Vandenberg v. Brunswick Corporation , 90 N.E.3d 1048 ( 2017 )

2017 IL App (1st) 170181
FIRST DIVISION
November 27, 2017
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646
(Consolidated)
SCOT VANDENBERG and ) Appeal from the
PATRICIA VANDENBERG, 1 ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiffs-Appellees, )
)
v. )
)
BRUNSWICK CORPORATION; BRUNSWICK )
BOAT GROUP, a division of Brunswick ) No. 2010 L 003188
Corporation; RQM, LLC., )
)
Defendants, )
)
(BRUNSWICK CORPORATION; BRUNSWICK ) Honorable
BOAT GROUP, a division of Brunswick ) James N. O’Hara,
Corporation, ) Daniel J. Lynch and
) Elizabeth M. Budzinski,
Defendants-Appellants.) ) Judges Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Mikva specially concurred, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendants, Brunswick Corporation and Brunswick Boat Group (collectively,
Brunswick), appeal the order of the circuit court granting plaintiffs Scot and Patricia
Vandenberg’s 2 motion to vacate the court’s prior orders and to reinstate the parties’ settlement
1
We note that the cover of appellant’s brief refers to plaintiffs as “Vanderberg” but the record,
the briefs and argument of appellee, and the argument within appellant’s brief refers to them as
“Vandenberg.” We will therefore refer to plaintiffs as “Vandenberg.”
2
We note that the cover of appellant’s brief refers to plaintiffs as “Vanderberg” but the record, the
briefs and argument of appellee, and the argument within appellant’s brief refers to them as
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
agreement. On appeal, Brunswick contends (1) the trial court failed to give deference to the
court’s prior finding that plaintiffs’ counsel fraudulently induced the settlement, (2) the trial
court erred in reinstating the settlement where there was a mistake in a material term and
Brunswick was deprived of its due process right to a fair trial, and (3) the trial court erred in
vacating the judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of Brunswick. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
¶2 JURISDICTION
¶3 The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to vacate its prior orders and to reinstate the
settlement agreement on December 20, 2016. On January 18, 2017, Brunswick filed a motion to
vacate the December 20, 2016, order, and on January 19, 2017, Brunswick filed a notice of
appeal from the order. The trial court denied Brunswick’s motion to vacate on February 14,
2017. On February 15, 2017, the trial court entered an amended order denying Brunswick’s
motion to vacate and entered final judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $25 million. Brunswick
filed its notice of appeal on March 15, 2017. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rules 303 (eff. May 30, 2008) and 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), governing
appeals from final judgments entered below.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 While hosting a party on a yacht, Scot Vandenberg fell from the upper deck and broke his
neck. The accident rendered him quadriplegic. The yacht was manufactured by Brunswick and
owned and chartered by RQM. Plaintiffs filed a negligence and strict liability action against
Brunswick and RQM, alleging failure to provide railings or equivalent protection around the
periphery of the boat deck, failure to prevent Vandenberg from accessing areas without railings,
“Vandenberg.” We will therefore refer to plaintiffs as “Vandenberg.”
-2­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
and failure to warn about the lack of railings. Plaintiffs subsequently settled with RQM, and the
case proceeded to trial against Brunswick before Judge Budzinski.
¶6 I. Trial and Settlement
¶7 On June 9, 2015, the parties presented closing arguments, during which plaintiffs’
counsel requested a verdict in favor of plaintiffs for $103 million. Prior to closing arguments,
AIG Global Claims Officer Andrew Barberis instructed Charles Patitucci, a claims adjuster, to
offer plaintiffs $25 million in settlement of their claims against Brunswick. Brunswick was
insured through AIG, and through the program, Brunswick was responsible for the first $2
million of liability, with AIG thereafter responsible for liability up to the policy limit of $41.5
million. Patitucci did not want to make the offer to plaintiffs, but Barberis instructed him to make
the unconditional offer. While the jury deliberated, Patitucci extended the $25 million offer to
plaintiffs’ attorney, Mark McNabola.
