People v. Montgomery , 427 Ill. Dec. 472 ( 2018 )

2018 IL App (2d) 160541 Nos. 2-16-0541, 2-16-0544, 2-16-0545 cons.
Opinion filed October 16, 2018
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) Nos. 15-DT-1534
) 15-TR-62094
) 15-TR-62098
)
PRINCE D. MONTGOMERY, ) Honorable
) Helen S. Rozenberg,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SPENCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Prince D. Montgomery, appeals his conviction of driving under the influence
(DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2014)). He contends that the circuit court of Lake
County erred when it declined to instruct the jury that it could infer that the contents of a missing
video recording were detrimental to the State. He also contends that the trial court plainly erred
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) because (1) the court failed to ask
one of the jurors whether he understood and accepted the principle that defendant was not
required to produce any evidence on his own behalf and (2) the evidence was closely balanced.
We affirm.
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¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In July 2015, defendant was cited for DUI involving alcohol, DUI involving drugs, and
various traffic offenses. Only the DUI charge involving alcohol is at issue on appeal. Before
trial, the State was ordered to provide defendant with a squad-car video of the traffic stop. It
failed to do so, and defendant moved to bar evidence of the events captured by the video, as a
sanction. The trial court denied the motion. The record does not contain a transcript of the
hearing on the motion. However, in a motion to reconsider, defendant stated that the parties
stipulated that Deputy Jason Plichta would testify that he recorded the stop, the video was never
uploaded to the system where videos were stored, he could not explain why it was not uploaded,
and he was unsure if the recording was still “ ‘in the [c]loud.’ ”
¶4 Defendant later moved in limine for the following nonpattern jury instruction: “If you
find that the State has allowed to be destroyed or lost any evidence whose content or quality are
in issue, you may infer that the true fact is against the State’s interest.” The State objected. The
State told the court that during the stop Plichta had no information that the video equipment was
malfunctioning, but, when he checked the system where the videos were stored, he noticed that it
was not there, so no video was ever uploaded. The court sought to clarify by asking, “It was not
sent to the [c]loud and unretrieved? It was actually not sent anywhere?” The State responded
that, because of a malfunction in the computer, the video was not sent to the cloud. The State
further said that Plichta was not sure what the error was. The court expressed concern over
whether the video actually existed, and it continued the matter briefly for the attorneys to talk to
Plichta. Plichta told them that he believed that the video entered the cloud, because he saw space
for video on his computer free up after uploading, but that, since there were multiple videos, he
could not say for sure whether the video from defendant’s stop was uploaded. When he tried to
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download the video, he was unable to find defendant’s stop or any of the other stops that he had
uploaded. The video either did not exist or was irretrievable. An information-technology person
also could not retrieve the video. This was not the first time the problem had happened to
Plichta. The court then stated that there was nothing to indicate that the video ever existed and
was destroyed. Defense counsel replied that Plichta said that the system was recording when the
stop was done, so a recording existed at one point. Ultimately, after further argument from
counsel, the court denied the motion, noting that nothing showed that the State intentionally
destroyed evidence. It further rejected an argument that the State did not use sufficient efforts to
retrieve the video, noting that a bare allegation of such was insufficient and that there had been
four months for the defense to request further investigation. The court also rejected an argument
that there was a pattern of the State losing such evidence.
¶5 During jury voir dire, the trial court did not ask one of the jurors whether he understood
and accepted the principle that defendant was not required to produce any evidence on his own
behalf. There was no objection.
¶6 At trial, Plichta testified that, on July 20, 2015, at around 11 p.m., he saw defendant make
a wide right turn and cross over the centerline multiple times. Plichta’s radar showed that
defendant was driving 59 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone. Plichta pulled over
defendant. His squad car had an audiovisual system that automatically turned on at that time.
¶7 Plichta was on the passenger side of the vehicle when he spoke to defendant, observing
that there was also a person in the passenger seat. Defendant gave Plichta his driver’s license but
could not locate his insurance card. Plichta observed that defendant’s movements were slow and
lethargic. Plichta also smelled alcohol coming from the vehicle, and the odor got stronger when
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defendant spoke. Defendant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Plichta ran defendant’s plates
and found that his license was expired.
