Gallarneau v. Calvary Chapel of Lake Villa, Inc. , 2013 IL App (2d) 120218 ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Gallarneau v. Calvary Chapel of Lake Villa, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120218
Appellate Court BRITTANY GALLARNEAU, a Minor, by Her Father and Next Friend,
Caption Hugh Gallarneau, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALVARY CHAPEL OF
LAKE VILLA, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-12-0218
Filed June 27, 2013
Held In an action for the injuries suffered by the minor plaintiff while attending
(Note: This syllabus an end-of-the year party for a kids program at defendant church, the trial
constitutes no part of court erred in entering summary judgment for defendant on the ground
the opinion of the court that the program was a “school” under the School Code and was immune
but has been prepared from liability for the negligence alleged, since the church was not related
by the Reporter of to any educational system, its program was called a club, not a school,
Decisions for the and even though religious instruction was provided through the club, the
convenience of the voluntary instructional ministry and social setting did not fall within the
reader.)
scope of the School Code and its grant of immunity.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 10-L-1183; the Hon.
Review Christopher C. Starck, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Nicholas A. Riewer, of Riewer & Collins, LLC, of Lake Forest, for
Appeal appellant.
William B. Weiler and Kristen A. Cemate, both of Langhenry, Gillen,
Lundquist & Johnson, LLC, of Chicago, for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Burke and Justice Hutchinson concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Brittany Gallarneau, by her father and next friend, Hugh Gallarneau, appeals
from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Calvary Chapel of
Lake Villa, Inc. (Calvary). We reverse and remand.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 20, 2009, Brittany was attending the Calvary Kids Club (CKC), a program
sponsored by Calvary that provided “teachings and activities for children” on Wednesday
evenings. May 20 was the last meeting before summer, and CKC held an end-of-the-year
party. The activities included a relay race, outside on church property, in which the
contestants were to run backwards. While running in that race, Brittany fell backwards and
broke both of her arms.
¶4 Brittany filed a one-count complaint, seeking damages in excess of $50,000, alleging that
Calvary breached its duty “to provide and supervise the minor plaintiff in said activities in
a reasonably safe and secure setting.” Calvary eventually filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that it was immune to suits alleging ordinary negligence, pursuant to
section 24-24 of the School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/24-24 (West 2008)). After briefing
and oral argument, the trial court found that CKC was a school under section 24-24 of the
Code and entered summary judgment in favor of Calvary. This timely appeal followed.
¶5 II. ANALYSIS
¶6 Brittany contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Calvary. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, admissions, depositions, and
affidavits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate
-2-
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. G.I.S. Venture v. Novak, 388 Ill. App. 3d 184, 187 (2009). The
applicability and interpretation of legislation present questions of law that are amenable to
resolution through summary judgment. Id. We review de novo the meaning and effect of a
statutory provision, as well as a trial court’s grant or denial of summary judgment. Id.
¶7 Section 24-24 of the Code provides in relevant part:
“Subject to the limitations of all policies established or adopted under Section 14-8.05,
teachers, other certified educational employees, and any other person, whether or not a
certificated employee, providing a related service for or with respect to a student shall
maintain discipline in the schools, including school grounds which are owned or leased
by the board and used for school purposes and activities. In all matters relating to the
discipline in and conduct of the schools and the school children, they stand in the relation
of parents and guardians to the pupils. This relationship shall extend to all activities
connected with the school program, including all athletic and extracurricular programs,
and may be exercised at any time for the safety and supervision of the pupils in the
absence of their parents or guardians.” 105 ILCS 5/24-24 (West 2008).
In both disciplinary and nondisciplinary matters in schools, teachers and certified and
noncertified personnel stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the students.
Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill. 2d 165, 171-72 (1976).1 Since a parent
is not liable for injuries to his child absent willful and wanton conduct, section 24-24 makes
teachers and other covered personnel immune from liability for ordinary negligence. See id.
at 173; Courson v. Danville School District No. 118, 301 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755 (1998). This
immunity is not expressly provided by section 24-24; it arises indirectly from the in loco
parentis relationship of teachers and other educational employees with students. Henrich v.
Libertyville High School, 289 Ill. App. 3d 809, 815 (1997). For the immunity to apply, a
teacher-student relationship must give rise to the conduct that is the proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s injury. Jastram v. Lake Villa School District 41, 192 Ill. App. 3d 599, 603 (1989).