¶8 McNabola informed plaintiffs of the offer to settle, and at 3:40 p.m., plaintiffs told
McNabola they would accept the offer. McNabola had not informed Brunswick of plaintiffs’
acceptance when he received a call at 3:52 p.m. from Tatianna Agee, Judge Budzinski’s clerk.
Agee told McNabola that the jury had sent out a note asking the following question: “CAN WE
FIND FAULT WITH RQM, WITHOUT FINDING FAULT WITH BRUNSWICK?” Brooke
Reynolds, a student extern for Judge Budzinski, was in the room when Agee made the call.
Reynolds overheard Agee disclosing the contents of the note in a hushed voice, and Agee told
her she liked to “give the plaintiffs a little more of an opportunity to settle or figure the question
out before the defense.” Agee said that McNabola told her the answer was “no” and to “hold-off,
don’t do anything yet, I’m going to try to settle this.”
-3­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
¶9 McNabola tried to reach Patitucci but was unsuccessful at first. McNabola spoke again to
Agee around 4:01 p.m., telling her that he could not get a hold of the person he needed to speak
to about the settlement. He asked for further instructions, and Agee told him that Judge
Budzinski wanted the parties to return to court. McNabola called Brunswick’s lead counsel, John
Patton, and asked for Patitucci’s cell phone number. He did not tell Patton about the jury note or
that Agee had told him of the note’s contents. McNabola reached Patitucci at 4:03 p.m., and after
learning that Patitucci’s authority to settle was limited to the $25 million offered, McNabola
accepted the offer. Patitucci did not give any indication that he knew of the jury note or its
contents. At 4:11 p.m., Patitucci called Patton and informed him of the settlement.
¶ 10 Patitucci told Patton to place the settlement on the record, and Patton asked his colleague,
John Ouska, to go to court for that purpose. Patton also instructed Ouska to request that the jury
be allowed to continue deliberating to verdict because Patitucci was curious what the jury would
find. After speaking with Ouska, Patton received a call from Agee at 4:19 p.m., and she informed
him that Judge Budzinski wanted the parties to come to court to discuss the jury note. Patton had
not known about the jury note prior to Agee’s call. Patton called Patitucci and told him that he
would ask Ouska to “check into [the note] when he got [to court].” This was also the first time
Patitucci had heard of the note, and although he did not want to revoke the settlement based only
on the fact the jury sent out a note, he wanted to find out “[a]nything and everything about the
note.”
¶ 11 Patitucci returned to court along with Kelly Kaiser, associate general counsel for
Brunswick, and Kimberly Kearney, Brunswick’s appellate counsel. At approximately 4:40 p.m.,
Ouska, Kearney, and Kaiser entered Judge Budzinski’s chambers, where plaintiffs’ attorneys
Ruth Degnan and Terrance Nofsinger were already present. Judge Budzinski informed them that
-4­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
the jury had sent out a note “at approximately 3:50 p.m.” and she was surprised it took counsel
so long to return to court after being notified. All counsel present viewed the jury note and its
contents. On the bottom, the note bore a handwritten notation of “Rec’d 3:50 p.m.” Kaiser called
Patitucci at 4:45 p.m., and informed him of the contents of the note. Patitucci then called Patton.
At 4:50 p.m., the settlement was entered on the record in the presence of counsel and the case
dismissed.
¶ 12 Ouska requested that the jury be allowed to deliberate to verdict. Judge Budzinski agreed,
over Degnan’s objection, as long as the deliberations did not continue past 5 p.m. Judge
Budzinski answered the jury question, instructing them to continue deliberations according to the
instructions already given. The jury reached a verdict in favor of Brunswick at approximately 5
p.m. At this time, Patton arrived at court and waited to speak with Judge Budzinski. Patton
informed Judge Budzinski that the settlement occurred without him having knowledge of the
jury’s note. Agee, who was present during this exchange, claimed she tried to call Patton earlier,
but Patton responded that his phone did not indicate any calls from Agee before 4:19 p.m.
