People v. Walls ( 2007 )

Filed 01/12/07 NO. 4-05-0869
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Sangamon County
ONTARIO L. WALLS, ) No. 03CF1232
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Stuart H. Shiffman,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In June 2005, a jury convicted defendant, Ontario L.
Walls, of two counts of second degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-2
(West 2002)) and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm
(720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2002)). The trial court later sentenced
him to 15 years on each of the second-degree-murder convictions
and 15 years on the aggravated-battery-with-a-firearm conviction,
with all three sentences to run consecutively.
Defendant appeals, arguing only that the guilty ver-
dicts for second degree murder and aggravated battery with a
firearm were inconsistent because they required a finding of
conflicting mental states for the same conduct. We disagree and
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Evidence presented at defendant's June 2005 trial
showed the following. On November 19, 2003, two fistfights
erupted between friends of defendant and friends of the following
victims in this case: Kendrix Morgan, Clarence Perkins, and
Michael Cummings. In the early morning on November 20, 2003,
shots were fired at defendant's Springfield residence while he
and his family were inside. Defendant's wife was grazed by a
bullet. At the time of the shooting, both defendant and his wife
saw a white Chevy Caprice in a driveway across the street from
defendant's residence.
Around 9 a.m. on November 26, 2003, in the 2100 block
of South Wirt in Springfield, defendant and his brother, Itasha
Walls, opened fire on the white Chevy, which was parked. As a
result, Morgan and Perkins both died from gunshot wounds to their
heads. Cummings was wounded but survived. The car had been hit
with at least 13 bullets. Cummings later identified defendant as
one of the shooters.
Defendant gave two different statements to police.
First, he claimed that he was at a job interview and knew nothing
about the shooting. A few hours later, he admitted that he and
Itasha saw the white Chevy and believed its occupants were
responsible for the November 20, 2003, shooting of defendant's
residence. Defendant and Itasha then got their guns, went to the
car, and opened fire on it.
At trial, defendant presented evidence to show that, at
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the time he fired on the car, he believed the circumstances to be
such that the deadly use of force was justified, but that his
belief was unreasonable. Specifically, he presented evidence
that (1) the white Chevy had been seen cruising by defendant's
house and the car's occupants made threatening gestures; (2)
although defendant and Itasha got their weapons before they
approached the car, they intended to try to resolve their differ-
ences with the car's occupants peacefully; (3) when Itasha looked
into the front window of the car (the only window that was not
tinted), he saw Morgan holding a gun and pointing it at him; (4)
Itasha began to fire his gun at the car because he was in fear
for his own life; and (5) defendant began firing after Itasha
fired.
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted defendant of
two counts of second degree murder for the deaths of Morgan and
Perkins (720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 2002)) and one count of aggravated
battery with a firearm for the shooting of Cummings (720 ILCS
5/12-4.2 (West 2002)).
This appeal followed.
II. THE GUILTY VERDICTS
Defendant argues that the guilty verdicts for second
degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm were incon-
sistent because they required findings of conflicting mental
states for the same conduct. We disagree.
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"'Legally inconsistent verdicts occur when an essential
element of each crime must, by the very nature of the verdicts,
have been found to exist and to not exist even though the of-
fenses arise out of the same set of facts.'" People v. Price,
221 Ill. 2d 182, 188, 850 N.E.2d 199, 202 (2006), quoting People
v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 343, 589 N.E.2d 508, 516 (1992). A
claim that two verdicts are legally inconsistent presents a
question of law that we review de novo. Price, 221 Ill. 2d at
189, 850 N.E.2d at 202.
We begin by setting forth the statutory definitions of
the two offenses at issue. Section 9-2 of the Criminal Code of
1961 (Code) defines "second degree murder," in pertinent part, as
follows:
"(a) A person commits the offense of
second degree murder when he commits the
offense of first degree murder as defined in
paragraphs (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of
[s]ection 9-1 of this Code and either of the
following mitigating factors are present:
(1) At the time of the killing
he is acting under a sudden and
intense passion resulting from
serious provocation by the individ-
ual killed or another whom the
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offender endeavors to kill, but he
negligently or accidentally causes
the death of the individual killed;
or
(2) At the time of the killing
he believes the circumstances to be
such that, if they existed, would
justify or exonerate the killing
under the principles stated in
[a]rticle 7 of this Code, but his
belief is unreasonable.
