Com. v. Burgess, M. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
MARTEKE BURGESS, : No. 45 EDA 2014
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, December 13, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0003078-2012,
CP-51-CR-0003214-2011, CP-51-CR-0003215-2011
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND WECHT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2015
Following a jury trial, Marteke Burgess was convicted of criminal
conspiracy, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and multiple
violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. We affirm.
On January 7, 2011, at approximately 5:56 p.m., while standing on
the 3400 block of Helen Street, Anthony McGuigan was shot seven times in
the back, thigh, and stomach. (Notes of testimony, 10/9/13 at 30-32, 39.)
McGuigan was taken to Temple University Hospital where he was treated for
over a month, undergoing several surgeries including a colostomy. Nine
cartridge casings, fired from two separate guns, were recovered from the
scene.
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At approximately 1:00 p.m., on January 10, 2011, gunfire erupted on
the 800 block of East Allegheny Avenue. Stephen Ortiz looked down from
his seventh floor office window and saw two men shooting. (Notes of
testimony, 10/10/13 at 27-28, 30.) He described his office window as
“unusually big.” (Id. at 27.) Ortiz could see that each man had a gun. (Id.
at 32.) One of the men, who was dressed in black, held his right side and
began limping. Appellant, who was wearing a purple high school jacket with
gray sleeves, continued firing his weapon. (Id.)
Both men fled westbound; the man in black was limping. (Id. at
33-34.) The men turned into a vacant lot, and Ortiz lost sight of them. (Id.
at 34-35.) Ortiz ran outside and flagged down a patrol car; he pointed out
the man in the purple jacket who was at a nearby row home at 844 East
Hilton Street. (Id. at 36.) The police entered the house and found
co-defendant Brakeer Newsome lying on the floor bleeding. Upon arrest,
appellant and Newsome listed the house as their home address.
During this shooting, two bystanders suffered gunshot graze wounds:
67-year-old Ottis Holloway and 66-year-old Leon Daukas. Twenty fired
cartridge casings were recovered from the scene. A microscopic
examination showed an exact match between the majority of the casings
and the ballistics evidence from where McGuigan had been shot,
demonstrating that the same two firearms had been used in both crimes.
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Detective Sean Leahy interviewed McGuigan on March 9, 2011,
following his release from the hospital; McGuigan’s mother and stepfather
were in the room during the interview. (Notes of testimony, 10/11/13 at
18-22.) McGuigan stated that just before being shot, he had been
approached by “Brak” whom he identified as co-defendant Newsome. (Id.
at 23-24.) McGuigan explained that “my boys are beefing with Brak and his
people.” (Id. at 24.) “Brak” asked him, “Do you sell out here? . . . [W]ho
be selling out here?” (Id. at 23.) McGuigan responded, “not me” and
claimed he was then shot, but he did not know by whom. (Id.)
Two weeks later, on March 23, 2011, Detective Leahy returned to
McGuigan’s home and re-interviewed him. McGuigan said he had additional
information that he had not disclosed because he was afraid and “would
rather just deal with it.” (Id. at 36.) McGuigan revealed that “Brak” had
approached him along with “Lava” and “Dre”; “Brak” had a gun and “Lava
had one too.” (Id. at 34.) He averred that either “Brak” or “Lava” shot
him; he was not sure if “Lava” was the gunman but he thought that was the
case. (Id. at 35.) McGuigan was shown a photo array, pointed to appellant,
and stated it might be Lava, which he believed to be spelled “Lavae.” (Id.
at 34-35.) The detective subsequently located a different photograph of
appellant, which showed his right forearm; on it, the word “Lava” had been
tattooed. (Id. at 38.)
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Charges were filed against appellant and Newsome in connection with
both incidents. On May 23, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a motion to
consolidate the charges against appellant from the Helen Street shooting
with those arising from the Allegheny Avenue shooting.1 Following a
hearing, the motion was granted.
