Albee v. The City of Bloomington ( 2006 )

NO. 4-05-0923 Filed: 6/2/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
JEFF ALBEE, SHAWN ALBERT, DAVID GOODMAN,) Appeal from
JOHN HAMARA, DAVID HOOVER, CRAIG KURTH, ) Circuit Court of
JOEL LIVENGOOD, and RONNIE SHRIVER, ) McLean County
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) No. 04MR73
v. )
THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, a Municipal ) Honorable
Corporation, ) Charles G. Reynard,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs, Jeff Albee, Shawn Albert, David Goodman,
John Hamara, David Hoover, Craig Kurth, Joel Livengood, and
Ronnie Shriver, were denied benefits under the Public Employee
Disability Act (Disability Act) (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2002)) by
defendant, the City of Bloomington (City). Plaintiffs and
defendant interpreted differently the period of time that the
officers were entitled to benefits under the Disability Act.
Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief, seeking to obtain judicial construction of the
Disability Act. The trial judge construed the statute in plain-
tiffs' favor. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are law-enforcement officers for the City
who have been injured in the line of duty. Each plaintiff
returned to work prior to the one-year anniversary of their duty-
related injuries. Because of those duty-related injuries, each
plaintiff subsequently missed work following the one-year anni-
versary of their duty-related injuries.
Before the one-year anniversary of their duty-related
injuries, plaintiffs received full salary payments for the days
of work that they missed according to the Disability Act (5 ILCS
345/1 (West 2002)). After the one-year anniversary of their
duty-related injuries, plaintiffs were denied full salary pay-
ments under the Disability Act even though they continued to miss
work due to the same duty-related injuries and even though none
of the plaintiffs received an entire year's worth of full salary
payments. Defendant determined that the Disability Act benefits
only apply during the calendar year following the duty-related
injury.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to one year's
worth of the Disability Act benefits while they are unable to
perform their duties because of injuries they suffered in the
line of duty. Defendant claims that the City is obligated to pay
the officers' salaries under the Disability Act for only one
consecutive calendar year with the obligation ending on the one-
year anniversary of plaintiffs' injuries regardless of whether
the officer returned to work during that year.
As the issue is one of statutory construction, the
standard of review is de novo. Advincula v. United Blood Ser-
vices, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1015 (1996). In
interpreting the statute, we must "ascertain and give effect to
the true intent and meaning of the legislature." Kraft, Inc. v.
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Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1990). The
best evidence of the legislature's intent is the language of the
statute and, where the language is clear and unambiguous, this
court is bound by the plain meaning. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d at
189, 561 N.E.2d at 661. When the language of the statute is open
to two possible interpretations, the interpretation that is
reasonable and that will not produce "absurd, unjust, unreason-
able[,] or inconvenient results" should prevail. Collins v.
Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155
Ill. 2d 103, 110, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993). In determining
the statute's meaning, we must look at the statute as a whole,
considering all relevant parts. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d at 189,
561 N.E.2d at 661.
The applicable section of the Disability Act
states:
"Whenever an eligible employee suffers
any injury in the line of duty which causes
him to be unable to perform his duties, he
shall continue to be paid by the employing
public entity on the same basis as he was
paid before the injury, with no deduction
from his sick[-]leave credits, compensatory
time for overtime accumulations or vacation,
or service credits in a public employee pen-
sion fund during the time he is unable to
perform his duties due to the result of the
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injury, but not longer than one year in re-
lation to the same injury." (Emphasis added.)
5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2002).
The trial court determined that the Disability Act's one-year
limit defined a maximum benefit rather than a statute of limita-
tions.
There are arguments that favor a one-calendar-year
limitation. If the one-year limit is not the statute of limita-
tions, what is the statute of limitations? Could an officer work
for 20 years after his injury and then claim that he had finally
reached the stage where he was "unable to perform his duties" due
to the injury? "A limitations period encourages claimants to
investigate and pursue causes of action and thereby discourages
delay in the bringing of claims." Golla v. General Motors Corp.,
167 Ill. 2d 353, 370, 657 N.E.2d 894, 902 (1995). Under plain-
tiffs' interpretation, once an officer is injured he may claim
that all absences from work, two- to three-day periods over a
number of years, are due to that injury. A determination that
there is no limitations period may create uncertainty and doubt,
where the legislature intended to promote predictability and
finality. Golla, 167 Ill. 2d at 370, 657 N.E.2d at 902.
Nevertheless, the statutory language addresses the
period of incapacity. Under section 1(b), the employee is
entitled to continued pay "during the time he is unable to
perform his duties." 5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2002). That time,
however, is limited to a period of one year. The limitation is
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on the time he is unable to perform. The limitation is not on
the calendar period following the injury. Perhaps the legisla-
ture did not contemplate the situation where the period of
incapacity would not be continuous, where the employee would
return to work for a period and then be unable to work for
another period. The language of section 1(b), however, does seem
to refer to the period of incapacity. It is certainly possible
that a person could be incapacitated for a period of time, return
to work, and then be incapacitated for a subsequent period.
This interpretation is supported by other language in
section 1, which refers to "the period for which continuing
compensation is required" and "[d]uring this period of disabil-
ity." 5 ILCS 345/1(c), (d) (West 2002). The Disability Act
never phrases the time period for which benefits are to be paid
as one year from the date of the injury.
The Disability Act was enacted to "provide for a
continuation of full pay for law[-]enforcement officers *** who
suffer disabling injuries in the line of duty." Gibbs v. Madison
County Sheriff's Department, 326 Ill. App. 3d 473, 477, 760
N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (2001). It would be contrary to the purposes
of the Disability Act if an officer, injured in the line of duty,
were penalized for making a good-faith attempt to return to work.
An officer who was able to return to work for several months
should not have his year of full compensation shortened for that
reason. Similarly, an officer who is able to return to work
should not be given an incentive not to return, with the "use-it-
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or-lose-it" argument that the year of continuing compensation
begins to run immediately.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Affirmed.
TURNER, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.
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