People v. Main , 2022 IL App (3d) 210470-U ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 210470-UOrder filed October 6, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit,
) Knox County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-21-0470
v. ) Circuit No. 20-CM-312
)
CONNIE S. MAIN, ) Honorable
) William A. Rasmussen,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDade delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Holdridge and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) Because defendant has failed to secure the filing of the reports of proceedings
on appeal, the appellate court cannot resolve her claims of error that require
factual determination; (2) without factual testing of her claim that officers
obtained testimonial statements from defendant while she was in custody, we
cannot assess whether her Miranda rights were violated; and (3) the State did not
violate its Brady requirement where the alleged materials were initially within
defendant’s control.
¶2 Defendant, Connie S. Main, was charged with disorderly conduct, a Class C
misdemeanor in violation of section 26-1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (“Code”). 720
ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 2020). The State elected not to seek incarceration as a penalty and Main
proceeded to trial pro se. The jury found her guilty, and the court sentenced her to pay fines
totaling $554. Main now appeals, alleging multiple claims of miscarriage of justice. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm her conviction and sentence.
¶3 FACTS
¶4 On May 27, 2020, the State charged Connie S. Main with three counts of disorderly
conduct, including one count alleging that on or about May 7, she “knowingly yelled at, swore
at, and berated David Benson in such an unreasonable manner as to alarm and disturb [him] and
provoke a breach of the peace,” in violation of section 26-1(a)(1) of the Code. Id. § 26-1(a)(1). A
warrant for her arrest was issued the same day and bail was set at $1500—with 10% to apply.
¶5 On June 18, Main was arrested and posted a bond of $850 to cover her release on all the
charges of disorderly conduct. At a subsequent bond hearing on July 22, Main appeared pro se
and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and a motion to amend her bond, alleging that (1) she
had evidence of her innocence; (2) her due process rights were violated when “she was arrested
without proper investigation of matters or being informed of or asked about matters”; (3) her due
process was violated by the use of deceptive or inaccurate evidence; (4) she was not properly
informed of her charges at her arrest; (5) she was not shown the arrest warrant until after her
booking; (6) she was not allowed to make a phone call for four-to-five hours; and (7) the reports
provided by the State’s witnesses were false.
¶6 On August 20, Katherine Drummond entered her appearance as Main’s attorney.
Through her new counsel, Main entered a plea of not guilty, filed a motion for discovery and
made a speedy trial demand. Counsel also responded to the State’s discovery motion with a
“voluntary statement and a video” of an alleged May 28 altercation. On November 6, the State
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announced that it was ready for trial, suggesting a trial date of November 16. The same day,
defense counsel filed a motion for substitution of judge, seeking to remove Judge James
Standard. Four days later, the circuit court reassigned the case to Judge William A. Rasmussen.
¶7 On November 13, the court ordered the State “to tender all field notes” in the case to
Main and to provide her with the file-stamped executed arrest warrants in all cases pending
against her. On November 16, Main filed her witness list, identifying John Main (her husband) as
the sole defense witness. Trial was not held that day. Instead, Main—again through her
counsel—filed a motion for supplemental discovery. On November 25, Main’s counsel filed a
motion to withdraw, alleging that the attorney-client relationship had broken down. Main
subsequently filed a pro se entry of appearance and a motion to join all matters pending against
her.
¶8 On February 4, 2021, Main filed a motion, announcing she was ready for trial and
contending that she never received the “field notes” the court had ordered the State to tender. She
explained that her counsel said she had received the police reports and arrest videos. However,
she alleged that she had not received any discovery from the State. The following day, Main filed
a new motion to dismiss. The State characterized the motion as challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, which it noted was an issue to be resolved at trial.
¶9 The court set trial for July 14, 2021. It ordered the State to provide Main with a statement
of the case, its witness list, and all documents intended to be introduced at trial. Main was
ordered to make the same disclosures. On the day of the trial, Main filed another motion to
dismiss, alleging: (1) there was no probable cause for her arrest; (2) her Miranda rights were
violated; (3) she was unlawfully detained; and (4) the State failed to timely notify her of a
previous filing. The court denied her motion and rescheduled the trial for August 24.
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¶ 10 The case proceeded to a two-day trial, after which the jury returned a signed verdict
finding Main guilty of the offense charged. The court imposed no jail time but ordered fines of
$554. Main subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied on
September 16, 2021.
