People v. Cooper , 365 Ill. App. 3d 278 ( 2006 )

NO. 4-04-0471 Filed: 5/22/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
MICHAEL J. COOPER, ) No. 03CF1406
Defendant-Appellant )
) Honorable
) Heidi Ladd,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
In March 2004, a jury found defendant, Michael J.
Cooper, guilty of involuntary manslaughter based on his partici-
pation in the beating of Frederick McNeal, which led to McNeal's
death (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West Supp. 2003)). In April 2004, the
trial court sentenced defendant to five years in prison. Defen-
dant appeals, arguing he was denied his right to an open trial.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2003, the State charged defendant with
five counts of first degree murder for his involvement in
McNeal's death (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2002)). In
March 2004, the cause proceeded to trial. On March 11 (the third
day evidence was presented), during the first break of the day,
the following colloquy took place:
"MR. ROSENBAUM [defendant's counsel]:
Judge, there is something I wanted to bring
to the record's attention I suppose. My cli-
ent and [codefendant's] family. They have
family here in court. They've been watching
the proceedings. I've been told during the
break that they're not being allowed to re-
turn. Obviously [codefendant's counsel] and
I[,] we've talked about this. We don't know
what's going on because we're obviously look-
ing forward at the trial and what's going on.
We've been told that they may have been dis-
ruptive. We don't know at whose request this
has been, what the observations have been,
whether it's one particular person or if it's
been all of them together. And I would just
like to inquire for the record why they're
being left out and if there is any other
option in terms of perhaps an admonition to
them or excluding only the people who, in
fact, have been causing the disruption.
THE COURT: I was informed by the offi-
cers that I believe there were four people.
Is that correct, Officer Sherrick?
Five people that have been making audi-
ble sounds and tisks and disagreeing audibly
and loudly with the witnesses to the point
where two of the officers in the courtroom
noticed that the four jurors on the end
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turned and visibly looked at the people mak-
ing the sounds. The officers have repeatedly
admonished these people not to make any
sounds or any editorial comments of that
nature. They persisted in doing it yesterday
and again today, and I will not have anyone
in the audience make any disruptive noises or
gestures or commentaries on anything that
transpires in the courtroom so those five
people are now not allowed in the courtroom.
They were warned by the officers. They per-
sisted in doing it.
Anyone else may come in if they conduct
themselves appropriately. I don't know who
the five were or who they're affiliated with.
I'm not going to have anybody carrying on in
my courtroom.
MR.ROSENBAUM: May I just step in the
hallway because I think there may have been
more than five excluded and in particular I'm
thinking of my client's mother. If she was
not involved, I would ask that she come in.
May I have just one moment to see?
THE COURT: You may. Certainly.
MR. ROSENBAUM: Thank you, Judge. We
have to take it up later. Some of them are
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not right in the hallway so.
THE COURT: All right."
Later that day, following the conclusion of the presen-
tation of evidence, defense counsel again raised the issue with
the trial court, stating:
"MR. ROSENBAUM: Judge, I would ask that
the [c]ourt revisit the issue of my client's
family and I suppose [codefendant's] family
as well. I spoke with his mother in particu-
lar and one other woman who was here, I think
another relative, who indicated to me in the
hallway that they in particular did not make
any noises or talk at all and I'm at least a
little concerned that perhaps all five were
taken as a group whereas maybe one or two did
not specifically make any noises.
I would ask that the [c]ourt consider
perhaps if they were allowed into the court-
room tomorrow at 8:30 to listen to closing
arguments with an admonition of the [c]ourt
that should for any reason they make any
noises, signs, or anything they would be
escorted out without any questions. I would
simply ask the [c]ourt to reconsider that.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Rosenbaum.
I have considered that. I didn't know
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who they were affiliated with, but they were
admonished repeatedly by the officers. Both
the officers were very clear as to who vio-
lated that and that their noises were audible
and disrupted the jury. There will be no way
to put that cat back in the bag if it happens
during closing arguments. I appreciate the
issues, but they were given every opportunity
and that is unfair to any of the parties or
to the jurors to have that disruption affect-
ing them so I am not going to let them back
in. They were given repeated opportunities
to address those concerns.
