Stanphill v. Ortberg , 2020 IL App (2d) 190769 ( 2020 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2020.12.29
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Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2020 IL App (2d) 190769Appellate Court ZACHARY STANPHILL, as Administrator of the Estate of Keith
Caption Stanphill, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LORI ORTBERG,
Individually, and as an Agent of Rockford Memorial Hospital, d/b/a
Rockford Memorial Health Systems, and ROCKFORD MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL, d/b/a Rockford Memorial Health Systems, Defendants-
Appellees.
District & No. Second District
No. 2-19-0769
Filed April 28, 2020
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 14-L-35;
Review the Hon. Donna R. Honzel, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Lori A. Vanderlaan and James F. Best, of Best, Vanderlaan &
Appeal Harrington, of Naperville, for appellant.
Hugh C. Griffin, of Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC, and Laura G.
Postilion, of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., both of Chicago,
for appellees.
Panel JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Jorgenson and Bridges concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The plaintiff, Zachary Stanphill, as administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Keith
Stanphill (Keith), obtained a general jury verdict of $1,495,151 against the defendants, Lori
Ortberg and Rockford Memorial Hospital. Based on the jury’s response to a special
interrogatory, however, the circuit court of Winnebago County overturned the general verdict
and entered judgment in the defendants’ favor. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s
judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the general
verdict. Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2017 IL App (2d) 161086 (Stanphill I), aff’d, 2018 IL 122974.
On remand, the plaintiff sought interest on the judgment, accruing from the date the jury
returned its general verdict. The trial court, however, found that interest started accruing on the
date this court entered its judgment. The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order. We
affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2005, Ortberg performed a suicide screening of Keith and determined that he was not at
imminent risk of harming himself. Nine days after that screening, Keith killed himself. The
plaintiff filed a wrongful death and survival action against Ortberg and Rockford Memorial
Hospital, her employer. On June 2, 2016, following a jury trial, the jury returned a general
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor and awarded $1,495,151 in damages. The jury, however, also
answered in the negative a special interrogatory that asked whether Ortberg could reasonably
foresee that Keith would commit suicide nine days after his meeting with her. The trial court
overturned the general verdict and entered judgment in the defendants’ favor, based on the
special interrogatory answer.
¶4 On October 31, 2017, we reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with directions
that the trial court enter judgment for the plaintiff on the $1,495,151 general verdict. Id. On
December 28, 2018, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this court’s decision. Stanphill v.
Ortberg, 2018 IL 122974.
¶5 On May 2, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for entry of judgment against the defendants
in an amount that included interest accruing from June 2, 2016—the date on which the jury
had returned the general verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants responded that interest should
not begin to accrue until October 31, 2017—the date on which this court ordered the entry of
judgment on the general verdict. On August 6, 2019, following a hearing, the trial court found
that the interest did not accrue until October 31, 2017, because that was the first time that any
court had ordered the entry of judgment on the general verdict. Accordingly, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the general verdict and also awarded interest
accrued from October 31, 2017, in the amount of $155,544.18. The trial court further found
that the defendants had satisfied the entire judgment. The plaintiff thereafter filed a timely
notice of appeal.
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¶6 II. ANALYSIS
¶7 On appeal, the sole issue that we are confronted with is whether interest began to accrue
on the date the jury returned the general verdict in favor of the plaintiff or the date this court
ordered the entry of judgment on the general verdict. This issue is governed by section 2-1303
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2018)), which provides in pertinent
part:
“When judgment is entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be
computed *** from the time when made or rendered to the time of entering judgment
upon the same, and included in the judgment. *** The judgment debtor may by tender
of payment of judgment, costs and interest accrued to the date of tender, stop the further
accrual of interest on such judgment notwithstanding the prosecution of an appeal, or
other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the judgment.”
¶8 When reviewing a statute, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the legislature. The plain meaning of the language in the statute provides the best indication of
legislative intent. “Where the statutory language is clear, the court must give it effect without
resorting to other aids of construction.” Puleo v. Topel, 368 Ill. App. 3d 63, 67 (2006).
¶9 Our supreme court has determined that the purpose of section 2-1303 is to “preserve[ ] the
value of the liquidated obligation by compensating the judgment creditor for delays in
payment.” Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 157
Ill. 2d 282, 295 (1993). In other words, “interest is neither a penalty nor a bonus, but instead a
preservation of the economic value of an award from diminution caused by delay.” Id. at 301.
Further, the application of interest under section 2-1303 is mandatory, so a trial court has no
discretion to refrain from imposing interest upon a money judgment. Browning, Ektelon
Division v. Williams, 348 Ill. App. 3d 830, 833 (2004).
¶ 10 We first consider whether the jury’s general verdict constituted a verdict for purposes of
section 2-1303. In answering this question, we find instructive our supreme court’s decision in
People v. Almo, 108 Ill. 2d 54 (1985). There, the defendant was charged with murder. The trial
court submitted verdict forms to the jury on both murder and voluntary manslaughter. Id. at
60. The trial court instructed the jury that, if it found the defendant guilty on one of those
charges, it “ ‘need’ ” not return a verdict on the other charge. Id. at 61. The jury then returned
verdicts finding the defendant guilty of both charges. Id. Determining that the jury’s verdicts
were inconsistent, the trial court did not accept them. Instead, the trial court told the jury to
continue its deliberations and instructed that if it found the defendant guilty of one of the
charges, it “must” not return a verdict on the other charge. Id. The jury then returned a verdict
of guilty on the charge of murder, and the trial court accepted it. The defendant appealed,
arguing that the trial was over the moment the verdict forms were returned by the jury with the
word “guilty” written on the voluntary-manslaughter verdict form and that anything that took
place thereafter was a nullity. Id. at 63.
