In re Estate of O'Gara , 2023 IL App (1st) 210710-U ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (1st) 210710-UNo. 1-21-0710
Order filed March 8, 2023
THIRD DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
In re ESTATE OF VIATEUR F. O’GARA, )
Deceased )
) Appeal from the Circuit Court
(Judith O’Gara, in her Capacity as ) of Cook County.
Administrator of the Estate of Thomas )
O’Gara, Deceased, )
)
Petitioner-Appellant, ) No. 1991 P 12802)
v. )
)
LAWRENCE O’GARA, in his Capacity as ) The Honorable
Supervised Administrator with the Will ) Kent A. Delgado,
Annexed De Bonis Non of the Estate of ) Judge Presiding.
Viateur F. O’Gara, Deceased, )
)
Respondent-Appellee.) )
JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Reyes and Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the decisions of the probate court to allow amendment of the petition for
executor’s commission and to grant the requested executor’s commission in part. We dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction the issues of whether the probate court erred in overruling Judith’s
objections to the pro-forma final accounting, denying Judith’s motion to file a reply, denying
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Judith’s motion for discovery, and denying Judith’s motion for subpoenas. Finally, we find
that the issue of whether the May 18, 2021 order was premature is forfeited.
¶2 This appeal concerns part of an ongoing dispute between Judith O’Gara (Judith), in her
capacity as administrator of the estate of her husband, Thomas O’Gara, deceased, and
Lawrence O’Gara (Lawrence), here in his capacity as the supervised administrator with the
will annexed de bonis non of the estate of Viateur O’Gara, deceased, regarding the
administration of the estate of Viateur O’Gara (the estate). The case below concerns the sale
of Viateur’s home and Lawrence’s alleged improper acts in the process of reopening the estate
for the purpose of selling the home and in the sale process itself. Judith appeals several
decisions entered by the circuit court of Cook County in an order dated May 18, 2021.
¶3 For the following reasons, we affirm the probate court’s decision to allow amendment of
the petition for executor’s commission and to grant the requested executor’s commission in
part. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the issues of whether the probate court erred in
overruling Judith’s objections to the pro-forma final accounting, in denying Judith’s motion to
file a reply, in denying Judith’s motion for discovery, and in denying Judith’s motion for
subpoenas.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 As this is an interlocutory appeal, we recount only those facts relevant to resolving this
appeal. Viateur O’Gara died on November 7, 1989. At the time of his death, Viateur had six
surviving sons: John, James, Daniel, Thomas, Lawrence, and Martin. Viateur’s will named
Daniel and Thomas co-executors. Upon petition of Lawrence, as counsel for Thomas, Viateur’s
will was admitted to probate and opened January 8, 1992. The estate was closed September
18, 2002 on the probate court’s own motion. On June 20, 2018, Lawrence, on his own behalf,
filed a petition to reopen the estate for the sole purpose of administering the sale of Viateur’s
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home. The probate court reopened the estate and letters of office were issued to Lawrence on
July 3, 2018, naming him independent administrator of the estate.
¶6 On September 12, 2018, Judith filed a “Petition to Terminate Independent Administration”
and on September 17, 2018, the probate court granted the petition and switched the estate to
supervised administration. Also on September 17, 2018, Lawrence filed a petition requesting
the probate court’s permission to sell Viateur’s home. On November 16, 2018, the probate
court approved Lawrence’s petition to sell the home to Next Iteration Properties, LLC or its
nominee. On April 25, 2019, Judith issued subpoenas to the title company involved in the
home’s sale and another title company involved in its resale six weeks later. Lawrence filed a
motion to quash and, on May 9, 2019, the probate court quashed the subpoenas.
¶7 The probate court continued all matters in the case for an extended period of time between
June 12, 2019 and November 16, 2020, during which time the parties were subject to a
restriction against filing any further pleadings, motions, or other documents.
¶8 On January 12, 2021, Lawrence filed a petition for commission and his costs as executor,
totaling $6,250, for the period from July 3, 2018, when the estate was reopened, through
December 16, 2020. In her response, Judith generally objected to any grant of fees while issues
concerning the administration of the reopened estate remained unresolved. None of the issues,
however, concerned the requested executor’s commission, costs, or any errors therein. Judith
also objected to the following entries, among others, in Lawrence’s billing, because they did
not benefit the estate: (1) Lawrence’s three entries totaling five hours for “Services” with
“buyers on site,” “buyers and contractor on site,” and “buyer and architect on site;” (2) three
entries totaling five hours for meetings with Judith, Fidelity Investments, and Chase Bank; (3)
another one-hour entry for a meeting with Chase Bank; and (4) two entries for a total of three
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hours for attendance at three hearings, which Judith argued were necessitated by Lawrence’s
own misdeeds.