¶8 Plichta went to the driver’s side of the vehicle and saw defendant shove something under
the rear seat and cover it with the floor mat. Plichta asked defendant to step out of the vehicle
and asked him what he was hiding. Defendant said that it was alcohol, and Plichta’s partner
retrieved an empty bottle of hard lemonade.
¶9 Plichta asked defendant to perform several field sobriety tests. On the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test, Plichta saw a lack of smooth pursuit in defendant’s eyes. He also noted
constricted pupils and asked defendant if he took any medication. Defendant said that he took an
opiate pain medication, which Plichta noted could constrict the pupils. Plichta saw two out of six
signs of impairment, which were not enough alone to show impairment.
¶ 10 Plichta next had defendant perform the walk-and-turn test, which requires only two signs
to show impairment. Plichta observed six out of eight signs of impairment. For example,
defendant stepped out of position during the instructions, raised his hands more than six inches
away from his body while walking, took the wrong number of steps, and stopped walking
because he forgot the instructions.
¶ 11 During the one-leg-stand test, defendant swayed and hopped to maintain his balance.
Plichta observed two out of four signs of impairment, which were sufficient to show impairment.
Plichta also had defendant perform a nonstandardized balance test and defendant was unable to
follow the instructions. Plichta opined that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and
narcotics.
¶ 12 During cross-examination, Plichta acknowledged that, other than crossing the centerline,
defendant did not drive erratically. He also acknowledged that there were many possible reasons
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for red, glassy eyes, such as fatigue, allergies, or exposure to smoke, and that he did not know if
any of those affected defendant. Plichta agreed that lethargy could be caused by fatigue, stress,
or other factors and that he did not know if defendant suffered from those issues. He also agreed
that he could not tell how much a person had drunk based on the odor of alcohol alone and did
not know who drank the bottle of hard lemonade that defendant concealed. Defendant was polite
during the stop.
¶ 13 Defendant presented no evidence, and his motion for a directed verdict was denied.
During closing, the defense was allowed to briefly argue over objection that the State had failed
to present the video of the stop. The defense focused its argument on the lack of various signs of
impairment and Plichta’s failure to explore all other possibilities to explain defendant’s
performance on the tests.
¶ 14 The jury found defendant guilty of the DUI charge involving alcohol and two of the
traffic offenses but acquitted him of the DUI charge involving drugs. Defendant’s motion for a
new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to five days in jail and 12 months’ probation. He
appeals.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his
requested nonpattern instruction that the jury could infer that the contents of the missing video
were against the State’s interest.
¶ 17 “Whenever applicable, an Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) should be used whenever
it accurately states the law.” People v. Danielly, 274 Ill. App. 3d 358, 367 (1995). “A non-IPI
instruction should be used only if the pattern instructions for criminal cases do not contain an
accurate instruction and if the tendered non-IPI instruction is simple, brief, impartial, and free
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from argument.” Id. “The decision of whether to give a non-IPI instruction is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Id. “The court abuses its discretion in refusing to give an
instruction when the jury is not instructed on a defense theory of the case which is supported by
the evidence.” Id. at 367-68.
¶ 18 Defendant’s argument that his requested instruction was required is based on a discussion
of a similar instruction in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), and Danielly, 274 Ill. App.
3d at 368. In Youngblood, police officers failed to refrigerate clothing of a rape victim, later
resulting in the inability to perform serological tests. The Court held that the failure to preserve
the evidence was not a denial of due process, absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the
police. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. The Court mentioned that the trial court instructed the jury
that, if it found that the State had lost or destroyed evidence whose content or quality was at
issue, the jurors could infer that the true fact was against the State’s interest. Id. at 54. However,
in its analysis, the Court did not rely on the instruction. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens noted
that, because the instruction was given, the uncertainty as to what the evidence might have
proved was an advantage to the defendant and made it unlikely that the defendant was prejudiced
by the failure to preserve the evidence. Id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., concurring). Neither the
majority nor the concurrence suggested that such an instruction was required anytime that the
police lost evidence.