MR. ROSENBAUM: I completely appreciate
the [c]ourt's concern. I just wish the court
officers had told me yesterday and I could
have confronted the family and we never would
have reached this point. I apologize.
THE COURT: There is no need to apolo-
gize. It was out of your control, and the
officers are--they were given their chance."
The jury found defendant guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter, and the trial court sentenced defendant as stated. In
April 2004, the court held a hearing on defendant's posttrial
motion.
In addressing the public-trial issue raised in the
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motion, the trial court noted only those spectators who were
disruptive were barred from reentering the courtroom. The court
stated it was informed by the court officer and a correctional
officer the individuals were "making comments, gesture[s], loud
noises, facial expressions, and commenting on the testimony of
witnesses; generally disrupting the proceedings." Both officers
reported the jurors were clearly distracted and on multiple
occasions turned to look at the noisy spectators. The court
noted the officers were positioned several feet away from the
disruptive spectators. The court stated it also heard noise
coming from that general area but was unable to identify the
source because it was too far away and was concentrating on the
proceedings. The court indicated it also noticed jurors looking
in the direction of the noise. The court stated it authorized
the officers to bar the disruptive spectators because they
persisted in acting inappropriately after repeated warnings, on
two separate days, by the officers. The court stated it had a
duty to maintain an orderly proceeding free from outside influ-
ence on the jurors, and the barred spectators had proved them-
selves "untrustworthy." The court denied the posttrial motion.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its
discretion and violated his right to a public trial when it
denied defendant's mother and another woman entry into the
courtroom for the remainder of the trial and closing arguments.
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The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees a defendant the right to a public trial. U.S. Const.,
amend. VI. This guarantee is for the benefit of the accused and
"is a safeguard against any attempt to employ the courts as
instruments of persecution." People v. Seyler, 144 Ill. App. 3d
250, 252, 494 N.E.2d 267, 268-69 (1986); Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 46, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 38, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2215 (1984)
While a presumption exists that all trials are open,
the right is not absolute. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45, 81 L. Ed. 2d
at 38, 104 S. Ct. at 2215. However, the presumption of openness
will yield only to an "overriding interest" that is specifically
articulated. People v. Taylor, 244 Ill. App. 3d 460, 468, 612
N.E.2d 543, 549 (1993). "[T]he party seeking to close the
hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be
prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to
protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings
adequate to support the closure." Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 81 L.
Ed. 2d at 39, 104 S. Ct. at 2216.
Neither the press nor members of the general public
were excluded from the courtroom, so the limited exclusion of the
disruptive spectators from the courtroom was a partial closure of
the trial proceedings. Taylor, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 612
N.E.2d at 546. The "overriding interest" test applies to partial
closures. Taylor, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 467, 612 N.E.2d at 548.
The defendant is not required to prove specific preju-
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dice to obtain relief for a violation of his right to a public
trial (Waller, 467 U.S. at 49, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 40, 104 S. Ct. at
2217), nor is the right subject to harmless-error analysis
(Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302,
331, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991)). The sixth amendment protects
all portions of the trial and not just the right to publicly
present evidence and witnesses. People v. Willis, 274 Ill. App.
3d 551, 554, 654 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1995). "The standard to be
applied in determining whether there is a sufficient record to
support a trial judge's finding that grounds exist to exclude
spectators from a courtroom is whether there has been an abuse of
discretion." Seyler, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 252, 494 N.E.2d at 269.
The trial court, through the court officers, barred re-
entry of five individuals known to have caused repeated distur-
bances. Defendant does not dispute maintaining proper courtroom
decorum is an overriding interest or that this interest was not
likely to be prejudiced in this case. Instead, defendant con-
tends (1) the court failed to insure the closure was no broader
than necessary to protect that interest, (2) the court did not
consider alternatives, and (3) the court's findings of fact were
inadequate. We disagree.
