In re Q.P. , 2022 IL App (1st) 220354 ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 220354No. 1-22-0354
Opinion filed September 7, 2022
Third Division
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re Q.P., A Minor, )
)
(The People of the State Of Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
B.V. and Q.P., ) Appeal from the
) Trial Court of
Respondents ) Cook County.
)
(B.V., Respondent-Appellant; Q.P., Respondent-Appellee; ) No. 19 JA 1227
The Department of Children and Family Services, )
Intervenor-Appellee)). ) Honorable
) Patrick T. Murphy,
) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Gordon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case comes before us pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1,
2019). The trial court certified two questions for our review. First: “Does the [c]ourt have the
authority under 89 Ill. Adm. Code 328[.3](b)(1), when asked by DCFS to approve an out-of-state
No. 1-22-0354
move, to find it is not in the child’s best interest to move out-of-state and prevent the move?”
Second: “Does the court have the authority under [the Juvenile Court Act of 1987,] 705 ILCS
405/2-28(2.5)[,] to find it is not in the best interest of a child to move out-of-state because the
[c]ourt determines that the child’s planned placement is not necessary or appropriate?” We answer
both questions in the affirmative. However, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the Department
of Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) motion to place the minor out-of-state because that
ruling did not comply with the requirements of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court
Act), specifically section 2-28(2.5) (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2.5) (West 2020)). We reverse the trial
court’s ruling and remand this matter for further proceedings.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On May 23, 2019, respondent B.V. gave birth to minor respondent, Q.P. 1 Several months
later, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that Q.P. was neglected due
to an injurious environment and abused due to a substantial risk of physical injury. Specifically,
the petition alleged that B.V. and Q.P. tested positive for illegal substances at the time of Q.P’s
birth, that B.V. had four other children in DCFS custody, and that she had not cooperated with a
care plan for Q.P since June 2019. The trial court granted temporary custody of Q.P. to the DCFS
guardianship administrator. Following an adjudicatory hearing on March 3, 2020, the court found
that Q.P. was abused or neglected because he was born exposed to controlled substances and had
four older siblings in DCFS custody. Following a dispositional hearing on October 9, 2020, the
1
The record and briefs variously refer to the minor’s father as “Q.P.,” “Q.P., Jr.,” and “Q.P., Sr.”
Hereafter, any reference to “Q.P.” means the minor, not his father.
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court found that both parents were unable to care for Q.P. and set a permanency goal of returning
Q.P. home within 12 months.
¶4 DCFS first placed Q.P. with his great aunt in Dolton, Illinois, then with a nonrelative foster
parent, and then with his great aunt again after the foster parent became ill and died. On January
5, 2021, DCFS removed Q.P. from his great aunt’s home after discovering that his parents also
lived in that home and had a physical altercation in front of him. DCFS placed Q.P. with
nonrelative foster parents S.K.-M. and her husband A.M. in McCook, Illinois. On February 1,
2021, S.K.-M. told the court that she and her husband were able to adopt Q.P., and the court
changed the permanency goal to termination of parental rights.
¶5 The trial court conducted a hearing on the issue of placing Q.P. out-of-state on July 21,
2021. DCFS caseworker Sabrina Fisher stated that she planned to conduct an interstate compact
to place Q.P. with his maternal aunt, C.V., in Phoenix, Arizona. 2 The court responded that “it’s
not in the best interests of the kid to be bounced from home to home to home” and ordered that
DCFS could not remove Q.P. from his foster home until the court held a best interest hearing. On
August 31, 2021, DCFS caseworker Vicky Carter stated that the interstate compact had been
approved. She also opined that placing Q.P. with C.V. would be in his best interest because C.V.
was a “great relative caregiver” and because Q.P. would live near his grandmother and four
siblings in Phoenix. The court stated that “it is never in a kid’s best interest to move the kid around”
and again ordered that Q.P. could not be removed from his foster home without a best interest
hearing.