¶ 19 In Danielly, the First District suggested that the instruction is mandatory. There, the
defendant was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault in connection with an incident at
the defendant’s home. The victim fled the defendant’s home, leaving behind her clothes,
underwear, shoes, and purse. Danielly, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 360. At the victim’s request, the
police returned the items to her. She testified at trial that the underwear was torn and that she
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threw it in the trash. Id. at 361. The defendant claimed that the sexual encounter was consensual
and that the victim’s underwear was not torn. Id. at 362-63. The jury found the defendant guilty
and, on appeal, he argued that the return of the victim’s underwear deprived him of due process
under Youngblood. Id. at 360, 362-63. He asserted that the underwear would have been physical
evidence contradicting the victim’s claim that it had been torn and supporting his claim that the
sex was consensual. Id. at 363. The appellate court rejected this argument, but reversed on other
grounds. Id. at 364, 366. The court then addressed whether the jury should have been instructed
that it could infer that the missing evidence was against the State’s interest, because the issue
was likely to recur on remand. Id. at 367. In doing so, the court noted that the instruction
discussed in Youngblood would be appropriate and held that the defendant would be entitled to
such an instruction on remand if he requested it. Id. at 368.
¶ 20 While Danielly would appear to require the instruction, nothing in Youngblood indicated
that such an instruction was required or that a court would automatically abuse its discretion by
declining to give the instruction. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 54; see also State v. Watley, 788
P.2d 375, 378-79 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (trial court not required to give Youngblood instruction
and absence of instruction did not render the defendant’s trial unfair). Further, the circumstances
justifying such an instruction in Danielly are not present here. In Danielly, there were
circumstances to justify an adverse inference, other than the fact that the State allowed the
evidence to be lost. The victim testified that the underwear was torn, which was relevant to
prove that the sex was not consensual. Indeed, the State argued at trial that the torn underwear
was evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Danielly, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 363-64. Meanwhile, the
defendant testified that it was not torn. See id. at 362-63.
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¶ 21 Here, unlike in Danielly, and contrary to the portion of the requested instruction
concerning “evidence whose content or quality are in issue,” defendant never suggested that the
missing video would have shown something different from the circumstances Plichta described
in his testimony. Defendant’s theory of the case was not that Plichta misstated the observable
facts. Instead, it was that those facts were insufficient to support a conclusion that defendant was
impaired. Thus, given that there was nothing to suggest that the video would have shown
anything contrary to Plichta’s testimony, the requested instruction was not in accordance with a
defense theory of the case that was supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to give it.
¶ 22 Defendant next contends that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 431(b), because
the court did not ask one of the jurors whether he understood and accepted the principle that
defendant was not required to produce any evidence on his own behalf. Defendant concedes that
he forfeited the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court, but he argues that it is plain error
requiring reversal because the evidence was closely balanced.
¶ 23 To preserve a claim for review, a defendant must both object at trial and include the
alleged error in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). The
plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error where either (1) a
clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that such error threatens to
tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a
clear or obvious error occurs and is so serious that it affects the fairness of the defendant’s trial
and challenges the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.
People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124 (2009). In both instances, the burden of persuasion
remains on the defendant. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005) (citing People v. Hopp,
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209 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2004)). The first step in conducting a plain-error review is to determine
whether an error occurred at all. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d at 124.
¶ 24 Rule 431(b) contains the four commonly known “Zehr principles.” See People v. Zehr,
103 Ill. 2d 472, 477 (1984). It provides:
“(b) The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether
that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is
presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be
convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that
the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that
if a defendant does not testify it cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of
a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant’s decision not to testify when the
defendant objects.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012).
¶ 25 The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each prospective juror an opportunity to
respond to specific questions concerning the principles set out in the rule. Id. The trial court
must ensure that each prospective juror both understands and accepts each of the four principles.
People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶¶ 44-46; People v. Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 32;
People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 607 (2010). The questions may be asked of the prospective
jurors individually or as a group, but in either event Rule 431(b) contemplates “ ‘a specific
question and response process.’ ” Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 32 (quoting Thompson, 238
Ill. 2d at 607).
¶ 26 Here, the court failed to ask one of the jurors whether he understood and accepted the
principle that defendant was not required to produce any evidence on his own behalf. The State
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concedes that this violated Rule 431(b), and we agree. The question, then, is whether it was
plain error.