¶ 11 On review, the supreme court rejected the defendant’s argument as contrary to Illinois law.
The supreme court explained:
“ ‘The finding of a jury does not become a verdict until it has been received,
accepted by the court and entered of record [Citations.]’ (People v. Wilson[, 51 Ill. 2d
302, 309 (1972)].) The principle of People v. Wilson applies to this case. The trial judge
is responsible for the conduct and progress of the trial through all of its stages, from
pretrial through final recording of the verdict. When the jury has reached a verdict, the
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jury foreman tenders the verdict forms to the trial judge. It is then his duty to review
the verdict and to determine whether it is proper in both form and substance. In this
case, the trial judge received the verdicts and, upon reading them, realized that the
convictions of murder and voluntary manslaughter were inconsistent.” (Emphases
added.) Id.The supreme court concluded that the trial court properly had the jury continue its deliberations
and that the trial court’s acceptance of the eventual murder verdict was not improper. Id. at 64.
¶ 12 From Almo, we learn two things. First, as the Almo court explicitly states, the jury’s finding
is not a verdict until the trial court accepts it. Id. at 63. Second, the jury’s finding that leads to
a verdict is often referred to as a verdict as well. See id. However, the fact that a jury’s finding
may be referred to as a verdict does not make it a verdict in the sense that it has been received
and accepted by the trial court and entered of record. Id.
¶ 13 Here, the jury returned a general verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. However, since the trial
court did not accept it, it did not become a verdict. See id. Thus, interest did not begin to accrue
until October 31, 2017, when this court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with
directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the general verdict. The trial court therefore
properly determined that interest did not begin to accrue until October 31, 2017.
¶ 14 We note that our determination is consistent with the decision of the Appellate Court, Third
District, in Owens v. Stokoe, 170 Ill. App. 3d 179 (1988) (Owens II). There, the jury returned
a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor for $40,000. Owens v. Stokoe, 140 Ill. App. 3d 355, 356 (1985)
(Owens I), aff’d, 115 Ill. 2d 177 (1986). However, the jury also determined that the plaintiff
was 75% contributorily negligent. Id. As such, the trial court entered judgment in the plaintiff’s
favor for $10,000. Id. On appeal, the Owens I court reversed the contributory negligence
finding and entered judgment of $40,000 for the plaintiff. Id. at 361. On remand, the trial court
ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to interest on the entire $40,000 from the time of the original
jury verdict. Owens II, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 181. The Owens II court reversed that ruling,
determining that, when an appellate court increases an award granted in a trial court, “interest
on the increased portion of the award is available only after the appellate court or the trial court
on remand enters judgment.” Id.
¶ 15 We also determine that all of the cases the plaintiff relies upon are distinguishable from the
case at bar. In those cases, there was a verdict accepted by the trial court with judgment entered
thereon or an award to the plaintiff ordered by a court, an arbitrator, or another adjudicatory
body. See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 157 Ill. 2d at 299 (interest began to accrue
when trial court incorporated jury’s verdict into its judgment order); Wirth v. Industrial
Comm’n, 63 Ill. 2d 237, 241 (1976) (interest began to accrue when arbitrator filed his decision,
and it did not stop when award was set aside under the Workmen’s Compensation Act’s
intermediate review procedures but reinstated after appeal to the supreme court); Proctor
Community Hospital v. Industrial Comm’n, 50 Ill. 2d 7, 9-10 (1971) (interest began to accrue
when Industrial Commission awarded compensation to the petitioner, and it did not stop when
the trial court set the award aside and trial court’s decision was later set aside by the supreme
court); Gnat v. Richardson, 378 Ill. 626, 627 (1942) (interest began to accrue on jury verdict
when trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and it did not stop when trial court
granted the defendant a judgment n.o.v. that was subsequently reversed on appeal); Duffek v.
Vanderhei, 104 Ill. App. 3d 422, 425 (1982) (same).
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¶ 16 Relying on Duffek, the plaintiff next contends that we should find that interest began to
accrue when the jury rendered its general verdict because the defendants had the opportunity
to pay the amount of the verdict and preclude the accrual of interest. Duffek, 104 Ill. App. 3d
at 425. However, we have already found Duffek distinguishable because there the trial court
did accept the jury’s verdict. See id. at 422.
¶ 17 We also reject the plaintiff’s argument that, to stop the accrual of interest, the defendants
should have tendered payment to him immediately after the jury returned its finding of liability
because the defendants should have reasonably foreseen that this court would reverse the trial
court’s decision. We believe that requiring the defendants to anticipate the reversal of a
judgment in their favor is a difficult and unfair burden to impose upon them. See Owens II,
170 Ill. App. 3d at 183 (it would be inequitable to expect the defendant to tender payment to
cover a nonexistent judgment). Further, imposing that burden on the defendants would be
particularly inappropriate in this case, where there were conflicts in the existing case law as to
whether the special interrogatory the trial court gave the jury in Stanphill I was proper. The
conflict in authority at the time is evident from the supreme court’s decision to review our
opinion in Stanphill I. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) (supreme court has discretion to
grant petitions for leave to appeal and will do so if it believes there are conflicts of decisions
of the Illinois Appellate Court that need to be addressed). As both this court and the supreme
court found that the underlying law was not clear and that the plaintiff’s argument was not
clearly meritorious, it would not be reasonable for the defendants to anticipate that the trial
court’s decision in Stanphill I would be reversed.
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is
affirmed.
¶ 20 Affirmed.
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