¶ 13 Judge Budzinski left the courtroom, and when Patton approached her chambers around
5:15 p.m., he heard shouting. He saw Agee, who “had tears in her eyes.” She walked out of the
judge’s chambers, and Patton handed Judge Budzinski the order he wanted entered. The order
reflected that the parties had settled and also acknowledged a judgment on the verdict for
defendants. Judge Budzinski denied Patton’s request to enter an order reflecting a jury verdict for
the defense because the case had already been dismissed pursuant to the settlement. She
informed Patton that he did not receive a call because “McNabola told [Agee] not to call you so
he could settle the case.” Patton requested an evidentiary hearing and for the preservation of
-5­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
phone records and court materials. On June 12, 2015, Brunswick filed a motion to vacate the
settlement and for entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict on the grounds of fraud and mistake.
¶ 14 On June 15, 2015, Judge Budzinski filed a memorandum of the court detailing the events
of June 9, 2015. The memorandum stated that the court received a jury note at 3:50 p.m. and
instructed Agee “to contact the lawyers and direct them to appear in chambers.” Reynolds was
also present at the time. Agee later informed the court that she spoke with McNabola and he told
her the case had settled. McNabola told Agee that he wanted to speak to the court “since the case
was settled [and] neither he nor the defendant was interested in the contents of the jury note.”
The court responded that they still needed to appear in chambers. Agee was instructed to contact
Patton and inform him that he needed to appear in chambers to address the unpublished jury
note. Patton spoke with the court and confirmed the settlement and “that both he and Mr.
McNabola wanted the jury to continue their deliberations.” Patton informed the court that Ouska
would appear in chambers.
¶ 15 The court asked Agee if she had informed McNabola of the jury note’s contents, and she
responded “no.” The court also asked Agee if she had contacted Patton at the same time she
contacted McNabola, and Agee responded “yes.” McNabola had also told Agee to “hold off, or
something to that effect.”
¶ 16 At 4:40 p.m., Degnan, Ouska, Kearney, and a corporate representative from Brunswick
gathered in chambers, and the jury note was read. The court gave the jury a written response and,
“[p]ursuant to the parties’ request, the settlement was put on the record.” The jury reached a
verdict in favor of defendants 5 to 10 minutes later. The jury was released, and the court entered
a dismissal order. Patton had arrived by this point and informed the court that he had not
received a call about the jury note. “The Court asked Ms. Agee again in open court and later in
-6­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
chambers if she had called Mr. Patton advising him that there was a jury note and that he was
required to come to chambers. Ms. Agee assured the Court that she did call Mr. Patton.”
¶ 17 Patton requested that the court enter an order reflecting that the jury reached a verdict in
favor of defendants, as well as the settlement, so he and the court would get “credit” for the
verdict. The court denied Patton’s request, and Patton reiterated that he never received a call
about the jury note. The following day, Reynolds advised the court that she overheard Agee
speaking with McNabola on the phone and that Agee informed him of the contents of the jury
note. McNabola also told Agee that the answer to the jury question should be “no.”
¶ 18 II. Brunswick’s Motion to Vacate Settlement Agreement
and Enter Judgment on the Verdict
¶ 19 Judge Budzinski subsequently recused herself, and Judge Daniel J. Lynch was assigned
to the case. The court then addressed Brunswick’s motions to vacate the settlement and to enter
judgment on the verdict filed on June 12, 2015. The court first held an evidentiary hearing on
Brunswick’s motion to vacate. At the hearing, McNabola, Degnan, Patitucci, Patton, Kearney,
Agee, Reynolds, and plaintiffs testified. The court also received phone records as evidence.
