Lauren Leonforte Co. v. Meisenhelter , 2021 IL App (4th) 210253-U ( 2022 )


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  •             NOTICE
    
    2022 IL App (4th) 210253-U
                                FILED
    This Order was filed under
    Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                               January 3, 2022
    not precedent except in the                   NO. 4-21-0253                                 Carla Bender
    limited circumstances allowed                                                           4th District Appellate
    under Rule 23(e)(1).                 IN THE APPELLATE COURT                                   Court, IL
    OF ILLINOIS
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    LAUREN LEONFORTE CO.,                                             )      Appeal from the
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                                   )      Circuit Court of
    v.                                                     )      Macon County
    GREGG MEISENHELTER                                                )      No. 19MR863
    and MEI FARMS, INC.,                                              )
    Defendants-Appellees.                                  )      Honorable
    )      Thomas E. Little,
    )      Judge Presiding.
    PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
    Justices DeArmond and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    ¶1      Held: (1) Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim fails as plaintiff failed to prove the alleged
    breaches proximately caused its damages.
    (2) Plaintiff failed to establish it was entitled to injunctive relief.
    ¶2               Defendants, Gregg Meisenhelter and MEI Farms, Inc., an Illinois Corporation,
    sold plaintiff, Lauren Leonforte Co., student-rental properties near Millikin University (Millikin).
    The parties entered into a purchase agreement, with two addenda, which created geographical
    restrictions on the parties’ future purchases of properties and limited defendants’ ability to
    “target” plaintiff’s tenants. After Meisenhelter purchased a property in violation of the terms of
    the second addendum and placed signage advertising defendants’ rental properties, plaintiff sued
    defendants for breach of contract and for injunctive relief. The trial court found no breach
    occurred and ruled in defendants’ favor. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the trial court erred by
    (1) failing to enforce the geographic restrictions of the second addendum and (2) improperly
    construing the term “target” by consideration of parol evidence rather than by its plain and
    ordinary meaning. Defendants respond, in part, by emphasizing plaintiff failed to establish
    damages associated with either alleged breach. We agree with defendants and affirm.
    ¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND
    ¶4             Meisenhelter is the president of MEI Farms, Inc. Since the mid-1990s,
    Meisenhelter was in the business of providing rental housing to Millikin students. Plaintiff, a
    California corporation, was authorized to do business in Illinois.
    ¶5             On February 2, 2015, plaintiff and defendants signed a purchase agreement.
    Under the express terms of the purchase agreement, defendants agreed to sell to plaintiff real
    estate “[t]o be furnished later” for an unspecified price. The agreement expressly states, “Refer to
    Addendum” in spaces following the “To be furnished later” language. Added in paragraph 15 is
    the following: “Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Agreement will superceed [sic] any terms in
    conflict in Purchase agreement.” The record contains a “List of subject properties for Real Estate
    Purchase Contract dated February 2, 2015.” The list contains 12 residences and 5 vacant lots.
    ¶6             On that same date, the parties signed an Addendum to Real Estate Purchase
    Agreement (First Addendum). The properties that were sold were in the 1300 block of West
    Wood Street and the 1300 block of West Macon Street. The purchase price for these properties
    was $850,000. The First Addendum further provided the following:
    “Seller agrees not to target the existing Tenants (students)
    who are currently in the subject properties now and in the future in
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    an effort to have them move to Seller’s other rental properties.
    Similarly, Seller agrees not to target the future Tenants (students)
    in the subject properties in an effort to have them move to Seller’s
    other rental properties, however, Seller can secure any other
    students for the remainder of his properties.”
    Defendants further agreed “during this period and pursuant to the signing of the purchase
    agreement not to attempt in any way to purchase any vacant lots or any homes in the 1300 block
    on W Wood St or W Macon St between S Fairview Ave and S McClellan Ave.”
    ¶7             On March 10, 2015, the parties signed a Second Addendum to Real Estate
    Purchase Agreement (Second Addendum). The Second Addendum listed the same properties and
    same purchase price. The Second Addendum further included the same paragraph by which
    defendants agreed “not to target the existing Tenants (students).” The Second Addendum
    contained, in paragraph 10, an agreement that stated the following:
    “Seller and/or any of his affiliates further agrees during this
    period and after the closing for so long as Buyer owns these
    subject properties and/or student housing and investment
    properties, and pursuant to the signing of the purchase agreement,
    not to attempt in any way, nor to purchase any vacant lots or any
    homes West of S. Oakland Avenue without first obtaining the
    written permission of the Buyer. Buyer and/or any of its affiliates
    further agrees during this period and after the closing for so long as
    Seller owns student housing and investment properties, and
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    pursuant to the signing of the purchase agreement, not to attempt in
    any way, nor to purchase any vacant lots or any homes East of S.
