Ruiz v. Walker ( 2008 )

NOS. 4-08-0126, 4-08-0127 cons. F: 12/19/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
MICHAEL RUIZ, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. (No. 4-08-0126) ) Sangamon County
ROGER E. WALKER, JR., Director of the ) No. 06MR75
Illinois Department of Corrections; )
RANDALL TAYLOR, Superintendent of School )
District No. 428; and GUY PIERCE, Warden )
of the Pontiac Correctional Center, )
Defendants-Appellants. )
---------------------------------------- )
EUGENE ROBERT BILSKI, ) No. 05MR495
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
v. (No. 4-08-0127) )
ROGER E. WALKER, JR., Director of the )
Illinois Department of Corrections; GUY )
PIERCE, Warden of the Pontiac )
Correctional Center; RANDALL TAYLOR, )
Superintendent of School District No. )
428, BLAIR LEIBACH, Assistant Warden of )
Operations for the Pontiac Correctional )
Center; and ROBERT GRIFFIN, Assistant )
Warden of Programs for the Pontiac ) Honorable
Correctional Center, ) Leslie J. Graves,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
On February 10, 2006, plaintiff, Eugene Robert Bilski,
an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center (PCC), pro se filed an
amended complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief
against defendants, Roger Walker, Jr., Director of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (DOC); Guy Pierce, warden of PCC;
Randall Taylor, superintendent of School District No. 428; Blair
Leibach, assistant warden of operations for PCC; and Robert
Griffin, assistant warden of programs for PCC. On February 15,
2006, plaintiff Michael Ruiz, an inmate at PCC, pro se filed a
complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against
defendants Walker, Pierce, and Taylor.
After a combined evidentiary hearing, the trial court
entered orders in each case requiring defendants to "allow a
willing staff member of DOC to proctor examinations to the
plaintiff in his pursuit of approved correspondence courses for
college credit, upon the plaintiff satisfying his burden of
securing a willing proctor and an available time, date, and
location for such examinations." Defendants filed notices of
appeal, docketed as No. 4-08-0126 and No. 4-08-0127. At defen-
dants' request, we have consolidated these appeals.
Plaintiffs here are inmates of PCC. Plaintiffs re-
quested a staff member be allowed to proctor correspondence-
course exams. Plaintiffs' request was denied. Plaintiffs filed
a four-count complaint for declaratory judgement and injunctive
relief against defendants requesting the trial court compel
defendants to allow a staff member to proctor correspondence-
course exams. The court filed as stated. This appeal followed.
Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we consider
defendants' motion to strike portions of plaintiffs' brief.
Defendants have moved to strike those portions of plaintiffs'
brief that refer to facts not in evidence. Plaintiffs filed an
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objection and a response thereto, and this court ordered defen-
dants' motion be taken with the case. "The general rule is that
'material which was not part of the court record or considered by
the trial court is not part of the record on appeal and should
not be considered by the appellate court.'" Doyle Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. Board of Education, Quincy Public District No.
172, 291 Ill. App. 3d 221, 229-30, 683 N.E.2d 530, 536 (1997),
quoting Smith v. First National Bank of Danville, 254 Ill. App.
3d 251, 258, 624 N.E.2d 899, 905 (1993). We find no reason to
deviate from that rule in this case. We will not consider the
portions of plaintiffs' brief that refer to facts not in evi-
dence.
A prisoner has no liberty or property interest in
attending an educational program. See Murdock v. Washington, 193
F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); 20 Ill. Adm. Code §405.20(a), as
amended by 18 Ill. Reg. 2970, 2974 (eff. February 14, 1994)
("[n]othing in this [p]art shall be construed to require educa-
tional opportunities for all committed persons"); see also Hadley
v. Snyder, 335 Ill. App. 3d 347, 354, 780 N.E.2d 316, 323 (2002)
(a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in attending educa-
tional or recreational programs); Williams v. Thompson, 111 Ill.
App. 3d 145, 148-51, 443 N.E.2d 809, 810-12 (1982) (reversing a
preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to allow
inmates to complete vocational training programs for lack of
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right to participate in said programs). In the instant case,
plaintiffs have not shown that limitations on access to a staff
member to proctor correspondence-course exams affected plain-
tiffs' liberty or property interests. Consequently, these
limitations did not violate plaintiffs' right to due process.
Plaintiffs contended that limitations on their access
to postsecondary programs as prisoners confined in protective
custody, as compared to the general prison population, violated
their equal-protection rights. DOC operates its protective
custody units under a consent decree, Meeks v. Lane, No. 75-C-96
(N.D. Ill. 1981), issued by a three-judge panel of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The
decree requires defendants to provide inmates in protective
custody "educational opportunities commensurate with those
available to inmates in the general population." In this case,
PCC does not house a general population.
