People v. Keller ( 2008 )

NO. 4-07-0704 Filed 5/7/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
ex rel. TAMMI SUSSEN, ) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Champaign County
v. ) No. 90L37
THOMAS G. KELLER, )
Respondent-Appellant. ) Honorable
) Brian L. McPheters,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioner, Tammi Sussen, and respondent, Thomas G.
Keller, are the parents of David, born December 17, 1987. In
July 2007, the trial court entered an order directing Keller to
pay one-third of the cost of tuition, books, registration, rent,
and food for David to attend Lincoln College of Technology
(Lincoln College) in Indianapolis, Indiana. Keller appeals.
Because the court abused its discretion by finding the cost to
attend Lincoln College was reasonable, we reverse and remand with
directions.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 1990, the Illinois Department of Public Aid
filed a paternity complaint against Keller on Sussen's behalf.
In December 1990, the trial court entered a judgment of parentage
and order for support. Keller was in arrears on his child-
support obligation several times over the years and support was
abated once due to Keller's unemployment.
In August 2004, after Keller inherited $50,000, Keller
consented to $25,000 of the funds being deposited in a bank
account until further hearing could be held on Sussen's motion to
establish a trust for support and educational expenses. In
October 2004, the trial court ordered that the $25,000 in the
bank account was to be used to support David and provide for
educational expenses should David decide to attend postsecondary
education and should the court order payment of such expenses.
Any funds remaining after such time would be returned to Keller.
The court also directed that $300 a month be distributed from the
bank account to Sussen as continuing child support for David. In
January 2005, the court ordered $5,000 be distributed from the
account to Sussen as child support from the inheritance (20% of
$25,000) and $418 be distributed from the account to Sussen for
payment of a certain amount of David's orthodontic expenses.
In June 2007, Sussen filed a petition for support for
educational expenses. The petition alleged that David had been
accepted into a 15-month program at Lincoln College. The
petition sought contribution from Keller for the expenses of
attending Lincoln College, including tuition, books, and fees
($26,753), rent ($4,125), living expenses, health and medical
insurance, and dental expenses. According to the petition, David
obtained grants totaling $8,100, David and Sussen had applied for
loans, and David intended to work part-time.
On June 28, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on the
petition.
- 2 -
A. Testimony Pertaining to Lincoln College, Shawnee
Community College, and Living Expenses
The testimony established that David had graduated high
school where he had earned As and Bs. David had focused on
automotive classes in high school and wanted to continue his
studies in that area. David wanted to attend Lincoln College,
which offered a 15-month automotive-technology program that would
teach David how to service and repair motor vehicles. When asked
why he was interested in Lincoln College, David stated, "It's
away from home. I have heard really good stories about them."
David further explained that at Lincoln College, he did not have
to take any general-education classes, which explained why the
program took only 15 months--consisting of two terms or
sequences--to complete. David met with a recruiter, who
explained that NASCAR and Mercedes-Benz hired graduates from
Lincoln College. David did not know if he wanted to work for
either of those two companies. David testified that when he
graduated, he would be "ASC" certified (the record does not
indicate what "ASC" certified means) and be fully trained in
high-performance automotive technology. David did not know if
graduates from Shawnee were ASC certified. The Lincoln College
materials admitted into evidence demonstrate that upon completion
of the program, students are awarded an associate-of-applied-
science degree.
David intended to rent an apartment with two other
students. The total rent per month was $799, of which David
- 3 -
would pay one-third. The rent did not include gas and electric
costs. Sussen estimated gas and electric costs would total
approximately $180 per month, of which David would pay one-third.
Sussen estimated David's food costs would total approximately
$200 per month.
Keller provided information about Shawnee Community
College (Shawnee), which also offered an automotive-technology
program. The Shawnee campus was located approximately 20 to 25
miles south of where Sussen and David lived. Excerpts from the
Shawnee course catalog, admitted into evidence, demonstrated the
Shawnee program was a 67-hour program--approximately 21 months of
schooling--at a cost of $65 per credit hour, which totaled
$4,355. Service fees totaled $402.
