the ALJ’s decision was supported by
    substantial evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the district
    court is REVERSED.