¶ 20 The court issued an oral opinion on January 19, 2016, rescinding the settlement
agreement. It stated that “[t]here is absolutely no dispute between the parties in this matter as to
what Agee did or failed to do between 3:50 p.m. and 4:19 p.m. with the note and its contents.” It
found Patitucci and Patton to be credible witnesses regarding when and how they learned of the
jury note, and it found Degnan’s and McNabola’s testimony regarding their belief that
Brunswick had contemporaneous knowledge of the note and its contents not credible. The court
also found Agee was “clearly not a credible witness” when she denied she saw the jury note or
that she revealed its contents to McNabola at 3:52 p.m.
-7­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
¶ 21 The court determined that Patitucci had the authority to reject a settlement and would
have done so here “if he knew any one of the following: The existence of the note, the contents
of the note, or that McNabola knew of both.” It concluded that McNabola had a duty to disclose
his knowledge of the note and its contents to Brunswick under court rules and rules of
professional conduct. The court vacated the settlement agreement based on grounds of fraud in
the inducement, unilateral and mutual mistake, due process, and public policy. It further found
that the case might implicate criminal conduct and indicated to Brunswick’s posttrial counsel,
Dan Webb, that he should contact the State’s Attorney’s office, which he did. On March 9, 2016,
plaintiffs sent a letter to Patitucci accepting the $25 million offer, and also filed a motion to
enforce settlement in the case.
¶ 22 The court subsequently reconstituted the jury that reached a verdict for the defense on
June 9, 2015, and confirmed that a unanimous verdict had been reached. On May 19, 2016, the
court held a hearing on Brunswick’s motion to enter judgment on the verdict. The court found
that the parties did not dispute “that the Vandenbergs did form the intent to accept this $25
million offer sometime around or shortly immediately after 3:40 p.m. Certainly neither side
disputes the fact that they formed this intent to accept it prior to the 3:50 p.m. note perhaps, but
certainly prior to the 3:52 phone call between Ms. Agee and Mr. McNabola, but the Court has to
fashion a remedy in the extremity, if you will, of these facts and circumstances.” Although it
found that plaintiffs had “clean hands” in the case, the court entered judgment in favor of
Brunswick and against plaintiffs due to McNabola’s conduct.
¶ 23 On June 24, 2016, plaintiffs, through current counsel, filed a motion to have Judge Lynch
recuse himself in the matter or to have him disqualified. The motion cited Judge Lynch’s alleged
bias against plaintiffs due to the conduct of their former counsel, McNabola, and the court’s
-8­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
failure to ensure they received adequate representation. Plaintiffs also alleged that using Webb as
a court conduit to refer the matter of McNabola’s conduct to the State’s Attorney’s office
reflected improper bias and prejudice. Judge Lynch held a hearing on September 23, 2016, to
recount the events of the January 19 meeting about the State’s Attorney’s office matter. After the
hearing, Judge Lynch recused himself from further proceedings, and the case was reassigned to
Judge James O’Hara.
¶ 24 III. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate Judgment
and Reinstatement of the Settlement Agreement
¶ 25 On October 25, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the court’s January 19, 2016,
and May 26, 2016, orders, and enforce the settlement. After briefing and oral argument, the court
found that “the settlement was entered into the record between 4:50 and 4:51 p.m.” and
immediately thereafter the court “entered an order dismissing the case pursuant to said
settlement.” Prior to the settlement being entered, at 4:40 p.m., the court found that “all parties
were made aware of the content of the jury’s question and the time it was published. All parties
had the opportunity to participate in a discussion as to how to respond to the note.” Therefore,
“[t]he parties freely settled this case after full disclosure of all material information concerning
the content and time of publishing the jury note. At no point did [Brunswick], through counsels,
object to or question the validity of the settlement after learning of the content of the jury
question contained in the note or the time it had come out prior to the settlement’s entry into the
record. Through this conduct, [Brunswick] manifested a consistent intention and willingness to
agree and enter into the settlement and to its entry into the record and to the dismissal of the case
pursuant to settlement.” The court vacated the judgment entered in favor of Brunswick and all
-9­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
orders entered after June 9, 2015, inconsistent with its order and reinstated the settlement
agreement.
