Com. v. Kupersmit, H. ( 2015 )


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  • J-A06027-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    HAROLD KUPERSMIT
    Appellant                   No. 1475 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 8, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0007095-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                          FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2015
    Harold Kupersmit appeals pro se from the order entered April 8, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, which denied his motion for
    writ of habeas corpus. Because meaningful appellate review is precluded by
    Kupersmit’s defective brief, we quash the appeal.
    The trial court set forth the factual and procedural background as
    follows:
    On September 5, 2013 at approximately 4:30 p.m.,
    [Kupersmit] telephoned Pennsylvania District Court 07-1-12, in
    which Magisterial District Judge Joseph Falcone sits, identified
    himself to court staff member Kathleen Riccio, and stated that
    “[his upcoming preliminary hearing] is going to be explosive with
    lots of guns, and they better have lots of security the day of the
    hearing.” (Affidavit of Probable Cause, September 11, 2013
    (“Aff.”)). Thereafter, on September 9, 2013 he informed court
    staff member Susan Wagner that “The judge better recuse
    himself from the proceedings on the 25th on this month
    pertaining to the casino. GOT IT?” (Aff.) Although [Kupersmit]
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    did not identify himself on this specific occasion, Ms. Wagner is
    familiar with [Kupersmit]’s voice due to prior communications.
    (Aff.) According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, [Kupersmit]
    also sent numerous letters to the court accusing Judge Falcone
    of “not doing his duty as a judge” and [Kupersmit] has “been
    investigated on prior occasions for threatening public officials.”
    (Aff.)
    On September 11, 2013, [Kupersmit] was charged with
    Terroristic Threats1 and Harassment.2 On October 23, 2013 at
    [Kupersmit]’s preliminary hearing, the summary charge of
    Defiant Trespass3 was added to the complaint.4 [Kupersmit]
    waived his preliminary hearing and the case was transferred to
    this Court.
    [Kupersmit] entered into an open guilty plea to all charges
    on January 7, 2014.5 On March 10, 2014 he was sentenced to
    not less than two (2) months nor more than twenty-three (23)
    months’ incarceration on Terroristic Threats with a two (2) year
    period of probation to be served consecutive to his parole. We
    ordered that he immediately be screened for house arrest and
    work release.
    [Kupersmit] filed a “Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus” on
    March 19, 2014.6 In this Motion, [Kupersmit] challenges the fact
    that he was denied house arrest and claimed that, due to a
    medical condition for which he required immediate surgery, he
    was essentially given a “death sentence by the Court.”
    However, we later granted [Kupersmit]’s Motion for Medical
    Furlough to take care of this medical issue on April 8, 2014. On
    this same date, we denied [Kupersmit]’s Motion for Writ of
    Habeas Corpus.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).
    2
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(3).
    3
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b)(1)(i).
    4
    The Defiant Trespass charged stemmed from
    [Kupersmit]’s trespass of Parx Casino in Bensalem, Bucks
    County, PA. This underlying offense was the basis for
    [Kupersmit]’s threatening telephone calls to Magisterial
    District Judge Falcone’s staff. Based on said threats, the
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    charge was transferred to a different Bucks County district
    court and thereafter added to this complaint at the
    preliminary hearing.
    5
    We questioned [Kupersmit] extensively about his desire
    to proceed pro se. As we recall, he insisted that he was
    capable of presenting his issues himself. We were careful
    to inform him of his rights as well as instruct him that he
    would be held to the same standard as a lawyer and would
    be expected to comport himself with dignity in court.
    6
    For the sake of brevity, we will not list in detail the
    volume of indecipherable and seemingly irrelevant letters
    and other filings of [Kupersmit] in connection with this
    case, all of which are contained in his Clerk of Courts file.
    [Kupersmit] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court on
    April 16, 2014.7
    7
    [Kupersmit] has yet to serve us with his Notice of
    Appeal. We did not become aware of [Kupersmit]’s appeal
    until we received the docketing statement from the
    Pennsylvania Superior Court on May 21, 2014. Pursuant
    to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure
    (“Pa.R.A.P.”), an appellant is required to “serve copies [of
    the notice of Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 905], and of any
    order for transcript, and copies of proof of service showing
    compliance with the rule, upon: the judge of the court
    below, whether or not the reasons for the order appealed
    from already appear of record. Pa.R.A.P. 906(a)(2).
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/2014, at 1-3.
    Before we may address the merits of the appeal, we note that
    appellate briefs must substantially conform to the briefing requirements set
    forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.        See Pa.R.A.P.
    Chapter 21.   “This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant
    fails to conform to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Appellate Procedure.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 
    882 A.2d 496
    , 497 (Pa.