Moreover, prison officials do not violate the equal-
protection clause when they treat protective-custody inmates
differently from general-population inmates based on legitimate
penological concerns. French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th
Cir. 1985). Restrictions on plaintiffs' access to a staff member
to proctor correspondence-course exams were based on "limited
resources and budgetary constraints." Because these limitations
were based on legitimate penological concerns, plaintiffs failed
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to show that restricted access to postsecondary educational
programs violated plaintiffs' equal-protection rights.
Similarly, plaintiffs contended that limitations on
their access to postsecondary programs as male inmates at PCC, as
compared to female inmates at Dwight Correctional Center (DCC),
violated their equal-protection rights. Male and female prison-
ers are often not similarly situated in relevant respects for
purposes of asserting equal-protection claims. See Klinger v.
Department of Corrections, 107 F.3d 609, 612 (8th Cir. 1997)
(male prisoners housed in multiple institutions and female
prisoners housed in one not similarly situated for purposes of
access to programs and services based on differences in prison
demographics); Keevan v. Smith, 100 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1996)
(male and female inmates not similarly situated for purposes of
prison programming based on different number of male and female
inmates, differences in sentences served, and classification
levels of male and female inmates); Women Prisoners of the
District of Columbia Department of Corrections v. District of
Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 924-27 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (male and female
inmates housed in separate prisons not similarly situated for
purposes of access to programs and services); Timm v. Gunter, 917
F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir.1990) (male and female inmates not
similarly situated for purposes of pat-down searches by opposite-
sex guards); Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243, 1261 (S.D. Iowa
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1995) (male and female inmates not similarly situated for pur-
poses of inmate security and programming where male inmates
housed in different facilities by security classifications and
female inmates housed together, served shorter sentences, and had
special characteristics).
Defendants' affidavits in support of their response to
a motion for summary judgment by plaintiffs stated that DCC
houses a total of 977 female inmates. Thirty-four inmates are
held in segregation status and nine are in protective custody.
The remaining 934 inmates are made up of multilevel classifica-
tions. In comparison, PCC houses 1,619 inmates. Three hundred
ninety-eight are held in a medium-security unit, six hundred
ninety-eight are in segregation, and five hundred are in protec-
tive custody. DCC is classified as maximum security because it
is the only DOC facility to house maximum-security female inmates
in Illinois. However, the maximum-security inmates make up a
small percentage of the overall population. In comparison, PCC's
primary purpose is to house long-term disciplinary-segregation
and protective-custody inmates. Female inmates housed in DCC's
segregation- and protective-custody units do not participate in
educational programing that is also not available to those
inmates at PCC.
Thus, the programs at PCC and DCC reflect separate sets
of decisions based on entirely different circumstances. Program
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priorities differ from prison to prison depending on innumerable
variables that officials must take into account. PCC and DCC are
different institutions with different inmates, each operating
with limited resources to fulfill different specific needs.
Thus, plaintiffs and DCC inmates are not similarly situated for
purposes of prison programs and services and plaintiffs have
failed to make the requisite threshold showing that they are
similarly situated to the group that they claim receives favor-
able treatment. For this reason, plaintiffs have not suffered an
equal-protection violation.
Likewise, neither the provisions in the Unified Code of
Corrections (Unified Code) nor the Illinois Constitution, each of
which propounds general policies of rehabilitation and restora-
tion to useful citizenship, creates an entitlement to participate
in postsecondary education. See 730 ILCS 5/1-1-2 (West 2004)
(concerning restoration to useful citizenship); 730 ILCS 5/3-7-1
(West 2004) (requiring DOC to promulgate rules in compliance with
the Unified Code); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11. Instead,
whether a prisoner may "secur[e] a willing proctor and an avail-
able time, date, and location for *** examinations" is a matter
of discretion solely for DOC. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-2(d) (West
2004) (postsecondary opportunities encouraged "wherever possi-
ble"); 20 Ill. Adm. Code §405.20(a)(1)(D), as amended by 18 Ill.
Reg. 2970, 2974 (eff. February 14, 1994) (adult-division educa-
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tional provisions shall include postsecondary education "where
possible").
Courts are not to intervene in matters within the
discretion of DOC, including whether a staff member may proctor
correspondence-course exams. As such, ruling on plaintiffs'
request to allow a staff member to proctor correspondence-course
exams exceeds the scope of the trial court’s authority.
Because plaintiffs had no right to proctored
correspondence-course exams, the trial court abused its discre-
tion by entering the injunction below, and we reverse.
Reversed.
TURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.
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