People v. Walker , 2021 IL App (1st) 200985-U ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 200985-USIXTH DIVISION
December 10, 2021
No. 1-20-0985
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 19 CR 60227
)
LEVANT WALKER, ) Honorable
) Michael Clancy,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Pierce and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for residential burglary is affirmed where (1) the evidence
was sufficient and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not
declare a mistrial and instructed the jury to continue deliberating.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Levant Walker was found guilty of residential burglary
and sentenced to seven years in prison. On appeal, Mr. Walker argues that (1) the State failed to
prove him guilty of residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the trial court abused
its discretion by effectively coercing a verdict when it refused to declare a mistrial. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
No. 1-20-0985
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Levant “Mississippi” Walker was charged with one count of residential burglary for
breaking and entering the home of Carter Martin on August 17, 2019. After being admonished by
the judge, Mr. Walker chose to represent himself at trial.
¶5 At the trial, Mr. Martin testified that on August 17, 2019, at around 10:30 a.m., he was
watching television alone in his home at 7950 South Wood Street when he heard glass shatter in
the kitchen. He went to his kitchen, located at the back of his house, and discovered a broken
window and glass on the floor. He called 9-1-1 and went to the front of his home to wait for the
police.
¶6 Mr. Martin testified that shortly after calling 9-1-1, he heard a “boom” from the kitchen
and again went to see what it was. In the kitchen, Mr. Martin saw an individual he recognized as
Mr. Walker grasping the inner portion of the windowsill with his shoulders, head, and chest
through the window. Mr. Walker was shirtless, wearing only blue jeans and white gym shoes. Mr.
Martin said, “what the f****,” then saw Mr. Walker push back out of the window, fall to the
ground, and run down a nearby alley. Mr. Martin testified that he had an unobstructed view of Mr.
Walker’s face and saw Mr. Walker’s arms touch the glass as he was leaving the window. Mr.
Martin testified that prior to the incident, he had seen Mr. Walker in person approximately six or
seven times. Mr. Martin said he had never given Mr. Walker permission to enter or take anything
from his home, and Mr. Walker had never been inside Mr. Martin’s home before the incident. Mr.
Martin again called 9-1-1, and soon two Chicago police officers arrived.
¶7 Officer Yore testified that he and his partner, Officer Mohammad, were assigned to
investigate the burglary at Mr. Martin’s house. When they arrived, Mr. Martin told the officers
that he had heard glass breaking and that the person who he knew as “Mississippi” was trying to
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crawl through the window to enter his home. Officer Yore confirmed that the window was broken.
However, he did not see any blood on the scene, and Mr. Martin similarly said there was no blood
in the kitchen or the yard. The officers took photos of the scene. Mr. Martin testified that the
window was about five or six feet from the ground. In contrast, Officer Yore testified that the
window was about 10 feet from the ground, but said he believed that the window was accessible
from the porch. Whatever item was used to break the window was not found on the scene. After
the incident, Mr. Martin had placed a screen in the broken window. The State published clips from
the body cameras worn by Officers Yore and Mohammad during their time at Mr. Walker’s home.
¶8 Mr. Martin testified that on the day after the incident, August 18, 2019, he was walking to
a nearby store between 1 and 1:30 p.m. when he saw Mr. Walker talking to another person. As Mr.
Martin passed Mr. Walker, Mr. Walker smiled, and Mr. Martin told him, “[w]e going to get you.”
Mr. Martin then ran to a police car that was stopped at a stop sign about 50 feet away. Mr. Martin
told the officer in the car, Officer Perdue, that he had just passed Mr. Walker, who had broken into
his house, and gave the officer Mr. Walker’s description; specifically, that Mr. Walker was a man
in his 40s, wearing navy blue pants and a white shirt. Officer Perdue put out a flash message of
the description and had Mr. Martin get into the back of his squad car.