2
“Interstate compact” refers to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children Act, which
facilitates cooperation between states for the interstate placement of children. 45 ILCS 15/0.01 et seq.
(West 2020).
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¶6 In November 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing on DCFS’s motion to approve
placement of Q.P. with his aunt in Arizona. 3 Carter testified that Q.P. was born exposed to cocaine
and lived with his mother and great aunt after he was discharged from the hospital. B.V. stopped
communicating with DCFS in June 2019, so DCFS removed Q.P. from his mother and great aunt’s
home in November 2019. DCFS briefly placed Q.P. with a nonrelative foster parent, then returned
him to his great aunt’s home. DCFS again removed Q.P. from his great aunt’s home when it learned
that both his parents were living in that home and had a physical altercation in front of him. Q.P.
was then placed with S.K.-M. and A.M. in January 2021. In June 2021, Q.P. exhibited “severe
language delay,” “some delays in fine motor and gross motor skills,” and “emotional and physical
delays.” Q.P. received speech therapy, occupational therapy, and developmental therapy to treat
those delays.
¶7 When DCFS placed Q.P. with S.K.-M. and A.M., it simultaneously explored placing him
with relatives in Arizona. DCFS first considered placing Q.P. with his grandmother in Arizona
because she had adopted his four older brothers. However, Q.P.’s grandmother told DCFS that she
could not take custody of a very young child. Approximately a month later, Q.P.’s aunt C.V., who
lived about 30 minutes away from his grandmother, informed DCFS that she was interested in
taking custody of him. C.V. worked as the manager of a fast-food restaurant and previously worked
at a day care center with children of different ages and abilities. She also had three children of her
own. Fisher conducted the interstate compact, and Carter conducted a clinical staffing. Carter also
developed a plan to transition Q.P. from Illinois to Arizona, which included video calls with C.V.
so he could become familiar with her. Carter acknowledged that a placement change could cause
3
DCFS’s motion stated that Q.P.’s aunt lived in Arkansas. However, everything in the record
indicates that she lived in Arizona, and the parties’ briefs agree that she lived in Arizona, not Arkansas.
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trauma but testified that children of Q.P.’s age “are resilient” and “can pretty much get bonded or
become bonded with the next caregiver,” and that Q.P. had demonstrated such resilience in foster
care. Carter testified that placing Q.P. with C.V. would be in his best interest because she would
be a loving relative caregiver, because Q.P. would grow up near his siblings, and because Q.P.
generally appeared happier around his family. Carter acknowledged that Q.P. was “bonded and
attached” to his current foster parents but also testified that Q.P. was “reluctant to go back to the
foster parent[s]” when she visited him in their home. Although the court stated that it “want[ed] to
hear from both the present foster parent and the mother,” no other witnesses testified.
¶8 DCFS moved into evidence a home study and evaluation report prepared by Lutheran
Social Services of the Southwest (Lutheran Social Services). This report states that C.V. was 27
years old and lived with her three daughters in a two-bedroom apartment in Phoenix, Arizona,
although Carter testified that C.V. was in the process of moving into a three-bedroom apartment
as of November 2021. C.V.’s financial information indicated that she could support Q.P. She
“expressed her interest in helping keep [Q.P.] in a safe and stable home” and stated that she was
willing to adopt him. Lutheran Social Services recommended that C.V. be approved as a caregiver
for Q.P.
¶9 DCFS also introduced a report summarizing its September 2021 clinical staffing. This
report stated that C.V. visited Q.P. in April 2021 and introduced him to his brothers and her
daughters via a video call. The report also indicated that a move to Arizona would not disrupt his
therapy services. The clinical staffing concluded that Q.P. should be placed with C.V. because that
placement would provide “increased sibling visitation and bonding, and participation in family
holidays and other special events with extended family; thus not only strengthening his sense of
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attachment and self-confidence but also his understanding of heritage, origin, and identity through
daily family ties and bonding experiences.” The clinical staffing acknowledged that Q.P. was
“bonded and attached in his current placement” with S.K.-M. and A.M. and that a “move may
cause attachment and adjustment difficulties,” but explained that a “transition plan *** can help
him transfer his attachment relationship from one caregiver to another.”
