In re Estate of Cage ( 2008 )

SIXTH DIVISION
March 14, 2008
No. 1-07-1297
In re ESTATE OF ERIC CAGE, ) Appeal from the Circuit
Deceased ) Court of Cook County.
)
(Sherlie Butler, )
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 06 P 7610)
Lahienda Thompson, as )
Administrator of the Estate of )
Eric Cage, ) Honorable
) Jeffrey A. Malak,
Cross-petitioner-Appellee). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioner Sherlie Butler appeals from the circuit court's
order that denied Butler's petition for letters of administration
and granted cross-petitioner Lahienda Thompson's cross-petition
for letters of administration pertaining to the estate of
decedent Eric Cage. On appeal, Butler contends that the circuit
court erred when the court determined that Thompson, who is the
mother and court-appointed guardian of decedent's children, had a
higher statutory preference of appointment as compared to Butler,
who is decedent's sister, under certain provisions of the Probate
Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/9-1 et. seq. (West 2006)) (the Act). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
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In September 2006, decedent died as a result of a vehicle
collision involving his vehicle and an unmarked Chicago police
department vehicle. Decedent was survived by his three minor
children, namely, Eric Cage, Jr., Eriel Cage, and Erin Cage.
Thompson is the mother of decedent's three minor children, but
she and decedent were never married.
On October 23, 2006, Butler filed a petition for letters of
administration, wherein she sought to be appointed independent
administrator of decedent's estate. In that petition, in
pertinent part, Butler identified herself as decedent's sister.
Butler also identified decedent's three minor children as
individuals who were entitled to nominate or administer equally
or in preference to her. In addition, Butler attached to her
petition her affidavit, wherein she attested that Thompson was
the mother of decedent's three minor children and those children
lived with Thompson.
On October 24, 2006, the circuit court entered an order
declaring decedent's heirship, which declared that decedent's
three minor children were decedent's only heirs.
On October 25, 2006, the circuit court appointed Butler
administrator to collect for decedent's estate.
On October 30, 2006, Thompson sent Butler's attorney a
letter indicating that she was objecting to the appointment of
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Butler as independent administrator of decedent's estate.
On December 19, 2006, the circuit court entered an order
appointing Thompson the guardian of her and decedent's three
minor children.
On December 20, 2006, the circuit court entered an order
granting Thompson leave to file a cross-petition for letters of
administration in connection with decedent's estate.
That same day, December 20, 2006, Thompson filed her cross-
petition for letters of administration, wherein she sought to be
appointed independent administrator of decedent's estate. In
that petition, in pertinent part, Thompson identified herself as
guardian of decedent's three minor children and indicated that no
one had a higher statutory preference to become the administrator
of decedent's estate.
In January 2007, Butler responded to Thompson's cross-
petition for letters of administration and urged the trial court
to deny Thompson's cross-petition. Butler maintained that
Thompson was never married to decedent and was never related to
decedent in any way. According to Butler, the plain language of
section 9-3 of the Act permitted the guardian of a minor, such as
Thompson, to "only file letters of administration for the purpose
of nominating someone in the order of preference (e.g. a spouse
or sibling)." Butler further argued that "there is no provision
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in Section 9-3 allowing [Thompson], the guardian of a minor, the
right to nominate someone outside the preference list, including
herself."
In February 2007, Thompson replied and argued that she was
qualified to act as an administrator of decedent's estate and had
been appointed guardian of decedent's minor children. Thompson
argued that as their guardian, she had a statutory right and
authority to nominate on behalf of those minors. Thompson
further argued that decedent's minor children had a higher
statutory preference over Butler, who was decedent's sister.
In March 2007, the circuit court entered an order appointing
Thompson independent administrator of decedent's estate. In
particular, the court found that Thompson, as guardian of
decedent's minor children, had preference over Butler, as a
sibling of decedent, under section 9-3 of the Act. Accordingly,
the court found that Thompson had preference over Butler to
nominate herself as administrator of decedent's estate.
In April 2007, the circuit court denied Butler's motion to
reconsider.
This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Butler contends that the circuit court erred when
the court determined, pursuant to section 9-3 of the Act (755
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ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2006)), that Thompson, as guardian of decedent's
minor children, had a higher statutory preference of appointment
as compared to Butler, as decedent's sibling. Specifically,
Butler asserts that under the plain statutory language of the Act
decedent's minor children "never had the right to nominate on
their own" and that "the only persons on the [statutory]
preference list that Lahienda Thompson could nominate are the
parents of Eric Cage and his siblings."
Because Butler presents an issue involving statutory
construction, we review de novo the circuit court's
interpretation of the applicable provisions of the Act. In re
Estate of Poole, 207 Ill. 2d 393, 401 (2003). When we interpret
a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's
intent, which is best indicated by the plain and ordinary meaning
of the statutory language itself. Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221
Ill. 2d 453, 460 (2006).
Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we
must apply it without resorting to other aids of statutory
construction. Wisniewski, 221 Ill. 2d at 460. However, a
reviewing court must always presume that the legislature did not
intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Fisher
v. Waldrop, 221 Ill. 2d 102, 112 (2006). In addition, we should
consider a statute in its entirety and avoid constructions that
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would render any term or provision meaningless or superfluous.
