People v. Way , 2015 IL App (5th) 130096 ( 2015 )

NOTICE
2015 IL App (5th) 130096
Decision f iled 09/25/15. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-13-0096
changed or corr ected prior to
the f iling of a Petition f or
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 12-CF-486
)
IDA WAY, ) Honorable
) John Baricevic,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Stewart and Schwarm concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The defendant, Ida Way, appeals her conviction, following a stipulated bench trial
in the circuit court of St. Clair County, for the offense of aggravated driving under the
influence (DUI). For the following reasons, we reverse the defendant's conviction and
remand for further proceedings.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 The facts necessary to our disposition of this appeal follow. They are derived
from this court's review of the record on appeal. On March 30, 2012, the defendant was
charged, by information, with three counts of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6),
1
(d)(1)(C) (West 2010)), following an investigation into a traffic accident in which the
defendant was involved on January 28, 2012. The accident resulted in serious injuries to
the defendant's 14-year-old son, who was a passenger in the vehicle the defendant was
driving, and to the driver of another vehicle, Emily Wood, who was pregnant at the time
of the accident, but whose baby was later born healthy and has remained so. The
defendant's son reported to responding police officers that the defendant "fell asleep" just
prior to the accident. The State's theory of the case, as reflected in the wording of the
charges, was that at the time of the accident, the defendant was operating her vehicle
"while there was an amount of a drug, substance or compound in her breath, blood, or
urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis."
¶4 On December 17, 2012, the State filed both its first and its second motions in
limine. The first motion in limine is not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. In the
second motion, the State contended that the defendant's medical reports "suggest another
possible reason for the defendant losing consciousness and causing the vehicle crash" in
question. The State posited that pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois
in People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, in an aggravated DUI case involving the presence
of illegal drugs in a defendant's system, the State is not required to prove that impairment
by the drugs was the proximate cause of the victims' deaths or injuries; to the contrary,
the State need prove only that the defendant's driving was a proximate cause of the deaths
or injuries. Pursuant to its understanding of the holding of Martin, the State asked the
trial court to prohibit the defendant from introducing evidence, or making argument, with
2
regard to other possible reasons for the defendant's loss of consciousness prior to the
accident.
¶5 On January 3, 2013, the defendant filed a response to the State's motion, arguing
therein that although the defendant agreed that under Martin, the State did not have to
prove impairment, the defendant nevertheless should be allowed to introduce evidence to
rebut any presumption of impairment, because if the defendant were not allowed to do
this, the statute would contain what the defendant deemed an "unconstitutional ***
mandatory, irrebuttable presumption."
¶6 On January 4, 2013, the trial judge entered a written order in which he ruled in
favor of the State. He first noted that the position of the defendant was, inter alia, "that
the causal connection must be able to be rebutted." The trial judge disagreed, writing that
his reading of the statute indicated a legislative intent to require "strict liability as to the
accident." He ruled that "[t]he State must prove that there was an accident with the
defendant driving one car," and that the injured person was injured "as a result of the
accident." However, he added that in his opinion, "further causal connection is not
required" because the statute "established a system that makes any driver responsible for
the outcome of an accident if there is any level of drugs in the system" of that driver.
¶7 On January 7, 2013, the case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. After ensuring
that the defendant's waiver of her right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary, 1 the
1
We commend the trial judge for his detailed and thorough admonishment of the
defendant with regard to this and other procedural issues and rights throughout this case.
3
trial judge allowed the parties to stipulate to the following facts pertinent to this appeal:
(1) a police officer who investigated the accident would testify that the defendant told
him she had used cannabis at some point prior to the accident, and he found cannabis on
the ground near her open purse; (2) the defendant's son would testify that the defendant,
who was driving, "started to fall asleep" just prior to the accident, and he attempted to
grab the steering wheel but could not stop the vehicle from crossing the center lane and
crashing into Wood's vehicle; (3) a qualified forensic scientist would lay a proper
foundation and would testify that the defendant's urine specimen, taken following the
accident, contained THC metabolite, which results from the use of cannabis; and (4) both
the defendant's son and Wood "suffered great bodily harm" as a result of the accident.
¶8 In addition to the above stipulations, counsel for the defendant noted that had
there been a jury trial, and had he been allowed to do so, he would have called to testify:
(1) the defendant, who would have testified that she did not use "any illegal drugs" on the
day of the accident; and (2) the defendant's physician, Dr. Helen McDermott, who would
have testified that the defendant has low blood pressure, and that "it is possible that the
loss of consciousness right before the accident was caused by this condition and not
caused by any particular drug." The trial judge found that although there was evidence of
an "illegal substance" in the defendant's blood, there was nevertheless "not evidence of
impairment." The judge reiterated that proof of impairment was not required pursuant to
Martin, and ruled that sufficient evidence existed to find the defendant guilty of all three
counts against her. He withheld entering judgment on the counts until the State could
complete research and present argument regarding the merger of the counts.