    Oakland Avenue without first obtaining the written permission of
    the Seller.”
    ¶8             In June 2019, plaintiff filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking equitable
    relief. In July 2020, plaintiff filed a second verified amended complaint. According to the
    amended complaint, defendants purchased a residential home at 1383 West Main Street on or
    about April 20, 2018, without seeking written consent from plaintiff. Plaintiff asserted
    defendants breached the amended contract by purchasing 1383 West Main Street and by
    displaying advertising on that property that “targets, among others, the existing or future tenants
    of those properties which are the subject of the Amended Contract.” Plaintiff contended
    defendants’ breaches caused “damages in the form of decreased rental revenue at properties
    which are the subject of the Amended Contract.” Plaintiff further maintained the average
    monthly rental revenue, since defendants’ breaches, decreased by approximately $1281 and it
    suffered $86,493 in the reduction of the value of its rental-property portfolio.
    ¶9             Plaintiff asked the court to enter an injunction compelling defendants to (1) divest
    all residential properties and vacant lots west of South Oakland Avenue in Decatur, Illinois,
    within five miles, or other radius the court deems reasonable, of Millikin that were acquired after
    March 10, 2015; and (2) cease advertising of their rental properties, “including signage and
    physical advertisement” within five miles of Millikin, or within any radius the court deems
    reasonable, that may target the existing or future tenants of plaintiff’s properties. Plaintiff further
    sought an injunction barring defendants from (1) acquiring residential properties and vacant lots
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    west of South Oakland Avenue, within five miles of Millikin, or any other radius the court deems
    reasonable, for as long as plaintiff owns and operates rental housing; and (2) advertising their
    rental houses within five miles of Millikin, or within such other radius as the court deems
    reasonable, in a manner that targets existing or future tenants of the properties subject to the
    Amended Contract, including signage and physical advertisement displayed west of South
    Oakland Avenue. Plaintiff last sought damages in the amount of $104,427 for 14 months of
    decreased rental revenue and reduced property value, as well as an additional $1281 per month
    for each month beyond August 2019 while the breaches continued and attorney fees and costs.
    ¶ 10           In March 2021, the trial court conducted a bench trial. Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 2
    was entered into evidence. This exhibit showed 11 of the 17 properties sold were on the same
    city block, which was bordered on the north by West Wood Street, on the south by West Macon
    Street, on the east by South Fairview Avenue, and on the west by South McClellan Avenue. Four
    of the properties appeared to be across Wood Street on a different block. West Main Street was
    the north border of that city block. The property defendants purchased after the Second
    Addendum was signed was located on West Main Street, on the same block as four of plaintiff’s
    properties. The remaining two properties that were a part of the 2015 sale were on the other side
    of West Macon Street.
    ¶ 11           Plaintiff’s first witness was Meisenhelter. Meisenhelter testified he sold the
    properties to plaintiff as student housing. Doing so was key to his offering because of the value it
    would generate for a buyer. Meisenhelter agreed, for rental properties, one could charge more
    per bedroom than one could for a single-family home.
    ¶ 12           Meisenhelter testified he and his mother, in April 2018, purchased property west
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    of South Oakland Avenue, 1383 West Main Street, without first obtaining plaintiff’s written
    permission. Three rental signs were placed on that property, advertising “for rent for the next
    upcoming school year, Meisenhelter Properties.” The signage also contained his phone number.
    According to Meisenhelter, Kennedy Chandler, a former tenant of plaintiff’s, signed a lease to
    rent 1383 West Main Street for February 2020 through May 2020. Meisenhelter denied soliciting
    Chandler. She was brought to defendants by a friend, who had not leased from plaintiff.
    Meisenhelter further reported Chandler did not list plaintiff as a previous landlord. In December
    2020, Meisenhelter and his mother sold 1383 West Main Street.
    ¶ 13           Meisenhelter identified Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 8 as a lease signed by Jackson
    Delfosse and Marissa McElroy for one of his properties east of Oakland Street. Both Delfosse
    and McElroy had previously rented from plaintiff.
    ¶ 14           On cross-examination, Meisenhelter testified he believed the purchase of 1383
    West Main Street did not violate the contract as the property was not on Wood or Macon Streets.
    There were no tenants in that property during the 2018-19 school year. On McElroy’s and
    Delfosse’s application to rent from defendants, both indicated they learned about the rental from
    their friend who already resided in that house. Meisenhelter had no contact with McElroy before
    she applied to live in the house.
