People v. Massey , 2022 IL App (4th) 210710-U ( 2022 )

NOTICE
This Order was filed under 2022 IL App (4th) 210710-UFILED
August 10, 2022
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the NO. 4-21-0710 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
) McLean County
v. ) No. 20CF1301
)
WANYAE A. MASSEY, ) Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) John Casey Costigan,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence for burglary.
¶2 In November 2020, the State charged defendant, Wanyae A. Massey, with two
counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (counts I and II) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a)
(West 2020)), four counts of burglary to a motor vehicle (counts III through VI) (id. § 19-1(a)),
obstructing justice (count VII) (id. § 31-4(a)(1)), obstructing identification (count VIII) (id.
§ 31-4.5(a)), and obstructing a peace officer (count IX) (id. § 31-1(a)). Relevant to this appeal is
count V, which alleged that in November 2020, defendant entered a motor vehicle belonging to
Logan Venturi “with the intent to commit therein a theft.”
¶3 In April 2021, the trial court conducted a bench trial and found defendant guilty
of all four counts of burglary (counts III through VI), obstructing identification (count VIII), and
obstructing a peace officer (count IX). The trial court sentenced defendant to seven years in
prison for each burglary and 180 days in jail for obstructing identification and obstructing a
peace officer, with all sentences to be served concurrently.
¶4 Defendant appeals, arguing only that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of burglary to Venturi’s vehicle (count V) because defendant took no property.
We disagree and affirm.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 In November 2020, the State charged defendant with two counts of unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon (counts I and II), four counts of burglary to a motor vehicle
(counts III through VI), obstructing justice (count VII), obstructing identification (count VIII),
and obstructing a peace officer (count IX). In April 2021, the trial court conducted a bench trial
at which the State presented the following evidence.
¶7 On November 25, 2020, Alonzo McMath, who lived at the Parkway Court
Apartments in Normal, Illinois, called the police after he saw someone “entering people’s cars.”
He reported that the person was holding a plastic bag and took a shirt or other garment out of the
trunk of one of the cars and put it on. Officers from the Normal Police Department responded to
the scene.
¶8 When Officer Evan Easter arrived at the complex, he “located a black male in a
hooded sweatshirt that appeared to be going through cars.” He initially saw the man, later
identified as defendant, at a white Kia, and then observed him “check multiple cars in the
parking lot.” Defendant was holding a white plastic bag. Easter radioed for assistance and
continued to observe defendant.
¶9 Officer John Gaffney arrived to assist Easter and observed defendant in the
driver’s side of a black Ford Focus. Easter and Gaffney approached the Focus, Gaffney
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announced himself, and defendant fled. In doing so, defendant discarded the plastic bag. Gaffney
and a third officer pursued defendant on foot and caught him as he tried to climb a fence. Upon
his arrest, defendant provided a false name and had on his person cash, a large amount of loose
change, phone chargers, and other miscellaneous items. The officers later recovered the plastic
bag that defendant had discarded and determined that it also contained a large amount of loose
change and the wallet of Donald Brewer. Brewer later reported to the police that his unlocked
car, which was parked in the apartment complex parking lot, had been burglarized.
¶ 10 At trial, Brewer testified that “everything was missing” from the center console of
his car, including his wallet and change, and that he did not give anyone permission to enter his
car. Ford Davis, a resident of the same apartment complex, testified that the trunk of his car was
ajar, the inside was “disheveled,” and change had been taken from his coin compartment.
Leonard Woods testified that he looked over his car and found that “stuff [was] scattered
everywhere.”
¶ 11 Venturi testified that after police contacted him regarding his vehicle, he went to
the parking lot in front of his building and saw that the driver and passenger side doors were
open, and the glove compartment had been “ran through.” His insurance papers and title
information were also pulled out in the car along with his wallet, which contained $10. However,
nothing had been taken from the car. We note that defendant chose not to testify and offered no
evidence.
¶ 12 The trial court found defendant guilty of four counts of burglary, one count of
obstructing identification, and one count of obstructing a peace officer. In September 2021, the
court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison for each burglary and 180 days in jail for
obstructing identification and obstructing a peace officer, with all sentences to be served
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concurrently.