¶ 10 The guardian ad litem (GAL) moved into evidence a note from DCFS’s file, which stated
that, on May 31, 2019, Q.P.’s grandmother in Arizona told caseworker Debra Robinson that she
adopted B.V.’s “older children” but “gave them back to her” two years prior.
¶ 11 During this hearing, the court requested studies regarding the impact of movement between
foster homes on children. The studies that the parties provided are included in the record on appeal.
The GAL submitted a 2007 study that concluded that “[c]hildren with unstable placements were
more likely to have behavioral problems than children who achieved early stability.” It also
submitted a 2000 study that found that “volatile placement histories contribute negatively to both
internalizing and externalizing behavior of foster children, and that children who experience
numerous changes in placement may be at particularly high risk for these deleterious effects.”
¶ 12 B.V. submitted six studies. A 2011 study concluded that, “[r]elative to children in foster
care, those in kinship care displayed significantly lower levels of problem behaviors.” A 2009
study found that “long-term kinship care alone does not result in more positive adult mental
health.” A 2008 study concluded that “[c]hildren placed into kinship care had fewer behavioral
problems three years after the placement than children who were placed into foster care” and
encouraged “efforts to maximize placement of children with willing and available kin when they
enter out-of-home care.” A 2000 study found that “[c]hildren in kinship care, regardless of age,
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had fewer placement moves than those in nonkinship care” and that “children who had more than
one placement move during their first year of care were more likely to experience placement
instability in the long-term.” A 1999 study found that the probability of restoring a child to his or
her family decreases the longer the child spends in foster care. Another 1999 study concluded that
“simply counting the number of placements children experience” is an inadequate methodology in
this field of study.
¶ 13 The parties also submitted memoranda of law regarding the court’s authority to rule on
DCFS’s motion. The State argued that the court should grant DCFS’s motion pursuant to section
2-28 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West 2020)). B.V. argued that the trial court
had to defer to DCFS’s placement decision unless the court determined that the Arizona placement
would cause “manifest injustice.” The GAL argued that the court should deny DCFS’s motion
pursuant to both section 2-28(2.5) of the Juvenile Court Act (id. § 2-28(2.5)) and section
328.3(b)(1) of Title 89 of the Illinois Administrative Code (89 Ill. Adm. Code 328.3(b)(1) (1999))
because placement in Arizona was not in Q.P.’s best interest.
¶ 14 On March 4, 2022, the trial court denied DCFS’s motion for out-of-state placement. The
court expressed concern about “Reactive Attachment Disorder” as a result of Q.P. being “moved
and moved and moved.” Reviewing best interest factors, the court explained that Q.P. was safe,
loved, and secure in his current foster home and had 14 months of community ties there, but
development of his identity would be better with his relatives. The court stated that it “kn[e]w
nothing about the Arizona home” but acknowledged that Q.P.’s family in Arizona appeared to be
“very decent people who desperately would like to have [him] in their care.” The court concluded
that any move to any other home was contrary to Q.P.’s best interest and that his placement with
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S.K.-M. and A.M. was “necessary and appropriate.” The court certified the following questions
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (eff Oct. 1, 2019):
“1. Does the [c]ourt have the authority under 89 Ill. Adm. Code 328[.3](b)(1), when asked
by DCFS to approve an out-of-state move, to find it is not in the child’s best interest to
move out-of-state and prevent the move?
