Byron Walker v. Ken Murphy, Assignee of Ennis State Bank ( 2007 )


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    IN THE

    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

     

    No. 10-07-00176-CV

     

    Byron Walker,

                                                                                        Appellant

     v.

     

    Ken Murphy, Assignee of

    Ennis State Bank,

                                                                                        Appellee

     

       


    From the County Court at Law

    Ellis County, Texas

    Trial Court No. 01-C-3061

     

    MEMORANDUM  Opinion


     

                Byron Walker filed an appeal from a judgment rendered against him.  He now files a voluntary motion to dismiss his appeal stating that he has paid and satisfied the underlying judgment; and he requests this Court to dismiss his appeal.

                This appeal is dismissed.  Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1).

     

                                                                                        TOM GRAY

                                                                                        Chief Justice

     

     

    Before Chief Justice Gray,

                Justice Vance, and

                Justice Reyna

    Appeal dismissed

    Opinion delivered and filed August 1, 2007

    [CV06]

    sdiction. It is not enough that the document could be so construed as an attempt to invoke our jurisdiction. The party must actually have filed it for the purpose of invoking our jurisdiction.

          When the document filed late is the notice of appeal, it is obviously filed in an effort to invoke our jurisdiction. This is also true of the older cases when a defective appeal bond was filed. The purpose of such a filing was beyond dispute. But when some other document is filed late, unless we are clairvoyant, we do not know why the document has been filed. Thus seldom, if ever, could a motion for new trial be intended to invoke our jurisdiction, because the express purpose of a motion for new trial is just that, to have the trial court order a new trial, not to obtain appellate review of the judgment. Even if we harken back to the days that a motion for new trial was a necessary predicate to bring an issue on appeal, the motion for new trial would have been properly characterized as a prerequisite to an appeal, not an effort to invoke appellate jurisdiction.

          We have not previously notified the parties that our jurisdiction was in question. The parties, therefore, have not advised us of the purpose for the filing of the motion for new trial or the indigency affidavit. The majority speaks for Merritt by telling her why she filed these documents. We should not.

          After telling Merritt why she filed these documents, the majority then tells her all that we should be telling her, and which is what we have consistently told other litigants in the past: “...that her appeal is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless she files a response showing a reasonable explanation for the late filing of her [notice of] appeal.”

          When we raise jurisdiction on our own motion due to the failure to timely file a notice of appeal, as we have done in this case, I contend the party should be advised by letter, because there is no need for a published notice, that the notice of appeal appears to be filed late and the appeal is subject to dismissal unless grounds for continuing the appeal are shown. See e.g. In the Interest of B.G., No. 10-02-019-CV, 2002 Tex. App. Lexis 4371, *3 (Waco June 19, 2002, order). Accordingly, I can join only that portion of the notice which notifies the parties that we are questioning our own jurisdiction and that they should explain why this appeal is not subject to dismissal.

                                                                       TOM GRAY

                                                                       Justice


    Dissenting and concurring opinion issued and filed October 16, 2002

    Publish

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-07-00176-CV

Filed Date: 8/1/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2015