Johnson v. O'Connor , 2018 IL App (1st) 171930 ( 2019 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2019.02.04
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Johnson v. O’Connor, 2018 IL App (1st) 171930Appellate Court EDDIE JOHNSON, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of the
Caption City of Chicago Police Department, and THE CITY OF CHICAGO,
Petitioners-Appellees, v. EDWARD O’CONNOR and THE HUMAN
RESOURCES BOARD OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Respondents
(Edward O’Connor, Respondent-Appellant).
District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-17-1930
Filed September 28, 2018
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-CH-120003;
Review the Hon. Franklin U. Valderrama, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Counsel on Christopher Cooper, of Law Office of Christopher Cooper, Inc., of
Appeal Chicago, for appellant.
Edward N. Siskel, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth
Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Julian N. Henriques Jr.,
Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Hoffman* and Pucinski concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Respondent-appellant Edward O’Connor was removed from a list of eligible candidates for
a position as a Chicago police officer based on his admission that he had twice been arrested
for domestic battery in 2003 and 2014. Following a hearing on his removal, he was reinstated
to the eligibility list by respondent Human Resources Board of the City of Chicago (Board).
Petitioners-appellees Eddie Johnson, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) superintendent,
and the City of Chicago (petitioners) petitioned for a common law writ of certiorari in the
circuit court to review the Board’s decision. The court reversed the decision of the Board, and
O’Connor appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm and remand with directions.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2014, O’Connor applied for a position as a probationary police officer with the CPD.
Part of the application process required completing a personal history questionnaire, in which
O’Connor admitted that he had been arrested for domestic battery against his mother in 2003,
when he was 18, and against his roommate and ex-girlfriend in 2014.
¶4 O’Connor wrote that in 2003 he was living with his mother, a retired police officer. One
morning, his mother woke him up and asked him to do chores, but he said no because he had to
leave for work and told her he would do them when he returned. According to O’Connor, his
mother yelled at him, and he repeated his refusal to do the chores and slammed the door in her
face, whereupon his mother had him arrested for domestic violence. O’Connor’s narrative with
regard to the 2014 incident indicated that his roommate “became enraged” after he declined to
take her to the grocery store and threatened to ruin his life by hitting herself and telling the
police that he did it. O’Connor laughed and walked away, and his roommate then called the
police saying O’Connor hit her, when in fact she hit herself with an object she found next to the
parking lot of O’Connor’s apartment. The police arrived and arrested O’Connor, disbelieving
his claim that his roommate injured herself.
¶5 An administrative special order (Special Order) by the CPD provides that “[a]ny conduct
demonstrating a propensity for violence may be grounds for disqualification.” Such conduct
includes battery and domestic violence. Based on this Special Order, and following a
background investigation in which the CPD obtained police reports of the arrests, Investigator
Stanley Golucki recommended that O’Connor be disqualified for the position of police officer.
The CPD accepted the recommendation and advised the Department of Human Resources
(DHR) to remove O’Connor from the list of eligible candidates.
¶6 On June 26, 2015, DHR notified O’Connor of his removal from the list but informed him
that he could challenge the removal by requesting a hearing with the Board, which he did. At
*
Justice Hoffman, justice of the Sixth Division, was designated as the third panel member
following recusals by other members of the Second Division.
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the hearing, which was held on December 16, 2015, Golucki, O’Connor, O’Connor’s mother,
Karen O’Connor, and O’Connor’s girlfriend, Tanya Dovichi, all testified. Golucki testified to
the contents of the arrest report of the 2003 incident, which was also made part of the record.1
The 2003 arrest report indicated that when police arrived at Karen’s house, she told them that
she and O’Connor engaged in a verbal dispute after she asked him for help around the house.
O’Connor grabbed Karen by the neck and threw her to the kitchen floor, causing her injury.
Karen declined treatment and to have photos taken of her neck, which the report described as
“reddened.” O’Connor “freely stated” that he “didn’t grab [Karen] that hard.” The officers
took O’Connor into custody and advised Karen of the upcoming court date. O’Connor was
charged with domestic battery, but the charge was ultimately stricken with leave to reinstate.
¶7 Karen testified that one morning when O’Connor was about 17 or 18 years old and living
with her, she woke him up to ask for his help in moving something. When O’Connor did not
get out of bed, Karen took his car keys and told him to walk to work. This prompted O’Connor
to get out of bed and follow Karen to the kitchen, where he grabbed the keys out of Karen’s
hand. During the struggle with the keys, Karen slipped and fell. She denied that O’Connor
threw her to the floor or that he choked her. Karen testified that she called the police to “teach
[O’Connor] a lesson” not to put his hands on her. On cross-examination, Karen testified that
she was surprised the police report indicated that O’Connor grabbed her by the neck and threw
her to the floor. She was also surprised that the report described her as having a reddened neck.