¶ 26 Brunswick filed a motion to vacate the order or, in the alternative, for clarification. The
court denied the motion and entered final judgment on February 15, 2017. This appeal followed.
¶ 27 ANALYSIS
¶ 28 First we address our standard of review. Brunswick argues that a de novo standard
applies where this court is reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant or deny enforcement of a
settlement agreement and the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. See City of Chicago v.
Ramirez, 366 Ill. App. 3d 935, 946 (2006). However, in K4 Enterprises, Inc. v. Grater, Inc., 394
Ill. App. 3d 307, 312 (2009), this court stated that “[w]hen presented with a challenge to a trial
court’s determination that parties reached an oral settlement agreement, a reviewing court will
not overturn that finding unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence,” although no
evidentiary hearing had been held. Although we acknowledge the split in authority within this
district, we need not decide which standard is correct since our determination here is the same
under either standard.
¶ 29 The parties agreed to the $25 million settlement and, with counsel for all parties present,
the trial court entered the settlement into the record between 4:50 and 4:51 p.m. on June 9, 2015.
Generally, a settlement agreement is not subject to appellate review because it is a recordation of
an agreement between the parties rather than a judicial determination of their rights. In re
Marriage of Bielawski, 328 Ill. App. 3d 243, 251 (2002). Illinois public policy generally favors
the peaceful and voluntary resolution of disputes, and a settlement is presumed valid and is
conclusive as to all parties and matters included therein. Cameron v. Bogusz, 305 Ill. App. 3d
267, 272 (1999). A party can overcome this presumption of validity if it shows, by clear and
- 10 ­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
convincing evidence, that there was fraud in the inducement, fraud in the execution, mutual
mistake, or mental incompetency. Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 232 Ill. App. 3d 463, 468 (1992).
¶ 30 The trial court determined that Brunswick agreed to have the settlement entered into the
record after its counsel and representatives discovered the contents of the jury note and the time
the court received the note. Therefore, it found “[Brunswick] manifested a consistent intention
and willingness to agree and enter into the settlement and to its entry into the record and to the
dismissal of the case pursuant to settlement.” Brunswick argues, however, that McNabola knew
of the jury note and contents almost 30 minutes before Brunswick, but fraudulently concealed
this information. Brunswick did not discover this fact until June 15, 2015, six days after the
settlement was entered into the record, when Judge Budzinski filed her memorandum of the
court. It alleges that, had it possessed this information, it would not have agreed to the
settlement. Therefore, Brunswick argues, McNabola fraudulently concealed his knowledge of the
note, and the trial court below erred in reinstating the settlement in light of that fraud.
¶ 31 The elements needed to prove fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment of a material
fact, (2) intent to induce a false belief where there exists a duty to speak, (3) that the other party
could not have discovered the truth through reasonable inquiry and relied upon the silence as an
indication that the concealed fact did not exist, (4) that the other party would have acted
differently had it known of the concealed information, and (5) that its reliance resulted in its
injury. Schrager v. North Community Bank, 328 Ill. App. 3d 696, 706-07 (2002). In order to
prevail on its claim of fraudulent concealment, Brunswick must establish the existence of a
special or fiduciary relationship giving rise to McNabola’s duty to speak. Hassan v. Yusuf, 408
Ill. App. 3d 327, 345 (2011).
- 11 ­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
¶ 32 Brunswick, however, does not allege that McNabola had a fiduciary duty to inform
Patton or Brunswick of the note. Nor does Brunswick allege a special or confidential relationship
between the parties giving rise to McNabola’s duty to speak. See Kurti v. Fox Valley
Radiologists, Ltd., 124 Ill. App. 3d 933, 938 (1984) (finding a confidential relationship “where
trust and confidence, by reason of friendship, agency and experience, are reposed by one person
in another so the latter gains influence and superiority over the former”). Rather, Brunswick
adopts Judge Lynch’s determination that McNabola had a duty to disclose his knowledge of the
note and its contents to Brunswick under court rules and rules of professional conduct.