2. Does the court have the authority under 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2.5) to find it is not in the
best interest of a child to move out-of-state because the [c]ourt determines that the child’s
planned placement is not necessary or appropriate?” 4
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 “Supreme Court Rule 308 provides a remedy of permissive appeal for interlocutory orders
where the trial court has deemed that they involve a question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and where an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Apollo Real Estate Investment Fund, IV, L.P.
v. Gelber, 398 Ill. App. 3d 773, 778 (2009); Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). “We apply a
de novo standard of review as to legal questions presented in an interlocutory appeal brought
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308(a).” Apollo Real Estate, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 778.
¶ 17 This appeal involves the interpretation of both the Juvenile Court Act and the Illinois
Administrative Code. Administrative rules and regulations have the force of law, and we interpret
4
The first certified question references “89 Ill. Adm. Code 328(b)(1).” There is no section with
that designation. We construe the certified question as referring to section 328.3(b)(1), which addresses
court approval of out-of-state placement of Illinois children. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 328.3(b)(1) (1999). We
modify the first certified question to correct this minor error. See In re Marriage of Wendy W., 2022 IL
App (1st) 201000, ¶ 5 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), and De Bouse v. Bayer, 235 Ill. 2d
544, 556-67 (2009)) (not yet released for publication and subject to revision or withdrawal).
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them under the same standards that govern the construction of statutes. People ex rel. Madigan v.
Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 231 Ill. 2d 370, 380 (2008). “The fundamental objective of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” 1010 Lake Shore Ass’n
v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 21. “The most reliable indicator of
legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “A reasonable
construction must be given to each word, clause, and sentence of a statute, and no term should be
rendered superfluous.” Id. “ ‘[W]hen statutory language is plain and certain the court is not free to
give it a different meaning.’ ” Kalkman v. Nedved, 2013 IL App (3d) 120800, ¶ 12 (quoting In re
Estate of Hoehn, 234 Ill. App. 3d 627, 629 (1992)). “[A] court may not depart from the plain
statutory language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the
legislature.” Id. ¶ 12 (citing In re Estate of Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d 45, 51 (2009)).
¶ 18 A. Illinois Administrative Code Title 89, Section 328.3(b)(1)
¶ 19 The first certified question concerns section 328.3 of Title 89 of the Illinois Administrative
Code, which governs out-of-state placement of Illinois children. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 328.3 (1999).
Section 328.3(b)(1) provides that, “prior to placing [DCFS] wards in other states, [DCFS] shall
have determined that the applicable court of jurisdiction approves of the placement.” 89 Ill. Adm.
Code 328.3(b)(1) (1999). This language is straightforward: Before placing a child out-of-state,
DCFS must obtain the relevant juvenile court’s approval. It follows that, if the court does not
approve the out-of-state placement, DCFS cannot make the placement. This section would be
purely symbolic if the court could not enforce its disapproval of an out-of-state placement, so
section 328.3(b)(1) must give juvenile courts the authority to reject out-of-state placements when
DCFS requests approval. Moreover, this approval procedure requires the juvenile court to make a
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best interest determination. Section 328.3(b)(1) references DCFS’s “placement” of children, and
a child’s best interest takes precedence in determining placement. In re Violetta B., 210 Ill. App.
3d 521, 533 (1991). Although the certified question discusses approval of a “move” rather than a
“placement,” we see no practical difference between these terms. An out-of-state placement of a
child requires moving the child out of Illinois.
¶ 20 B.V. essentially argues that the approval process of section 328.3(b)(1) is a formality, and
that a juvenile court cannot override DCFS’s decision to place a child out-of-state. However,
section 328.3(b)(1) uses the word “approves,” which “connotes the exercise of discretion.”
Veterans Assistance Comm’n v. County Board, 274 Ill. App. 3d 32, 35 (1995). That is, the court
does not simply rubber stamp DCFS’s out-of-state placement decision. The court must exercise its
judgment and either approve, and therefore allow, the placement or disapprove, and therefore
disallow, the placement. This exercise of judgment must give precedence to the child’s best interest
(In re Violetta B., 210 Ill. App. 3d at 533), so B.V.’s argument that the trial court erred by holding
a best interest hearing on DCFS’s motion is incorrect. Accordingly, we answer the first certified
question in the affirmative, the trial judge has the authority to approve or reject DCFS placement
decisions.
