People v. Eastling ( 2008 )

First Division
October 20, 2008
No. 1-05-2969
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
)
v. ) No. 00 CR 24953
)
)
JOSEPH EASTLING, )
) Honorable
) James M. Schreier,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial, defendant Joseph Eastling was found
guilty of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Dwayne
Cobbins. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to natural life
imprisonment without parole.
Defendant contends on appeal that his sixth amendment right
to confront witnesses against him was violated when the trial
court improperly admitted State witness Julius Wilson's prior
statements to the grand jury and his prior statements to police
as substantive evidence under section 115-10.1 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West
1998)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The State presented evidence that on February 29, 2000, at
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approximately 4:15 in the afternoon, defendant and two of his
fellow gang members, one of whom is a codefendant and the other
who is now deceased, drove up beside the victim's double-parked
car and fatally shot the victim as he sat in the car talking to a
man standing curbside. The State theorized that the shooting was
motivated by a gang war between defendant's gang, The One Ways,
and the victim's gang, The Imperial Insane Vice Lords or Double
I's.
Julius Wilson, a convicted felon, was called as a witness by
the State. Wilson testified that at the time of the shooting he
was a member of the Traveling Vice Lords street gang. Wilson's
gang was affiliated with the defendant's gang.
At the time of his testimony, Wilson was being held in
custody pursuant to an outstanding warrant in connection with an
unrelated case. On direct examination, Wilson denied ever
appearing before the grand jury. Wilson also denied ever meeting
with Detective Kato to discuss this case, although he initially
admitted that the detective questioned him about the case and he
claimed he was forced into making the statements attributed to
him by the detective.
Detective Kato testified about his meeting with Julius
Wilson. The detective testified that on June 16, 2000, he
received information from a fellow detective that Wilson had
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information concerning the shooting.
Detective Kato testified that Wilson told him that around
March 1, 2000, Wilson had a conversation with defendant during
which defendant stated that he had caught the victim "snoozing"
and had "chopped his ass," meaning he caught the victim off guard
and then fatally shot him. Wilson also identified a photograph
of defendant as the person who admitted to killing the victim.
Detective Kato further testified that Wilson told him that
in April or May 2000, Wilson and defendant observed the police
conduct a police raid on a building located at 4235 West
Kamerling. Wilson stated that the defendant became visibly upset
when he saw a police officer exit the building carrying a rifle.
According to Wilson, defendant claimed that the rifle was the
same firearm he used to kill the victim.
Detective Kato testified that Wilson gave his statement
under his own free will, he was never threatened into giving the
statement, and he was not offered anything in exchange for his
information.
Based on Wilson's information, Detective Kato was able to
locate the rifle recovered in the police raid. The rifle fit the
description of the firearm Wilson claimed he observed during the
raid.
The prosecutor confronted Wilson with a transcript of his
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grand jury testimony after he denied appearing before the grand
jury. When the prosecutor read Wilson the questions and answers
from the transcript, Wilson denied giving each and every answer
attributed to him.
At this point, the trial court asked defense counsel for
defendant if he would stipulate that according to the court
reporter's notes the aforementioned questions and answers were
asked and given during Wilson's grand jury examination. Defense
counsel agreed to the stipulation.
Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Ed Maloney then testified
about the circumstances surrounding Wilson's grand jury
testimony. ASA Maloney testified that on September 20, 2000, he
presented Wilson to the grand jury in connection with this case.
ASA Maloney testified that he asked Wilson a series of questions
concerning the shooting incident and that Wilson provided him
with a series of answers to those questions.
ASA Maloney then identified State's exhibit No. 46 as a true
and correct copy of the transcript of Wilson's grand jury
testimony. However, the trial court did not allow him to publish
the contents of the transcript to the jury because the court
determined that the State had already read through the transcript
during Wilson's direct examination.
While the jury was out deliberating, the trial court called
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Julius Wilson and his counsel before the bench, stating as
follows:
"THE COURT: The State just finished their last argument
in this case. I'm going to give the State until Friday to
see whether or not they are going to indict [Wilson] for
perjury and/or contempt. And if they don't do it by Friday,
I'll dismiss the petition. If they do, that will be a whole
different avenue. But I've never seen or heard of any
witness who has denied that he was the person who testified
before the grand jury. I never heard of such a thing. I
never saw it. It might be the first in the annals of
American criminal jurisprudence. But it's not going to be
for me to decide whether he should be indicted for it, or if
he is, whether he's guilty or not guilty.
The case will be held until Friday to see if the State
decides to secure an indictment and if they do, whether
there's a true bill voted. That's all."1
ANALYSIS
1
Julius Wilson was indicted for perjury (People of the
State of Illinois v. Julius Wilson, No. 05 CR 19862 (Cir. Ct.
Cook Co.)). On June 16, 2006, he pled guilty to committing
perjury in the instant case and received a two-year sentence of
imprisonment.
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Defendant now contends on appeal that the admission of
Julius Wilson's prior statements to the grand jury violated
defendant's confrontation rights under the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI) because he
was denied an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Wilson
regarding his alleged grand jury testimony where Wilson claimed
he never appeared before the grand jury.
Defendant also contends that Wilson's prior statements to
the grand jury were inadmissible as substantive evidence under
section 115-10.1(b) of the Code because he was denied an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine Wilson regarding these statements
where Wilson claimed he never appeared before the grand jury.
Defendant further contends that Wilson's prior statements to
Detective Kato were inadmissible as substantive evidence under
section 115-10.1 of the Code because the statements did not meet
the personal knowledge requirement of subsection (c)(2). We
disagree.