¶9 After about 15 minutes, Officers Diaz and Alcaraz radioed that they had a person in an
alley matching Mr. Walker’s description. Upon arriving on the scene, Mr. Martin confirmed that
the suspect was Mr. Walker. Officer Perdue conducted a pre-arrest protective pat down, during
which he noticed that Mr. Walker’s inner biceps were bandaged with tissue paper and Scotch tape.
Mr. Walker was arrested and taken back to the police station.
¶ 10 At the police station, Mr. Walker was interviewed by Detective Terance Nalls and another
detective. Detective Nalls also testified that Mr. Walker’s inner biceps were wrapped with tissue
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paper and Scotch tape. Detective Nalls testified that the interview was not recorded because
recording an interview is not required for residential burglary crimes under Chicago Police
Department directives and statutes. According to the detective, after being read his Miranda rights,
Mr. Walker indicated that he understood his rights and agreed to speak to the detectives. Detective
Nalls testified that when he asked what had happened, Mr. Walker said that he went to the
residence “to take s****.” When asked how he got into the window, Mr. Walker said that he went
up the back stairs and broke the window with a brick. From there, he was able to lean across the
porch and climb through the window. Mr. Walker said that after he got further inside the window,
the owner of the house saw him, so he exited the window, fell to the ground, and took off running.
Detective Nalls also said that Mr. Walker explained that he sustained cuts on his upper body
underneath his arms when he fell from the window. Detective Nalls did not get a signed written
version of Mr. Walker’s statements.
¶ 11 Mr. Walker did not testify.
¶ 12 The jury deliberations spanned two different days, during which several questions were
asked by the jury. Because Mr. Walker is arguing that this process resulted in a coerced verdict,
we will discuss the deliberations in more detail below. Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Walker
guilty of residential burglary.
¶ 13 The trial court denied Mr. Walker’s motion for a new trial and sentenced Mr. Walker to
seven years in prison. The court also denied Mr. Walker’s motion to reconsider his sentence. This
appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 15 Mr. Walker’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied on August 11, 2020, and he
timely filed his notice of appeal on August 20, 2020. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI,
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section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court
Rules 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and 606 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final judgments
in criminal cases.
¶ 16 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 A. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Verdict
¶ 18 On appeal, Mr. Walker argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of residential burglary. Specifically, he argues that the evidence
was insufficient to show that he had pulled himself through the window, as Mr. Martin claimed,
because (1) there was no blood on the broken glass or at the scene, and (2) to the extent that Mr.
Martin’s testimony was confirmed by Mr. Walker’s own statement to detectives, that statement
was not memorialized, and should not therefore have been relied on.
¶ 19 Due process provides that a defendant may not be convicted “except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
a reviewing court will not retry a defendant. People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 387 (2001). Instead,
the reviewing court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The trier of
fact remains responsible for “making determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”
People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). However, a conviction will be set aside where the
evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt
of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 542 (1999).
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¶ 20 To convict a defendant of residential burglary, the State must prove that the defendant
knowingly entered the dwelling of another without authority and with intent to commit a theft or
felony. 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2018). The evidence here is sufficient to convict Mr. Walker of
residential burglary. That evidence included the testimony of Mr. Martin that he was at his home
when he heard glass break, he discovered a window in his kitchen had been broken, and later saw
Mr. Walker climbing through the broken window. Mr. Martin identified Mr. Walker as the
individual who had been climbing through the window both to police at his house the day of the
incident and the following day when Mr. Walker was apprehended.
¶ 21 This firsthand account is confirmed by Detective Nalls’s testimony about what Mr. Walker
acknowledged in his police interview. Mr. Walker admitted that he went to Mr. Martin’s home “to
take s****” and entered the home by going up the back stairs, breaking the window with a brick,
and leaning across the porch railing to climb through the window.
¶ 22 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact
could have found the evidence and testimony established that Mr. Walker had entered Mr. Martin’s
home, by putting himself through the window that he had broken, without Mr. Martin’s authority
and with an intent to commit a theft.