According to the Shawnee materials, students in the
program receive an associate-of-applied-science degree upon
completion. The Shawnee program is ASE certified ("ASE"
apparently stands for "automotive service excellence"), and
Shawnee is accredited by the North Central Association Commission
on Accreditation and School Improvement. The Lincoln College
materials provide no information about accreditation.
Sussen testified she did not look into the Shawnee
program "too much" because it did not offer what Lincoln College
offered and was a different program. Sussen claimed the
automotive-technology course at Shawnee was not the same course
as offered by Lincoln College. Sussen explained that Shawnee
"probably" offered a two- to four-year program while Lincoln
- 4 -
College offered a 15-month, high-performance maintenance program,
which is what David wanted. The Lincoln College materials
indicate the program has a "[six]-[c]ourse [h]igh[-p]erformance
add-on program," but the record otherwise contains no information
about "high-performance maintenance."
David testified Shawnee Community College did not seem
as good to him as Lincoln College. David thought Lincoln College
was a "better fit" for him. Sussen testified it would save money
and time if David attended Lincoln College because he would
become gainfully employed once he finished the program.
Keller's objections to David attending Lincoln College
included the cost, the lack of accreditation, and the distance
from home. Keller assumed David would live with Sussen if he
attended Shawnee.
B. Testimony Regarding the Parents' Financial Circumstances
Sussen testified that at the time of the hearing, she
earned $500 per week and expected to earn that sum through the
summer. By late fall, Sussen would earn approximately $400 a
week. Sussen testified she earned $14,000 to $18,000 in 2006.
Sussen's financial affidavit, contained in the record, indicated
Sussen had income of approximately $2,300 per month (excluding
the $300 a month in child support she had been receiving from
Keller) and received an additional $720 from "boarders." Sussen
has a 12-year-old daughter for whom she received no child
support. Sussen's stated expenses totaled approximately
$2,501.38, and she had no assets.
- 5 -
According to Keller's testimony and financial
affidavit, Keller lived with his girlfriend, Laura Bower, in a
house Bower owned. Keller paid Bower $360 a month toward her
house payment. Keller was currently unemployed and on temporary
medical light duty following a "knee scope" to remove two-thirds
of the meniscus. He last worked in May or June 2007 for Dash
Management, a maintenance-management company. Keller testified
his previous job had "a lot of knee work, working on fryers and
grills and crawling around on my knees and climbing ladders." He
did not expect to be able to return to that type of work but was
currently looking for employment. He planned on building a deck
for a former employer to make money. Keller had also applied for
unemployment and expected to receive $300 per week.
Keller testified he earned $29,000 in 2006 and $22,000
in 2005. Keller testified he averaged earnings of $22,000 a year
the past five or six years. He confirmed that for 2005 and 2006,
child support was taken directly from the bank account
established for David.
Keller's monthly expenses totaled approximately $1,900
(including car payments for his and Bower's vehicles). His
assets included a 2001 Dodge Dakota (for which he was still
making payments) and a 1969 Harley Davidson motorcycle worth
$10,000.
Keller testified he used the portion of the inheritance
not deposited in the bank account for David ($25,000) to pay
bills and living expenses and make repairs on the house. Keller
- 6 -
also purchased a truck (which he no longer owned), shop
equipment, a car-hauling trailer, and a hot tub. Keller gave
$8,000 to $10,000 of the inheritance to his girlfriend for money
he owed to her.
Bowman testified she had lived with respondent for four
years. They shared living expenses. She used the money he gave
her from the inheritance to pay bills because Keller had been
"off work" for six months and had gotten behind on his bills and
living expenses. Bower testified that because Keller was
currently unemployed, he was not paying one-half of the living
expenses.
C. Testimony Regarding Funds Taken From Account
Keller testified that the State of Illinois took
$4,098.51 from the bank account established for David to pay a
child-support arrearage for Betty Stockwill. (In a document
contained in the record, Keller asserted he had consented to
adopt Betty years earlier.) Keller testified he did not have the
funds to pay the arrearage and did not think he had any means of
stopping the State from taking the funds from the bank account.
Keller testified that when he spent the money from the
inheritance, he was not aware of the obligation owed to
Stockwill. When the court held the hearing on the petition for
educational expenses, the bank account contained approximately
$5,000.