¶9 On April 5, 2021, Lawrence filed a motion to amend his petition to change only certain
dates that he realized were listed incorrectly. Judith responded, arguing that Lawrence’s
request to amend should not be granted because he could have clarified his entries when he
replied to Judith’s response to the petition. Judith also included, as part of her response, an
unrelated motion to “issue subpoenas to Chase and Fidelity for all account statements and
documentation” because Lawrence had failed to provide certain documents that could be
produced by those entities.
¶ 10 On January 12, 2021, the probate court ordered Lawrence to file a “pro-forma final account
with supporting documentation,” which would explicitly supersede the account previously
filed in 2019. In supplying the supporting documentation to accompany this account, Lawrence
failed to include one monthly statement from Chase that Judith alleged had been repeatedly
withheld up to that point. Judith subsequently filed a Verified Petition for Issuance of
Discovery, which sought to obtain all statements for the Chase account directly from Chase,
as well as “other information” from entities involved in the sale of Viateur’s home, to show
“breach or neglect of fiduciary duty and/or other administrator misconduct by Lawrence.” The
motion explains that the request for discovery directed at entities involved in the sale of the
Viateur home was based in her suspicions about the sale of the home to a nominee rather than
the originally named purchaser, time spent by Lawrence with the buyers after the contract for
sale of the home was signed, the price for which the home was sold, and the fact that the home
was resold for a significantly higher price shortly after Lawrence sold it.
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¶ 11 Lawrence subsequently was granted leave to file a revised pro-forma final account for the
stated purpose of correcting a mistake in the percent distributed to Linda O’Gara, the surviving
spouse of Daniel O’Gara. Judith responded with a set of verified objections to specific details
in the revised pro-forma final account. Lawrence responded to Judith’s objections and, on May
12, 2021, Judith filed a “Motion for Leave to (1) File a Reply Instanter in Support of Her
Verified Objections and (2) Issue Subpoenas to JP Morgan Chase, NA and Fidelity
Investments.”
¶ 12 May 18, 2021 Order
¶ 13 On May 18, 2021, the probate court entered an order rendering decisions on a number of
pending motions, including, but not limited to, all of those decisions at issue in the instant
appeal. In relevant part, the order read:
“1. Judith O’Gara’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply instanter in support of her verified
objections and Petition for issuance of Discovery or Citation and to issue subpoenas to
JP Morgan Chase, N.A. and Fidelity Investments is denied.
2. Judith O’Gara’s Objections to Lawrence O’Gara’s Revised Pro-Forma Final
Account are overruled. Lawrence O’Gara shall provide court w/statement of Chase acct
of estate of decedent for 1/17/19 – 2/15/19 within 24 hours.
***
4. Lawrence O’Gara’s Motion to Amend Petition for Commissions and Costs is
granted.
5. Lawrence O’Gara, Supervised Administrator de bonis non with Will Annexed of
this Estate, is hereby awarded $512.50 for fees for services and reimbursement of
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$1,000 for cash advanced to Carey White Boland Murnighan & Murray, LLC to cover
costs for this Estate, for a total of $1,512.50.”
¶ 14 The order stated that each of the decisions listed were for the reasons stated in open court.
With regard to the probate court’s decision to allow Lawrence’s motion to amend his petition
for executor’s commission, the probate court stated: “I’m going to allow [Lawrence] to amend
it. As he says in his statement, it’s not amending hours. It’s not amending the amount. It’s
simply amending what he referred to as an error with a date. So I’ll allow that.”
¶ 15 With regard to the decision to grant the petition for executor’s commission itself, the
probate court first noted that it had only reviewed the petition filed January 12, 2021, but that
to the degree the petition was to be amended, it was only to change incorrect dates and the
court’s ruling “has nothing to do with the actual court date. My ruling has to do with the hours
and what is noted. So if I get the date wrong, I’ve already reviewed it and I already went
through it so I’m not going to go through your amended petition.” The probate court then
detailed a number of individual entries, reducing the hours for each before then reducing the
requested rate of $150 per hour to $25 per hour, as Lawrence was serving only as executor, not
as attorney for the estate.