A joint jury trial commenced on October 9, 2013. McGuigan testified
as a hostile witness, claiming the detectives had obtained his statements by
hassling him and denying that appellant or Newsome had shot him. (Notes
of testimony, 10/9/13 at 34-35.) McGuigan verified that the person he had
pointed out to detectives on March 23, 2011, was “Lava” and that “Lava”
and appellant were one and the same. (Id. at 58-59.) Detective Leahy took
the stand to rebut allegations that the police had engaged in any
misconduct. The detective testified that McGuigan’s prior statements were
knowing and voluntary. (Notes of testimony, 10/11/13 at 13-38.)
The jury convicted appellant of criminal conspiracy in connection with
the shooting on Helen Street, two counts of aggravated assault, reckless
endangerment, and three firearms violations in connection with the
shootings of Holloway and Daukas on Allegheny Avenue. On December 13,
2013, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 27 to 54 years’
1
The corresponding charges against Newsome had been previously
consolidated.
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imprisonment.2 Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on December 17,
2013; the motion was denied on December 20, 2013. A timely notice of
appeal was filed on December 27, 2013. The trial court directed appellant to
file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A.; appellant did not timely
comply. The trial court did not file an opinion as the Honorable Kenneth J.
Powell, Jr., has since retired. On July 18, 2014, after this court issued a
briefing schedule, appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was filed.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did not the trial court err in granting the
Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate CP-51-
CR-0003078-2012 (Case 1 - January 7, 2011,
300 Helen Street) with CP-51-CR-0003214-15-
2011 (Case 2 - January 10, 2011, 800 East
Allegheny Avenue) where: (1) there were no
similarities between the cases other than that
matching fired shell cases were recovered from
each scene; (2) the evidence did not tend to
establish the identity of the perpetrator in each
case since no gun was ever recovered at either
scene and there were multiple shooters
involved in each case; (3) conflicting defenses
applied in each case; and (4) joinder resulted
in prejudicial cumulation of evidence?
2. Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter
of law to sustain Appellant’s conviction for
conspiracy to commit attempted murder
beyond a reasonable doubt on Case 1 (CP-51-
CR-0003078-2012) where there was no
evidence as to any agreement or overt act on
the part of Appellant as the complainant,
2
Newsome was also convicted of multiple charges in connection with both
shootings and was sentenced to 45½ to 91 years’ imprisonment.
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Anthony McGuigan, testified that Appellant was
not present on the night of the shooting, nor
did the complainant ever identify Appellant in
any prior statements, thus the Commonwealth
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant was the person referenced as
“Lavae?”
3. Was not the evidence insufficient as a matter
of law to sustain Appellant’s convictions on
Case 2 (CP-51-CR-0003214[-]15-2011) where
no witness identified Appellant by face, no
weapon was ever recovered, and the
cumulative evidence was insufficient to prove
Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
4. Did not the court err as a matter of law and
violate the discretionary aspects of sentencing
when it imposed a manifestly excessive and
unreasonable statutory maximum sentence of
27 to 54 years where: (1) the sentence was
well above the aggravated range of the
sentencing guidelines and was based on
inappropriate reasons; (2) Appellant was a
juvenile at the time the alleged crimes were
committed; (3) the trial court ignored all
mitigating evidence, focusing solely on
punishment and retribution; and (4) the trial
court concluded, based on no empirical
evidence, that Appellant could not be
rehabilitated?
Appellant’s brief at 4-5.
Preliminarily, we address appellant’s failure to file a timely
Rule 1925(b) statement. As mentioned, after appellant filed the notice of
appeal, the trial court ordered the filing of a statement within 21 days.
Appellant did not file an application for an enlargement of time for the filing
of the statement with the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2). Instead, on
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June 27, 2014, appellant filed a “motion to vacate briefing schedule and
remand to the court below to transmit a complete set of all notes of
testimony to be made part of the certified record.” Appellant then filed a
concise statement on July 18, 2014.
Appellant’s concise statement was untimely filed. Previously, this
would have resulted in waiver of appellant’s issues. Commonwealth v.