D. Trial Court's Ruling
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found
- 7 -
that whether Lincoln College was an accredited school did not
matter much given that David's goal was to be an automotive
mechanic and not to seek further education. After examining all
the relevant factors, the court stated it "boils down to the ***
parties' abilities to pay for a very expensive school." The
court characterized Lincoln College as a "proprietary school," a
for-profit business that provides training. The court noted it
did not have information about any other proprietary school that
would cost substantially less than Lincoln College. The court
concluded Lincoln College was an appropriate school for David's
interests and aptitude.
The trial court then examined the parties' ability to
pay. The court noted the bank account established for David
would have had an additional $4,000 available for David's
education had the State not taken the arrearage for Betty. The
court also noted Keller had a motorcycle valued at $10,000. The
court recognized that respondent was currently unemployed but
noted Keller admitted he was employable. The court did not
determine the amount Keller could expect to earn in 2007, except
to state that it was not appropriate to find that Keller would
continue to earn $22,000 a year when in 2006 he earned $29,000.
The court ordered respondent to pay one-third of the cost of
attending Lincoln College, including living expenses.
In July 2007, the trial court entered a written order.
The court calculated the total cost to attend Lincoln College,
including tuition, books, registration, rent, and food, was
- 8 -
$35,273. The court ordered Keller to pay one-third ($11,757.67)
at a rate of $6,000 within 21 days and the remainder ($5,757.67)
30 days prior to the start of the second term at Lincoln College.
The court directed that the balance of the bank account
(approximately $5,000) be transferred to Sussen.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Keller appeals the trial court's order, arguing that
the cost to attend Lincoln College was not reasonable and Keller
did not have the means to pay those costs.
A. Standard of Review
The parties assert appellate courts are split regarding
the appropriate standard of review. We agree that the
appropriate standard of review is unclear. This court has
routinely reviewed a trial court's decision to award educational
expenses for an abuse of discretion. See In re Marriage of
Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d 626, 629, 613 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1993)
(Fourth District reviewing for an abuse of discretion); In re
Marriage of Alltop, 203 Ill. App. 3d 606, 618, 561 N.E.2d 394,
402 (1990) (Fourth District reviewing for an abuse of
discretion). However, in In re Support of Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d
545, 547, 490 N.E.2d 1274, 1275 (1986), the Illinois Supreme
Court reviewed an order for educational expenses under the
manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.
When a party challenges a trial court's findings of
fact, the appellate court will affirm unless the court's findings
- 9 -
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., In
re Estate of Lower, 365 Ill. App. 3d 469, 477, 848 N.E.2d 645,
652 (2006). However, the ultimate decision whether to award
educational expenses should be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hubbs, 363 Ill. App.
3d 696, 699-700, 843 N.E.2d 478, 482-83 (2006) (finding that a
trial court's determinations on dissipation and the valuation of
marital property should be reviewed under the manifest-weight-of-
the-evidence standard of review and that the review of the trial
court's determination on the ultimate division of marital
property should be conducted under an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review; the court noted that "dissipation and the
valuation of marital assets are generally factual determinations"
while "the circuit court's decision on the ultimate division of
marital property depends upon a circuit court's view of the facts
*** [and] statutory factors, and so the circuit court is accorded
more discretion"). Therefore, this court will review the trial
court's factual findings under the manifest-weight-of-the-
evidence standard, but we review the court's ultimate
determination for an abuse of discretion.
B. Trial Court's Determination That the Cost To Attend Lincoln
College Was Reasonable Was Against the Manifest Weight of the
Evidence and the Court Abused Its Discretion by Ordering
Keller To Pay One-Third of that Cost
Keller argues nothing in the record shows that Lincoln
College was superior in any way or even equal to Shawnee. We
agree.
- 10 -
"A child does not have an absolute right to a college
education." Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 613 N.E.2d at 360.
However, a trial court may order the payment of postsecondary
educational expenses, including college, professional, or other
training. 750 ILCS 5/513(a)(2) (West 2006); see also Rawles v.
