United States v. Samuel Mamudu , 591 F. App'x 222 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4596
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL G. MAMUDU,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:13-cr-00227-HEH-1)
Submitted: January 29, 2015 Decided: February 4, 2015
Before AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.
Platt, Appellate Attorney, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.
Boente, United States Attorney, Erik S. Siebert, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Samuel G. Mamudu appeals the 216-month upward variant
sentence imposed by the district court following a jury
conviction for interference with commerce by robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012), and brandishing a
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). On appeal, Mamudu contends that the
upward variant sentence is unreasonable. Finding no error, we
affirm.
We review sentences for reasonableness under an abuse
of discretion standard. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
576 (4th Cir. 2010); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46
(2007). “In reviewing a variant sentence, we consider whether
the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its
decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the
extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United
States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Mamudu first contends that the district court’s
decision to impose an upward variance is unreasonable. In
imposing a variance, the district court must adequately explain
its decision; that explanation “must be tied to the factors set
forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] and must be accompanied
by findings of fact as necessary.” United States v. Hernandez-
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Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 122-23 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
citation omitted). The court is not, however, required to
“explicitly discuss each factor on the record or robotically
tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United States v.
Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We discern no error in the district court’s
determination that an upward variance was warranted in this
case. The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors,
explained the basis for the upward variance, and clearly tied
the variance to several of the § 3553(a) factors. Thus, we
conclude that the district court’s decision to impose an upward
variance was reasonable.
Mamudu also contends that the extent of the district
court’s upward variance is unreasonable. Any sentence imposed
by the district court “must be sufficient, but not greater than
necessary,” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). “[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion
when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.
2011); see Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d at 105 (stating that “it was
well within the court’s discretion to accord more weight to the
host of aggravating factors”). This Court must “give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
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factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51.
We conclude that, given the broad discretion afforded
to the district court, the extent of the upward variance is
reasonable. Upon balancing several of the § 3553(a) factors,
the court found the extent of the variance to be adequate but
not greater than necessary to satisfy the § 3553(a) factors, and
we defer to that determination under the circumstances.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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