Vicarious immunity is also bestowed upon the institution if the cause of action is predicated
on the ordinary negligence of an employee who has the statutory immunity. See Knapp v.
Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 376, 383 (1995); Jastram, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 603.
¶8 “The term ‘school’ is a generic one which has numerous meanings.” Possekel v.
O’Donnell, 51 Ill. App. 3d 313, 315 (1977). After providing a national review of judicial
definitions (id. at 315-16), the Possekel court found that the “common denominator” of the
definitions was “that the place be one where instruction is given, generally to the young.” Id.
at 316. Illinois courts have found that an institution constitutes a school: at a daycare program
affiliated with a private, parochial school system owned and operated by a church
(Hilgendorf v. First Baptist Church, 157 Ill. App. 3d 428 (1987)); where religious instruction
was given to children twice a week in rooms on the upper floors of a church building (City
1
Noncertified personnel were not included in section 24-24 at the time that Kobylanski was
decided but were added by legislative amendment. See Pub. Act 89-184, § 1 (eff. July 19, 1995).
-3-
of Chicago v. Bethlehem Healing Temple Church, 93 Ill. App. 2d 303 (1968)); and even in
a private home where a child was receiving home-schooling (People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574
(1950)). Here, it is uncontested that Calvary provided religious instruction on Wednesday
evenings through CKC. As such, CKC can be found to be a “school” under the generic
Possekel definition.
¶9 However, a mere generic finding that an institution is a “school,” based on the fact that
instruction is given to the young, is not sufficient to invoke the immunity extended under
section 24-24 of the Code; the “sole question *** is not whether the defendant’s
establishment constituted a school, but whether it comes within the scope of section 24-24.”
Possekel, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 318. For example, the school that was found to exist on the upper
floors of the church in Bethlehem Healing Temple Church was found to exist for purposes
of determining whether a city ordinance requiring the installation of an automatic sprinkler
system in schools applied.2 See Bethlehem Healing Temple Church, 93 Ill. App. 2d at 306.
The question at issue was “the legal status of the defendant’s four-story building as either a
Type 1 School, and hence within the ordinance, or a church, and hence outside the terms of
the ordinance.” Id. at 308. Pursuant to the ordinance, which the parties agreed was “enacted
and enforced in an effort to prevent a tragic fire such as the one at Queen of Angels Parochial
School” (id. at 307), Type 1 schools included “day nursery schools, kindergarten schools,
elementary schools, high schools and other similar occupancies.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. at 306. The court’s finding that Bethlehem Church (through its religious
education classes, which served between 200 and 350 children at any one time) operated a
Type 1 school pursuant to the ordinance’s phrase “other similar occupancies” (id. at 308-09)
is of limited value in determining whether CKC “comes within the scope of section 24-24”
immunity.
¶ 10 Possekel involved a child injured while attending the defendant’s “nursery and
kindergarten” that, while licensed as a day care center pursuant to the Child Care Act of 1969
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 23, ¶ 2212.09), was not licensed as a nursery school or kindergarten.
The appellate court noted that the defendant had failed to produce evidence tending to show
that it engaged in instruction and failed to allege in its motion for summary judgment that it
did so; instead, the defendant merely “relied upon the fact the establishment was called a
nursery school, and the plaintiff in the complaint was called a student.” Possekel, 51 Ill. App.
3d at 317. However, even beyond this failure to establish that the institution fit within the
generic common-law definition of a school, the court also held that “[t]he School Code does
not concern itself with nursery schools and kindergartens unless they are run by a school
system.” Id. at 318. Merely calling an institution a school, and a child a student, does not
make either one so. Id. at 317.
¶ 11 Brittany first argues that Calvary “is a church,” is not “affiliated with a school or school
2
Interestingly, while Calvary points to Bethlehem Healing Temple Church to support its
contention that CKC is a school, the church in that case contended that “it is operating a church and
not a school on its premises.” Bethlehem Healing Temple Church, 93 Ill. App. 2d at 306-07. The trial
court and the appellate court disagreed.
-4-
system,” and “does not offer any academic schooling or teaching.” She characterizes CKC
as “a religious program” and points out that the women who were directing CKC on the
evening of her injury, Barbara Albert and Julie Kenney, “are neither actual teachers nor
employees” of Calvary but “are church members and volunteers who assist in running” CKC.