Initially, we note that defendant has waived these issues
for review because he failed to raise an objection to the
statements at trial and did not include these issues in his post-
trial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 185-86, 522
N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Furthermore, we find that the plain error
doctrine articulated in Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R.
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615(a)) does not apply because the statements at issue were not
so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial and the
evidence was not closely balanced. People v. Laugharn, 297 Ill.
App. 3d 807, 810-11, 698 N.E.2d 219 (1998).
Nevertheless, even absent waiver, we find that the trial
court did not err in admitting the statements at issue.
We generally review the admissibility of evidence at trial
for an abuse of discretion. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d
105, 109, 637 N.E.2d 1221 (1994). However, we independently
review constitutional issues. People v. Edwards, 309 Ill. App. 3d
447, 452, 722 N.E.2d 258 (1999).
"A criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right
to confront the witnesses against him, which includes the right
to cross-examination." People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 130, 705
N.E.2d 850 (1998); see also People v. Davis, 337 Ill. App. 3d
977, 984, 787 N.E.2d 212 (2003) (confrontation clause gives
criminal defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses against
him in order to show bias, motive, or other factors which might
influence testimony).
However, the confrontation clause guarantees only "'an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish.'" (Emphasis in original.) People
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v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 89, 538 N.E.2d 481 (1989), quoting
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951, 957,
108 S. Ct. 838, 842 (1988). The confrontation clause includes no
guarantee that a witness's testimony will not be "marred by
forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the
[c]onfrontation [c]lause is generally satisfied when the defense
is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these
infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the
attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight
to the witness' testimony." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,
21-22, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 21, 106 S. Ct. 292, 295 (1985).
Consequently, a witness's claimed inability to recall a
prior out-of-court statement does not violate a defendant's right
of confrontation as long as the witness is physically present at
trial, takes an oath to testify truthfully, and answers questions
put to him during cross-examination. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d at 89-
90. Under these circumstances, a defendant has a full and fair
opportunity to expose deliberate falsehoods or genuine flaws in a
witness's memory. See Owens, 484 U.S. at 559, 98 L. Ed. 2d at
958, 108 S. Ct. at 842 (confrontation clause not violated where a
defendant has a full and fair opportunity to bring out a
witness's bad memory and other facts tending to discredit his
testimony).
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Here, Julius Wilson's assertions that he never appeared
before the grand jury and that he never spoke to Detective Kato
about the shooting incident did not deprive defendant of the
opportunity to effectively cross-examine Wilson within the
meaning of the confrontation clause. Wilson was physically
present at trial and confronted the defendant face-to-face, he
was competent to testify and testified under oath, defense
counsel had a full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-
examination, and the judge, jury, and defendant were able to
observe Wilson's demeanor and body language and evaluate for
themselves whether he was being truthful when he testified that
he never appeared before the grand jury and never spoke to
Detective Kato about the shooting incident.
This examination satisfied the primary purpose of the
confrontation clause, which is to facilitate the truth-finding
process by providing the trier of fact with a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of a prior out-of-court statement.
United States v. Baker, 722 F.2d 343, 349 (7th Cir. 1983); People
v. Jenkins, 104 Ill. App. 3d 522, 524-25, 432 N.E.2d 1171 (1982).
In contrast to cases in which the witness either invoked a
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused
to answer questions (Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420, 13 L.
Ed. 2d 934, 938, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (1965)), or claimed to have
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totally not remembered testifying before the grand jury (People
v. Yarbrough, 166 Ill. App. 3d 825, 520 N.E.2d 1116 (1988)),
Wilson testified under oath that he never even appeared before
the grand jury in connection with this case. And although Wilson
testified that he never spoke to Detective Kato about the
shooting incident, he initially admitted that the detective
questioned him about the incident and claimed that he was forced
into making the statements attributed to him by the detective.
The record clearly shows that the defendant was afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine Julius Wilson under oath and
challenge his credibility by calling the jury's attention to
Wilson's contentions that he never appeared before the grand jury
in connection with this case and was never questioned by
Detective Kato concerning the shooting incident.
Finally, even though the portion of Wilson's statement to
Detective Kato in which he claims the defendant told him that he
shot the victim was inadmissible as substantive evidence under
subsection (c)(2) of section 115-10.1 of the Code because Wilson
had no personal knowledge of the event, such admission was
harmless where virtually identical evidence was properly admitted
through other witnesses.
Allen Sanders, a convicted felon, testified that he had
known the victim for about 10 years and that they were both
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members of the same street gang. Sanders claimed he also knew
defendant and codefendant. On redirect, Sanders acknowledged
that he spoke with Detective Sam Cirone at the scene of the
shooting and identified defendant and codefendant as the
individuals who shot and killed the victim.
Jarvell Jones testified that he was a member of the
Conservative Vice Lords street gang and that he grew up on the
same block where the shooting occurred and was friends with the
victim. Jones testified that on the date of the shooting, he was
sitting on his porch when he saw the victim sitting in his car
talking to a man standing curbside. At that point, defendant's
car pulled up beside the victim's car.
Jarvell Jones testified that defendant was driving the
vehicle, and that the codefendant, who was sitting in the front
passenger seat, reached across defendant and shot at the victim.
Jones estimated that about 10 shots were fired. On cross-
examination, Jones testified that he had seen defendant on two
prior occasions and recognized him because defendant had once
pulled a gun on him.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment
of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
R. GORDON, P.J., and WOLFSON, J., concur.
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