Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc. ( 2006 )

THIRD DIVISION
August 23, 2006
No. 1-04-1762
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
TERRY E. READY, Special Administrator of the ) Appeal from the
Estate of Michael P. Ready, Deceased, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County
v. )
)
UNITED/GOEDECKE SERVICES, INC., )
Defendant-Appellant and Counterplaintiff, ) No. 00 L 4797
(BMW Constructors, Inc., and Midwest Generation )
EME, L.L.C., )
Defendants; ))
Midwest Generation EME, L.L.C., BMW Constructors, )) Honorable
Inc., Midwest Generation L.L.C., Edison Mission ) Mary Mulhern, Judge
Energy Services, Inc., Presiding.
Counterdefendants).
JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court:
In this appeal, we must answer the question: Is a defendant who settles with the
plaintiff prior to trial still a "defendant sued by the plaintiff" within the meaning of section
2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 2002))? If we answer
this question in the affirmative, then all defendants sued by the plaintiff, including those
who settled prior to trial, may be included on the jury verdict form so that the fact finder
can assign each defendant their degree of relative fault, if any. If we answer this
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question in the negative, then only those defendants who remain when the case is
submitted to the fact finder may be included on the verdict form.
Plaintiff, Terry E. Ready, special administrator of the estate of Michael P. Ready,
sued defendants United/Goedecke Services, Inc. (United), BMW Constructors, Inc.
(BMW), and Midwest Generation EME, L.L.C. (Midwest), as a result of an accident in
which Ready was killed at Midwest's factory on December 23, 1999, in Joliet, Illinois.
Ready was a mechanic employed by Midwest Generation, L.L.C., whose parent
company was defendant Midwest. Ready was working on a pipe-refitting-project at the
factory. Defendant BMW was the general contractor hired by Midwest and defendant
United was the scaffolding subcontractor hired by BMW to erect temporary scaffolding
for the project. Ready was killed when one of the beams that was to be used for
scaffolding fell and struck him.
Plaintiff settled her claims prior to trial with defendants BMW and Midwest.
United did not object to the settlements and the trial court found they were made in
good faith. Plaintiff proceeded to trial against United, the sole remaining defendant.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $14,230,000. It assessed
Ready's contributory negligence at 35%, which reduced the judgment to $9,250,000.
The trial court allowed a setoff of $1,112,502.58, which was the total amount paid to
plaintiff by the settling defendants. United now appeals.
On appeal, United raises numerous contentions relating to the admissibility of
certain evidence at trial regarding the settling defendants. United also contends that the
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trial court erred in excluding the settling defendants from the jury verdict form.
Prior to trial, plaintiff filed motions in limine seeking to bar the introduction of any
evidence at trial relating to defendants BMW and Midwest. The trial court granted the
motions, finding that any evidence relating to BMW and Midwest was irrelevant because
they had settled with plaintiff prior to trial.
Also prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to have BMW and
Midwest included on the jury verdict form for purposes of fault apportionment. The trial
court denied the motion, determining that only the sole remaining defendant, United,
was to be included on the verdict form and the jury would apportion fault between
Ready and United.
United further argues that these erroneous pretrial rulings, in addition to the trial
court's use of the short form of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 12.04
(2000)(hereinafter IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.04), prevented United from raising the
argument that something other than the conduct of the defendant was the sole
proximate cause of the injury.
In order to address United's contentions, we first examine whether the trial
court's ruling excluding the settling defendants from the jury verdict form was proper.
The trial court's ruling was based on its interpretation of section 2-1117 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 2002)). Section 2-1117 assigns joint and/or
several liability for nonmedical damages to a defendant "sued by the plaintiff" depending
upon that defendant's percentage of total fault. The preamendment version of section
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2-1117 that was in effect at the time of Ready's death provides in part:
"Except as provided in section 2-1118, in actions on account of
bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based on
negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability, all defendants
found liable are jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's past and future
medical and medically related expenses. Any defendant whose fault, as
determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault
attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any
third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be
severally liable for all other damages. Any defendant whose fault, as
determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault
attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any
third party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be
jointly and severally liable for all other damages." (Emphasis added.) 735
ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1998).