(Emphases in original.)
¶ 12 Calvary responds that Brittany “ignores the fact that a religious entity can operate a
school and that Section 24-24 applies.” Indeed, immunity under section 24-24 has long been
recognized as extending to schools operated by religious organizations. See Hilgendorf, 157
Ill. App. 3d 428; Cotton v. Catholic Bishop, 39 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (1976); Merrill v. Catholic
Bishop, 8 Ill. App. 3d 910 (1972). However, Calvary’s reliance on these cases is misplaced.
In these cases, the defendants operated full-time educational institutions. See Hilgendorf, 157
Ill. App. 3d 428 (daycare program affiliated with a private, parochial school system owned
and operated by the defendant church); Cotton, 39 Ill. App. 3d at 1064 (did not describe the
school involved other than to reference “private schools”); Merrill, 8 Ill. App. 3d at 910
(described as “non-profit private school” and “a parochial school”).
¶ 13 Here, CKC has no relationship with such an educational system. Its own name announces
that it is a club, not a school. According to the depositions of Brittany, Albert, and Kenney,
CKC was held one evening per week, for an hour and a half, from September through May.
Calvary also provided Sunday School during Sunday church services and Vacation Bible
School for one week in July. Kids through age 10 (fifth grade) were allowed to participate
in CKC, while kids age 11 and older (grades 6 through 12) met separately as the youth group;
both CKC and the youth group met during Calvary’s Wednesday night church service.
According to Kenney, who was the director of CKC at the time in question, the “typical
schedule” of a CKC Wednesday (other than the last meeting of the year) was “worship. And
then we go into our different classroom games, snacks, whatever we’re doing that day.” The
CKC kids would do “Bible study, games, crafts, just learn about Jesus.” The children did
“lessons” and learned about the Bible every session, even utilizing a workbook.
Memorization of Bible verses and stories led to earning a CKC vest and patches to put onto
the vest, “like a girl scout vest,” according to Brittany. Kenney and all of the “teachers” were
volunteers. As Kenney stated, “It’s all pretty informal”; records were not kept, e-mails were
sent from her personal computer, and there was no office.
¶ 14 We conclude that, while Calvary provides religious instruction through CKC, CKC is
nevertheless not the type of establishment that comes within the scope of section 24-24; thus,
Calvary is not entitled to the immunity provided by that section. CKC is a voluntary club,
more akin to a scouting organization than a school. Such organizations, which are run by
volunteers, also provide instruction in various subjects and organized activities for the
members.3 Section 24-24 is not applicable to such voluntary organizations, even if they do
provide some element of instruction.
¶ 15 In attempting to apply the reasoning and holding of Hilgendorf to its own situation,
3
We also note that scouting programs are often sponsored by churches.
-5-
Calvary claims that it runs “a system of religious education” consisting of Sunday School
during Sunday morning church services, CKC on Wednesday nights, and Vacation Bible
School in the summer, such that CKC is “part of a private, parochial school system” as was
the daycare program in that case. See Hilgendorf, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 430. This attempt is
strained and artificial. In Hilgendorf, the defendant church “owned and operated” the First
Baptist Church School, which ran the daycare program at which a child was injured. Id. at
429. The teacher whose negligent supervision was alleged was an elementary school teacher
who was certified by the State of Illinois. Id. at 430. While the court did not describe in detail
the “private, parochial school system” that it found the church to be operating (id.), it is clear
that the church operated a distinct entity known as First Baptist Church School that employed
at least one certified teacher. Here, there is no evidence that CKC was part of an organized
“school system” rather than one of the various youth ministries and clubs that are part of the
life of a congregation.
¶ 16 This in no way denigrates the religious instruction that CKC provides to the children at
Calvary. However, this type of voluntary instructional/ministry/social setting does not come
within the scope of the Code and its grant of immunity. Viewing the pleadings, admissions,
depositions, and affidavits on file in the light most favorable to Brittany, we conclude as a
matter of law that the trial court erred in determining that CKC was a “school” pursuant to
section 24-24 of the Code and in granting summary judgment in favor of Calvary. Therefore,
we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the cause for further
proceedings.
¶ 17 Reversed and remanded.
-6-