¶ 33 Our supreme court has the exclusive authority to prescribe rules governing attorney
conduct and to discipline attorneys who violate these rules. People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 119
Ill. 2d 485, 494 (1988). Consistent with this authority, the court has adopted a Code of
Professional Responsibility, appointed an Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
(ARDC), and “created a procedural scheme to enhance the ARDC in performing its duties.” Id.
“[T]hrough the use of its exclusive judicial power to prescribe rules governing attorney conduct,
and to discipline attorneys for violating those rules, [our supreme court] has created a
comprehensive program to regulate attorneys and punish their misconduct.” Id. Our supreme
court has emphasized that the rules of professional conduct are mandatory and “[a]ttorneys who
fail to understand them or follow them do so at their peril.” In re Demuth, 126 Ill. 2d 1, 13
(1988).
¶ 34 However, although these rules are “a safe guide for professional conduct” and attorneys
may be disciplined for failing to observe them (In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, 538 (1988)),
“[v]iolation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it
create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. *** The Rules are
- 12 ­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.” Ill. R. Prof’l
Conduct (2010) pmbl. (eff. Jan. 1, 2010). Thus, while violation of these rules may be relevant to
the standard of care in a legal malpractice claim, the rules themselves do not establish a separate
duty or cause of action. Owens v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 316 Ill. App. 3d 340, 353 (2000);
Nagy v. Beckley, 218 Ill. App. 3d 875, 881 (1991). As such, the rules of professional conduct
cannot give rise to McNabola’s duty to speak, the violation of which served as the basis of
Brunswick’s fraudulent concealment claim. Without establishing that duty, Brunswick cannot
prove fraudulent concealment as a means to vacate the parties’ settlement agreement.
¶ 35 We are also not persuaded by the other arguments Brunswick raises on appeal. First,
Brunswick argues that it “did not know all of the material facts regarding the jury note until after
the settlement” and this court should rescind the settlement based on mistake. Brunswick
contends that McNabola’s “superior knowledge” regarding the jury note when the settlement was
entered into the record was “material information” it did not have at the time.
¶ 36 However, any mistake made would have been a unilateral one since Judge Lynch found
that plaintiffs’ attorney McNabola was aware he had prior knowledge of the jury note. “A
unilateral mistake is insufficient to invalidate an agreement compromising and settling a disputed
claim.” Cole Taylor Bank v. Cole Taylor Bank, 224 Ill. App. 3d 696, 708 (1992). A court of
equity, however, may rescind an agreement at the request of one party, based on a material
mistake of fact, if it can be done “without doing injustice to the other party.” McCracken
Contracting Co. v. R.L. DePrizio & Associates, Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 680, 686 (1984).
“Recission of a contract refers to cancellation of that contract, so as to restore the parties to the
status quo ante, the status before they entered into the contract. [Citation.]” Hassan, 408 Ill. App.
- 13 ­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
3d at 353. To rescind a contract based on mistake, a party must show (1) the mistake is material
to the transaction, (2) it did not result from lack of diligence, (3) it is of such grave consequence
that enforcement would be unconscionable, and (4) the other party can “be placed in statu quo”
or its precontract position. McCracken Contracting Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d at 686. Where the
parties cannot be placed in the status quo ante, a claim for rescission based upon mistake is
properly dismissed. Wilkonson v. Yovetich, 249 Ill. App. 3d 439, 446 (1993).