¶ 23 Mr. Walker argues that the evidence is contradicted by the fact that Mr. Walker did not
have any injuries on his hands or forearms when he was arrested the following day. Mr. Walker
claims that this is inconsistent with his having climbed through the window because in the
photographs shown to the jury the windowsill still had shards of broken glass on it. According to
Mr. Walker, if he had crawled into the window, he would have been unable to avoid cutting his
hands on those shards.
¶ 24 While Mr. Walker did not have cuts on his hands or forearms, he did have cuts on the inside
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of his biceps. Both Officer Perdue and Detective Nalls testified that they saw these injuries. Also,
the jury was aware that there was no blood on the scene through the testimony of both Mr. Martin
and Officer Yore and was able to consider this as part of its deliberations.
¶ 25 The jury could have reasonably believed that Mr. Walker was careful going into the
window but cut his biceps while falling out of the window. They also could have reasonably
inferred that, given that Mr. Walker bandaged his cuts with just tissue paper and scotch tape, the
cuts were not the kind that would yield copious amounts of blood. It is the responsibility of the
trier of fact, not this court, to “weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224 (2009).
¶ 26 Similarly, Mr. Walker relies on the fact that no brick or other object was ever recovered to
confirm Mr. Martin’s testimony that Mr. Walker threw a brick through his window. However, the
jury saw photographs depicting the broken window so there was clearly some physical evidence
to corroborate that aspect of Mr. Martin’s testimony.
¶ 27 Mr. Walker also argues that his alleged confession to Detective Nalls after his arrest could
not be used to bolster the guilty verdict as it was “unbelievable” because it was not memorialized
in writing. The jury was aware, through Detective Nalls’s testimony, that Mr. Walker’s alleged
confession was not memorialized in writing. It was the jury’s responsibility to determine whether
Detective Nalls’s testimony, in the absence of a memorialized and signed statement, was credible.
A reviewing court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of
witness credibility (People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000)), and we will not do so here.
¶ 28 Additionally, just as Mr. Walker’s statement corroborated Mr. Martin’s testimony, Mr.
Martin’s testimony corroborated Detective Nalls’s testimony about Mr. Walker’s admissions.
Detective Nalls testified that Mr. Walker said he went to Mr. Martin’s house “to take s****” and
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that Mr. Walker said he got into the window by going up the back stairs and using a brick to break
the glass, then leaned over the porch railing and climbed through the window. This is in line with
the testimony given by Mr. Martin, who said that he heard a glass breaking and saw the broken
window in his kitchen and, after briefly leaving the kitchen to call police, saw Mr. Walker climbing
through the broken window. These two versions of what occurred corroborated each other.
¶ 29 Nothing in the finding of guilt was so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory to shed
doubt on the jury’s verdict. In sum, the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, is sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Mr. Walker entered Mr.
Martin’s home without his authority with an intent to commit a theft.
¶ 30 B. The Trial Court Did Not Coerce the Jury’s Verdict
¶ 31 Mr. Walker next argues that the trial court coerced the jury’s verdict by refusing to declare
a mistrial. At the conclusion of the trial, but before deliberations began, the judge gave the
following jury instructions that are relevant to this issue:
“You have before you evidence the defendant made a statement relating to the
offense charged in the information. It is for you to determine whether the defendant made
the statement and if so, what weight should be given to the statement. In determining the
weight to be given to a statement, you should consider all of the circumstances under which
it was made.
***
A person commits the offense of residential burglary when he knowingly and
without authority enters the dwelling place of another with the intent to commit therein the
offense of theft.
The term dwelling place means a house *** which at the time of the alleged offense,
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the owner actually resides—the owners actually reside or in their absence intend within a
reasonable period of time to reside.
To sustain the charge of residential burglary, the State must prove the following
propositions: First, that the defendant knowingly entered the dwelling place of another.
And second, that the defendant did so without authority. And third, that the defendant did
so with the intent therein to commit the offense of theft.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant
guilty. If you find from your considerations of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant
not guilty.”
