In re Y.A. , 383 Ill. App. 3d 311 ( 2008 )

No. 3--07--0568
_________________________________________________________________
Filed June 18, 2008
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2008
In re Y.A., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
a Minor ) Peoria County, Illinois,
)
(The People of the State of )
Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 06--JA--306
)
v. )
)
P.A., ) Honorable
) Albert L. Purham, Jr.,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the Opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The trial court adjudicated the one year old minor, Y.A.
neglected because he lived in an environment injurious to his
welfare. 705 ILCS 405/2--3 (West 2006). At the dispositional
hearing, the trial court found the respondent, P.A., fit but made
the minor a ward of the court and named the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) as guardian with the right to place.
The respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court (1) abused its
discretion by placing the minor outside his home; and (2) erred in
denying his motion for sanctions. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 27, 2006, the State filed a petition alleging that
the minor was neglected. 705 ILCS 405/2--3 (West 2006). The
petition alleged the minor was neglected because: (1) his mother
and father, the respondent, were previously found unfit in prior
juvenile proceedings and there was not a subsequent finding of
fitness in those proceedings; and (2) the minor's mother and the
respondent had not completed services that would have resulted in
the return home of the minors involved in those prior juvenile
proceedings. On that same date, the trial court entered an order
for temporary shelter care and placed the minor in the custody of
DCFS based on the allegations in the petition. The respondent did
not appear at the shelter care hearing.
On January 3, 2007, the minor's mother stipulated to the
allegations in the petition. On January 17, the respondent
stipulated to the allegations concerning the minor's mother but
denied the allegations concerning himself. On March 30, the State
notified the respondent that a significant error had been made in
the neglect petition. The State had improperly stated in the
petition that the respondent had been found unfit in the prior
juvenile proceedings when, in fact, he had been found fit but
reserved. The State indicated that it would amend the petition at
the next hearing. On April 17, the State made an oral motion to
amend the petition, which the trial court granted.
On May 16, 2007, the respondent filed a motion for sanctions
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pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) against the
signatories of the original neglect petition--Michael Mettel, a
DCFS investigator, and Janine Mallicoat, a paralegal for the State.
The motion alleged that the signatories filed a false pleading in
that they misrepresented the respondent's fitness in prior juvenile
proceedings.
On June 19, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on the
respondent's motion for sanctions. Mettel testified that he had
been a DCFS investigator for 14 years. He stated that he initiated
the neglect petition in this case. He sent the State a petition,
seeking shelter care for the minor, based on the prior finding of
unfitness against the minor's mother. The State then returned the
petition to him with the additional allegations against the
respondent. Mettel read and signed the petition, believing that
the State had added accurate allegations. Mettel testified that it
was not unusual for the State to add allegations to a petition
after it conducted its own investigation. Mettel stated that he
could have asked the State or a DCFS liaison to confirm the truth
of the new allegations.
The trial court denied the motion because Mettel's conduct did
not warrant sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137. The trial
court also set a hearing on the respondent's motion to vacate the
shelter care order for June 26, 2007.
On June 26, 2007, the trial court ordered that the motion to
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vacate the shelter care order be heard before the judge who
originally heard the matter. The record does not contain further
information about the resolution of the motion.
On July 3, 2007, the trial court held an adjudication hearing.
In addition to the stipulations of the minor's mother as to the
allegations in the petition, the State presented evidence that the
minor's mother and the respondent lived together as recently as
June 19, 2007. The respondent presented no evidence. The trial
court found that the minor was neglected because the minor's mother
had been found unfit in prior juvenile proceedings and because the
respondent continued to live with her.
Lutheran Social Services (LSS) filed a dispositional hearing
report on July 31, 2007. The report indicated that the respondent
lived with the minor's mother in a house that appeared to meet the
needs of the family. The respondent worked various odd jobs. He
told LSS that he recently started a new job, but he did not send
LSS any verification of employment. The report also indicated that
visits between the minor and his mother had been suspended because
the mother said that she would give her children pills to kill them
rather than see them in someone else's home.
On July 31, 2007, the trial court held a dispositional
hearing. Danielle Norman, an LSS caseworker, testified that the
respondent and the minor's mother continue to reside together. She
stated that the respondent did not visit with the minor for about
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a month but that they resumed visitation recently. Respondent's
interactions with the minor were appropriate during visitation.
The minor's mother testified that she did not make any comment
about killing her children. She also stated that she would abide
by any restrictions on contact with the minor, including living in
another home, if the minor were returned to the respondent.