¶ 16 Judith submitted a timely notice of appeal on June 16, 2021, and this appeal follows.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Judith appeals only the May 18, 2021 order detailed in the facts above. On appeal, Judith
contends that the probate court abused its discretion when it: (1) overruled Judith’s objections
to the pro-forma final account, “without addressing, inter alia, numerous irregularities in
Lawrence’s administration of the Viateur estate,” (2) denied Judith’s motion to file a reply in
support of her verified objections to the pro-forma final account, (3) denied Judith’s motion to
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issue subpoenas to JP Morgan Chase (Chase) and Fidelity Investments (Fidelity), (4) denied
Judith’s petition to issue discovery related to the sale of the house owned by the estate, (5)
allowed Lawrence to amend his petition for executor fees, (6) granted Lawrence’s petition for
executor fees in part “without briefing or objections by Judith or addressing, inter alia,
numerous irregularities *** as raised in Judith’s objections to the original petition.” and (7)
that, in the alternative (though Judith does not specify to which of her other arguments), the
probate court abused its discretion when it entered the May 18, 2021 decisions regarding the
pro-forma final account and the executor’s commission “without further proceedings related
to the allegations of irregularities and misconduct involving Lawrence in the Viateur Estate as
well as the related Thomas Estate and Estate of James O’Gara.”
¶ 19 I. Jurisdiction
¶ 20 Lawrence argues that this court lacks jurisdiction, as the order being appealed is not a
final judgment falling within the ambit of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304 (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
With respect to four of the six issues Judith argues on appeal, we agree that we lack jurisdiction.
¶ 21 The docketing statement filed by Judith in this appeal lists Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303
(eff. July 1, 2017) as the rule governing the appeal. Rule 303 governs appeals taken from final
judgments. An order is final if it “terminates the litigation between parties on the merits or
disposes of the rights of the parties either on the entire controversy or on a separate *** part
of it.” Village of Bellwood v. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 2011 IL App (1st)
093115, ¶ 44. The order being appealed here is no such final judgment, as it did not terminate
the litigation or a discrete component thereof, so Rule 303 is inapplicable. However, our
supreme court has held that we are to take a liberal approach to notices of appeal with mistakes
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such as this. People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008). In following that decision, we will
consider whether we have jurisdiction to review the instant appeal under a different rule.
¶ 22 In general, a non-final order is not appealable except under the provisions of Rule 304.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304 (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Rule 304(a) allows for an interlocutory
appeal in instances where a final judgment is entered as to one party or claim, but fewer than
all parties or claims. Id. However, Rule 304(a) allows such an interlocutory appeal “only if the
trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying either
enforcement or appeal or both.” In the case at bar, no such finding was made and so we can
find no jurisdiction under Rule 304(a).
¶ 23 Rule 304(b) provides a set of exceptions wherein interlocutory appeals may be pursued
without the explicit finding required by Rule 304(a). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b) (eff.
March 8, 2016). Rule 304(b)(1) allows such an appeal with respect to “[a] judgment or order
entered in the administration of an estate, guardianship, or similar proceeding which finally
determines a right or status of a party.” Id. As the case at bar concerns the administration of an
estate, the question that remains is whether the judgments in the May 18, 2021 order finally
determined a right or status of a party and therefore are appealable under Rule 304(b)(1).
¶ 24 Lawrence argues that we lack jurisdiction for all of the issues raised on appeal by Judith.
Judith argues that the matter of jurisdiction was already decided when Lawrence filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction and this court denied the motion.
Given the substantive rulings herein, that ruling was correct, as dismissal of the entire appeal
was not warranted. Regardless, the denial of a motion to dismiss at the appellate stage is
nonfinal and is subject to reconsideration. American Advisors Group v. Williams, 2022 IL App
(1st) 210734, ¶ 2. Judith cites to Liceaga v. Baez, 2019 IL App (1st) 181170, ¶ 25, for criteria
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that constrain this court’s reconsideration of a motion to dismiss, but that case is inapposite
here, as it concerns a motion for reconsideration at the trial court level. The case at bar matches
the facts of Williams. In that case, the court denied a motion to dismiss that was filed at the
motions stage and later found that its decision on that motion was nonfinal and was subject to
reconsideration. Williams, 2022 IL App (1st) 210734, ¶ 2. Further, this court is obligated to
consider its jurisdiction whether it is raised by the parties or not. See Secura Insurance Co. v.