4
¶9 On February 21, 2013, a sentencing hearing was held. Wood testified that she
had settled her civil litigation with the defendant's insurance company, and that the
settlement was sufficient to cover her medical bills and "lost finances due to the crash."
The defendant testified, reiterating that although she had used cannabis prior to the
accident, she had not used it on the actual day of the accident. She acknowledged that at
the time of the accident her driving privileges were revoked due to a prior DUI, and that
she should not have been driving. In allocution, the defendant apologized for the
accident and expressed empathy for Wood and the injuries Wood sustained. She stated
as well that she was "glad [Wood's] baby is okay. "
¶ 10 Following argument by the parties, the trial judge discussed factors in mitigation,
stating that "level of impairment is absolutely a mitigation," and that "[t]here's another
statute that the State could have charged if they believed there was impairment." He also
noted in mitigation the defendant's "acceptance and responsibility for her actions," and in
aggravation the fact that the defendant's driving privileges were revoked at the time of the
accident and that she "shouldn't have been behind the wheel." Noting again that he found
"no impairment," and that this is the defendant's first felony conviction, he sentenced the
defendant to a term of imprisonment of 18 months in the Illinois Department of
Corrections, to be followed by 1 year of mandatory supervised release. The parties
agreed, following their research, that the three counts merged; accordingly, the trial judge
entered judgment and sentence on the first count only. This timely appeal followed.
5
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 The sole issue presented on appeal by the defendant is that she was denied her
right to present a defense at trial because she was not allowed to contest the "proximate
cause" element of her aggravated DUI charge. The defendant points out the fundamental
precept that an individual charged with a criminal offense has the right to present one or
more defenses to the offense, and to present his or her " 'version of the facts as well as the
prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it may decide where the truth lies.' " People v.
Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1977) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19
(1967)). "[C]onsistent with the right to present a defense, there is the right of an accused
to show, by competent evidence, facts which tend to" negate one or more elements of the
offense charged. Id. The State does not quarrel with this well-established precept;
instead, the State contends the defendant was not denied her right to present evidence
related to any of the elements of the offense with which she was charged, and that even if
the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence the defendant wished to present, such error
was harmless. We shall address these contentions in more detail below.
¶ 13 With regard to the defense the defendant wished to present at trial, the defendant
correctly lays out the relevant statutory scheme: pursuant to section 11-501(a)(6) of the
Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2010)), a person in Illinois is
prohibited from driving a vehicle while "there is any amount of a drug, substance, or
compound in the person's breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or
consumption of cannabis" or certain other controlled substances. Violation of this
prohibition is generally a Class A misdemeanor. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(c)(1) (West 2010).
6
However, violation of the prohibition constitutes aggravated DUI, and therefore is a
felony, under certain delineated circumstances; the circumstance under which the
defendant in the case at bar was charged and convicted, and therefore the circumstance
relevant to this appeal, is when the person who violates the prohibition "was involved in a
motor vehicle accident that resulted in great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries." 625
ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2010).
¶ 14 As noted above, the parties stipulated that the accident in question resulted in great
bodily harm to both the defendant's son and Wood, and indeed stipulated to permanent
disability to Wood in the form of continuing pain when walking. They also stipulated to
the fact that the defendant had, in her system, THC metabolite, which results from the use
of cannabis, and that the defendant was driving the vehicle that crossed into Wood's lane
of traffic and struck Wood's vehicle. Moreover, the parties agree on appeal−and indeed
agreed in the trial court−that the State was not required to show that impairment of the
defendant by her use of cannabis was the proximate cause of the accident. The point of
contention between the parties is what does have to be proved with regard to the
proximate cause of the accident, and what kind of defenses a defendant may seek to
introduce at trial in an effort to convince the trier of fact that the defendant's driving did
not proximately cause the accident.
¶ 15 The State contends that this particular type of aggravated DUI is "a strict liability
crime with no element of impairment," and that the State need prove only that the
"defendant's driving was the proximate cause of the accident." The State maintains that
7
the trial court therefore properly granted the State's motion in limine. The defendant
agrees that the State must prove that the defendant's driving proximately caused the
accident, but argues that proximate cause requires, inter alia, foreseeability, and that
therefore the defendant should have been allowed to introduce evidence that might have
convinced the trier of fact that an unforeseeable sudden illness, rather than the defendant's
driving, was the sole and proximate cause of the accident.