Castillo, 888 A.2d 775 (Pa. 2005). However, subsequent changes to
Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A., and recent case law allow us to
review the issues. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428
(Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc) (untimely concise statement amounts to
ineffective assistance of counsel per se and review of issues is permitted
similarly to outright failure to file concise statement under Rule 1925(c)(3)).
The first issue raised involves the joinder of two separate criminal
informations for trial.
Whether or not separate indictments should be
consolidated for trial is within the sole discretion of
the trial court and such discretion will be reversed
only for a manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice
and clear injustice to the defendant. Consolidation
of separate offenses in a single trial is proper if the
evidence of each of them would be admissible in a
separate trial for the others and is capable of
separation by the jury so that there is no danger of
confusion. Pa. R. Crim. P. 1127(A)(1) (now Pa. R.
Crim. P. 582(A)(1)(a)). Evidence of distinct crimes
is inadmissible solely to demonstrate a defendant’s
criminal tendencies. Such evidence is admissible,
however, to show a common plan, scheme or design
embracing commission of multiple crimes or to
establish the identity of the perpetrator, so long as
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proof of the crime tends to prove the others. This
will be true when there are shared similarities in the
details of each crime.
Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d 162, 168 (Pa.Super. 2006),
appeal denied, 926 A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
Appellant argues that matching weapons were the only link between
the two incidents. We disagree. As the trial court noted in granting the
Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate “[T]he incidents are three days
apart, they are in the similar geographic neighborhood, they have identical
ballistics and both defendants have been identified by witnesses in relation
to either of them.” (Notes of testimony, 6/15/12 at 10-11.)
In this case, evidence of the two crimes was so closely related that
proof of one criminal act tends to prove the other. The evidence of the two
criminal informations served to establish the identity of appellant. The
cartridge casings recovered from both crime scenes matched and
demonstrated that they were fired from the same weapon, and this evidence
was relevant to the identity of the shooters. We agree with the
Commonwealth that appellant’s emphasis on the fact that the weapons were
never recovered is of no moment. See Commonwealth v. Rollins, 580
A.2d 744 (Pa. 1990) (matching cartridges from weapon fired at different
times admissible to establish defendant’s identity although the gun was
never recovered). Moreover, appellant, “Lava,” was identified as the second
gunman in the Helen Street shooting, and he was also identified in the
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East Allegheny shooting as the man in the purple and gray jacket seen firing
a gun on Allegheny Avenue before fleeing with co-defendant to the home
they shared. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
consolidating the two matters. Commonwealth v. Reid, 626 A.2d 118 (Pa.
1993) (holding that evidence establishing the defendant used the same gun
to commit another murder six days later was admissible to identify him as
the perpetrator).
Next, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to meet the
Commonwealth’s burden of establishing he was one of the actors in either
case.
We begin our analysis with our standard of review:
As a general matter, our standard of review of
sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the
record in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to
support the verdict when it establishes each material
element of the crime charged and the commission
thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish
guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about
the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact
finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability
of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Accordingly, [t]he fact that the evidence establishing
a defendant’s participation in a crime is
circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where
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the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of
innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our
judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as
the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the
respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond
a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will
be upheld.
Commonwealth v. Harvard, 64 A.3d 690, 699 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 77 A.3d 636 (Pa. 2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Norley, 55
A.3d 526, 531 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we find McGuigan identified “Lava” and co-defendant
Newsome as the two armed men that approached him immediately before
he was shot. While this identification was tentative, it was corroborated by
photographs the police obtained showing that appellant had the word “LAVA”
tattooed on his forearm. Appellant notes that at trial, McGuigan repudiated
his prior statements and asserted that appellant and Newsome were the
“wrong people.” Appellant also argues that McGuigan alleged that one of the
detectives who interviewed him had supplied him with the name “Lava.”
The jury, however, was entitled to discredit his statements and credit
Detective Leahy’s testimony denying this allegation.