Hartman, 172 Ill. App. 3d 931, 933, 527 N.E.2d 680, 681 (1988)
(section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act (Dissolution Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 513) is
applicable to a proceeding brought under the Illinois Parentage
Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par.
2501 et seq.), and a court may provide for the education and
maintenance of a nonminor child born to unmarried parents). The
payable expenses include, but are not limited to, room, board,
dues, tuition, transportation, books, fees, registration and
application costs, medical insurance, dental expenses, and living
expenses during the school year and periods of recess. 750 ILCS
5/513(a)(2) (West 2006).
When deciding whether to require the payment of
postsecondary education expenses and the amount thereof, the
trial court should consider "all relevant factors that appear
reasonable and necessary." 750 ILCS 5/513(b) (West 2006). The
statutory factors include (1) the financial resources of both
parents; (2) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed
had the marriage not been dissolved; (3) the child's financial
resources; and (4) the child's academic performance. 750 ILCS
5/513(b) (West 2006). Other relevant factors include the cost of
- 11 -
the school, the programs offered at the school, how the school
meets the child's goals, the benefits the child will receive from
attending the school, and whether the parent needs to pay for a
private school education when adequate public schools are
available. See Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 630, 613 N.E.2d at360-61 (citing cases); In re Marriage of Schmidt, 292 Ill. App.
3d 229, 237, 684 N.E.2d 1355, 1361 (1997).
The petitioner bears the burden of proving that the
respondent should contribute toward the college expenses of their
child and the burden of showing how much the respondent should
contribute. See In re Marriage of Taylor, 89 Ill. App. 3d 278,
283, 411 N.E.2d 950, 954 (1980). After the petitioner presents
her evidence, the respondent has the burden of going forward with
evidence that would "equally balance" the petitioner's evidence.
Taylor, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 283, 411 N.E.2d at 954; see also
Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 239-40, 684 N.E.2d at 1362-63
(finding the respondent did not need to present his own evidence
to meet his burden of proof when the parties' child did not
provide any meaningful reasons for her choice of an out-of-state
school over the state schools; in such circumstances, the
respondent need only show the costs of the state schools and his
own financial situation).
In this case, the record does not support the
conclusion that Keller should be ordered to pay one-third the
cost to attend Lincoln College when (1) Sussen and David did not
present sufficient reasons for David's choice of Lincoln College
- 12 -
over in-state schools and (2) Keller presented evidence that an
adequate, less-expensive public school was available. In
determining whether to order contribution to the educational
expenses for a particular school, a court may consider whether
the child has access to a less-expensive public institution.
Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 237, 684 N.E.2d at 1361; Pearson,
111 Ill. 2d at 551-52, 490 N.E.2d at 1277 (affirming the trial
court's order requiring the father to pay $100 per month toward
his son's education and reversing the appellate court order
directing the father to pay over $5,000 per year for his son to
attend an out-of-state technical school; the trial court did not
err by emphasizing the huge difference between the cost of the
technical school compared to the Illinois junior college that
offered a similar program). Here, the trial court noted that the
parties did not present evidence of another proprietary school
that cost less than Lincoln College. That analysis was wrong as
a matter of law. The proper determination in this instance was
whether David had access to a less-expensive school, proprietary
or nonproprietary. In this case, David had access to Shawnee,
which was considerably less expensive, and the record does not
support the conclusion that Shawnee was not a comparable program.
The record indicated that Shawnee, an Illinois public
community college, also offered an automotive-technology program
that was ASE certified and awarded an associate-of-applied-
science degree. The trial court concluded that the Shawnee
program "would not necessarily be directly equivalent even of the
- 13 -
Lincoln College" program. However, nothing in the record
supports that conclusion. No evidence was offered to demonstrate
the relative merits of Lincoln College versus Shawnee, such as
placement rates upon graduation or reputation in the industry.
See, e.g., Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 631, 613 N.E.2d at 361(noting that the affidavit from a school administrator would have
been more helpful had it stated the employment rate for
graduating students rather than that the school had "more
requests from employers" than could be filled). Moreover, while
David and Sussen testified that NASCAR and Mercedes-Benz
recruited from Lincoln College, David was unsure whether he
wanted to pursue a job with either of those companies.
