The City of Chicago v. Beythel Outcast Church , 375 Ill. App. 3d 317 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                   FIFTH DIVISION
    July 27, 2007
    No. 1-06-1724
    THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal        )    Appeal from the
    corporation,                            )    Circuit Court of
    )    Cook County.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,    )
    )
    v.                                      )
    )
    BEYTHEL OUTCAST CHURCH, n/k/a Beth-El   )
    All Nation Church of God in Christ;     )
    REVEREND EDGAR JACKSON; and UNKNOWN     )
    OWNERS and NONRECORD CLAIMANTS,         )
    1534-40 West 63rd Street, Chicago,      )
    IL 60629,                               )    Honorable
    )    Ann Houser,
    Defendants-Appellees.   )    Judge Presiding.
    JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:
    Plaintiff, the City of Chicago (City), appeals from the
    trial court's dismissal of the City's amended complaint against
    defendants, Beythel Outcast Church and Reverend Edgar Jackson
    (Church), for lack of jurisdiction over the City as a defendant.
    On appeal, the City asserts the trial court erred in ruling that
    the City needed to name itself as a defendant in its own
    complaint.   We reverse.
    The Church has not filed a response brief; however, we may
    proceed under the principles addressed in First Capitol Mortgage
    Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 
    63 Ill. 2d 128
    , 133 (1976).
    1-06-1724
    In a previous opinion, we explained the manner in which the
    City obtained title to the property located at 1534 West 63rd
    Street in Chicago, Illinois (Property).    City of Chicago v. Beth-
    El All Nations Church of God in Christ, No. 1-04-0364 (July 31,
    2005) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).    The
    Church was previously the registered owner of the Property;
    however, state and county records indicated no taxes had been
    paid on the Property from 1986 through 1995.   Cook County
    acquired the Property in 1997 and assigned its rights in the
    Property to the City in 1998.   The City also obtained a tax deed
    to the Property in 1998.
    Although the City held title to the Property, the Church
    remained in possession.    The Property operates as both a church
    and a retail furniture store.
    On August 27, 2004, the City filed a complaint against the
    Church, alleging the Property, which the Church "owned,
    maintained, operated, collected rents for, or had an interest
    in," was in violation of the Chicago Municipal Code (Code).     The
    City alleged building code violations for (1) problems with
    ornamental projections;(2) washed-out mortar on a parapet; (3)
    pealing paint on exterior wood; and (4) loose or missing paint on
    window panes. The City also alleged the building was dangerous.
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    1-06-1724
    In addition, the City sought fines of $2,000 for each day that
    violations existed, injunctive relief, appointment of a receiver
    to bring the Property into compliance with the Code, and other
    relief if necessary.
    On October 22, 2004, the City filed an amended complaint,
    adding several Code violations for (1) loose and bulging stone
    work; (2) an improper flue pipe; (3) the close proximity between
    the flue pipe and wall; (4) lack of light bulbs in exit signs;
    (5) lack of carbon monoxide detectors; (6) peeling paint; and (5)
    a loose sash and missing putty from window panes.   The City also
    requested fines of $5,500 per day and an additional $15,966.40
    for costs incurred from the installation of protective canopies.
    On December 3, 2004, the Church filed an answer, denying
    ownership of the Property.   The Church also claimed that the
    violations had been corrected or were in the process of being
    corrected.   The Church raised a counterclaim that the City
    illegally took title to the Property through a tax deed
    proceeding, interfered with the Church's ability to borrow money
    against the Property, and conducted unwarranted inspections to
    interfere with the Church's quiet title.
    On June 17, 2005, the trial commenced and Sam Clark, a City
    building inspector, testified regarding the condition of the
    - 3 -
    1-06-1724
    Property.   He also testified that at his inspection of the
    Property on December 2, 2004, young church members or students
    were present.   On September 19, 2005, the court ordered the
    parties to submit briefs addressing whether the court had proper
    jurisdiction over all necessary parties.
    On October 19, 2005, the City filed a memorandum of law
    arguing that the City, the Church and Reverend Edgar Jackson were
    the only necessary parties and had all been joined to this
    action.   The City also asserted its interests were fully
    represented by virtue of the City's presence in the case as a
    plaintiff, and therefore, it was unnecessary to add itself to the
    case as a defendant.   The City further asserted that it was not
    required to sue itself.   The record does not indicate that the
    Church submitted a brief.
    On February 27, 2006, the court ruled that it did not have
    jurisdiction over all necessary parties because the City had not
    been joined as a defendant.   The court also found that as a
    property owner, the City had some responsibility to address
    violations.   The court struck the City's complaint and granted
    the City 60 days to file an amended complaint.
    On May 2, 2006, the City filed a "memorandum of law and
    objection to February 27, 2006 Ruling and Order," asking the
    - 4 -
    1-06-1724
    court to reconsider its order.    The City again asserted that the
    trial court had jurisdiction over all necessary parties and that
    the City was not required to name itself as a defendant in its
    own complaint.
    On May 22, 2006, the trial court denied the City's motion to
    reconsider its order and dismissed the action because the City
    failed to file an amended complaint as directed by the court's
    order.
    On June 14, 2006, the City filed a notice of appeal from the
    trial court's order dismissing the action.
    On appeal, the City asserts that the trial court erred in
    ruling that it lacked jurisdiction because the City failed to
    name itself as a defendant in its own complaint.    Further, the
    City correctly concedes that it was necessary for the City to be
    a party in this action, but asserts that bringing its claims as a
    plaintiff satisfied that requirement.    In addition, the City
    contends that assuming it had some responsibility to correct Code
    violations, the Church could have asserted joint liability with
    the City in its counterclaim.
    A necessary party must be joined in an action or an order
    entered without jurisdiction over that party is void.
    Yorulmazoglu v. Lake Forest Hospital, 
    359 Ill. App. 3d 554
    , 561
    - 5 -
    1-06-1724
    (2005), citing Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Soffer, 
    213 Ill. App. 3d 957
    , 982 (1991).   A necessary party is one whose presence in an
    action is required to (1) protect that party's interest in the
    controversy which would be materially affected by a judgment
    entered in her absence; (2) protect the interests of the parties
    before the court; or (3) enable the court to completely determine
    the controversy.   Caparos v. Morton, 
    364 Ill. App. 3d 159
    , 175
    (2006).   However, an absent party is not required to be joined
    when a party in the action effectively protects the absent
    party's interests under the doctrine of representation.
    
