People v. Ramirez , 2023 IL App (3d) 200470-U ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 200470-UOrder filed March 21, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-20-0470
v. ) Circuit No. 18 CF 697
)
JOSE GUADALUPE RAMIREZ, ) Honorable
) Katherine S. Gorman,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s imposition of a mandatory life sentence on a 21-year-old defendant
was not unconstitutional as applied to him, and the trial court did not err in denying
defendant’s request to appoint an expert for sentencing proceedings or his request
to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Affirmed.
¶2 The trial court convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(1) (West 2018)) for the murders of his adoptive parents and sentenced him to mandatory life
imprisonment without parole (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2020)). Defendant raises three
arguments on appeal. First, he argues his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to
him, alleging the court failed to consider his youth, traumatic and abusive upbringing, mental
health issues, and potential for rehabilitation. Second, defendant argues the court erred in refusing
to appoint an expert for sentencing proceedings, which precluded him from presenting evidence
to support his as-applied constitutional challenges. Third, he argues the court erred in denying his
as-applied constitutional challenges without allowing him to develop the record pursuant to People
v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932. His second and third arguments are made in the alternative to his first
argument if we find the record is insufficient to rule on his first argument. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On October 28, 2018, defendant called 911 to report his parents missing and that someone
had broken into their house. Police entered the home and saw blood throughout. The television
was missing from the living room. Dresser drawers and jewelry boxes were open in the parent’s
bedroom. Police noted large bloodstains on the floor of the bedroom and all sheets and bedding
had been removed from the bed. Defendant later confessed to police that he and his codefendant
had snuck into the house, where defendant then maced his parents, hit them over the head with a
bat, and stabbed them in the stomach and throat. They wrapped the bodies in a tent and a tarp,
loaded them into his father’s car, and threw them off a bridge.
¶5 Defendant led police to the purported dump site in the Kewanee area, approximately 45
minutes away from the house. Police did not find the bodies there. The bodies were found two
days later in the Spoon River, 12 minutes away from the house. The victims were wearing pajamas.
The cause of death for both victims was multiple blunt-force and sharp-force injuries. Defendant’s
father had bruises all over his torso and head area, stab wounds to the torso, slice marks to the
throat, skin tears in the head, and his right ear was destroyed. Defendant’s mother had a single stab
wound under her right armpit, multiple stab wounds or slices on her throat, and skin tears on the
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top of her head. The coroner’s autopsy revealed the time between onset of injuries and death was
minutes.
¶6 Police recovered the missing television and other items in the crawlspace at defendant’s
friend’s house where defendant had been staying. While being interviewed at the station, defendant
told police “the why” was not important. He felt remorse for getting his friend involved, but not
for the murders themselves, because he felt that he could not live while his parents were still alive.
He was 21½ years old at the time of the murders.
¶7 Before trial, Dr. Terry Killian evaluated defendant’s fitness to stand trial and his sanity at
the time of the offense. He reported the evaluation was thorough, as defendant was facing a
possible sentence of life in prison without parole. Defense counsel did not provide the State or trial
court with a copy of Dr. Killian’s report prior to trial. The report included the following history.
Defendant was removed from his biological mother’s care when he was three years old due to
physical and sexual abuse by the mother’s boyfriends. He was abused in foster care. The victims
adopted defendant when he was eight years old. Defendant began seeing a therapist shortly after
the adoption and continued to see her until two months before the murders. The therapist diagnosed
him with reactive attachment disorder (RAD). Her therapy notes specified a concern for his
adoptive mother’s safety at home. Defendant attended a residential therapeutic high school out of
state, returning to Illinois for his senior year. Dr. Killian noted defendant’s childhood was fraught
with abuse but concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial and sane at the time of the offense.
¶8 The trial court found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder after a three-
day bench trial. After the trial, defendant filed several posttrial motions: (1) a motion asking the
court to appoint a mental health expert for sentencing; (2) a motion to declare the mandatory
natural life imprisonment statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 2020)) unconstitutional under the
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United States and Illinois constitutions as applied to defendant, due to his age and mental health
issues; and (3) an amended motion requesting a hearing pursuant to Harris, 2018 IL 121932, and
asking the court to appoint Dr. Killian to prepare a report and testify at the requested hearing. When
these motions were denied, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, averring that the court erred
in denying defendant’s request for an expert for sentencing purposes.
¶9 Defendant sought an expert to evaluate defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI)
and history for the purpose of mitigation. The State argued that Dr. Killian had already examined
defendant, and although the State was never provided a copy of the report, defense counsel was in
possession of the psychiatric evaluation and presumably would call Dr. Killian to testify at
sentencing if the report contained mitigating information. Defendant argued Dr. Killian’s purpose
for initially evaluating defendant was not for mitigation, but for fitness and sanity. He wanted to
find a qualified individual to evaluate for mitigation at a more economical rate than Dr. Killian.