Turning to the Allegheny Avenue shooting, appellant argued, “no
witness identified Appellant by face. The only eyewitness testimony was
elicited from Stephen Ortiz, who, from seven floors up, was able to discern a
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jacket . . .” (Appellant’s brief at 31.) He also argues that several people
called the police after the shooting and no one provided a description of a
person wearing a purple jacket. (Id.) Appellant also points to
inconsistencies in Ortiz’s testimony; again, determinations of credibility are
within the realm of the fact-finder. We also agree with the Commonwealth
that disputes concerning whether Ortiz had an adequate opportunity to
observe the shooting or whether his descriptions matched go to the weight
of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Bourgeon, 654 A.2d 555
(Pa.Super. 1994), appeal denied, 668 A.2d 1121 (Pa. 1995). Likewise, our
function is not to re-evaluate or disturb the court’s own credibility
determinations. Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super.
2011), appeal denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa. 2011.)
Here, Ortiz flagged down police and pointed to appellant -- the only
person in the area who was wearing a distinctive purple jacket with gray
sleeves -- and stated, “there he is.” (Notes of testimony, 10/10/13 at 32,
37, 39.) Ortiz then identified appellant in the courtroom. (Id. at 37.) Ortiz
also testified that he observed Newsome limping as the men ran from the
area. When appellant was apprehended in front of his house that he shared
with Newsome, Newsome was inside suffering from a bullet wound. (Id. at
34.) Accordingly, with due consideration of all of the circumstantial evidence
presented in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict
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winner, our review of the record confirms there was sufficient evidence to
sustain appellant’s convictions.
Next, appellant presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. Initially, we note, “[i]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects
of a sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the
claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings. Absent such
efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.”
Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation
omitted). Appellant timely filed a motion to modify his sentence in which he
argued that the sentence he received was excessive and based on
impermissible bias. As such, we find that appellant’s post-sentence motion
preserved the claims now raised on appeal.
A challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing is not automatically reviewable as a
matter of right. Commonwealth v. Hunter, 768
A.2d 1136 (Pa.Super.2001)[,] appeal denied, 568
Pa. 695, 796 A.2d 979 (2001). When challenging
the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
must invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by
including in his brief a separate concise statement
demonstrating that there is a substantial question as
to the appropriateness of the sentence under the
Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571
Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Commonwealth v.
Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987);
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The
requirement that an appellant separately set forth
the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal
‘furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code
as a whole of limiting any challenges to the trial
court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors
impinging on the sentencing decision to exceptional
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cases.’” Commonwealth v. Williams, 386
Pa.Super. 322, 562 A.2d 1385, 1387 (1989)
(en banc) (emphasis in original).
Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401, 407-408 (Pa.Super. 2004).
To demonstrate that a substantial question exists, “a
party must articulate reasons why a particular
sentence raises doubts that the trial court did not
properly consider [the] general guidelines provided
by the legislature.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon,
571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617, 622 (2002), quoting,
Commonwealth v. Koehler, 558 Pa. 334, 737 A.2d
225, 244 (1999). In Mouzon, our Supreme Court
held that allegations of an excessive sentence raise a
substantial question where the defendant alleges
that the sentence “violates the requirements and
goals of the Code and of the application of the
guidelines . . . .” Id. at 627. A bald allegation of
excessiveness will not suffice. Id.
Commonwealth v. Fiascki, 886 A.2d 261, 263 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal
denied, 897 A.2d 451 (Pa. 2006).
Instantly, appellant has complied with the requirements of
Rule 2119(f) by including such a statement in his brief. (Appellant’s brief at
17-19.) Therein, he claims that his sentence is manifestly excessive and
based on the following inappropriate reasons: “Appellant was a juvenile at
the time the alleged crimes were committed; the trial court ignored all
mitigating evidence, focusing solely on punishment and retribution; and,
finally, the trial court concluded, based on no medical or other evidence, that
Appellant could not be rehabilitated.” (Id. at 19.) We find appellant has
raised substantial questions about his sentence, and we will proceed to
review their merits. See Commonwealth v. Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105,
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1107 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc) (a substantial question is raised where an
appellant alleges the sentencing court erred by imposing an aggravated
range sentence without consideration of mitigating circumstances);
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 297 (Pa.Super. 2011) (“An
allegation of bias in sentencing implicates the fundamental norms underlying
sentencing and hence, we find that it raises a substantial question.”).