¶ 11 Main timely filed her notice of appeal, which was later amended. The common law
record was filed with the appellate court, but no report of proceedings was included. Main
clarified at oral argument that the choice not to include the report of proceedings was intentional
on her part because she did not believe it was necessary for our review.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, Main raises four claims of “miscarriage of justice,” contending that (1) the
arresting officers failed to tell her the reasons for her arrest and violated her Miranda rights; (2)
the prosecution violated her Brady rights by not introducing evidence at trial that had been
submitted by the defense in discovery; (3) the trial court allowed the case to proceed under
circumstances that violated her constitutional rights; and (4) the jury was biased against her due
to a familial relationship between her accuser and one of the jurors.
¶ 14 For each of her claims, Main requests that her conviction be vacated, and the matter
remanded for a new trial. The State notes that because Main has failed to include the reports of
any proceedings in the trial court on appeal, this court cannot address the issues presented.
“Where no report of proceedings is included in the record on appeal, the presumption is that
there was sufficient evidence to sustain the decision of the trial court.” People v. Rockett, 85 Ill.
App. 2d 24, 29 (1967) (citing Skaggs v. Junis, 28 Ill. 2d 199, 201-02 (1963)). “Also, in the
absence of a report of proceedings, no issue of fact may be reviewed.” Id. (citing People ex rel.
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Rose v. Craig, 404 Ill. 505, 508 (1950)). Thus, where Main’s allegations turn on an issue of fact,
we cannot review the question presented without a report of proceedings.
¶ 15 A. The Arresting Officers’ Alleged Misconduct
¶ 16 Main’s first issue on appeal alleges two claims of misconduct by the arresting officers.
First, she argues that the officers had no probable cause to arrest her for the offense of disorderly
conduct because her arrest was based solely on verbal statements of her accuser, David Benson.
She also contends that the fact the officers delayed her arrest by 41 days from the issuance of the
arrest warrant indicates they knew they did not have probable cause to arrest her.
¶ 17 “The determination of whether police had probable cause to arrest focuses on the factual
considerations upon which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act. This
determination is based on facts known to the police at the time the arrest was made.” People v.
Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 484 (2005). “The standard for determining whether probable cause is
present is probability of criminal activity, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
485. “Whether there is probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed a crime is based
on an evaluation of all of the information available, including its source.” Id.¶ 18 Main maintains that no report of proceedings is necessary because all the facts are in the
record before us. We disagree. The facts on which the warrant was issued are not before us. The
record does not include any affidavit from the officers applying for the warrant—or any
testimony thereof. Nor does the record contain the factual determination of the magistrate who
issued the arrest warrant. We cannot conduct the factual evaluation necessary to resolve this
issue without a report of proceedings.
¶ 19 Main also argues that her Miranda rights were violated. She contends that the officers
never informed her of the charges against her, did not allow her to make a phone call, and failed
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to read her rights. We reject Main’s claim of a Miranda violation because she has not identified a
custodial statement improperly obtained from her and offered into evidence at trial.
¶ 20 A person is denied the constitutional protections recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 469 (1966), if she is subject to custodial interrogation without first being “warned (1)
of [her] right to remain silent, (2) that any statement [she] makes may be used against [her], (3)
that [she] has the right to have an attorney present, and (4) that if [she] cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for [her].” People v. Barnett, 393 Ill. App. 3d 556, 558 (2009). Any
statements obtained from a person as a result of a custodial interrogation are admissible at trial
only if taken in compliance with Miranda. Id.¶ 21 In short, to establish a Miranda violation, Main must prove that the State offered or
sought to offer statements at trial obtained from her in the absence of the requisite warnings. The
purpose of a Miranda claim is to suppress any such statements and all evidence seized as a
result. Main does not contend that custodial statements obtained from her were introduced at
trial. Instead, she maintains that without the proper Miranda warnings, her arrest is without
probable cause. That is incorrect. Miranda warnings are only required when the defendant is
subject to custodial interrogation. Therefore, without a factual showing that the law enforcement
officers (1) obtained testimonial statements from her (2) while she was in custody, we cannot
conclude that Main’s Miranda rights were violated.
¶ 22 B. The State’s Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶ 23 Main asserts several claims of misconduct against State’s Attorney Jeremy Karlin. She
first alleges that he proceeded with the prosecution against her despite the fact that she had
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provided the State with evidence of her innocence in a discovery disclosure. 1 She contends that,
by failing to introduce it at trial, the State suppressed the evidence in violation of her right under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). We disagree.