¶ 21 B. Juvenile Court Act Section 2-28(2.5)
¶ 22 The second certified question concerns section 2-28(2.5) of the Juvenile Court Act . Section
2-28 sets forth the procedure for a juvenile court to review an abuse or neglect case through a series
of permanency hearings. 705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West 2020). After a juvenile court has taken
temporary custody of a child, it must hold a permanency hearing to “determine the future status of
the child” by setting one of several permanency goals, which can include return home, termination
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of parental rights, or adoption. Id. § 2-28(2).The court must hold permanency hearings at least
every six months thereafter “until the court determines that the plan and goal have been achieved.”
Id. The court cannot order a specific placement (id.), but section 2-28(2.5) confers certain authority
on both the court and DCFS at this stage (id. § 2-28(2.5)). The first portion of that section provides
that:
“If, after reviewing the evidence, including evidence from [DCFS], the court determines
that the minor’s current or planned placement is not necessary or appropriate to facilitate
achievement of the permanency goal, the court shall put in writing the factual basis
supporting its determination and enter specific findings based on the evidence. If the court
finds that the minor’s current or planned placement is not necessary or appropriate, the
court may enter an order directing [DCFS] to implement a recommendation by the minor’s
treating clinician or a clinician contracted by [DCFS] to evaluate the minor or a
recommendation made by [DCFS].” Id.
The second portion provides that:
“If [DCFS] places a minor in a placement under an order entered under this subsection
(2.5), [DCFS] has the authority to remove the minor from that placement when a change
in circumstances necessitates the removal to protect the minor’s health, safety, and best
interest. If [DCFS] determines removal is necessary, [DCFS] shall notify the parties of the
planned placement change in writing no later than 10 days prior to the implementation of
its determination unless remaining in the placement poses an imminent risk of harm to the
minor, in which case [DCFS] shall notify the parties of the placement change in writing
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immediately following the implementation of its decision. [DCFS] shall notify others of
the decision to change the minor’s placement as required by [DCFS] rule.” Id.
¶ 23 The first portion of section 2-28(2.5) addresses what happens when, following a
permanency hearing, a juvenile court concludes that a child’s current or planned placement is not
necessary or appropriate. In that case, the court must issue a written factual basis for that
determination and “enter specific findings based on the evidence.” Id. In addition, the court can
order DCFS to (1) implement a clinician’s placement recommendation or (2) implement DCFS’s
own placement recommendation. Id. In either case, the placement recommendation must be
different from the placement that the court rejected under section 2-28(2.5). Otherwise, this section
would allow DCFS to proceed with a placement that the court has found to be unnecessary or
inappropriate. So, the first portion of section 2-28(2.5) authorized the trial court to reject DCFS’s
planned placement of Q.P. with C.V. as unnecessary or inappropriate and to require DCFS to make
a different placement recommended by a clinician or by DCFS itself.
¶ 24 The second portion of section 2-28(2.5) concerns what happens when DCFS “places a
minor in a placement under an order entered under this subsection (2.5).” (Emphasis added.) Id.
This portion grants DCFS certain authority when DCFS places a child after the court has rejected
another placement pursuant to the first portion of section 2-28(2.5). In that case, DCFS may, under
certain circumstances, change the child’s new placement with notice to the parties, i.e., without
court involvement. Nevertheless, the court still must approve all out-of-state placements (89 Ill.
Adm. Code 328.3(b)(1) (1999)), the court must continue to evaluate the child’s placement at
permanency hearings (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2020)), and the court can reject future
placements as unnecessary or inappropriate (id. § 2-28(2.5)). The second portion of section 2-
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28(2.5) does not limit the court’s power to reject placements; rather, it governs what DCFS can do
after the court makes such a rejection and DCFS makes an alternative placement.