The trial court specifically found that section 2-1117 excluded settling defendants
from the verdict form because they were neither "defendants" nor "third party
defendants" at the time of trial. The court stated, "we cannot apportion on a verdict form
fault to settling parties." The court noted that its finding was the same regardless of
whether the preamendment or amended version of section 2-1117 was applied.
Section 2-1117 was amended in 2003, changing the phrase "any third party defendants
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who could have been sued by the plaintiff" to "any third party defendants except the
plaintiff's employer." 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 2004).
Initially, we note that the parties disagree as to which version of section 2-1117
applies. Plaintiff contends the amended version applies, whereas United contends the
preamendment version applies. Plaintiff argues that the amended version of the statute
applies because the amendment does not alter any "vested right." Defendant maintains
that because the 2003 amendments were substantive changes, they have prospective
application only and the preamendment version of the statute applies because it was in
effect when plaintiff's cause of action accrued.
In general, statutory amendments relating to substantive rights must be applied
prospectively while amendments relating to remedies or procedures are generally
applied retroactively. Harraz v. Snyder III, 283 Ill. App. 3d 254, 259 (1996). The
prospective application of statutes is preferred because of the fundamental principle that
the retroactive application of new laws is usually unfair and notice or warning of the rule
should be given in advance. Harraz, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 259. This presumption of
prospective application is rebuttable, but only by the act itself which, either by express
language or necessary implication, must clearly indicate that the legislature intended a
retroactive application. Harraz, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 259.
Here, the amended version of section 2-1117 does not specifically state whether
it applies prospectively or retroactively. Unlike the preamendment version, which stated
that it applied "to causes of action filed on or after its effective date," the amended
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version is silent in this regard. We find that this silence can be interpreted as either an
assumption that it could only apply prospectively, as is generally the case, or as an
indication that it could apply retroactively because of the absence of language limiting
its application. Because the statute is silent, we can also look to whether the
amendment was substantive or procedural to determine its prospective or retroactive
application. As stated previously, the amendment changed the phrase "any third party
defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff" to "any third party defendants
except the plaintiff's employer." The amendment is not procedural in nature; rather, it
excludes the plaintiff's employer's fault from section 2-1117's joint and several liability
analysis. Amendments that are substantive in nature weigh in favor of prospective
application. Therefore, because the statute is silent and the amendment was a
substantive change, as well as the general preference that amendments are applied
prospectively, we find that the amended version of section 2-1117 applies prospectively.
As a result, the amended version does not apply to this cause of action. We now
examine the parties' contentions in relation to the preamendment version of the statute.
Plaintiff contends that section 2-1117 prohibits including settling defendants on
the jury verdict form to apportion their relative degree of fault, if any. Plaintiff relies on
the Fifth District case of Blake v. Hy Ho Restaurant, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 372 (1995),
which held that settling defendants were not to be included in fault apportionment.
Plaintiff also relies on Freislinger v. Emro Propane Co., 99 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1996), a
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federal case that followed Blake and held that settling defendants should not be
included in fault apportionment because the term "defendants sued by the plaintiff"
referred to only those defendants who remained in the case when it was submitted to
the fact finder. Freislinger, 99 F.3d at 1419.
United's contentions are just the opposite. United relies on the Fourth District
case of Skaggs v. Senior Services of Central Illinois, Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d 1120 (2005),
which held that settling defendants were to be included on the jury verdict form to
apportion their relative degree of fault, if any, because even though a defendant settles
and is dismissed from the case, that defendant does not lose its status as a "defendant
sued by the plaintiff." Skaggs, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 1129. United also relies on Dowe v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 01-C-5808 (April 26, 2004)(memorandum opinion
and order), a federal court memorandum opinion and order ruling on pretrial motions.
The court's position in Dowe was that settling defendants were still "defendants sued by
the plaintiff," which required them to be included in fault apportionment. Dowe, slip op.
at 17.
Adding to the divergence of opinions is our supreme court's opinion in Lannom v.
Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535 (1994), which has been given various interpretations by different
courts. Both plaintiff and United contend Lannom supports their respective positions. In
Lannom, the parties consisted of a plaintiff, a defendant and a third-party defendant.
The third-party defendant settled with the plaintiff prior to trial and was dismissed from
the case. The defendant argued on appeal that the third-party defendant should not
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have been dismissed from the case because it would preclude the jury from
apportioning any fault to that third-party defendant due to its absence from the litigation.
Our supreme court affirmed the dismissal. The court noted, however:
"[T]his dilemma arises whenever a defendant or third party settles
with the plaintiff or is dismissed from an action for any reason. Section 2-
1117 was not intended to prohibit the dismissal of a defendant or third
party from an action, where such dismissal is otherwise warranted.
Moreover, the defendant's rights under section 2-1117 are not abolished
simply because a defendant or third party settles or is dismissed from an
action. The jury may still assess the remaining defendants' relative
culpability, and if the degree of fault attributable to one or more defendants
is less than 25%, those defendants' liability is several only." Lannom, 158
Ill. 2d at 542-43.
Plaintiff interprets Lannom as holding that only those defendants who remain in
the case when it is submitted to the fact finder are defendants within the meaning of
section 2-1117. This interpretation is consistent with the Freislinger court's reading of
Lannom. Freislinger, 99 F.3d at 1419.
United interprets Lannom to support its position that settling defendants should
be included in fault apportionment. United points to the following sentence in Lannom.
"The jury may still assess the remaining defendants' relative culpability, and if the
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degree of fault attributable to one or more defendants is less than 25%, those
defendants' liability is several only." Lannom, 158 Ill. 2d at 543. United maintains that
the term "relative culpability" assumes that the remaining defendant's culpability is
assessed relative to the other defendants, including any dismissed defendant or
dismissed third party defendant. The purpose of section 2-1117 is to hold minimally
culpable defendants minimally responsible. United maintains that it would be
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to interpret the above sentence in Lannom
as meaning to assess the remaining defendant's culpability relative only to the plaintiff.
United also points out that Lannom cited Alvarez v. Fred Hintze Construction, 247 Ill.
App. 3d 811, 818 (3rd Dist. 1993), which stated that "the rights of a nonsettling
defendant under section 2-1117 'cannot be negated simply because another tortfeasor
has settled with the plaintiff,'" quoting E. Walsh & E. Doherty, Section 2-1117: Several
Liability's Effect on Settlement and Contribution, 79 Ill. B.J. 122, 125 (1991). United
further points out that the court in Dowe, which analyzed Blake, Lannom and
Freislinger, concluded that the Freislinger court misread Lannom. The Dowe court
specifically noted that there was no statement in Lannom that the term "defendants
sued by the plaintiff" in section 2-1117 "mean[t] only those defendants who remain in
the case when it is submitted to the fact finder." Dowe, slip op. at 16, quoting
Freislinger, 99 F.3d at 1419. The Dowe court determined that the better interpretation
to be given to Lannom was that the supreme court had intended to indicate that the
culpability of the "remaining defendants" should be assessed against that of all
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defendants, including the settling defendants. Dowe, slip op. at 18.
Here, we agree with United and the courts' interpretations of section 2-1117 in
Dowe and Skaggs that a remaining defendant's culpability should be assessed relative
to the culpability of all defendants, including settling defendants. Only in this manner
can the intent of section 2-1117, that minimally culpable defendants be held minimally
responsible, be achieved. As stated in Dowe, there is no statement in Lannom that the
term "defendants sued by the plaintiff" as used in section 2-1117 means only those
defendants who remain in the case when it is submitted to the fact finder. A defendant
who settles with the plaintiff is still a "defendant sued by the plaintiff." Further, Lannom
is different from the case at bar insomuch as Lannom solely involved whether the
dismissal of a party was proper. Here, the issue is whether settling defendants who
have been dismissed from the case should remain on the verdict form for fault
apportionment. Nevertheless, because Lannom held that a settling defendant and its
dismissal from the case does not effect a nonsettling defendant's rights under 2-1117, it
follows that settling defendants must appear on the verdict form so as not to affect the
rights of the nonsettling defendants. In conclusion, we find that the trial court erred in
holding that BMW and Midwest should not be included on the jury verdict form for fault
apportionment. Accordingly, we find that a new trial is in order.