    ¶ 15           Meisenhelter testified when he first started the rental business, less than 5% of his
    tenants were not students. At the time of his testimony, Meisenhelter provided a rough estimate
    50% of the tenants were students. Meisenhelter believed the student pool had gotten smaller and
    Millikin had “enticed its students to stay on campus longer.” According to Meisenhelter, his
    gross revenues from rentals in the 2015-16 school year were $382,845. For 2016-17, they were
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    $314,000. In 2017-18, gross revenues were $249,842. In 2018-19, gross revenues were
    $189,000. In 2019-20, they were $134,000. Meisenhelter believed he may have sold a few
    houses in those years but not many. Fourteen or fifteen houses were “maybe” responsible for
    generating that revenue. He had sold three or four houses during those years.
    ¶ 16           Shefina Gorrell, property manager for Meisenhelter, testified she received calls
    from individuals looking to see a house or an apartment. All prospective tenants had to complete
    application materials. However, “the second page” of those materials was required only for
    former tenants of plaintiff. When McElroy and Delfosse applied, they indicated they were
    plaintiff’s tenants. Gorrell then asked the two to complete the second page. When asked if she
    took any other steps to avoid leasing Meisenhelter’s properties to plaintiff’s tenants, Gorrell said,
    “I guess this is the first time that had came up that we actually had somebody coming from one
    of [plaintiff’s] properties. I don’t think I’ve ever had anybody else.”
    ¶ 17           Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 10 was McElroy’s application. Under the preprinted text,
    “How did you hear/learn about the rental house at 1076 W. Main St,” it was written, “Our friend
    Nick lived there and had extra rooms.” Two preprinted questions also asked the applicant if he or
    she had heard of defendants or been solicited by Meisenhelter or Gorrell to rent from defendants.
    The lines next to “No” were checked.
    ¶ 18           Christopher Harrison, a real-estate broker, was the listing agent for the sale of
    properties from defendants to plaintiff. Harrison was familiar with Decatur’s real-estate market.
    According to Harrison, the student-housing market for Millikin students was within a half mile
    of campus. Within a block of campus “is ideal.”
    ¶ 19           Harrison testified he was the sole member of Home Again Properties, LLC,
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    which, in December 2020, purchased 1383 West Main Street from Meisenhelter and his mother.
    A sign on the property belonging to Harrison indicated the property was available as student
    housing. On cross-examination, Harrison testified 1383 West Main Street was marketed to the
    public before he purchased it. When asked why the properties were less valuable than when sold,
    Harrison testified to the following:
    “There’s fewer students that are there to rent now. Millikin
    has The Woods. Generally everybody knows what The Woods is.
    Millikin has—my understanding is Millikin has an agreement to
    meet certain requirements of revenue to The Woods, and if they
    don’t, they have to make up that difference, so what that’s done is
    Millikin has been more restrictive and forced more students to rent
    at The Woods, which means you have homes that are pushing that,
    if it’s a half mile, that two[-] or three[-]block threshold, students
    used to walk three blocks from campus. Well, now, that is moving
    in and then you have families moving in, and that’s moved all the
    rents down.”
    Harrison agreed the rental market had declined significantly in the previous five years.
    ¶ 20           Stefan Marchal, plaintiff’s chief executive officer, testified he negotiated with
    defendants for the purchase of rental properties near Millikin. The parties entered the Second
    Addendum because Marchal wanted to add two properties on the west side that were not in the
    initial offering memorandum. Those properties were 233 and 225 South Fairview. Marchal also
    wanted to expand the area in which defendant was not to purchase property relevant to student
    -8-
    housing. Marchal described himself as “a newcomer in the business” while Meisenhelter “was
    very much established.” Marchal bought all of defendant’s properties that were west of Oakland.
    The property located at 1383 West Main Street was “behind one of [plaintiff’s] houses” in “a
    high foot[-]traffic area *** to Millikin.” McElroy and Delfosse were tenants of plaintiff’s for 12
    months ending May 20, 2020.
    ¶ 21           When asked if defendants’ breaches, including “buying the prohibited property at
    1383 [West Main Street] and their advertising in your neck of the woods,” impacted rental
    revenues, Marchal testified, “I believe so, yes.” When asked how, Marchal testified, “Well, they
    went down.” In the fiscal year ending June 2017, the gross rents received was $246,868. For the
    year ending June 2018, the gross rents were $247,090.68. For the year ending June 2019, the
    gross rents were $231,597.34. The amount per month lost was $1281.83. Before the breaches,
    the fair market value of the portfolio was $1,091,157.30. After the breach, it was $851,899.16.
    Marchal testified he incurred other expenses because of the breach, expenses “to increase the
    attractiveness of [his] properties” given there was “an additional big player right in [his]
    backyard,” as well as attorney fees.