¶ 32 Deliberations began at 3:30 p.m. on November 14, 2019. At 5 p.m., the trial court indicated
it had received several questions from the jury. The transcript reflects that the court reported to the
State and Mr. Walker as follows:
“[Juror 1] is the, I assume the author whose name is first on it.
[Juror 1]: May we be granted a law book with thorough definitions of the crime.
Second question: Is it standard police protocol for Detective Nalls and the other
detective to have the defendant not sign his comment ‘I was there to take shit.’
[Juror 2]. Number three: Is it standard procedure for the evidence team to come out
on the same day of the crime or does this happen the next day afterwards?
The fourth question is does the third point of the definition of residential burglary
mean an intent of burglary must be proven by direct evidence of something stolen, or is it
to be assumed that intent was specifically for robbing the residence. [Juror 1].”
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¶ 33 The court asked the parties for a response, and the State argued that the court should simply
say that they had been given the law that applied to the case and “ha[d] all the evidence.” Mr.
Walker asked that “some type of law books” be sent to the jury to help them “really understand
the definition of burglary and things of that nature.”
¶ 34 The court thanked the parties for their responses and said it would respond that “the law
that applies to this case is stated in the instructions” and that “the evidence which you should
consider consists only of the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits and stipulations which
the court has received.” Mr. Walker again asked the judge to send a law book to the jury, and the
judge again declined, explaining that the jury generally cannot have a law book. The court noted
that “neither the State nor the defense” had introduced any evidence at trial of “a standard police
protocol with Detective Nalls or anyone else,” so that evidence, if it in fact existed, should not be
considered.
¶ 35 The court sent the jurors the first answers to their questions at 5:15 p.m. At 5:30 p.m.,
another note came from the jury requesting transcripts. Again, the court reported this to the State
and to Mr. Walker. The court advised the parties that he would respond to that request by stating:
“Those of you who took notes during trial may use your notes to refresh your memory
during jury deliberation. Each juror should rely on his or her recollection of the evidence.
Just because a juror has taken notes does not necessarily mean that his or her recollection
of the evidence is any better or more accurate than the recollection of a juror who did not
take notes.
Court transcript copies or copy of court transcripts [are] not available at this time.”
Neither party objected and the court sent this response at 5:40 p.m., telling the jury to “[c]ontinue
to deliberate.”
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¶ 36 At 5:55 p.m., the jurors sent a third note that said, “[d]espite thorough deliberation, we are
unable to reach a unanimous decision. Thank you.” The court raised the question with Mr. Walker
and with the State whether it should simply respond “continue to deliberate” or give the jury
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 26.07 (4th ed. 2000), commonly known as a Prim
instruction (see People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 75-76 (1972)). The State requested the Prim
instruction and Mr. Walker said, “[d]oesn’t matter to me, your Honor. Give it to them.” The court
then brought the jurors back into the courtroom and instructed them as follows, in accord with
Prim:
“The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to
return a verdict it is necessary that each juror agree thereto. Your verdict must be
unanimous. It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with a
view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to your individual
judgment.
Each of you must decide the case for yourself. But do so only after impartial
consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors.
In the course of your deliberations do not hesitate to re-examine your own views
and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest
conviction as to the weight or affect [sic] of the evidence solely because of your fellow
jurors. Or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans, you are judges. Judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to
ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
Ask you to please go back to the jury[ ]room. You will get this instruction in writing
and please continue to deliberate.”
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¶ 37 The court allowed the jury to continue deliberations until 7 p.m., at which time it sent them
home until the following day.
¶ 38 Although it is unclear from the record when deliberations resumed, the jury was told to
arrive at 9:30 a.m. the following day. At some unspecified time, another note was received from
the jury. The first question read, “[d]ear Judge, some members of the jury find the Defendant not
guilty due to the fact that they believe the law was misapplied by the Prosecution in this case. What
do we do in this case?” A second question read, “[w]hat do we do if someone is convinced of their
own opinion of what burglary [is] over the law?”