Plaintiff notes that interpreting section 2-1117 in this manner would confer a
"double benefit" upon United because United would be able to "levy fault to nonparties
at trial," and after trial, would receive the benefit of a reduction in the total judgment
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amount from BMW and Midwest's settlements with plaintiff. We disagree. Fault is to be
apportioned among all defendants sued by the plaintiff. Any settlement plaintiff enters
into with any defendant should not serve to alter the remaining defendant(s)' degree of
fault. United will not receive a "double benefit"; rather, United will be assessed it's
degree of fault relative to the fault of all defendants sued by the plaintiff as well as the
plaintiff's fault. The fact that there is a set off of the total judgment for the settlement
amount is not a "double benefit"; it is in essence the settling defendants' payment of
their portion of the total judgment.
We next examine whether the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence
regarding the settling defendants. The trial court found evidence relating to BMW and
Midwest irrelevant and inadmissible because they had settled with plaintiff. However,
because we now find that both BMW and Midwest should have been included on the
jury verdict form, it follows that any evidence necessary to determine their relative
culpability is relevant and admissible on retrial.
We now address United's contention that the trial court erred in giving the short
form of IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.04. United argues that, by only giving the first paragraph
of the instruction, the court precluded United from raising the argument that something
other than the conduct of the defendant was the sole proximate cause of the injury.
The instruction provides:
"12.04 Concurrent Negligence Other Than Defendant's
More than one person may be to blame for causing an injury. If you
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decide that a [the] defendant[s] was [were] negligent and that his [their]
negligence was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, it is not a
defense that some third person who is not a party to the suit may also
have been to blame.
[However, if you decide that the sole proximate cause of injury to
the plaintiff was the conduct of some person other than the defendant,
then your verdict should be for the defendant.]" IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.04.
The Notes that follow the instruction provide that "[t]he second paragraph should be
used only where there is evidence tending to show that the sole proximate cause of the
occurrence was the conduct of a third person." IPI Civil (2000) No. 12.04, Notes on
Use. Because we have determined that a new trial is in order, we need not now
address United's contention. However, to the extent that this issue might again occur
on retrial, we instruct the trial court that a determination regarding the instruction given
will depend upon the evidence adduced at retrial. See Leonardi v. Loyola University of
Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 100 (1995) (a litigant has the right to have the jury clearly and
fairly instructed upon each theory that was supported by the evidence).
Lastly, we must address whether the issue of damages will be revisited on retrial.
Plaintiff contends that because United did not argue in its brief that the damage award
was excessive, it has waived any right to challenge the amount of damages awarded.
United disagrees. United points out that it did challenge the damage award on pages
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69 and 70 of its opening brief. However, pages 69 and 70 of United's brief are not
within the "Argument" section; rather, they fall within the "Conclusion" section, which
United titles "Concluding Remarks." United's "challenge" to the damage award amount
is not presented as a separate issue for review. Instead, United briefly states that
because of the trial court's rulings, plaintiff was able to argue that United alone was
responsible for Ready's death, which appealed to the "passions and prejudice" of the
jury and had an effect on the jury's assessment of damages. We note that United's
posttrial motion challenging the jury's verdict did argue that the award was excessive
and asked for a remittitur. Further, United's brief does not set forth specific reasons or
argument as to why the damage award was excessive or unreasonable. Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) requires that arguments "shall contain the contentions of
the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of
the record relied on." 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). The rule further provides that "[p]oints
not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on
petition for rehearing." 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Because United has failed to
specifically argue that the damage award was improper, United has waived any right to
challenge the amount of damages awarded. See In re Marriage of Thornqvist, 79 Ill.
App. 3d 791, 799 (1979)(points not argued on appeal are waived). Therefore, we affirm
the damage award amount.
In conclusion, we find that the trial court should not have excluded the settling
defendants from the jury verdict form and that a new trial as to liability only is required.