    ¶ 22           On cross-examination, Marchal testified his student rentals were full for the
    2020-21 school year. For that reason, he did not believe defendants’ ability to rent to only 50%
    students was the result of Millikin’s pressure to get students into The Woods. Marchal, when
    counsel suggested defendants had not harmed plaintiff that 2020-21 year, Marchal testified,
    “You can have that opinion. He has also sold a house. He has removed his signs.” Marchal said
    the previous school year, the occupancy rate “definitely wasn’t full.”
    ¶ 23           According to Marchal, he began marketing the properties as furnished around
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    May 2020. About half of his houses were unfurnished. When he started renting to Millikin
    students, all were unfurnished.
    ¶ 24           For the defense, Raphaella Prange, vice president for student affairs at Millikin,
    testified. Prange was aware of the university regulations for student eligibility for off-campus
    housing. According to Prange, there was a three-year residency policy at Millikin, meaning a
    student is ineligible to live off campus until their seventh semester. A student must also have
    resided in campus housing for three years total. Even students who graduated early were not
    permitted to move off campus until those three years were satisfied. In addition, students wanting
    to live off campus had to file an off-campus petition to receive permission from the university.
    Prange testified the university kept records of students who were eligible for off-campus living.
    Those records were reflected in Defendants’ Exhibit No. 3. The first column were seniors
    enrolled at Millikin. In 2015-16, 320 seniors were enrolled, 200 of which were approved for off-
    campus housing. In 2016-17, there were 293 seniors enrolled, with 202 approved for off-campus
    housing. In 2017-18, there were 264 seniors, with 184 approved for off-campus housing. In
    2018-19, there were 254 seniors and 141 approved for off-campus housing. In 2019-20, there
    were 282 seniors with 116 approved for off-campus housing.
    ¶ 25           On cross-examination, Prange testified all Millikin students were eligible to live
    in The Woods complex, which was considered on-campus housing. Sorority and fraternity
    housing was also considered on-campus. Prange believed the apartment-style living at the
    Woods was not necessarily similar to residing in an apartment in the community as The Woods
    residents were all college students.
    ¶ 26           Jackson Delfosse testified he was a tenant of plaintiff’s from June 2019 to May
    - 10 -
    2020. At that time, he resided with McElroy and Skyler Harris. Delfosse and McElroy talked to
    Marchal about leasing beyond May 2020 but were told they could stay only if they signed a year
    agreement or had two other people sign for a year. Delfosse, however, had only one semester
    remaining until graduation. He did not want to sign a year lease. He then texted his former
    roommate, Nick Marion, and moved in with him in another Meisenhelter property. Delfosse
    testified Meisenhelter did not solicit him or McElroy in any way.
    ¶ 27           In April 2011, the trial court entered its written order, finding in favor of
    defendants. The court observed, in reviewing the documents, a handwritten clause in the
    purchase agreement provided, “Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Agreement will supersede
    any terms in conflict in Purchase Agreement,” but no similar clause was set forth in either the
    First Addendum or Second Addendum. The court concluded, absent the “superseding” language,
    it was unclear which geographical restriction applied. The court found, because plaintiff drafted
    the inconsistent language, the language in the First Addendum applied and defendants’ purchase
    of 1383 West Main Street did not constitute a breach.
    ¶ 28           Regarding the “targeting” argument, the trial court found the term “targeting,” in
    the context of the contract, meant “direct solicitation” and concluded the signs were advertising,
    not targeting. The court reasoned its interpretation was consistent with the provision in the
    addenda Meisenhelter “can secure any other students for the remainder of his properties.”
    ¶ 29           This appeal followed.
    ¶ 30                                      II. ANALYSIS
    ¶ 31           On appeal, plaintiff argues it satisfied its breach-of-contract claim. Plaintiff
    contends the trial court erred by not applying the geographical restriction of the Second
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    Addendum, which, according to plaintiff, changed the agreement of the parties and did not create
    an ambiguity. Plaintiff asserts under the Second Addendum, defendants’ purchase of 1383 West
    Main Street breached the contract. Plaintiff further argues the court erred in deciding the term
    “target” meant direct solicitation and did not apply to the use of signs near plaintiff’s properties.