In examining the exhibits tendered to the trial court,
this court notes that both programs apparently award an
associate-of-applied-science degree and certification upon
completion of the program. David expressed a desire to avoid
general-education classes, which were not required at Lincoln
College. However, the actual courses required by the Lincoln
College program are not contained in the record. The general-
education classes to which David referred for the Shawnee program
appear to include a one-semester college orientation class, six
hours of technical communication, three hours of technical math,
and three hours of practical psychology. Without any indication
of the actual courses required by the Lincoln College program,
the trial court had no basis on which to conclude that the
programs were not substantially equivalent, other than the
- 14 -
difference between a 15-month program and a 21-month program.
Even though the Shawnee program is longer, and even
assuming David stayed in an apartment near Shawnee (rather than
live at home) and had living expenses similar to those in
Indianapolis, the cost of attending Lincoln College far exceed
the cost of attending Shawnee. Using the trial court's
calculation of David's living expenses for 15 months at Lincoln
College ($8,520), David's living expenses to attend Shawnee would
be $11,928 for 21 months. Adding that amount to the tuition cost
at Shawnee ($4,757) results in a total cost of $16,685 to attend
Shawnee. In contrast, the cost to attend Lincoln College
(excluding the cost of books because the record contains no
evidence of the cost of books at Shawnee) totals $34,030.
Nothing in the record indicates the reason for the huge
difference in cost. David testified that Lincoln College offered
a "high[-]performance" program, but the record does not indicate
whether the high-performance course is included in the program
for which David enrolled. The Lincoln College materials suggest
it is an "add-on program" which requires additional cost and
time. Specifically, the Lincoln College materials noted:
"[Lincoln College] boasts *** a [six]-[c]ourse [h]igh[-]
[p]erformance add-on program." Moreover, nothing in the record
indicates what a high-performance course is or whether Shawnee
offered such a course as well. Therefore, the trial court's
conclusion that Shawnee was not a comparable school was against
the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court abused its
- 15 -
discretion by ordering Keller to pay one-third of the cost of
attending Lincoln College. See, e.g. Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at
631, 613 N.E.2d at 361 (finding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying the request for contribution to pay college
expenses at a nonaccredited Bible college); Schmidt, 292 Ill.
App. 3d at 240, 684 N.E.2d at 1363 (finding the trial court did
not err by ordering the father to pay one-half of the cost of
attending a state school instead of one-half of the cost of
attending the out-of-state school of his daughter's choice in
light of the father's financial circumstances and the fact that
no evidence was presented indicating why it was necessary or
appropriate for the daughter to attend the out-of-state school).
This does not mean a child and custodial parent may
never choose a private or expensive school when other less-
expensive choices are available. However, when a child wants to
attend an expensive school, the petitioner must present evidence
that (1) special programs or attributes of the school make the
additional costs reasonable under the circumstances or (2) the
more expensive school was necessary or more appropriate for the
child. See, e.g., Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 239-40, 684
N.E.2d at 1362-63. The next issue the trial court must address
is whether the parents can afford such school. See, e.g.,
Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 240, 684 N.E.2d at 1363 (wherein the
"trial court then was able to draw the conclusion there was no
advantage shown to make [the father] pay more than the state[-]
school costs, particularly in view of his financial situation").
- 16 -
Moreover, this conclusion does not interfere with the
custodial parent's authority to direct a child's education.
Here, David may attend whichever school Sussen and he choose.
Nonetheless, the courts must decide whether the noncustodial
parent must contribute to that education and in what amount.
See, e.g., Spear, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 629, 613 N.E.2d at 360(rejecting the petitioning mother's argument that the trial court
interfered with her authority as the custodial parent to direct
her child's education).
Keller also argues the trial court abused its
discretion by concluding that Keller had the ability to pay the
educational expenses. "The court should not order a party to pay
more for educational expenses than he or she can afford."
Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d at 552, 490 N.E.2d at 1277. The ability to
pay is determined based on the party's resources at the time of
the hearing. Pearson, 111 Ill. 2d at 552, 490 N.E.2d at 1277. A
court may award sums of money out of the property and income of
either parent. 750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2006).