***
(c) When a defendant is on trial for
first degree murder and evidence of either of
the mitigating factors defined in subsection
(a) of this [s]ection has been presented, the
burden of proof is on the defendant to prove
either mitigating factor by a preponderance
of the evidence before the defendant can be
found guilty of second degree murder. ***
In a jury trial for first degree murder in
which evidence of either of the mitigating
factors *** of this [s]ection has been pre-
sented and the defendant has requested that
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the jury be given the option of finding the
defendant guilty of second degree murder, the
jury must be instructed that it may not con-
sider whether the defendant has met his bur-
den of proof with regard to second degree
murder until and unless it has first deter-
mined that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt each of the elements of
first degree murder." 720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West
2002).
Subsections (1) and (2) of section 9-1(a) of the Code,
referred to in the foregoing section, provide as follows:
"(a) A person who kills an individual
without lawful justification commits first
degree murder if, in performing the acts
which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill
or do great bodily harm to that
individual or another, or knows
that such acts will cause death to
that individual or another; or
(2) he knows that such acts
create a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to that
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individual or another." 720 ILCS
5/9-1 (West 2002).
Under section 12-4.2 of the Code, "[a] person commits
aggravated battery with a firearm when he, in committing a
battery, knowingly or intentionally by means of the discharging
of a firearm (1) causes any injury to another person." 720 ILCS
5/12-4.2 (West 2002). The statutory definition of a battery
includes the requirement that the actor's intentional or knowing
conduct also be "without legal justification." 720 ILCS 5/12-3
(West 2002).
Defendant contends that the verdicts were inconsistent
in that when he fired shots into the white Chevy he could not
have believed both that (1) he was justified in shooting in self-
defense (as to Morgan and Perkins) and (2) he was not justified
in shooting (as to Cummings).
Defendant's argument that the mental states underlying
each of his convictions conflict is based on a fundamental
misunderstanding of Illinois' second-degree-murder statute. In
1995, in People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 122, 646 N.E.2d
587, 595 (1995), our supreme court explained the relationship
between first and second degree murder and the requisite mental
state for a second-degree-murder conviction:
"[T]he mental states required for *** second
degree murder[] are identical to that re-
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quired for first degree murder. Illinois law
recognizes only the following four mental
states: intent, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence. [Citation.] Murder and second
degree murder each require the same mental
state: either intent or knowledge. [Cita-
tions.] Moreover, second degree murder is
not a lesser included offense of murder.
Section 2-9 of the [Code] defines an included
offense in pertinent part as an offense that
'[i]s established by *** a less culpable
mental state.' [Citation.] Having deter-
mined that the mental states for murder and
second degree murder are identical, it is
evident that second degree murder is not a
lesser included offense of first degree mur-
der. Rather, second degree murder is more
accurately described as a lesser mitigated
offense of first degree murder." (Emphases
in original.)
In People v. Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d 441, 449, 655 N.E.2d
864, 867-68 (1995), the supreme court explained again that
"second degree murder requires the presence of a mitigating
circumstance, which, while not an element or mental state, does
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reduce the culpability and thus the sentencing range."
Thus, defendant is incorrect when he asserts that his
"mental state" when he committed the second degree murder of
Perkins and Morgan was that he believed that he was justified in
shooting. The only mental state the State was required to prove
--and did prove--on the murder counts was either (1) intent (to
kill or do great bodily harm) or (2) knowledge (that the shooting
would likely cause death). See Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 122, 646
N.E.2d at 595 ("Illinois law recognizes only the following four
mental states: intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence"
(emphasis in original)). Defendant's belief that he was justi-
fied in shooting constituted a "mitigating circumstance," not a
mental state, and the jury's finding that such a mitigating
circumstance existed did not negate the already proved mental
state required for a first-degree-murder conviction. See People
v. Thompson, 354 Ill. App. 3d 579, 584, 821 N.E.2d 664, 669
(2004) ("first degree and second degree murder each require the
same mental state, either intent or knowledge, and it is the
presence of statutory mitigating factors that reduces an unlawful
homicide from first degree to second degree murder, not the
absence of an intent to kill"). Accordingly, no inconsistency
exists between the mental states underlying defendant's convic-
tions for second degree murder and aggravated battery with a
firearm. See People v. Torres, 269 Ill. App. 3d 339, 348-49, 645
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N.E.2d 1018, 1024-25 (1995) (holding that guilty verdicts on
second degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm were
not legally inconsistent). In addition, no inconsistency exists
between convictions of second degree murder (defendant mistakenly
thought justified) and battery (not justified).
In so concluding, we note that the creation of second
degree murder was an act of legislative grace in that the legis-
lature recognized that some circumstances under which the crime
of first degree murder might be committed warrant lesser penal-
ties than others. The legislature has not seen fit to grant such
grace as to other crimes. We thus reject any argument that the
existence of a mitigating circumstance under the second-degree-
murder statute somehow forecloses the possibility of a guilty
verdict on another charge arising from the same set of facts.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
MYERSCOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.
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