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We note that because the preamendment version of section 2-1117 applies, it is proper
to include plaintiff's employer, Midwest, on the verdict form on retrial. We further find
that upon retrial, evidence relating to the culpability of the settling defendants and third-
party defendants is relevant and admissible. Additionally, only after the close of
evidence at retrial can a determination be made as to whether a jury instruction
regarding sole proximate cause would be proper.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part, reversed in part
and remanded for a new trial on the issues of liability and apportionment of damages
only.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.
THEIS, J., concurs.
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PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN, specially concurring:
In Skaggs v. Senior Services of Central Illinois, Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1128
(2005), PLA allowed, 216 Ill. 2d 734 (2005), the court correctly observed that:
"If a settling defendant may not be included under section 2-1117, a plaintiff
could sue two defendants, one who is primarily at fault but indigent and one
who is minimally at fault but wealthy. By settling with the indigent defendant,
the plaintiff could circumvent the application of section 2-1117, leaving the
wealthy defendant, even though minimally liable, jointly liable for all damages
because the settling defendant=s portion of the fault can no longer be
considered."
The Skaggs Court raised the possibility of bad faith, collusion and increased
gamesmanship if such a circumstance were allowed. However, there are two sides to
every story.
For the sake of analysis, let us assume that the hypothetical plaintiff in the Skaggs
Court=s example suffered a traumatic amputation of a foot and sued two defendants, one
who was primarily at fault, 85%, but indigent and having only $300,000 in insurance
coverage and one who was minimally at fault, 15%, but wealthy and having $5,000,000 in
coverage. Let us assume further that this plaintiff entered into a good-faith settlement with
the indigent defendant and accepted the policy limit of $300,000 in exchange for a release
of liability. Thereafter, the plaintiff went to trial against the wealthy defendant resulting in a
$3,000,000 verdict in favor of the plaintiff, no portion of which was assessed for medical
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expenses. If the indigent defendant=s fault is not considered in applying section 2-1117, the
wealthy defendant, who was in reality only 15% at fault for the plaintiff=s injury, would, just
as the Skaggs Court observed, be liable for the payment of the entire judgment less a set-
off for the settlement amount that the plaintiff received from the indigent defendant. Simply
put, the wealthy defendant would be required to pay the plaintiff $2,700,000. If, on the
other hand, the indigent defendant=s fault is considered in applying section 2-1117, the
wealthy defendant, being only 15% at fault for the plaintiff=s injury, would be severally liable.
The effect being that the wealthy defendant would pay 15% of the judgment after it was
reduced by the $300,000 settlement amount (see 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1998)) or
$405,000.
Under the first scenario, the plaintiff would recover his total damages of $3,000,000.
However, the wealthy defendant, who in actuality was only 15% at fault for the plaintiff=s
injury, would be required to pay $2,700,000 or 90% of the total damage award. Hardly an
equitable apportionment of damages according to relative fault. Under the second
scenario, the wealthy defendant would pay $405,000, and the plaintiff would recover
$705,000 in total compensation for damages assessed at $3,000,000. Not only has the
wealthy defendant paid $45,000 less than his 15% pro-rata share of the plaintiff=s total
damages as a result of the set-off provisions of the Contribution Act (see 740 ILCS 100/2(c)
(West 1998)), but the plaintiff has been under compensated by a total of $2,295,000.
Hardly just compensation for the injury suffered or an equitable apportionment of damages.
In this case, the position advocated by the plaintiff would support the result in the
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first scenario, and United=s position supports the result in the second. To my mind, neither
result is equitable. However, I cannot disagree with the reasoning of the majority in this
case. The plain language of the statute provides that the fault of "defendants sued by the
plaintiff" must be considered in resolving the issue of the joint or several liability of non-
settling defendants. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1998). The fact that a defendant may
have settled with a plaintiff during the course of litigation does not remove that defendant
from the status of a defendant "sued by the plaintiff." Skaggs, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 1129. For
these reasons, I concur. Any remedy for the possible inequities created by section 2-1117
lies with the General Assembly.
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