¶ 37 Brunswick contends that if this court rescinds the settlement, a judgment on the verdict is
the status quo ante because “[a]bsent Agee’s, McNabola’s and Degnan’s misconduct in hiding
material information from Brunswick, no settlement would have occurred and the jury would
have announced its unanimous verdict in favor of Brunswick on June 9.” We disagree. Returning
plaintiffs to the status quo ante means placing plaintiffs in their position “existing at the time the
contract was made.” U.S. Minerals & Mining, Inc. v. Licensed Processors, Ltd., 194 Ill. App. 3d
428, 433 (1990). No jury verdict existed when McNabola informed Patitucci that plaintiffs
accepted Brunswick’s $25 million offer, nor when the parties entered their settlement in the court
record. At that time, the parties had presented closing arguments where McNabola requested
$103 million in damages for plaintiffs, Patitucci had offered plaintiffs $25 million to settle amid
the uncertainty of the jury verdict, and the jury was in deliberations. Plaintiffs cannot be placed
in this presettlement position because the jury was allowed to deliberate to verdict after the
parties settled. Both parties now have knowledge that the jury had reached a verdict in favor of
Brunswick based on the evidence presented at trial, information that did not exist presettlement.
¶ 38 Furthermore, we find that rescission of the settlement would do an injustice to plaintiffs,
whom Judge Lynch found had “clean hands” in the jury note matter and formed their intent to
accept the settlement offer prior to Agee’s 3:52 p.m. call to McNabola. In fact, had McNabola
- 14 ­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
relayed the acceptance of Brunswick’s offer immediately after plaintiffs informed him of it at
3:40 p.m., the parties would have entered into a valid settlement prior to the court receiving the
jury note at approximately 3:50 p.m., with no mistake as grounds for rescission. For these
reasons, we decline to apply this equitable remedy here.
¶ 39 Brunswick also argues that Judge Budzinski’s clerk, Agee, “an extension of the judge
herself,” showed a bias in favor of plaintiffs and deprived Brunswick of its due process right to a
fair trial before an impartial tribunal. Brunswick contends this due process violation also
deprived them of property in the form of its “$25 million dollar property interest in the
settlement funds.” However, at the hearing before Judge O’Hara, Brunswick argued that “[w]e
have always contended that Mr. McNabola and Ms. Agee conspired together, there’s conspiracy
to deny due process rights.” This is not the same issue Brunswick argues on appeal. Also, the
record does not show that Brunswick raised the property interest issue before the trial court.
Issues not raised in the trial court are deemed forfeited and may not be raised for the first time on
appeal. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536 (1996).
¶ 40 In summary, we find that under the facts of this case McNabola did not have a duty to
inform Brunswick about the jury note. Therefore, the settlement which the trial court entered into
the record was enforceable, and Judge O’Hara properly vacated Judge Lynch’s prior order as
well as all orders inconsistent with enforcement of the settlement. We emphasize that our
determination does not mean we in any way condone inappropriate conduct by lawyers or court
clerks, as avenues do exist to address violations. We determine only that the recourse Brunswick
seeks in this appeal is not supported by the law.
¶ 41 Due to our disposition of this appeal, we need not consider Brunswick’s argument that
plaintiffs cannot benefit from a settlement fraudulently procured by their attorney or Brunswick’s
- 15 ­
Nos. 1-17-0181 & 1-17-0646, Consolidated
contention that it is entitled to entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict or, alternatively, a new
trial.
¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 43 Affirmed.
¶ 44 JUSTICE MIKVA, specially concurring:
¶ 45 I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case but would affirm on the basis
relied upon by Judge O’Hara and argued by the parties on appeal: that there could be no
fraudulent inducement or other basis for vacating the parties’ settlement because all material
information was disclosed prior to Brunswick moving to have the settlement placed on the
record. As Judge Lynch noted following the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the parties do not
dispute that plaintiffs decided to accept the $25 million offer prior to plaintiffs’ counsel learning
of the jury’s note. And, with full knowledge of the content of that note and the time that it had
been sent, counsel for Brunswick was present when the parties jointly moved to have the
settlement entered in the record. I would not reach the issue of whether a claim for fraudulent
inducement may ever be maintained based on a lawyer’s duty, under the applicable rules of court
and professional conduct, to disclose to opposing counsel that he or she has engaged in ex parte
conversation with the court or a member of the trial judge’s staff.
- 16 ­