¶ 25 We have interpreted analogous language in section 2-28(2) the same way that we interpret
section 2-28(2.5) in this case. Section 2-28(2) provides that:
“If, after receiving evidence, the court determines that the services contained in the
[permanency] plan are not reasonably calculated to facilitate achievement of the
permanency goal, the court shall put in writing the factual basis supporting the
determination and enter specific findings based on the evidence. The court also shall enter
an order for the Department to develop and implement a new service plan or to implement
changes to the current service plan consistent with the court’s findings.” (Emphasis added.)
Id. § 2-28(2).
This language means that if the court is dissatisfied with the services in a permanency plan, the
court “is required to make specific findings and to remand the matter to DCFS for its further
consideration.” In re Chiara C., 279 Ill. App. 3d 761, 766 (1996); see also In re T.L.C., 285 Ill.
App. 3d 922, 929 (1996) (Juvenile Court Act allows “DCFS, operating under a plan, to make
placement decisions with the safeguard being that the placements are subject to disapproval and
required reconsideration by the circuit court”). Section 2-28(2.5) provides essentially the same
thing in the context of placement, as opposed to services.
¶ 26 B.V. acknowledges that section “2-28(2.5) concerns a court’s consideration of whether a
placement is necessary or appropriate” based on “evidence during a permanency hearing,” but she
contends that a juvenile court has no statutory authority to deny a motion for out-of-state
placement. Similarly, DCFS argues that section 2-28(2.5) does not apply to out-of-state placements
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because section 328.3(b)(1) exclusively governs them. We disagree; these two sections are not
mutually exclusive of each other. Section 328.3(b)(1) provides that DCFS must always seek court
approval for an out-of-state placement before making the placement, regardless of the procedural
posture of the juvenile court case. If DCFS seeks such approval during the permanency hearing
stage, then section 2-28 applies. Section 2-28(2.5) applies to “current or planned placement[s]”
and makes no distinction between in-state versus out-of-state placements. We cannot read this
section as being limited to in-state placements. Kalkman, 2013 IL App (3d) 120800, ¶ 12. If the
court rejects any placement, in-state or out-of-state, as inappropriate or unnecessary during the
permanency hearing stage, then it must state its reasons for doing so in writing and may require a
recommendation for alternative placement. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2.5) (West 2020). These two
sections work together to ensure that a juvenile court can review an out-of-state placement before
it occurs and to ensure that the court makes a clear record of its reasons for rejecting such a
placement.
¶ 27 B.V. cites In re M.V., 288 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305 (1997) for the proposition that a juvenile
court “has no statutory authority to designate a specific placement or foster home.” We agree.
However, M.V. does not answer the second certified question. That question asks whether a
juvenile court can find that a planned out-of-state placement is not necessary, appropriate, or in
the child’s best interest and therefore prevent the placement. The answer to that question is yes,
and the statutory authority for it is section 2-28(2.5) of the Juvenile Court Act.
¶ 28 B.V. also argues that, even if the trial court properly conducted a permanency hearing in
deciding the motion for out-of-state placement, “the only available remedy was to order DCFS to
implement a clinical recommendation,” which was to place Q.P. in Arizona because that is what
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DCFS’s clinical staffing recommended. B.V.’s interpretation is too narrow. As explained above,
when a court finds that a planned placement is unnecessary or inappropriate, the court may order
DCFS to make an alternative placement based on a clinician’s recommendation or based on
DCFS’s own recommendation. Whichever path the court chooses, it would be illogical to allow
DCFS to proceed with a placement that the court has found to be unnecessary or inappropriate.
Accordingly, we answer the second certified question in the affirmative, the trial court has the
authority under the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-28(2.5) (West 2020)) to find it is not in
the best interest of a child to move out-of-state because the court determines that the child’s
planned placement is not necessary or appropriate.