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009). Judith argues that, should the
matter of jurisdiction be reconsidered, each of the decisions within the order do, in fact, finally
decide her rights as a party.
¶ 25 Final determinations made on requests for attorney fees and requests for trustee fees are
appealable under Rule 304(b)(1). Lampe v. Pawlarcyzk, 314 Ill. App. 3d 455, 470 (2000). This
court’s decision in In re Estate of O’Gara, 2022 IL App (1st) 210709, ¶ 34, extended the logic
of Lampe to decisions on executor’s commissions as well and that reasoning equally applies
here. See also In re Trusts of Strange ex rel Whitney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 37, 41 (2001) (finding
that a final decision on an issue of fees related to the administration of an estate is not collateral
or incidental to the principal action and therefore subject to appeal under Rule 304(b)(1))
(citing Estate of Kime, 95 Ill. App. 3d 262 (1981)). Accordingly, this court possesses
jurisdiction under Rule 304(b)(1) to review the probate court’s decision to grant part of
Lawrence’s requested fees.
¶ 26 Judith asserts that we also have jurisdiction to review the probate court’s decision to allow
Lawrence to amend his petition for executor’s commission. She cites to In re Westphal, 2021
IL App (2d) 190324-U, for the broad assertion that matters attendant to a matter appealable
under Rule 304(b)(1) are also appealable under the rule. While Westphal is a non-precedential
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order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (eff. Jan.1, 2021), precedential foundation for this
assertion exists in Olympic Federal v. Witney Development Co. Inc., 113 Ill. App. 3d 981. The
court in Olympic Federal found that orders attendant to appealable interlocutory orders could
be reviewed alongside the interlocutory orders. Id at 984. For example, “an interlocutory
appeal from the granting of temporary injunctive relief *** necessarily brings into question the
sufficiency of the complaint.” Id. We agree that where a validly appealable order under Rule
304(b)(1) is attendant to another order subsequently decided, it may be necessary for the
reviewing court to review those orders together. We disagree with Judith’s argument, however,
that Rule 304(b)(1) is expansive and encompasses a broad variety of orders. In the case at bar,
the probate court’s decision to allow amendment of Lawrence’s petition for executor’s
commission is attendant to and inextricable from the order granting the amended petition for
executor’s commission. Furthermore, it would be a waste of judicial resources to review the
probate court’s decision on the amended petition while leaving for a future appeal the question
of whether allowing amendment was proper. Accordingly, we find that we possess jurisdiction
to review the probate court’s decision to allow Lawrence to amend his petition for executor’s
commission.
¶ 27 We do not have jurisdiction, however, to consider Judith’s remaining claims on appeal.
The probate court’s decision as to each of those four matters did not finally decide Judith’s
rights as a party. Judith argues that, by overruling her objections to Lawrence’s pro-forma final
accounting, by denying her motion to issue subpoenas, by denying her motion to issue
discovery citations, and by denying her motion to file a reply in support of her objections, the
probate court finally determined her right to object, her right to issue subpoenas, her right to
seek issuance of discovery citations, and her right to file a reply, respectively. Allowing this
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reasoning to support a claim of jurisdiction under Rule 304(b)(1) would undermine the rule’s
purpose in promoting judicial economy that Judith herself cites and would lead to the untenable
result of rendering any decision on an objection or motion in a probate proceeding to be
immediately subject to interlocutory appeal. Judith cites to nonprecedential case law to support
her argument that this court has jurisdiction to review the probate court’s decision. One case,
Cori v. Schlafly, 2021 IL App (5th) 210146-U, is cited because the appellant therein appealed
an order granting partial summary judgment and ordering the administrator of the estate to
make a distribution and to provide an accounting of how that distribution was made. Summary
judgment is not an issue in this appeal and therefore Judith’s citation is clearly inapposite.
¶ 28 Judith further relies on the “attendant to” language of Westphal to establish jurisdiction for
these orders as well. None of the decisions that Judith appeals are attendant to the petition for
executor’s commission. Each was decided at the same time and each is, in some sense or
another, related to the assets of the estate, but are not connected necessarily to the petition for
executor’s commission, as would be required to find jurisdiction under Olympic Federal, 113
Ill. App. 3d at 984.