    Caparos, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 176
    .   Although provisions of the
    Code of Civil Procedure address the need to join parties to an
    action, none require a plaintiff already in an action to be
    joined in the action again as a defendant. See 735 ILCS 5/2-404
    through 2-407 (West 2004).   Furthermore, this court has held that
    "a party may not be both plaintiff and defendant in an action."
    Hume v. Town of Blackberry, 
    131 Ill. App. 3d 32
    , 34 (1985).
    Here, the City's presence in this action as the plaintiff
    was adequate.   The City, as plaintiff, sufficiently protected its
    own interest in this controversy.   Naming itself as a defendant
    would not enable the City to protect its interests anymore
    effectively.
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    1-06-1724
    We agree with the City that the Church's interests were also
    protected because the Church was free to assert joint liability
    with the City or raise other defenses against it.   In addition,
    we find no reason why the trial court was not able to completely
    adjudicate the controversy with the City present in this action
    as the plaintiff.   Furthermore, the City could not be both the
    plaintiff and defendant.   
    Hume, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 35
    .   Finally,
    although the Code does state that the owner of the property
    "shall be liable" for violations, the Code does not state that
    the City is required to sue all parties with liability, including
    itself as an owner.   Chicago Municipal Code, §13-12-020 (2000).
    As noted, the Church was free to raise the issue of the City's
    liability in a counterclaim, which it filed.
    For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
    trial court and remand for further proceedings.
    O'BRIEN, P.J., and O'MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1-06-1724 Rel

Citation Numbers: 375 Ill. App. 3d 317

Filed Date: 7/27/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023