The applicable standard of review is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion
of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is
not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the
record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation
omitted).
“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the
factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the
public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant . . . .” Id. Furthermore, “[a] trial
court judge has wide discretion in sentencing and can, on the appropriate
record and for the appropriate reasons, consider any legal factor in imposing
a sentence in the aggravated range.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867
A.2d 589, 593 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). The sentencing court,
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however, must also consider the sentencing guidelines. See Fullin, 892
A.2d at 847.
Instantly, appellant was sentenced to the maximum allowable
sentence on all but one charge: 10 to 20 years on conspiracy to commit
attempted murder; 5 to 10 years on each aggravated assault charge; 1 to
2 years’ on each reckless endangerment charge; 2½ to 5 years on the
firearms charge under Section 6108; 2½ to 5 years on the firearms charge
at Section 6110.1; and no further penalty imposed on the firearms charge
under Section 6106. Each charge was to run consecutively for a total of 27
to 34 years. Appellant had a prior record score of zero as an adult, and a
misdemeanor retail theft adjudication as a juvenile. The record
demonstrated, however, that appellant had six arrests as a juvenile and five
as an adult. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence report and a mental
health evaluation. Our supreme court has ruled that where pre-sentence
reports exist, the presumption will stand that the sentencing judge was both
aware of and appropriately weighed all relevant information contained
therein.3 Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988).
Defense counsel also referred to the sentencing guidelines when arguing on
appellant’s behalf:
I’m asking Your Honor to consider a guideline
sentence. The most serious charge that he was
convicted of was the attempted murder. His
3
We note that the certified record does not contain a copy of the
pre-sentence report or a Guidelines Sentence Form.
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guideline was a 14/0 so his guidelines are 72 to the
statutory limit. I’m asking Your honor to give him a
guideline sentence in the middle. Obviously, I would
ask on the low end but I know Your Honor is not
inclined to do that. I would be asking for 8 to 16 on
that and for anything else to run concurrent with
that charge.
Notes of testimony, 12/13/13 at 25.
Additionally, when imposing sentence, the court indicated that it
understood it was sentencing appellant in the aggravated ranges of the
sentencing guidelines and provided its reasoning. (Id. at 32.)
Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc)
(court not required to recite numeric range of sentences within the
guidelines as long as record shows understanding of range and of court's
chosen deviation from range).
Additionally, we find no merit to appellant’s argument that the
sentence was based on an openly expressed bias. The trial court was in a
position to observe appellant’s demeanor throughout the proceedings; the
court expressed that appellant consistently thumbed his nose at the system.
There are no other crimes that I can see the
Defendant was found guilty of. I passed sentence on
this Defendant considering his presentence
investigation, his mental health investigation, the
arguments of counsel, as well as the circumstances
surrounding the Defendant’s entire social life, family
life, and his patterns of delinquency and crime, which
began at an incredibly ripe age and have continued
even while incarcerated.
I believe that the aggravated sentence was
absolutely necessary considering all the
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circumstances, the boldness of this crime, the
demeanor of the Defendant, who seemed to be
concerned about nothing, who smiled and laughed
throughout his entire trial, who is sociopathic no
matter what was said, although a personality
disorder can be, in fact, that, does not belong in the
streets of Philadelphia.
It is my responsibility to remove him for as
long as possible and I have done that. And I believe
that it was right, just, and helpful to society, for me
to do exactly what I did. And I do it without
reluctance and certainly without vengeance.
Id.
Although we may not agree with all of the colorful characterizations of
appellant utilized by the trial court, it is clear that a reading of the
sentencing transcript as a whole does not establish bias on the part of the
court. We have no reason to disturb the sentencing court’s discretion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Olson, J. concurs in the result.
Wecht, J. files a Concurring and Dissenting Memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/26/2015
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