    ¶ 32           To establish a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must establish the existence
    of a valid and enforceable contract, a plaintiff’s performance of the contract, the defendant’s
    breach of that contract, and resulting injury to the plaintiff. Barry v. St. Mary’s Hospital Decatur,
    
    2016 IL App (4th) 150961
    , ¶ 78, 
    68 N.E.3d 964
    . “The basic theory of damages in a breach of
    contract action requires that a plaintiff ‘establish an actual loss or measurable damages resulting
    from the breach in order to recover.’ ” In re Illinois Bell Telephone Link-Up II, 
    2013 IL App (1st) 113349
    , ¶ 19, 
    994 N.E.2d 553
     (quoting Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
    Co., 
    216 Ill. 2d 100
    , 149, 
    835 N.E.2d 801
    , 832 (2005)). Damages that “are not the proximate
    cause of the breach are not allowed.” 
    Id.
     A plaintiff who seeks damages carries the burden of
    proof to show it sustained damages resulting from the defendants’ breach. See 1472 N.
    Milwaukee, Ltd. v. Feinerman, 
    2013 IL App (1st) 121191
    , ¶ 16, 
    996 N.E.2d 652
    .
    ¶ 33           While plaintiff presents compelling arguments the language of the Second
    Addendum controls and the purchase of 1383 West Main Street was a breach of that addendum
    and the placement of signs on the property purchased in breach of contract is targeting students
    on plaintiff’s side of South Oakland Avenue, plaintiff has not met its burden of proving the
    damages alleged were the proximate cause of the breach. Plaintiff has shown its portfolio
    declined substantially and it had lost rental income. Plaintiff, however, has not shown
    defendants’ purchase of 1383 West Main Street and the posting of signs on that property was the
    - 12 -
    proximate cause of that damage. When Marchal was asked about a link, he testified he “believed
    so,” but he relied only on the decrease in value and rental income as proof of that link. The
    record contains evidence the rental market had been in decline. Plaintiff’s own witness testified
    to the decline and Millikin’s restrictions pushing students to use on-campus housing. Testimony
    from a Millikin vice president showed the enrollment of seniors, which students have to be at a
    minimum in order to be eligible for non-commuting, off-campus housing, had decreased, as had
    the numbers of students approved for off-campus housing. In addition, plaintiff identified no
    students who saw the signage and, as a result, elected to rent from defendants as opposed to
    plaintiff. The record shows only a few of plaintiff’s former tenants later leased from defendants,
    but testimony and evidence show the move was not due to signage. Only one of those former
    tenants leased 1383 West Main Street, for a three-month period, and there is no evidence or
    testimony showing that tenant would have rented from plaintiff had defendant not purchased
    1383 West Main Street.
    ¶ 34           Plaintiff attempts to discount Harrison’s testimony about an alleged decline in the
    rental market by arguing Harrison’s testimony is undermined by the fact he purchased 1383 West
    Main Street from defendants. Plaintiff asserts if the market was declining, Harrison would not
    have purchased that property. This argument carries no weight. There is no testimony from
    Harrison establishing the purchase price for the property did not reflect a decline in the rental
    market. Plaintiff further discounts Meisenhelter’s decreasing lost gross profits by emphasizing
    Meisenhelter sold properties and decided to accept lower-paying non-students in his rentals.
    Even without consideration of Meisenhelter’s situation, the record contains sufficient evidence of
    a decline in the rental market and the availability of students to use off-campus housing to
    - 13 -
    undermine any inference plaintiff’s losses were caused by the three signs on 1383 West Main
    Street.
    ¶ 35            At best, plaintiff has shown two events occurred—a breach and a loss in income
    and value. Plaintiff has shown no causal link between the two and, therefore, cannot prevail on
    its breach-of-contract claim.
    ¶ 36            In its reply brief, plaintiff asks this court “[r]egardless of the disposition of
    Plaintiff’s prayers for contract and other money damages” to “independently adjudicate
    Plaintiff’s prayers for injunctive relief and consider an award of nominal damages if warranted.”
    Plaintiff, however, has developed no argument and cited no legal authority for this court to
    determine whether injunctive relief should be awarded. To obtain injunctive relief in the form of
    a permanent injunction, the party seeking that injunction must show “(1) a clear and
    ascertainable right in need of protection, (2) that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the
    injunction is not granted, and (3) that no adequate remedy at law exists.” Swigert v. Gillespie,
    
    2012 IL App (4th) 120043
    , ¶ 27, 
    976 N.E.2d 1176
    . Plaintiff has not cited these elements or
    attempted to explain how irreparable harm will occur when there is no evidence defendants have
    purchased and currently own student-rental property west of South Oakland Avenue or have
    signage in that area. We will not research and make these arguments for plaintiff. The issue of
    injunctive relief is forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are
    forfeited.”).
    ¶ 37                                     III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 38            We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    ¶ 39            Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 4-21-0253

Citation Numbers: 2021 IL App (4th) 210253-U

Filed Date: 1/3/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/4/2022