In barring reentry of the five disruptive individu-
als, the trial court properly relied on information provided by
the officers and the officers' identification of the individuals.
The officers were within a few feet of the disruptive spectators
and warned the individuals on numerous occasions to cease their
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conduct. In addition, the court heard noises coming from the
general area indicated by the officers and observed several
jurors looking in that direction. However, the court could not
clearly identify who was responsible for the disturbances because
it was too far away and was concentrating on the proceedings.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court did
not have to conduct a hearing on the issue. Defense counsel
presented defendant's mother's account that she was not involved
in the disturbances. However, the court clearly believed the
officers were able to identify the offenders. In light of the
two officers' close proximity and repeated interaction with the
individuals over the course of two days, the court could reason-
ably rely on the officers' identification of the parties respon-
sible. Because only those spectators known to have caused the
disturbances were excluded, the closure was no broader than
necessary.
Defendant's assertion the trial court did not consider
alternatives to excluding the spectators is without merit. After
the close of the evidence, defense counsel suggested the individ-
uals be allowed to enter the courtroom for closing arguments with
an admonishment that they would be escorted out for any more
disturbances. The court expressly stated it had considered this
option but rejected it in light of the individuals' refusal to
comply with the officers' numerous requests to cease their
inappropriate conduct. The disruptive parties were repeatedly
warned by the court officers about their behavior over two days
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of proceedings, yet continued to be disruptive. The court found
the parties' continued disruptions and refusal to heed the
officers' warnings made them "untrustworthy." The court consid-
ered defendant's right to an open trial but found the spectators'
refusal to comply with the officers' request put the fairness of
the proceeding at stake.
The fact the officers warned the problematic spectators
multiple times before barring them from the courtroom shows the
trial court not only considered but also implemented an alterna-
tive to partially closing the proceedings. The disruptive
spectators were given ample opportunities to correct their
behavior but simply refused to conduct themselves accordingly.
The trial court's findings were sufficient to support
excluding the disruptive spectators and partially closing the
proceedings. The record shows the officers repeatedly warned
these individuals their conduct was inappropriate, yet they
continued to be disruptive. The court indicated it and the
officers observed several jurors become distracted and look
toward the disruptive spectators. The court indicated it also
heard noises coming from the area indicated by the officers.
Although the judge was not personally able to identify the
problematic individuals, the officers could. The information
before the court was adequate to support the closure and the
court did not have to conduct a hearing in spite of some of the
spectators' denials of wrongdoing.
Court officers and bailiffs need the ability to evict
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or limit entrance to disruptive spectators. The court must also
carefully guard the fairness of the trial. No error occurred
here, but the trial court should have provided a more complete
record of what transpired and should have investigated further
when defense counsel advised the barred spectators were family
members of the defendant and codefendant.
Even though it would have required more court time, it
would have been prudent for the trial court to be certain the
individuals who were barred entrance were correctly identified
and that only those specific individuals identified by the court
officers were the ones barred from entrance. It would have been
helpful if defense counsel had offered the names of the individu-
als who believed they had been barred from the proceedings.
It is understandable both counsel and the trial court
were focused on the trial itself rather than this distraction.
However, the right to a public trial is important and this
unfortunate distraction deserved the personal attention of the
court.
It would have been preferable for the trial court to
have confronted the individuals outside the presence of the jury
and entered an order barring them from the proceedings after
their identification was confirmed by the court officers.
We do not believe the trial court was required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing or to permit the identified
spectators to speak on their own behalf. The record is clear
disruptive spectators were repeatedly warned and they continued
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their behavior over the course of two days. A trial judge
managing a jury trial must rely on the court officers to assist
in maintaining decorum. The trial judge appropriately relied
upon the officers, but once defense counsel raised a concern, the
trial judge should have created a record as to who was barred.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
APPLETON and COOK, JJ., concur.
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