¶ 13 This appeal followed.
¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Defendant appeals, arguing only that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of burglary to Venturi’s vehicle (count V) because defendant took no property.
We disagree and affirm.
¶ 16 A. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 17 “ ‘The State bears the burden of proving each element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” People v. Williams, 2020 IL App (4th) 180554, ¶ 45, 167 N.E.3d 233(quoting People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 54, 126 N.E.3d 703). A defendant
commits burglary when (1) without authority he knowingly enters or remains within a motor
vehicle with (2) intent to commit therein a felony or theft. 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2020).
¶ 18 A reviewing court will not “substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on
questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 55. Additionally, when
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court draws all reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the prosecution and “will not reverse the trial court’s
judgment unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Cline, 2022 IL 126383, ¶ 25.
¶ 19 B. This Case
¶ 20 In the present case, defendant argues that the State failed to prove he intended to
commit a theft when he entered Venturi’s car. Defendant contends that because (1) he did not
take anything from the car, (2) did not try to conceal himself, and (3) “voluntarily left the vehicle
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and its contents behind,” the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that defendant had some
motive other than theft for entering the car. Accordingly, defendant claims, the State did not
prove the elements of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 21 We disagree. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for burglary.
¶ 22 Although defendant did not actually take anything from Venturi’s car, the offense
of burglary is accomplished “the moment an unauthorized entry with the requisite intent occurs
even if no subsequent felony or theft is committed; there is no requirement that a defendant
successfully complete the theft.” People v. Murphy, 2017 IL App (1st) 142092, ¶ 13, 77 N.E.3d
96. Consequently, defendant’s not taking the wallet from Venturi’s car does not preclude a
finding of guilt. See People v. Roberts, 189 Ill. App. 3d 66, 544 N.E.2d 1340 (concluding that
the defendant’s ransacking an office but taking nothing of significance did not show that the
defendant convicted of burglary had not intended to commit a theft when entering building).
¶ 23 Intent may be inferred based on the totality of the circumstances, which include,
“but are not limited to, the time, place, and manner of entry into the premises; the defendant’s
activity within the premises; and any alternative explanations offered for the defendant’s
presence.” People v. York, 2020 IL App (2d) 160463, ¶ 17, 157 N.E.3d 1022.
¶ 24 Moreover, just because there could be other explanations for defendant’s entry
into Venturi’s car does not mean the trial court was “required to search for any possible innocent
explanation” of defendant’s actions and “elevate [it] to the status of *** reasonable doubt.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Smith, 2021 IL App (5th) 190066, ¶ 69, 184 N.E.3d
315; see also York, 2020 IL App (2d) 160463, ¶ 18 (“An inference of intent does not require the
trier of fact to look at all possible explanations consistent with the defendant’s innocence or to be
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satisfied that each circumstance was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
¶ 25 In the present case, the State presented evidence that showed on the night of
November 25, 2020, defendant was observed by several witnesses going from car to car in the
parking lot of an apartment complex attempting to open the car doors. Defendant entered several
of the cars. One witness observed defendant taking a shirt or other garment out of the trunk of
one of the cars and putting it on. Defendant was inside a white Kia when Easter arrived and was
seen in a black Ford by Gaffney. Venturi’s car was also ransacked with the doors opened and
papers scattered about its interior. Further, upon seeing Gaffney, defendant fled immediately.
The evidence also showed that defendant had taken cash, loose change, and other items out of
cars belonging to Brewer and Davis.
¶ 26 In short, defendant expects us to believe that despite the fact that he (1) was
observed stealing items from various unlocked cars in the parking lot of an apartment complex at
night, (2) was caught by the police, and (3) fled from an open car, no reasonable person could
have inferred that he entered Venturi’s car with the intent to commit a theft. We emphatically
disagree. Given the aforementioned evidence, the inference that defendant entered Venturi’s car
with the intent to steal is not only compelling but nearly compulsory. Accordingly, we conclude
the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary to Venturi’s vehicle.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 29 Affirmed.
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