¶ 24 The Brady “rule seeks to eliminate any asymmetry of information between the State and
the accused.” People v. Gomez-Ramirez, 2021 IL App (3d) 200121, ¶ 19. “It prohibits actual or
inadvertent suppression by the State of evidence” favorable to criminal defendants “that is in [the
State’s] control.” Id. ¶ 20. A Brady violation occurs when the State hides evidence from the
defendant that could be used by or on his or her behalf to avoid a finding of guilt. Where both
parties are aware of the evidence at issue and are equally capable of obtaining the evidence, there
is no Brady violation even if the State does not provide the evidence to the defendant.
¶ 25 Here, Main admits that she provided the videotape evidence to the State as part of her
disclosure. She also alleged that the evidence included a surveillance video of her farm and the
alleged altercation with Benson. Her admission and allegation show that she knew about the
evidence, it was initially in her possession, and it remained within her control to produce at trial.
We, therefore, cannot find that a Brady violation occurred.
¶ 26 Main further maintains that because Karlin was aware of the evidence, he should have
known that she was innocent of the offense and thus should not have prosecuted her. At oral
argument, she characterized his behavior as “malicious prosecution.” Because this allegation of
malicious prosecution was neither asserted nor litigated in the trial court and is being raised for
the first time in this appeal, we cannot properly address it.
1
Although we cannot determine whether a video of the May 7 incident was included in discovery, we
have reviewed the composite video that Main alleges in her brief was prepared for tender for the jury and
the May 7 incident is not in that video.
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¶ 27 Main next claims that her sixth amendment right to counsel was violated despite her
request that an attorney be appointed for her. The sixth amendment right to counsel applies only
in cases where the defendant is actually sentenced to imprisonment. People v. Easley, 288 Ill.
App. 3d 487, 493 (1997) (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979)). Because the State
announced prior to trial that it would not be seeking a term of incarceration as part of her
penalty, Main was not entitled to the appointment of counsel.
¶ 28 Finally, Main also argues that the prosecution’s inaction led to the violation of her speedy
trial right. We note that Main made her speedy trial demand on August 20, 2020, and the State
announced that it was ready for trial on November 6, 2020, with a tentative trial date of
November 16. Because Main was on pretrial release, she should have been tried “within 160
days from the date” she demanded trial unless a proper delay occurred. 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West
2020). Here, only 89 days had elapsed between the date of the speedy trial demand and the date
the State announced it was ready for trial. Several delays occurred thereafter. Without a proper
record to determine the nature of the delays and the party to whom they should be attributed, we
cannot determine whether Main’s speedy trial rights were violated.
¶ 29 C. The Trial Court’s Alleged Miscarriage of Justice
¶ 30 Main maintains that six judges presided over her case before the court finally assigned
Judge Rasmussen. She contends that Judge Rasmussen engaged in multiple instances of
misconduct, including ignoring her complaints about unserved subpoenas, failing to direct a “not
guilty verdict” despite the lack of evidence against her and ignoring her insistence regarding a
Brady violation. Each of these allegations requires the court to make factual findings. Again,
without a complete record, we cannot resolve these issues.
¶ 31 D. The Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to Remove a Biased Juror
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¶ 32 Main claims that the jury was biased against her. She also argues that the trial court
engaged in judicial misconduct by preventing her from presenting her challenge to a specific
juror and allowing the trial to proceed with the juror. Specifically, Main contends that the juror
had a familial relationship with her accuser (Benson) because the juror had an in-law who lived
in the same town where Benson maintains his business.
¶ 33 The burden of showing that a potential juror is not impartial rests on the party
challenging the juror. People v. Tondini, 2019 IL App (3d) 170370, ¶ 18. Satisfying this burden
requires more than a mere suspicion of bias. Id. A court’s failure to remove a juror for cause is
grounds for reversal only if the defense had exercised all its peremptory challenges and a biased
juror was allowed to sit on the jury. Id. Here, without a complete record, we cannot determine
whether Main’s objection had factual merit or whether Main exercised all her peremptory
challenges, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying her for-cause challenge against the
juror.
¶ 34 Because the record on appeal provides us no factual basis for addressing and resolving
the issues raised by Main, the verdict reached by the jury and entered by the trial court must be
affirmed.
¶ 35 CONCLUSION
¶ 36 The judgment of the circuit court of Knox County is affirmed.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
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