The record discloses the bank account established for
David contained approximately $5,000. In addition, Keller owned
a motorcycle valued at $10,000. Further, at oral argument,
Keller's counsel informed this court that Keller borrowed the
money to pay the educational expenses ordered by the trial court.
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding
that Keller had the ability to pay for David's educational
expenses.
- 17 -
To conclude, the trial court abused its discretion by
directing Keller to pay the cost for David to attend Lincoln
College when an adequate public school was available. On remand,
the trial court shall direct Keller to pay one-third of the total
cost to attend Shawnee for the completion of an associate-of-
applied-science degree in automotive technology. Morever, the
court shall order Keller to pay one-third of the reasonable
living and transportation expenses David would have incurred by
attending that school (i.e., the cost to live at home with Sussen
and commute or to obtain an apartment near Shawnee). If the
record is inadequate to make that determination, the court shall
hold a hearing for that purpose. In addition, because the court
did not make any provision in its original order for medical and
dental expenses, the court may do so on remand.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand with directions.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
TURNER, J., concurs.
COOK, J., dissents.
- 18 -
JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
Keller had the ability to pay for David's educational expenses
but did abuse its discretion by directing Keller to pay for the
school of David's choice when an adequate public school was
available. Reevaluating the evidence, the majority concludes
that Sussen did not present evidence that the extra $17,345 it
would cost for David to go to Lincoln was reasonable, necessary,
or appropriate. I disagree.
Sussen presented evidence that the Lincoln program
lasted only 15 months and focused solely on David's area of
interest, high-performance automotive technology, and that two
well-known companies recruited from Lincoln. On the other hand,
Shawnee would take at least 24 months to complete and would
involve taking general-education courses, and no evidence sug-
gested that Shawnee offered a high-performance program or that
top automotive companies recruited Shawnee graduates.
Custodial parents are not free to choose a more expen-
sive school without reason. As the majority noted, choosing a
more expensive school is only appropriate if the custodial parent
shows that "(1) special programs or attributes of the school make
the additional costs reasonable under the circumstances or (2)
the more expensive school was necessary or more appropriate for
the child." Slip op. at 16, citing Schmidt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at
239-40, 684 N.E.2d at 1362-63. Such restrictions are necessary
- 19 -
to prevent cases where a custodial parent may abuse his or her
position of decision-making authority by allowing a child to
choose a more expensive school without good reason and then stick
the noncustodial parent with a larger bill.
This does not appear to be a case where the child is
ambivalent about where he wants to go to college, so the custo-
dial parent picks the more expensive school to stick the
noncustodial parent with a larger bill. First, Sussen and David
together are paying two-thirds of the more expensive school.
Sussen, a single mother who also cares for a 12-year-old daughter
for whom she receives no child support and who clearly does not
make more than $26,000 a year, is not financially able to pick an
expensive school just to spite Keller. David found a school that
fit his career choice and presented the court with a reasonable
explanation as to why the more expensive school was more appro-
priate for him.
Second, Sussen and David are not asking that Keller pay
a great amount more. According to the majority's figure, they
are asking for Keller to pitch in $5,781 more (one-third of the
extra $17,345 it would cost for David to go to Lincoln), so that
David may go to the school more tailored to his aspirations.
Finally, the evidence shows that David wants to be an
automotive mechanic who works with high-performance automotive
technology. If he were forced to go to Shawnee, he would have to
take nonautomotive courses and attend for nine more months, and
he could not focus on high-performance technology. The trial
- 20 -
court concluded that the evidence showed that Lincoln offers
special programs or has attributes that made the additional costs
reasonable or at least that the school was more appropriate for
David's chosen career path, justifying the added costs. This
decision was not an abuse of discretion.
While Sussen and David could have aided their case had
they presented more evidence regarding the special traits of
Lincoln's program and how it was more appropriate given David's
ambitions, their failure to do so should not be fatal. Sussen
and David presented enough evidence to find that it was necessary
or appropriate for David to attend Lincoln. When some evidence
is present to support a trial court's decision, this court should
not reweigh that evidence in order to reverse.
- 21 -