¶ 29 C. Procedural Requirements of Section 2-28(2.5)
¶ 30 Finally, B.V. maintains that the trial court made procedural and factual errors in denying
DCFS’s motion for out-of-state placement. The merits of the trial court’s ruling are not among the
certified questions. However, once we answer the certified questions, “in the interests of judicial
economy and the need to reach an equitable result, we may consider the propriety of the circuit
court order that gave rise to these proceedings.” In re Marriage of Dahm-Schell, 2021 IL 126802,
¶ 31.
¶ 31 B.V. is the only appellant in this case, so first we examine whether she has standing to
challenge the denial of DCFS’s motion for out-of-state placement. B.V., as the biological mother
of Q.P., has standing to present arguments that assure Q.P.’s placement serves his best interest.
In re Al. S., 2017 IL App (4th) 160737, ¶ 37. B.V.’s argument that the court’s placement decision
is against the manifest weight of the evidence presents an actual controversy having a direct and
substantial impact on the ultimate determination of whether Q.P.’s placement serves his best
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interest. See id. So B.V. has standing to contest the trial court’s decision to prevent DCFS from
placing Q.P. with his aunt in Arizona. DCFS’s motion sought a change of placement from S.K.-
M. and A.M.’s home in Illinois to C.V.’s home in Arizona. A motion for a change of placement
can be construed as a permanency review hearing under section 2-28. In re Chiara C., 279 Ill.
App. 3d at 766; see also In re M.P., 401 Ill. App. 3d 742, 747 (2001); In re A.L., 294 Ill. App. 3d
441, 446 (1998).
¶ 32 We agree with B.V. that the trial court made a procedural error in denying DCFS’s motion
for an out-of-state placement. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of DCFS’s motion
because the court did not comply with the requirements of section 2-28(2.5). When a court rejects
a planned placement as unnecessary or inappropriate, it “shall put in writing the factual basis
supporting its determination and enter specific findings based on the evidence.” (Emphasis added.)
705 ILCS 405/2-28(2.5) (West 2020). The word “shall” is “ ‘a clear expression of legislative intent
to impose a mandatory obligation,’ and the trial court was not free to ignore this mandate.” In re
T.S., 402 Ill. App. 3d 1159, 1171-72 (2010) (quoting People v. O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001)).
The trial court entered an order that denied the motion for out-of-state placement and stated, “See
transcript of [p]roceedings.” That is, the court did not put in writing the factual basis supporting
its denial of DCFS’s motion. This approach was insufficient because the reports of proceedings in
the record span more than 350 pages and approximately 14 different hearings. In addition, the
court’s order does not indicate whether or how it evaluated more than 200 pages of exhibits
submitted by the parties, including the academic studies that the court specifically requested. Even
if the court’s oral ruling was sufficient to comply with section 2-28(2.5), that ruling did not address
the exhibits either, and it provided only a generalized summary of witness testimony, not the
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No. 1-22-0354
specific findings that the Act requires. On remand, the trial court is directed to comply with section
2-28(2.5) of the Juvenile Court Act. See id. at 1172.
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we answer both certified questions in the affirmative. However,
we reverse the trial court’s denial of DCFS’s motion for out-of-state placement as noncompliant
with the procedural requirements of section 2-28(2.5).
¶ 35 Reversed and remanded; certified questions answered.
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No. 1-22-0354
In re Q.P., 2022 IL App (1st) 220354Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19-JA-1227;
the Hon. Patrick T. Murphy, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Sharone R. Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Alexander
for Stein, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, and Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s
for Attorney, both of Chicago (David E. Neumeister, Assistant
Appellee: Attorney General, and Enrique Abraham, Gina DiVito, and Ashlee
Cuza, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Charles P. Golbert, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain,
Jeffrey Sterbenc, and Carrie Fung, of counsel), guardian ad litem.
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