National Bank v. Multi National Industries, Inc. ( 1997 )


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  •                               No. 3 95 0763

    _________________________________________________________________

      

                                     IN THE

      

                           APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

      

                                 THIRD DISTRICT

      

                                   A.D., 1997

      

    NATIONAL BANK OF MONMOUTH,    )    Appeal from the Circuit Court

                                 )    of the 9th Judicial Circuit

        Plaintiff-Appellee,      )    Warren County, Illinois

                                 )

        v.                       )

                                 )

    MULTI NATIONAL INDUSTRIES,    )    No. 83 L 35

    INC., MONTY P. McCLELLAN,     )

                                 )

        Defendants-Appellants,   )

                                 )

    MARSHA FESLER NEWMAN,         )    Honorable

                                 )    Patricia A. Walton

        Garnishee.               )    Judge, Presiding.

                                 )

    _________________________________________________________________

      

    JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:

    _________________________________________________________________

        This case involves an intricate maze of legal maneuvering in

    the state and federal courts.  We are now faced with putting the

    final piece of this puzzle into place.

      

                               PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      

        Monty P. McClellan is a physician who worked at the M & S

    Medical Center, S.C. (Center).  He had a vested interest in the

    Center's pension and profit-sharing qualified plans (plan); the

    plan was subject to the provisions of the federal Employee

    Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. §1001 et

    seq. (1975)).

        The bank received a $150,145.53 default judgment against

    McClellan on February 9, 1984, and subsequently obtained a non-wage

    garnishment order.  A few days later, both McClellan and the Center

    filed for bankruptcy, and a bankruptcy trustee was appointed.  The

    bankruptcy court ordered the plan's custodian to turn the plan

    funds over to the trustee, who used them, in part, to satisfy

    claims from other employees of the Center.

        On August 7, 1992, McClellan filed a "Motion for Distribution

    of Exempt Property" seeking recovery of the remaining plan funds

    from the trustee.  The bank objected, claiming that the

    distribution request was barred by the garnishment order.  The

    bankruptcy court denied McClellan's motion, finding that the funds

    were part of the bankruptcy estate.  Both parties appealed this

    decision to the United States District Court, which affirmed.

    McClellan then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for

    the Seventh Circuit, and the bank cross-appealed.

        On January 6, 1995, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district

    court, retroactively applying the decision in Patterson v. Shumate,

    504 U.S. 753, 119 L. Ed. 2d 519, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).  In

    Patterson, the Supreme Court held that assets in ERISA-qualified

    plans never become part of a bankruptcy estate.  Patterson, 504

    U.S. at 759, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 528, 112 S. Ct. at 2247.

    Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did

    not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plan or its assets

    and could not order the funds to be turned over to the trustee.

        On March 29, 1995, the trustee had $81,281.44 of the original

    plan funds.  The bank revived its default judgment against

    McClellan and filed an affidavit for a non-wage garnishment.

    McClellan then filed a motion in the bankruptcy court seeking a

    direct rollover of the funds into his individual retirement account

    (IRA).  On June 13, 1995, the bankruptcy judge found that the

    trustee had no interest in the funds and ordered her to turn them

    over as directed by the Illinois trial court in the garnishment

    action.  An appeal was taken to the federal district court.

        Meanwhile, on September 25, 1995, the state trial court

    ordered that the funds be turned over to the bank.  McClellan

    appealed the trial court's order to this court.

        On October 31, 1995, the federal district court vacated the

    bankruptcy court's order as void for want of jurisdiction.

    McClellan appealed that decision to the Seventh Circuit; we stayed

    the instant appeal until after the Seventh Circuit affirmed the

    district court on November 7, 1996.

      

                      ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION

      

        The Seventh Circuit's November 7 ruling vacated the bankruptcy

    court's June 13, 1995, order, holding that the court lacked subject

    matter jurisdiction to order the transfer of the funds.  The

    Seventh Circuit concluded, "[A]ll that remains is the Bank's

    original state court garnishment action.  ***  When all is said and

    done, the proper forum to hear [McClellan's] appeal of the state

    court's decision is the Illinois Appellate Court."  We agree and

    now address the merits of the instant appeal.

      

                                        

                                 THE PLAN FUNDS

      

        McClellan argues that the plan funds remain protected from

    garnishment by the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA.  See 29

    U.S.C. §1056(d) (1982).  The bank objects, contending that since

    the funds were taken by the trustee, they are no longer protected

    by ERISA and may be garnished.

        "The anti-alienation provision required for ERISA

    qualification *** constitutes an enforceable transfer restriction

    for purposes of *** exclusion of property from the bankruptcy

    estate."  Patterson, 504 U.S. at 760, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 528, 112 S.

    Ct. at 2248.  A bankruptcy court thus has no subject matter

    jurisdiction over ERISA funds.  See, e.g., In re Hagel, 171 B.R.

    686, 688 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994), aff'd, 184 B.R. 793 (Bankr. 9th

    Cir. 1995).  Every act of a court without subject matter

    jurisdiction is void.  In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64, 619 N.E.2d

    702, 709 (1993).  Void orders are a complete nullity from their

    inception and have no legal effect.  In re Application of Cook

    County Collector, 228 Ill. App. 3d 719, 731, 593 N.E.2d 538, 547

    (1991).  Such orders may not change the status of a case.  See In

    re Marriage of Hale, 278 Ill. App. 3d 53, 56, 662 N.E.2d 180, 183

    (1996).

        Here, the plan funds never became part of the bankruptcy

    estate.  The bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

    over the plan and exceeded its authority by ordering the assets

    turned over to the trustee.  The bankruptcy court's void transfer

    order did not and could not vitiate the anti-alienation protection

    provided by ERISA.  See Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville v.

    Irving Trust Co., 786 F.2d 466, 468 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating in

    dicta that ERISA protection does not end even if the funds are

    moved under court order).  The bank is not entitled to possession

    of the remaining funds.

        Plan funds can lose their protection if they are distributed

    without being rolled over into another ERISA-qualified account

    within the requisite time (see Tenneco, Inc. v. First Virginia Bank

    of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688, 691 (4th Cir. 1983)).  However, the

    funds in this case have not been distributed to McClellan or his

    representative.  McClellan's motion for distribution requested a

    rollover directly into his IRA, which is not subject to garnishment

    in Illinois.  See 735 ILCS 5/12-1006 (West 1992).  Under the

    circumstances of this case, this option remains viable.

        Congress intended ERISA "to safeguard a stream of income for

    pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually

    are, blameless), even if that decision prevents others from

    securing relief for the wrongs done them.  If exceptions to this

    policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task."

    Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365,

    376, 107 L. Ed. 2d 782, 795, 110 S. Ct. 680, 687 (1990).

                                   CONCLUSION

      

        For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of

    Warren County is reversed and remanded.

        Reversed and remanded.

        HOLDRIDGE and McCUSKEY, JJ., concur.