The respondent testified that he wanted the minor to live with
him. He stated that he would send the minor to day care while he
worked, but he had not arranged for any day care services. He
noted that he had a bedroom for the minor, but he stated that he
needed to buy a crib for him. The respondent also testified that
he started a new job and that he had two other jobs in the past few
months.
The trial court found that the minor's mother remained unfit
and that the respondent was fit. The trial court made the minor a
ward of the court and named DCFS as guardian with the right to
place. The trial court believed that placement was necessary
because the respondent: (1) had been evasive, if not dishonest,
about his employment; (2) was not prepared for the child as he had
not bought a crib or arranged for day care; and (3) had no contact
with the minor for a month until just before the dispositional
hearing. Finally, the trial court stated that it was not confident
that the respondent would live apart from the mother and protect
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the minor from her, as she remained unfit.
The respondent appeals.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the respondent first argues that the trial court
abused its discretion when it placed the minor outside his home.
Under section 2--27(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the
trial court may commit a minor to DCFS wardship if the trial court
determines that the parents are "unfit or are unable, for some
reason other than financial circumstances alone, to care for,
protect, train or discipline the minor or are unwilling to do so,
and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor will be
jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of his or her
parents." 705 ILCS 405/2--27(1) (West 2006). Generally, both
parents must be adjudged unfit, unable, or unwilling before
placement with DCFS is authorized because biological parents have
a superior right to custody. In re Ryan B., 367 Ill. App. 3d 517,
855 N.E.2d 272 (2006). However, the best interests of the child
are superior to all other factors, even the interests of the
biological parents. In re J.J., 327 Ill. App. 3d 70, 761 N.E.2d
1249 (2001). On review, we will not reverse the trial court's
determination unless it abused its discretion by selecting an
inappropriate dispositional order. April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 245,
760 N.E.2d 101 (2001).
The respondent argues that the trial court abused its
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discretion by placing the minor outside his home because he was fit
and, therefore, he had a superior right to custody of the minor.
Although it is true that the respondent was fit, the purpose of the
dispositional hearing was for the trial court to determine whether
it was in the best interests of the child to be made a ward of the
court. In re Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 799 N.E.2d 304(2003). As such, the trial court could consider any evidence
presented at the hearing, including the respondent's living
arrangements. Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 799 N.E.2d 304.
In the present case, the trial court was concerned about the
fact that the respondent was living with the minor's mother because
she had been found unfit and had threatened to kill the children if
they were placed in someone else's home. The trial court
questioned whether the respondent would actually live apart from
the mother and protect the minor from her. Furthermore, the
evidence showed that the respondent was not prepared to take
custody of the minor. He stopped visiting the minor for about a
month right before the dispositional hearing, and he had not bought
a crib or arranged for day care for the minor. Thus, we find that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing the minor
outside the respondent's home.
The respondent also argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for sanctions. The respondent requests that we
remand this cause to the trial court to impose sanctions against
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Mettel, DCFS, and the Peoria County State's Attorney's office. In
the alternative, the respondent requests that we enter whatever
order the circumstances demand, including, but not limited to,
vacating the shelter care order.
Supreme Court Rule 137 provides, in part:
"The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or
other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R.
137.
The purpose of the rule is to prevent the filing of false or
frivolous lawsuits. Sadler v. Creekmur, 354 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 821
N.E.2d 340 (2004). It is designed to prohibit the abuse of the
judicial process by parties who make claims based on unsupported
allegations of fact or law. Senese v. Climatemp, Inc., 289 Ill.
App. 3d 570, 682 N.E.2d 266 (1997). We review a trial court's
decision on a motion for sanctions for an abuse of discretion.
Sadler, 354 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 821 N.E.2d 340.
The respondent argues that the trial court should have imposed
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sanctions because Mettel signed the original neglect petition that
contained false allegations against the respondent without
conducting an investigation as to the truth of the allegations.
Although the respondent is correct about the falsity of the
allegations, the State amended the petition as soon as it
discovered the errors and prior to any adjudication in this case.
Also, we note that the petition was not wholly false, as it
contained accurate allegations against the minor's mother, and that
Mettel signed the petition, believing the State had added accurate
allegations. It was not unusual for the State to add allegations,
and it would be almost useless for Mettel to ask the State to
confirm whether the allegations were accurate as it was the party
that investigated and added them.
The respondent also argues that he was prejudiced by the false
allegations in the petition as the trial court relied on the
original petition in granting the shelter care order and removing
the minor from his custody. We find that the respondent was not
prejudiced as he had the opportunity to vacate the shelter care
order after the mistake was corrected, and, according to the
record, he attempted to do so. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the respondent's motion for
sanctions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
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of Peoria County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, JJ., concurring.
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