¶ 27 “A Rule 431(b) violation is not cognizable under the second prong of the plain-error
doctrine absent evidence that the violation produced a biased jury.” People v. Daniel, 2018 IL
App (2d) 160018, ¶ 26 (citing People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 52). Defendant does not
contend that the error produced a biased jury and argues only that the evidence was closely
balanced, under the first prong of the doctrine.
¶ 28 “In determining whether the evidence adduced at trial was close, a reviewing court must
evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of it
within the context of the case.” Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53. “That standard seems quite
simple, but the opposite is true. A reviewing court’s inquiry involves an assessment of the
evidence on the elements of the charged offense or offenses, along with any evidence regarding
the witnesses’ credibility.” Id.
¶ 29 In Sebby, the defendant was charged with felony resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS
5/31-1(a-7) (West 2010)). Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 1. That charge required the State to prove
in part that the defendant knowingly resisted a peace officer and that his resistance was the
proximate cause of an injury to that officer. 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2010). On the
resistance element, the three responding officers testified that the defendant resisted. Sebby,
2017 IL 119445, ¶¶ 55-56. Three other witnesses, including the defendant, testified that the
defendant did not resist and was instead being yanked around by the officers. Id. ¶¶ 57-58.
¶ 30 The Sebby court concluded that the evidence was closely balanced. Id. ¶ 61. The court
observed that the State’s witnesses provided accounts that were consistent with each other, as did
the defendant’s witnesses. Id. Neither party’s version of the events was fanciful. Id. The court
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rejected the State’s argument that the testimony of the defendant’s witnesses was less plausible
because those witnesses were relatives or friends of the defendant and might be biased. Id. ¶ 62.
The court also noted that neither party’s version of the events was corroborated by extrinsic
evidence. Id. The court found that, as in People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584 (2008), the outcome
of the trial depended on a “ ‘contest of credibility’ ” between the officers and the defendant.
Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 63 (quoting Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d at 606-07). The court explained that,
because the outcome depended on a choice between two versions that were both credible, the
evidence was closely balanced. Id. (citing Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d at 608). Recently, in Daniel, 2018
IL App (2d) 160018, ¶ 31, we applied Sebby and found the evidence to be closely balanced when
witnesses for the State and witnesses for the defense gave plausible opposing versions of the
events, neither of which was corroborated by extrinsic evidence.
¶ 31 However, courts have found no “credibility contest” when one party’s version of the
events was either unrefuted, implausible, or corroborated by other evidence. See, e.g., People v.
Effinger, 2016 IL App (3d) 140203, ¶¶ 12, 26 (circumstantial evidence supported victim’s
version of the events and defense presented no evidence); People v. Tademy, 2015 IL App (3d)
120741, ¶¶ 19-20 (no “credibility contest” between experts where lay testimony corroborated
one expert’s testimony); People v. Lopez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101395, ¶¶ 88-90 (evidence not
closely balanced where circumstantial evidence supported State’s witnesses’ testimony while
defendant’s entire version of events “strained credulity”); People v. Anderson, 407 Ill. App. 3d
662, 672 (2011) (evidence not closely balanced where defendant’s version of events was
implausible).
¶ 32 Here, the evidence was not closely balanced. Unlike in cases such as Sebby, where the
outcome of the trial depended on a contest of credibility, there was no such contest in this case.
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Through Plichta’s testimony, the State presented ample evidence to support the conclusion that
defendant was impaired. That evidence was unrefuted. No evidence was presented to challenge
Plichta’s honesty or to support defendant’s speculation that defendant might have shown signs of
impairment for reasons other than intoxication. Defendant points to weaknesses in the State’s
case, such as the lack of some signs of impairment, but the evidence need not be perfect to avoid
application of the plain-error doctrine. Instead, we apply a commonsense approach based on the
context of the case. Given that the State’s evidence was strong and unrefuted, we cannot say that
the evidence as a whole was closely balanced.
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury that it
could infer that the contents of the missing video recording were detrimental to the State. The
trial court also did not plainly err when it failed to ask one of the jurors whether he understood
and accepted the principle that defendant was not required to produce any evidence on his own
behalf. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed. As part of
our judgment, we grant the State’s request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal.
55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2016); see also People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (1978).
¶ 35 Affirmed.
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