¶ 16 In support of this proposition, the defendant points to the body of law developed in
civil cases involving the question of proximate cause, noting that it is well established
that proximate cause requires both cause in fact and legal cause. See, e.g., Lee v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455 (1992). As the Supreme Court of Illinois
pointed out in Lee, these two requirements reflect "a policy decision that limits how far a
defendant's legal responsibility should be extended for conduct that, in fact, caused the
harm." Id. The requirement at issue in this case, legal cause, " 'is essentially a question
of foreseeability.' " Id. at 456 (quoting Masotti v. Console, 195 Ill. App. 3d 838, 845
(1990)). In Evans v. Brown, 399 Ill. App. 3d 238, 246 (2010) (quoting Wald v. Pittsburg,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co., 162 Ill. 545, 551 (1896)), the appellate court
noted the longstanding rule that " '[a] loss or injury is due to the act of God, when it is
occasioned exclusively by natural causes such as could not be prevented by human care,
skill[,] and foresight.' " Relying upon earlier cases, the court went on to hold that "[a]
sudden illness or death that renders a driver incapable of controlling his [or her] car,
provided that the event is unforeseeable and beyond the power of human intervention to
prevent, is an act of God," but cautioned that "liability is only precluded if the alleged act
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of God constitutes the sole and proximate cause of the injuries." Id. The court further
held that the question of whether a sudden illness was foreseeable will almost always be a
question of fact that must be presented to and resolved by the trier of fact, and that it
harbored "strong reservations that, as a matter of law, an affirmative defense based on an
act of God could ever prevail in a summary-judgment context when the plaintiff's injury
arose out of an automobile accident." Id. at 249-50. That is because "[t]o conclude that a
natural event was the sole and proximate cause of such an injury requires irrefutable and
unequivocal evidence, an extremely rare commodity," and because "even when the
evidence presented is seemingly unequivocal, different inferences may still reasonably
flow" from that evidence. Id. at 250. Accordingly, evidence related to a sudden illness
prior to an automobile accident will almost always raise a genuine issue of material fact
that precludes summary judgment. Id. at 252. On the basis of this case law, the
defendant in the case at bar contends that she should have been allowed to present to the
trier of fact the testimony of her physician, Dr. Helen McDermott, that the defendant has
low blood pressure, and that "it is possible that the loss of consciousness right before the
accident was caused by this condition."
¶ 17 The State takes issue with the defendant's reliance on Evans, noting that no drugs
or alcohol were involved in that case, that the State is aware of no criminal cases that
allowed an "act of God" defense, and that at most, the alleged sudden illness of the
defendant in this case would be a proximate cause of the accident, not the "sole"
proximate cause of the accident required by Evans, which means that even if the
exclusion of the evidence was in error, it would constitute harmless error. We find no
9
support in the record or in the law for the State's position. First, the fact that there were
no drugs or alcohol involved in Evans is of no relevance to our analysis, because in this
case the trial judge repeatedly found that there was no evidence of impairment of the
defendant by alcohol or drugs. In other words, although the defendant's urine specimen,
taken following the accident, contained THC metabolite, which results from the use of
cannabis, it was the factual finding of the trial judge−uncontested by the State on
appeal−that there was no evidence that the presence of the metabolite had any connection
to the accident, and we therefore find it illogical to attempt to distinguish Evans on that
basis.
¶ 18 Second, as the defendant points out, the Supreme Court of Illinois has repeatedly
held that " 'the analogies between civil and criminal cases in which individuals are
injured or killed are so close that the principle of proximate cause applies to both classes
of cases.' " People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392, 401 (2006) (quoting People v. Lowery,
178 Ill. 2d 462, 466 (1997)). That is because " '[c]ausal relation is the universal factor
common to all legal liability.' " Id. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Illinois has
repeatedly employed the same definition of proximate cause, and the same general
analysis regarding foreseeability, that we have outlined above, albeit without specifically
incorporating the "act of God" defense into criminal cases. See, e.g., id. We see no
logical reason, however, to bring part, but not all, of the civil law analysis regarding
proximate cause into criminal cases, and the State has suggested none. Certainly, the
General Assembly, in choosing to employ the term "proximate cause" in section
11-501(d)(1)(C) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2010))
10
to explain when an offense would constitute aggravated DUI under circumstances such as
those in the case at bar, was aware of the longstanding meaning of this term in Illinois, as
well as the ramifications of its use, and had the General Assembly wished to limit the
"proximate cause" analysis−by, for example, excluding the "act of God" defense−in
aggravated DUI cases such as this one, it certainly would have chosen appropriate
language to do so. Indeed, had the General Assembly wished to craft the "strict liability"
offense the State claims exists in the case at bar, the General Assembly would have
omitted the ending phrase "when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries" and
left the statute to state instead that aggravated DUI is committed when a driver violates
section 11-501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2010))
and is "involved in a motor vehicle accident that result[s] in great bodily harm or
permanent disability or disfigurement to another." The General Assembly did not craft
the statute in this manner, and we decline to reshape it as the State desires.