¶ 29 We now examine those issues where jurisdiction does lie with this court: Lawrence’s
petition for executor’s commission and his petition to amend that petition.
¶ 30 II. Standard of Review
¶ 31 Both parties assert and this court agrees that the appropriate standard of review for each
issue presented in the instant appeal is abuse of discretion, “the most deferential standard of
review—next to no review at all.” Evans v. Cook County State’s Attorney, 2021 IL 125513(quoting In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 356 (2007)). “An abuse of discretion occurs only when the
circuit court’s ruling is arbitrary or fanciful or when no reasonable person would adopt the
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view of the court.” Brown v. Illinois State Police, 2021 IL 126153 (citing Seymour v. Collins,
2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41).
¶ 32 III. Amendment to the Petition for Executor’s Commission
¶ 33 Judith argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Lawrence’s petition
to amend his petition for executor’s commission. She argues that the probate court’s decision
to grant the motion without allowing her the opportunity to file objections “deprived [her] of
the opportunity to substantively respond to the modified entries.” Judith does not explain how
she would have responded to the amended petition before any amendment was made. Judith
further argues that because the probate court granted the amended petition without her having
the opportunity to review it, the probate court again deprived her of the opportunity to respond
substantively to the amendment. Judith cites to Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Temple as
Trustee of Carla S. Temple Family Trust, 2019 IL App (4th) 150346 for the proposition that
this appeal should be remanded to give her an opportunity to respond, but her citation is in two
ways inapposite: First, it seems, based on her argument, that she intended to cite instead to the
first appeal in that litigation, Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Temple as Trustee of Carla
S. Temple Family Trust, 2017 IL App (4th) 150346. Second, that case concerns a traverse
hearing in the context of eminent domain, which, as the court there pointed out, constitutes the
one and only opportunity for the landowner to rebut a rebuttable presumption key to whether
the power of eminent domain was validly exercised. Id. Not only is the cited case easily
distinguishable by its specific context, but there is no rebuttable presumption at issue in the
case at bar.
¶ 34 Judith’s actual assertion that the probate court abused its authority lacks any further citation
to authority and is entirely separate. Judith asserts that “the trial court abused its discretion
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when it allowed Lawrence’s amended fee petition without requiring him to explain the reasons
for his original errors.” Accordingly, Judith has presented no actual argument that the probate
court’s granting Lawrence’s petition to amend was an abuse of discretion. However, even if
we assume this to be an error in drafting and apply an abuse of discretion standard to the
probate court’s decision viewed in the light of each of Judith’s arguments, those regarding
amendment are entirely without relevant legal support.
¶ 35 Lastly, the probate court’s decision is reasonable within this particular set of facts.
According to the report of proceedings, the probate court stated on the record:
“I hadn’t had the chance to review it. The one I reviewed was the petition that was
filed on January 12 of 2021. Whatever dates you amended they’re simply dates. I’m
not -- my ruling has nothing to do with the actual court date. My ruling has to do with
the hours and what is noted. So if I get the date wrong, I’ve already reviewed it and I
already went through it so I’m not going to go through your amended petition. But I’m
allowing you to file it and amend whatever the court date was.”
¶ 36 While it is generally unreasonable for the court to grant a motion without reading it, the
inconsequential nature of the amendment and the quagmire of objections to every detail that
this case had previously presented made the decision a reasonable one. As the probate court
noted, Lawrence stated in his petition to amend his petition for executor’s commission that he
had entered some dates incorrectly, but that the hours and content of the entries was accurate.
As such, the correction of those errors would not have any impact on the amount requested in
the petition for commission or that the probate court subsequently granted. The probate court’s
decision to move forward in the administration of this estate, within the context of the
numerous motions, objections, and recriminations, was in the interest of judicial economy. If,
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at the time the amended petition was submitted, it did not match Lawrence’s assertions and
there were, in fact, changes beyond mere corrections to dates, there would be time yet for
objections and for the probate court to modify its decision. To grind the estate to a halt once
again to allow Judith time to substantively respond to some changed dates would have had no
meaningful impact on the outcome of the proceedings. We cannot find that the probate court’s
decision was arbitrary or fanciful, or that no reasonable person would have come to the same
decision. Accordingly, the probate court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm its decision
to grant Lawrence’s petition to amend his petition for executor’s commission.