¶ 39 The judge again reported these notes to the State and to Mr. Walker. Mr. Walker again
wanted a definition of burglary provided to the jury, while the State maintained that the jury
already had the proper definition of burglary and “all the evidence” that it could consider in
deciding whether the State had established the elements of that offense. The State further said that
“[a]t this point, if there’s somebody back there who’s refusing to deliberate or refusing to follow
the law as given to them by the Court, which is the actual law, then we either need to strike that
person and put an alternate in, or we need to hang [the jury],” to which Mr. Walker responded,
“[n]o, I object to that.” The judge informed the parties that it would respond to the questions by
telling the jury that he had provided them with the applicable law during the jury instructions, that
the law must be followed, and that they had agreed to follow the law. When the court brought the
jury out again, its precise instructions were as follows:
“The law that applies to this case is stated in the instructions that you have received
and it is your duty to follow all of them. You must not single out certain instructions and
disregard others.
So again, let me repeat: The law that applies to this case is stated in these
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instructions which you have, obviously, in back, and it is your duty to follow all of them.
You must not single out certain instructions and disregard others.
And I want to go back to some questioning when we—when you were under oath
and you were questioned by me earlier, before the jury was selected. We went through a
number of things, but one of the questions I state—let you know is that at the end of the
trial, I will instruct the jury on the law. The law must be followed even if you disagree with
it.
***
What I think I probably said to you was this, word for word: You understand it is
your duty to follow the law that I give to you, even if you personally disagree with it. And
each of you answered, yes, that you understood that it’s your duty to follow the law that I
give you, even if you—even if you disagree with it.
So with those instructions, I’d ask you to go back to the jury room and continue to
deliberate. Thank you.”
¶ 40 The jury left the room. Mr. Walker then asked, again, for the definition of burglary “straight
out of the book” to be sent to the jury. The court denied this request, maintaining that the jury
instruction already given to the jury regarding the elements of burglary had been appropriate.
Sometime later another note was sent, this time stating: “The jury environment is too hostile. We
cannot come to a conclusion.”
¶ 41 The court asked the parties for suggestions, and the State requested that the court question
the person who was apparently refusing to follow the law, strike that person, and replace him or
her with an alternate juror. Mr. Walker objected. The court declined to do as the State had
suggested, opting instead to bring the jury back out, read them the Prim instruction again, and ask
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them to continue deliberating.
¶ 42 The next time they came out, the jury delivered its verdict, finding Mr. Walker guilty of
residential burglary. The court polled the jury and each juror assured the judge that that was his or
her verdict.
¶ 43 Mr. Walker argues that the trial court effectively coerced the jury’s guilty verdict by
refusing to declare a mistrial after the jury “repeatedly” told the court that they were deadlocked.
Mr. Walker is correct that the possibility of a hung jury is an inevitable byproduct of a unanimous
verdict requirement, and “the jury cannot be compelled to reach a verdict in all instances.” People
v. Gregory, 184 Ill. App. 3d 676, 681 (1989). On the other hand, a “trial court has discretion to
have the jury continue its deliberation even though the jury has reported it is deadlocked and will
be unable to reach a verdict.” People v. Ferro, 195 Ill. App. 3d 282, 292 (1990) (citing People v.
Cowan, 105 Ill. 2d 324, 328 (1985)). Moreover, “a trial judge has the duty to provide guidance to
a jury that is not hopelessly deadlocked.” Gregory, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 681 (citing People v. Prim,
53 Ill. 2d 62, 64 (1972)). A trial judge’s decision to continue deliberations will be reversed only if
it is an abuse of the court’s discretion, even where the jury has reported to the court that it is
“hopelessly deadlocked.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Green, 91 Ill. App. 3d
1085, 1090 (1980). And an abuse of discretion exists “only where the trial court’s ruling is so
arbitrary or fanciful that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Simmons, 2016 IL App (1st) 131300, ¶ 114.