¶ 19 Moreover, although the State repeatedly contends that pursuant to People v.
Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26, a "presumption of impairment" exists in aggravated DUI
cases involving the presence of controlled substances, rather than alcohol, in a
defendant's body, that point is undisputed: the parties agree, and this court agrees, that
Martin stands for the proposition that the State is not required to prove impairment in
such cases. However, the Martin court was not asked to address the question before this
court, which as stated above is what must be proved with regard to the proximate cause
of the accident, and what kind of defenses a defendant may seek to introduce at trial in an
effort to convince the trier of fact that the defendant's driving did not proximately cause
11
the accident in question. Therefore, Martin is of limited relevance to the question before
us, although the Martin court did recognize that in a case such as this one, "the central
issue at trial will be proximate cause, not impairment" (id.), a point with which we agree.
¶ 20 Third, we cannot agree with the State that the exclusion of the evidence was
harmless error. The State posits that the alleged sudden illness of the defendant may have
been "a possible secondary reason for [the] defendant falling asleep" just prior to the
accident, but because of the aforementioned "presumption of impairment" it could not be
the sole and proximate cause of the accident. We agree with the defendant that neither
Martin nor any other reported decision stands for such a sweeping proposition, and that
in fact such a proposition is inconsistent with the declaration of the Martin court that in
cases such as this one, proximate cause will be the central issue at trial. See People v.
Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26. Moreover, the defendant has never contended that the
alleged sudden illness was merely a possible secondary reason for her loss of
consciousness; to the contrary, her argument has always been that the trier of fact should
have been allowed to hear evidence and to then decide whether the sudden illness was the
sole and proximate cause of the accident. Based upon Evans and its progeny, as
explained above, if the trier of fact decided the sudden illness was the sole and proximate
cause of the accident, the defendant would prevail, as her driving would not be the legal
cause of the accident and the injuries resulting therefrom; if the trier of fact decided the
sudden illness was, as the State proposes, a secondary cause−or only one of several
causes, or not related to the accident at all−the defendant would not prevail. But that was
12
for the trier of fact to decide, and it was not harmless error for the trial judge to rule
otherwise. See, e.g., Evans v. Brown, 399 Ill. App. 3d 238, 249-52 (2010).
¶ 21 That said, we offer no opinion as to the strength of the defendant's proposed
evidence, nor do we know what evidence the State might have presented, or adduced
during its cross-examination of Dr. McDermott, regarding how foreseeable the alleged
sudden illness of the defendant was; certainly, if Dr. McDermott testified that the
defendant had passed out before while driving, or had been advised that she might pass
out while driving, such testimony could impact the trier of fact's analysis with regard to
foreseeability. Nevertheless, the defendant should have been allowed to present her
evidence, the State should have been allowed to attempt to discredit or rebut that
evidence, and the trier of fact should have been allowed to evaluate it. Accordingly, we
conclude that the defendant was denied her right to present a defense at trial. See, e.g.,
People v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 576 (1977).
¶ 22 CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the defendant's conviction and remand for
further proceedings.
¶ 24 Reversed; cause remanded.
13
2015 IL App (5th) 130096
NO. 5-13-0096
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 12-CF-486
)
IDA WAY, ) Honorable
) John Baricevic,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: September 25, 2015
______________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable James R. Moore, J.
Honorable Bruce D. Stewart, J., and
Honorable S. Gene Schwarm, J.,
Concur
______________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Ellen J. Curry, Deputy
for Defender, Maggie A. Heim, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of
Appellant the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 909 Water Tower
Circle, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
______________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Hon. Brendan F. Kelly, State's Attorney, St. Clair County Courthouse,
for 10 Public Square, Belleville, IL 62220, Patrick Delfino, Director,
Appellee Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Sharon Shanahan, Staff Attorney,
Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 East Illinois
Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
__________________________________________________________________________