¶8 In his testimony, O’Connor agreed with his mother’s description of the 2003 incident. He
clarified that when he went to the kitchen to retrieve the keys, his mother had her back to him
and was holding the keys in her fist, but the lanyard attached to the key ring was free.
O’Connor approached Karen from behind and grabbed the lanyard to pull the keys from her
hands. According to O’Connor, Karen then bumped him and he started to fall backwards while
still holding the lanyard, which caused Karen to fall down. O’Connor denied choking Karen,
throwing her to the ground, or punching her. He testified that he learned a lesson, and the
charges were dismissed.
¶9 The hearing officer’s report found that it was more likely than not that O’Connor engaged
in domestic battery against his mother in 2003, but that it was not more likely than not that
O’Connor committed domestic battery in 2014. The hearing officer concluded that although
“one instance of domestic battery was shown more likely than not, it occurred 13 years ago
when [O’Connor] was a teen; once [sic] instance alone does not show a propensity.”
Accordingly, the hearing officer recommended to the Board that the decision of the CPD be
reversed and O’Connor’s name be returned to the eligibility list.
¶ 10 In July 2016, the Board adopted the hearing officer’s findings and recommendations in
their entirety and reinstated O’Connor to the eligibility list.
¶ 11 Johnson petitioned the circuit court for a common law writ of certiorari. Following
briefing and oral argument, the court reversed the decision of the Board holding that the
hearing officer’s conclusion that a single violent incident is insufficient to demonstrate a
propensity for violence was inconsistent with the language of the Special Order. O’Connor
1
At the hearing, evidence was also introduced regarding the 2014 incident, but because the hearing
officer found that it was not more likely than not that O’Connor committed domestic battery in 2014,
and because that finding is not challenged on appeal, we find it unnecessary to recount that evidence
here.
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timely appeals.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 At issue in this case is the Board’s decision to reinstate O’Connor to the eligibility list
notwithstanding that he more likely than not committed domestic battery against his mother in
2003. The parties do not dispute that the circuit court properly reviewed the Board’s decision
pursuant to a common law writ of certiorari, given that the act conferring power on the Board
does not expressly adopt the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West
2016)) and does not provide for another form of review. See Applegate v. Department of
Transportation, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1061 (2002). Our review of a writ of certiorari is
“essentially the same” as our review of a petition filed under the Administrative Review Law.
Outcom, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 233 Ill. 2d 324, 337 (2009). In either
case, we review the decision of the agency rather than the circuit court under our “traditional
standards of review of administrative decisions.” Porter v. Illinois State Board of Education,
2014 IL App (1st) 122891, ¶ 25.
¶ 14 The applicable standard of review of the agency decision depends on the question
presented on appeal. Id. ¶ 26. If the question is one of fact, we apply a manifest weight of the
evidence standard, while if the question is one of law, we review the decision de novo. Beggs v.
Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL
120236, ¶ 50. And if the appeal presents a mixed question of law and fact, it is subject to
review under the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard. Id. Here, O’Connor urges us to
apply a clearly erroneous standard to what he contends was a mixed question of law and fact,
while Johnson maintains that our review is de novo, arguing the issue on appeal is solely a
question of law.
¶ 15 At the outset, we note that O’Connor did not advocate for application of the clearly
erroneous standard in the circuit court and instead argued that the Board’s decision was subject
to review under a manifest weight of the evidence standard as it was “a question of fact and fact
alone.” As Johnson points out, a party waives any argument he fails to present in circuit court.
Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403, 413 (2002). But because waiver is a
limitation on the parties and not the court (Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill.
2d 1, 11 (1996)), we nevertheless address the merits of the parties’ dispute regarding the
standard of review.
¶ 16 A mixed question of law and fact examines “the legal effect of a given set of facts” or,
stated differently, whether uncontested facts satisfy the statutory standard. Comprehensive
Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455, 472 (2005).
O’Connor contends that the issue on appeal is whether the uncontested facts of his 2003 arrest
implicate the Special Order so as to justify his disqualification. But that determination turns, in
the first instance, on the interpretation of the Special Order, which is a question of law. See
Burris v. Department of Children & Family Services, 2011 IL App (1st) 101364, ¶ 30
(interpretation of agency regulation is a question of law). And as discussed supra ¶ 14, we
review an agency’s decision on questions of law de novo. See Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50.
Importantly, however, an agency’s interpretation of its own rules and regulations “ ‘enjoys a
presumption of validity.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burris, 2011 IL App (1st)
101364, ¶ 30 (quoting Walk v. Department of Children & Family Services, 399 Ill. App. 3d
1174, 1181 (2010)).
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¶ 17 We construe administrative regulations according to the same standards governing the
construction of statutes. People v. Bonutti, 212 Ill. 2d 182, 188 (2004). The fundamental rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Hayashi v.
Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 16. The most
reliable indicator of the legislative intent is the plain language of the statute, which must be
given its ordinary meaning. Id. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we may not
depart from that language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that
the legislature did not express. Id. With these principles in mind, we turn to an examination of
the Special Order.
¶ 18 The Special Order at issue is titled “Pre-Employment Disqualification Standards for
Applicants for the Position of Police Officer,” and the relevant subsection of the Special Order
is titled “Disqualification Based on Criminal Conduct.” Prior to listing the types of criminal
conduct that disqualify a candidate, there is a disclaimer which reads: “The Standards are as
comprehensive as possible, however as noted above, they cannot encompass every possible
scenario. *** Commission of any criminal or quasi-criminal act may result in disqualification
from employment as a Police Officer if it is determined that the acts or omissions of the
applicant make him or her unsuitable for the position of Police Officer.” Here, O’Connor was
disqualified based on subsection (B)(2)(c) of the Special Order, which reads:
“Conduct Indicating Violent Tendencies. Any conduct demonstrating a propensity for
violence may be grounds for disqualification. Conduct demonstrating a propensity for
violence includes but is not limited to, conduct which would constitute *** battery ***
[and] domestic violence ***. As noted above, an applicant who has engaged in any act
falling within the scope of this section that constitutes a felony will be found unsuitable
for employment. An applicant who has engaged in any act falling within the scope of
this section that constitutes a misdemeanor within the last three (3) years (from the date
of [personal history questionnaire] submission) or more than one (1) time in his or her
life, will be found unsuitable for employment.”
¶ 19 The plain language of subsection (B)(2)(c) of the Special Order defines both when
disqualification is discretionary as well as when it is mandatory. The first sentence of the order
provides that an applicant may be disqualified for any conduct demonstrating a propensity for
violence. The word “may” indicates that the decision to disqualify a candidate for conduct
demonstrating a propensity for violence is within the CPD’s discretion. See People v.
Garstecki, 234 Ill. 2d 430, 443 (2009) (statute’s use of the word “may” indicates that a rule is
permissive). This is particularly true when we consider that the remaining sentences of the
order specify the circumstances under which an applicant will be “found unsuitable for
employment,” i.e., if the act charged constitutes a felony or if it was a misdemeanor committed
(i) within the past 3 years or (ii) more than once in an applicant’s life. See Hoffman v.
Altamore, 352 Ill. App. 3d 246, 256 (2004) (“[W]hen the legislature uses certain words in one
instance and different words in another, different results are intended.”).
¶ 20 Our conclusion finds additional support in the fact that the Special Order expressly states
that the standards for disqualification based on criminal conduct “cannot encompass every
scenario” and provides generally that disqualification may be based on the commission of “any
criminal or quasi-criminal act” where the act makes the applicant “unsuitable for the position
of police officer.” This language suggests that the Special Order is intended to invest broad
discretion in the CPD in disqualifying candidates. For these reasons, we conclude that the
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Board’s interpretation was contrary to both the Special Order’s plain language and well-settled
principles of statutory construction.
¶ 21 When the Board concluded as a matter of law that one instance of violence constituting a
misdemeanor committed more than three years before the candidate’s submission of his
personal history questionnaire is per se insufficient to warrant disqualification, it prohibited
CPD from exercising its discretion. Certainly, there are situations where, in CPD’s discretion,
it could determine that a single misdemeanor act of domestic violence disqualifies a candidate
from eligibility for employment. By way of example, if the battery was committed against a
candidate’s pregnant wife with other small children present, CPD could determine that those
“aggravating” circumstances render the candidate ineligible no matter when the conduct
occurred.
¶ 22 Having determined that the Board erred in its interpretation of the Special Order, we turn to
the proper remedy. We cannot merely remand with directions for the Board to remove
O’Connor’s name from the eligibility list, as the CPD’s initial decision to disqualify O’Connor
was based on both the 2003 and 2014 incidents, and the hearing officer determined that it was
not more likely than not that the incident in 2014 in fact occurred. Given that O’Connor’s
disqualification was based on two incidents of domestic battery, CPD was not given the
opportunity to consider whether the circumstances of the first incident warranted
disqualification. Therefore, the appropriate course is to allow the CPD to exercise its discretion
to determine if the 2003 incident alone disqualifies O’Connor. In making this determination,
the CPD may consider the fact that, while O’Connor disclosed the incident in his personal
history questionnaire, his description of slamming the door in his mother’s face, which he
included in the questionnaire, was at odds with (i) the police report, which indicated that
O’Connor grabbed his mother’s neck and threw her to the floor and told police he “didn’t grab
her that hard,” and (ii) his testimony at the hearing.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand to the
circuit court with directions to remand to the Board with the further direction to remand to the
CPD to determine whether the single incident of conduct constituting domestic violence
engaged in by O’Connor is grounds for discretionary disqualification.
¶ 25 Affirmed and remanded with directions.
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