Fisher, 221 Ill. 2d at 112.
Section 9-1 of the Act is entitled "Who may act as
administrator," and provides:
"A person who has attained the age of 18
years, is a resident of the United States, is
not of unsound mind, is not an adjudged
disabled person as defined in this Act and
has not been convicted of a felony, is
qualified to act as administrator." 755 ILCS
5/9-1 (West 2006).
Section 9-3 of the Act lists categories of persons entitled
to preference in obtaining letters of administration. 755 ILCS
5/9-3 (West 2006); Estate of Poole, 207 Ill. 2d at 402, citing
755 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 1998). In particular, section 9-3
identifies 10 specific categories entitled to preference in
obtaining letters of administration in sequential order. 755
ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2006). In pertinent part, the third category in
order of preference is "[t]he children or any person nominated by
them." 755 ILCS 5/9-3(c) (West 2006). The sixth category in
order of preference is "[t]he brothers and sisters or any person
nominated by them." 755 ILCS 5/9-3(f) (West 2006).
Section 9-3 further provides, relevant to this appeal, that
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the guardian of a person "who is not qualified to act as
administrator solely because of minority *** may nominate on
behalf of the minor *** in accordance with the order of
preference set forth in this Section." 755 ILCS 5/9-3 (West
2006).
Here, after carefully interpreting the plain and ordinary
meaning of sections 9-1 and 9-3 of the Act, we agree with the
circuit court's conclusion that Thompson, as guardian of
decedent's minor children, has a higher statutory preference in
nominating an administrator and obtaining letters of
administration when compared to Butler, as decedent's sibling.
Most significantly, it is undeniable that section 9-3 of the
Act explicitly and unambiguously provides that decedent's
children have higher preference in obtaining letters of
administration when compared to Butler, who is decedent's sister.
755 ILCS 5/9-3(c),(e) (West 2006). While section 9-1 of the Act
(755 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2006)) precludes decedent's minor children
from serving as administrators of decedent's estate solely
because of their minority status, those minor children are
nonetheless entitled under section 9-3 to be represented by their
guardian, in this case Thompson, who is indisputably authorized
to "nominate [an administrator] on behalf of the minor."
(Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2006).
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Furthermore, contrary to Butler's contentions otherwise,
there is nothing in the Act's provisions that prohibits Thompson
from nominating herself as the administrator of decedent's
estate. In fact, section 9-1 of the Act, which is entitled "Who
may act as administrator," rather broadly defines an eligible
administrator as an individual who (1) is at least 18 years of
age; (2) is a resident of the United States; (3) is not of
unsound mind; (4) is not an adjudged disabled person; and (5) is
not a convicted felon. 755 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2006). In the case
sub judice, as Butler implicitly concedes by not arguing to the
contrary, there is absolutely no evidence that Thompson fails to
satisfy the requirements of section 9-1.
Ultimately, after carefully interpreting the plain and
ordinary meaning of the statutory language of sections 9-1 and 9-
3 as a whole, we find that the Thompson, as guardian of
decedent's minor children, was authorized to nominate herself as
administrator of decedent's estate and had a higher preference to
do so than Butler, who is decedent's sister.
We are not persuaded by Butler's strained interpretation of
sections 9-1 and 9-3 of the Act. First, we acknowledge, as
Butler maintains, that decedent's minor children were ineligible
to serve as administrator of decedent's estate or nominate an
administrator because of their minority status. However, we
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reiterate that the Act clearly provides a mechanism whereby the
interests of minor children are to be represented by the guardian
of such minor children. See 755 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2006)
(providing that a guardian of a person "who is not qualified to
act as administrator solely because of minority *** may nominate
on behalf of the minor). Here, Thompson was the undisputed
guardian of decedent's minor children and was thus empowered
under section 9-3 to nominate on their behalf.
Second, we reject Butler's assertion that Thompson was
limited to nominating only those individuals who were identified
in the preference list of section 9-3. Specifically, Butler
argues that, pursuant to section 9-3, Thompson was limited to
nominating either decedent's parents or decedent's siblings,
including Butler. However, Butler's strict interpretation of
section 9-3 would render superfluous and meaningless the broad
and clear definition of eligible administrators under section 9-1
of the Act, which is an unfavorable outcome that we necessarily
reject. See, e.g., Fisher, 221 Ill. 2d at 112 (reviewing court
should avoid a statutory interpretation that renders any term
meaningless or superfluous).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
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Affirmed.
McBride, P.J., and McNulty, J., concur.
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REPORTER OF DECISIONS - ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
TITLE In re ESTATE OF ERIC CAGE, Deceased
of Case
(Sherlie Butler,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Lahienda Thompson, as Administrator of the Estate of
Eric Cage,
Cross-Petitioner-Appellee).
Docket No.
1-07-1297
COURT
Appellate Court of Illinois
First District, Sixth Division
Opinion
MARCH 14, 2008
Filed
JUSTICES
JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:
McBRIDE, P.J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
Appeal's
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Origination
The Hon. Jeffrey A. Malak, Judge Presiding.
Counsel for For Appellant, Matthew C. Friedman, Friedman &
APPELLANT Bonebrake, P.C., Chicago, Illinois.
Counsel for For Appellee, Michael W. Rathsack, Chicago,
APPELLEE Illinois.
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