Mazen Shahin v. City of Dover , 615 F. App'x 739 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 14-1904
    ___________
    MAZEN SHAHIN, Ph.D.;
    NINA SHAHIN, CPA, MAS. MST,
    Appellants
    v.
    CITY OF DOVER, DELAWARE; CARLETON E. CAREY, SR.,
    DOVER MAYOR; CHERYL A. RUSSELL, DOVER ASSESSOR
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-12-cv-00604)
    District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    July 8, 2015
    Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: August 27, 2015)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    PER CURIAM
    Pro se appellants Nina and Mazen Shahin appeal the District Court’s order
    dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons detailed below, we
    will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    This case concerns the Shahins’ challenge to the 2010 assessment of their real
    property in Dover, Delaware. In 2002, the Shahins purchased the property for $223,000;
    in 2010, it was reassessed at $286,700. As a result, the property tax the Shahins owed on
    the property increased from $839.85 in 2009 to $968.47 in 2010.
    The Shahins appealed the assessment to the City of Dover Board of Assessment,
    which denied relief. They appealed that decision to the Delaware Superior Court. Before
    the Superior Court, in addition to arguing that the assessment was inflated, the Shahins
    claimed, for the first time, that the defendants-assessors had discriminated against them
    on the basis of their race and national origin. The Superior Court affirmed the
    Assessment Board’s judgment, concluding, among other things, that the Shahins had
    presented no evidence to support their claims of discrimination. See Shahin v. City of
    Dover Bd. of Assessment, Civ. A. No. K10A-06-002JTV, 
    2011 WL 704490
    , at *3 (Del.
    Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2011) (non-precedential). The Shahins then appealed to the Delaware
    Supreme Court, which likewise affirmed. That Court declined to address the
    discrimination claims because the Shahins had not first presented them to the Assessment
    Board. See Shahin v. City of Dover, 
    31 A.3d 77
    , 
    2011 WL 4055405
    , at *2 (Del. Sept.
    12, 2011) (table).
    2
    The Shahins then filed a complaint in the District Court. Citing Title VI of the
    Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Shahins again
    alleged that the defendants had performed the assessment in a discriminatory manner.
    The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The District Court dismissed the
    complaint, concluding that the Tax Injunction Act deprived it of jurisdiction over the
    Shahins’ claims. The Shahins filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise de novo review over
    the District Court’s order. See Landsman & Funk P.C. v. Skinder–Strauss Assocs., 
    640 F.3d 72
    , 75 (3d Cir. 2011).
    We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case. The Tax Injunction
    Act provides that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
    assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and
    efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1341
    . While
    § 1341 speaks only in terms of equitable relief, principles of comity also bar actions
    seeking damages. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 
    454 U.S. 100
    , 107 (1981). Thus, “a federal court cannot entertain a suit posing either an equitable
    or a legal challenge to state or local taxes” if the state provides an adequate remedy.
    Kerns v. Dukes, 
    153 F.3d 96
    , 101 (3d Cir. 1998).
    Here, the Shahins’ challenge to the property assessment falls squarely within
    § 1341’s ambit. See Gass v. Cnty. of Allegheny, Pa., 
    371 F.3d 134
    , 136-37 (3d Cir.
    2004). Moreover, we have previously held that “the courts of Delaware can indeed
    3
    provide the forms of judicial inquiry and (as appropriate) judicial remedy that meet the
    requirements of the Tax Injunction Act and the principles of comity.” Kerns, 
    153 F.3d at 103
    . That conclusion is supported by the procedural history of this case — the Delaware
    Superior Court expressly considered the Shahins’ “claims of discrimination against
    foreign-born home owners” and rejected them on the merits, concluding that the Shahins
    had “introduced no evidence to support these claims.” Shahin, 
    2011 WL 704490
    , at *3.
    The adequacy of the remedy is not undermined by the fact that the Superior Court denied
    relief on the merits and the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Shahins had not
    properly preserved their claims. See Sacks Bros. Loan Co. v. Cunningham, 
    578 F.2d 172
    , 175 (7th Cir. 1978). We therefore agree with the District Court that the Tax
    Injunction Act bars the Shahins’ claims.1
    Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    1
    In light of this determination, the District Court did not err in denying the Shahins’
    other filings, including their motion for class certification.
    4