¶ 44 If the court chooses to tell the jury to continue deliberations, that instruction “should be
simple, neutral, and not coercive.” Ferro, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 293. “The test for determining
whether the trial court’s comments to the jury were improper *** is whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, the language used by the court actually interfered with the jury’s deliberations
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and coerced a guilty verdict.” People v. McCoy, 405 Ill. App. 3d 269, 275 (2010). Because we are
not privy to the jurors’ subjective thoughts, we must examine the trial court’s instructions to see if
they likely “imposed such confusion or pressure on the jury to reach a verdict that the accuracy
and integrity of the verdict returned becomes uncertain.” Id.¶ 45 Here, the jury deliberated for approximately three-and-a-half hours the first day, and during
that time sent notes to the court three different times. With the third note, the jurors indicated for
the first time that they were “unable to reach a unanimous decision.” At this point, the court read
the jury the Prim instruction for the first time. As our supreme court explained:
“The Prim instruction informs the jury of the requirement that the verdict be unanimous;
that the jury has a duty to deliberate; that jurors must impartially consider the evidence;
and that jurors should not hesitate to reexamine their views and change their opinions if
they believe them to be erroneous, provided the change is not solely because of the opinion
of fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” People v. Chapman, 194
Ill. 2d 186, 222 (2000).
¶ 46 The length of deliberations on the following day is unclear from the record. During that
time, the court received two notes from the jury. In the first, two individuals indicated that at least
one juror was not applying the law correctly. In response, the judge brought the jurors out and
reminded them that before being sworn in they had assured the court that they would follow the
law even if they disagreed with it. In the second note, the jury again indicated it could not reach a
unanimous decision and, further, that the “jury environment [wa]s too hostile.” The court gave the
jurors a second Prim instruction and, after an undisclosed amount of time, the jury reached its
verdict of guilty. The jurors were polled, and each indicated that this was his or her verdict.
¶ 47 We cannot say that the trial court here abused its discretion by instructing the jury to
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continue their deliberations. The court gave the Prim instruction after the first time the jury
indicated it was deadlocked, instructed the jurors that they had agreed to follow the law even if
they did not agree with it when notes indicated that a juror may have been ignoring the law, and
gave the Prim instruction a second time when the jury again indicated that it was deadlocked.
¶ 48 Mr. Walker argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial in light of the jury
“repeatedly communicat[ing] to the judge that it could not reach a unanimous verdict,” “effectively
request[ing]” the court do so “several times when reporting it was deadlocked,” stating that “the
environment in the jury room had become hostile,” and “indicat[ing] that numerous jurors had
ceased deliberating.” But “[t]here is no requirement that a mistrial be declared because of the
jurors’ inability to come to a unanimous verdict immediately,” and a trial court is not “required to
accept a jury’s assessment of its own ability to reach a verdict.” People v. Logston, 196 Ill. App.
3d 30, 33 (1990).
¶ 49 This is not like People v. Wilcox, 407 Ill. App. 3d 151, 163 (2010), which is the case relied
on by Mr. Walker. In Wilcox, the court told the jury, “ ‘[w]hen you were sworn in as jurors and
placed under oath you pledged to obtain a verdict. Please continue to deliberate and obtain a
verdict.” Id. In contrast, in the Prim instruction, the court here specifically stated, “do not surrender
your honest conviction as to the weight or affect [sic] of the evidence solely because of your fellow
jurors. Or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.” Unlike in Wilcox, the trial judge in this case
never suggested to the jury that they would not be able to leave unless and until they reached a
unanimous verdict.
¶ 50 Mr. Walker argues that the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial was “compounded by
[its] refusal to engage with the jury’s concerns.” The trial court provided the jury with multiple
simple, neutral, non-coercive instructions, after which the jury agreed on a verdict of guilty. Mr.
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Walker provides no authority to suggest that the trial judge was required to do anything more.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion by this trial judge.
¶ 51 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 53 Affirmed.
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