¶ 37 IV. Executor’s Commission
¶ 38 A representative of an estate is entitled to reasonable compensation for their services. 755
ILCS 5/27-1 (West 2020). Our court has previously held that “[f]actors which may be
considered in determining the reasonableness of fees include good faith, diligence and
reasonable prudence used by the attorneys; time expended; the size of the estate; the work
which was done; the skills and qualifications of the counsel; the novelty and complexity of the
issues confronted; and the benefits conferred on the client by the legal services rendered.” In
re Estate of Halas, 159 Ill. App. 3d 818, 832 (1987). Further, the matter of what amounts to
reasonable compensation for the representative of an estate is “a matter peculiarly within the
discretion of the Probate Court.” In re Estate of Brown, 58 Ill. App. 3d 697, 706 (1978). As
such, we agree with the parties that the relevant standard of review for this issue is abuse of
discretion. Further, for a reviewing court to alter a probate court’s allowance to an executor,
“a reviewing court is required to find that the trial court’s determination is manifestly or
palpably erroneous.” Matter of Minsky’s Estate, 59 Ill. App. 3d 974, 978 (1978).
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¶ 39 On appeal, Judith concludes that “it was an abuse of discretion to grant Lawrence’s fee
petition in part,” but it is difficult to discern what argument Judith is making to arrive at that
conclusion. Judith’s brief cites to case law to establish the general legal framework around
estate representatives and the factors a court should use to determine whether a representative’s
fees are reasonable. Judith then enumerates time entries to which she objected in the probate
court and asserts with regard to each that “this time provided no apparent advantage or benefit
to this Estate.” In no instance does Judith provide any more in-depth examination of how the
law applies to the facts of this case, nor does she provide any more specific citation to the law.
She also fails to explain how the probate court incorrectly applied the law. After these
recitations of fact, Judith asserts that, because Lawrence allegedly did not respond
substantively to her arguments, her assertions should be deemed true under Higgens v. House,
288 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1997). After her citation to Higgens, Judith notes that the probate court
“never explained how these time entries benefitted the Viateur Estate” and then concludes that
the probate court abused its discretion.
¶ 40 Higgens concerns a matter of a failure of a party to respond to a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 546-47. Further, Higgens finds only that the court was justified in granting
summary judgment after the non-moving party failed to substantiate its allegations. Id. The
ruling in Higgens is inapplicable to the case at bar, and we reject Judith’s assertion that the
mere failure of a party to respond to a motion means that everything asserted in that motion
should be accepted by the court as true. Without any argument to consider beyond Judith’s
Higgens argument, we cannot conclude that the probate court’s decision was palpably
erroneous, arbitrary, fanciful, nor a decision that no reasonable person would adopt.
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Accordingly, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in granting Lawrence’s fee petition
in part.
¶ 41 V. Forfeiture
Lastly, Judith argues in the alternative that the probate court abused its discretion by
granting Lawrence’s petition for executor’s commission without first resolving “all matters of
Lawrence’s fiduciary misconduct, and related recovery for this estate, the James Estate, and
the Thomas Estate.” Judith includes no legal argument or citation in her brief to support her
assertion that the probate court abused its discretion.
¶ 42 “A point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore
forfeited.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (argument in appellate brief must be
supported by citation); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005); In re Marriage of Bates,
212 Ill. 2d 489, 517 (2004) (“A reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with
relevant authority cited”); Rosier v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d 559, 568 (2006)
(holding that, by failing to offer any supporting legal authority or reasoning, plaintiffs waived
consideration of their theory for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants); Ferguson v.
Bill Berger Associates, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d 61, 78 (1998) (“it is not necessary to decide this
question since the defendant has waived the issue” by failing to offer case citation or other
support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires). Judith’s final argument is therefore forfeited and
will not be considered.
¶ 43 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decisions of the probate court with regard to
allowing amendment of the petition for executor’s commission and granting the requested
executor’s commission in part. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the issues of whether the
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probate court erred in overruling Judith’s objections to the pro-forma final accounting, in
denying Judith’s motion to file a reply, in denying Judith’s motion for discovery, and in
denying Judith’s motion for subpoenas. We find that the issue of whether the May 18, 2021
order was premature is forfeited.
¶ 44 Affirmed in part, dismissed in part.
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