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    Super. 2005). Furthermore, it merits mention that Kupersmit’s pro se status
    does not excuse his failure to comply with the rules of appellate practice.
    Commonwealth v. Lyons, 
    833 A.2d 245
    , 252 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal
    denied, 
    879 A.2d 782
     (Pa. 2005); see also Adams, 
    882 A.2d at 498
    (“Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro
    se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.”).
    The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure set forth the following
    requirements regarding the content of an appellant’s brief:
    Rule 2111. Brief of Appellant
    (a) General rule. – The brief of the appellant, except as
    otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the
    following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in the
    following order:
    (1) Statement of jurisdiction.
    (2) Order or other determination in question.
    (3) Statement of both the scope of review and the standard of
    review.
    (4) Statements of the questions involved.
    (5) Statement of the case.
    (6) Summary of argument.
    (7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to challenge
    the discretionary aspects of a sentence, if applicable.
    (8) Argument for appellant.
    (9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
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    (10) The opinions and pleadings specified in Subdivisions (b)
    and (c) of this rule.
    (11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of errors
    complained of on appeal, filed with the trial court pursuant to
    Rule 1925(b), or an averment that no order requiring a
    statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was entered.
    Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1-11) (emphasis added).          “Additionally, Rules 2114
    through 2119 specify in greater detail the material to be included in briefs on
    appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119.” Adams, 
    882 A.2d at 498
    .
    Turning to the present matter, Kupersmit’s failure to adhere to Rules
    2101-2119 is extensive. Indeed, his brief lacks the statement of jurisdiction,
    the order in question; statement of both the scope of review and the
    standard of review; summary of the argument; argument for appellant; and
    a copy of the statement of errors complained of on appeal, all in
    contravention of Rule 2111(a).
    Moreover, Kupersmit’s statement of the case contains rambling
    references to “the Fitzpatrick Affair,” bankruptcy, trial counsel’s failure to
    “protect [Kupersmit]’s interests,” “the Casey Affair,” “treatment that the
    ‘grandkids’ are receiving as public policy,” and the district attorney’s concern
    only “with his conviction rate; not equity, justice or fairness.” Kupersmit’s
    Brief at 1-3. Likewise, his “issues to be presented for review” include the
    following:   (1) “regulatory capture;” (2) “PARX’s ability to issue arrest
    warrants;” (3) violations committed by the Bucks County District Attorney,
    Department of Corrections, and the Criminal Division of the Bucks County
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    Court of Common Pleas; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) pro se
    rights; (6) “subpoena power;” (7) “transcript power;” (8) probation; and (9)
    “gag order.” Id. at 3-4.
    Most notably, there is no argument section in the appellate brief
    besides what we observe as Kupersmit’s bald assertions in his “issues to be
    presented for review” section. He does not cite authority, make reference to
    the record, give a synopsis of the evidence, or state where he preserved
    these issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b-e). As such, we are confounded as to
    what errors he claims the trial court committed based on the lack of any
    cogent legal argument.
    While we recognize that Kupersmit is acting pro se, we emphasize that
    his status as a pro se litigant does not relieve him of his responsibility to
    conform to the applicable rules. Accordingly, because there are substantial
    defects in Kupersmit’s brief that preclude us from conducting a meaningful
    judicial review of his purported issues, we are compelled to quash this
    appeal. See, e.g., Branch Banking & Trust v. Gesiorski, 
    904 A.2d 939
    (Pa. Super. 2006) (appeal quashed because of deficiencies in the appellant’s
    pro se brief that prohibited the court from discerning what issues the
    appellants wished to raise or the arguments they wanted to present to the
    appellate court); Smathers v. Smathers, 
    670 A.2d 1159
     (Pa. Super. 1996)
    (appeal quashed where the pro se brief violated Rule 2111 because it did not
    contain a statement of jurisdiction, reference to the order in question,
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    statement of questions involved, or summary of argument, and brief
    contained no organized and developed arguments, and even a liberal
    construction of the brief based on appellant’s pro se status did not remedy
    the brief’s shortfalls); Commonwealth v. Maris, 
    629 A.2d 1014
     (Pa. Super.
    1993) (appeal quashed because brief violated the rules of appellate
    procedure to a degree that precluded the court from conducting a
    meaningful review of appellant’s claims).1
    Appeal quashed. Oral argument in this matter scheduled for February
    25, 2015 is CANCELLED.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/19/2015
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Furthermore, we note that even if Kupersmit’s brief was not defective, he
    would have waived all issues on appeal for failing to serve a copy of his
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement on the trial judge, as required by
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1). See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/2014, at 3 n.8; see
    also Commonwealth v. Schofield, 
    888 A.2d 771
     (Pa. 2005) (holding that
    the failure to serve the trial judge with a concise statement results in waiver
    of all issues on appeal).
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