Defendant later asked the court to appoint Dr. Killian, as Dr. Killian could probably use his report
for the purposes of mitigation, and it would likely be quicker and cheaper than hiring a different
expert. He asked for funds not to exceed $3000. The State objected because Dr. Killian already
wrote a report that the State had not seen.
¶ 10 On January 27, 2020, the trial court issued a written order denying defendant’s motion to
declare the sentencing statute unconstitutional. The trial court wrote,
“Both the Unites States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have
‘unmistakenly instructed that youth matters in sentencing.’ Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 578-579 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012); People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 1.
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The Supreme Court has never extended its reasoning to young adults age 18
or over. In fact, the Supreme Court has clearly and consistently drawn the line
between juveniles and adults for the purpose of sentencing is 18.
Further, claims for extending Miller to offenders 18 years of age or older
have been repeatedly rejected. United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1039-40
(10th Cir. 2017); U.S. v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2013); People v.
Argeta, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 245-246 (Ct. App. 2012).
In the instant case, the Defendant was 21 ½ at the time of the offense. The
Defendant’s claim fails both generally and as applied.”
¶ 11 Before sentencing, the court received and reviewed the PSI, Dr. Killian’s pretrial forensic
psychiatric evaluation, and Dr. Killian’s proffered testimony. The State moved to strike Dr.
Killian’s proffered testimony, arguing that his testimony asked the court to disregard the law. The
trial court allowed the testimony, stating it would address the proffered testimony in its sentencing
remarks.
¶ 12 At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that, because defendant was over 18 years of
age and had murdered two people, he was subject to mandatory life imprisonment without parole.
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2020). The State offered no evidence in aggravation but
presented a victim impact statement. Defendant offered no formal evidence in mitigation but
presented letters in his support, which stated defendant was publicly humiliated and emotionally
abused by his adoptive mother, and his actions were not typical of him. Defendant stated in
allocution,
“I can’t excuse the actions that I have done, but I feel like that if I’m given
life without the possibility of parole, I’m being denied the chance that I cannot
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prove to people that I can change, but I also realize that actions always have
consequences, whether good or bad, and whatever consequences you give me
today, I will completely respect those.”
¶ 13 The trial court considered the PSI, trial evidence, victim impact statement, statement in
allocution, arguments of counsel, statutory and nonstatutory factors in aggravation and mitigation,
defendant’s history and character, and seriousness of the offense. In ruling, the trial court found,
“In aggravation, Mr. Ramirez, I sat through the trial and I watched you when
you were being interrogated, and I watched you confess to killing your parents with
little to absolutely no emotion, with no remorse, with no concern of the terror, the
fear, and the betrayal that they must have felt while you pepper sprayed them, beat
them, and then stabbed them.
***
One of the most disconcerting events—in my involvement in what occurred
and then my role in this case has been one of the most disconcerting things I’ve
ever seen. The legislature has set out what happens to people that do things that you
did.
Mr. Ramirez, I read every word of those letters from people that knew you
before, and I read every word of the terrible things that happened to you before your
parents ever got involved, and through those things, I have compassion for you that
you as a child had to suffer that and it shouldn’t have happened, period.
But you were given an opportunity with your parents that lots of children
that endured things like you did would have loved to have had *** and instead of
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working it out, you acted out in a manner that was so vicious to the people that
altered the course of their entire lives for you.
***
There’s lots of children that have difficult lives, and there is not one instance
where what you did can be put into context or explained.
With respect to the proffered testimony of Terry Kilian, whether I consider
that testimony or I don’t, it does not change the outcome of what you have done.
You are correct when you indicated that there are consequences for your
actions, and the fact that you were approximately 21 and a half years of age does
not in any way, shape, or form change the analysis of what should be done pursuant
to statute because that age has been considered by many courts along the way.”
Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole.
¶ 14 Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence, arguing it was excessive and unconstitutional
as applied to him. The court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Defendant’s primary contention is that his sentence of mandatory life without parole is
unconstitutional as applied to him, and the record is sufficiently developed to allow this court to
review his claim. Alternatively, he contends, if the record is not sufficient to review his claim, we
should remand the matter for new sentencing proceedings because the trial court erroneously
refused to appoint an expert for sentencing and failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 17 Because defendant’s alternative argument relies on the premise that the record is
insufficient to review his claim, we must first determine whether the record is sufficient.
¶ 18 A. Completeness of the Record
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¶ 19 “All as-applied constitutional challenges are, by definition, dependent on the specific facts
and circumstances of the person raising the challenge. Therefore, it is paramount that the record
be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate
review.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 39. “A court is not capable of making an ‘as applied’
determination of unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings
of fact. Without an evidentiary record, any finding that a statute is unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is
premature.” Id. A defendant must present an as-applied constitutional challenge to the trial court
in order to create a sufficiently developed record; however, there is a very narrow exception to that
rule for an as-applied claim pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) for which the
record is sufficiently developed for appellate review. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 32. In
Holman, the supreme court found the record sufficient to decide the defendant’s Miller claim, and
it therefore addressed the merits of the defendant’s claim in the interest of judicial economy.
Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 32.
¶ 20 Here, defendant presented his as-applied constitutional challenge both before and after he
was sentenced. In his amended motion to declare the sentencing statute unconstitutional, filed
before sentencing, defendant asserted he was 21½ years old at the time of the offense with a long
history of mental health diagnosis and issues; the status of his mental health treatment played a
part in the events leading to his conviction; and “in light of developments in the areas of law,
medicine, psychology, and science, to conclude that someone who is the age of the defendant is
beyond redemption and is incapable of rehabilitation violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution as well as the Illinois Constitution.” Defendant again raised this claim in his motion
to reconsider the sentence.
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¶ 21 Dr. Killian’s forensic psychiatric evaluation report, dated August 24, 2019, specifically
referenced the issue of mitigation as applied to defendant. Further, Dr. Killian’s proffered
testimony addressed the issue of appropriate punishment considering defendant’s RAD diagnosis,
his psychological and social history, his childhood abuse, his age, and his potential for
rehabilitation. Thus, we find the record to be sufficiently complete regarding defendant’s youth,
abusive upbringing, mental health issues, and his potential for rehabilitation. Accordingly, we
address the merits of defendant’s claim in the interest of judicial economy. Id.¶ 22 B. As-Applied Constitutional Challenge
¶ 23 Whether a sentence is constitutional is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. People
v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 11. “Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging
the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity.” People v.
Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22. “A court must construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality
if reasonably possible.” Id. “A defendant who has an adequate opportunity to present evidence in
support of an as-applied, constitutional claim will have his claim adjudged on the record he
presents.” Id.¶ 24 “By definition, an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular
circumstances and facts of the individual defendant or petitioner. Therefore, it is paramount that
the record be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of
appellate review.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37. The eighth amendment prohibits,
among other things, “cruel and unusual punishments” (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and applies to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 15. A statute
may be deemed unconstitutionally disproportionate in violation of the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11) if the punishment for the offense is
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cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller).
¶ 25 The emerging adult theory proposes to apply Miller protections to young adults over the
age of 18 because recent research in brain development suggests the brain and maturity continue
to develop into a person’s mid-twenties. However, “the Supreme Court has clearly and consistently
drawn the line between juveniles and adults for the purpose of sentencing at the age of 18.” Harris,
2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58. Claims for extending Miller protections to offenders 18 years of age or
older have been repeatedly rejected. Id. ¶ 61. But juvenile defendants may still be sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole if the trial court determines the defendant’s conduct shows
irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility
of rehabilitation. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46. The trial court may make that decision only after
considering the defendant’s youth and attendant characteristics, which include:
“(1) the juvenile defendant's chronological age at the time of the offense
and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant's family and home
environment; (3) the juvenile defendant's degree of participation in the homicide
and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the
juvenile defendant's incompetence, including his inability to deal with police
officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the
juvenile defendant's prospects for rehabilitation.” Id.¶ 26 Defendant maintains the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without considering
his age (21½ years), history of abuse, mental health issues, or capacity for rehabilitation. Defendant
asks us to vacate his sentence in light of the recent advances in adolescent brain development
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research and Illinois courts’ recognition of the evolving standards of decency in sentencing young
adults to life sentences, where there is no opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation even after
decades in prison.
¶ 27 The State argues we should reject any claim that defendant’s sentence violates the eighth
amendment under Miller because such a challenge is not cognizable for adult offenders over the
age of 18. Even so, the State maintains the sentencing hearing was “Miller compliant” because the
court did in fact consider defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances. We agree with the State
on both points.
¶ 28 We decline to extend Miller and its progeny to a 21-year-old defendant and reiterate that,
for Miller purposes, the line between juveniles and adults is 18. However, Illinois courts have “not
foreclosed emerging adult defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising an as applied
proportionate penalties clause challenge [under the Illinois constitution] to life sentences based on
the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL
127273, ¶ 87. “Our supreme court has twice acknowledged that young adults—at least those who
were 20 years of age or younger at the time of their crimes—may still rely on the evolving
neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller to support as-applied challenges
to life sentences brought pursuant to the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. People v. Daniels,
2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 25; see Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (19-year-old defendant
sentenced to a term of natural life in prison); Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 (defendant, aged
18 years and 3 months, sentenced to 76 years in prison). “The evolving science on brain
development may support such claims at some time in the future, but for now individuals who are
21 years or older when they commit an offense are adults for purposes of a Miller claim.” People
v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 33. Even assuming a 21½ year old defendant can raise
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an as-applied proportionate-penalties challenge to his or her sentence, we conclude defendant’s
claim lacks merit.
¶ 29 Here, Dr. Killian focused on defendant’s individual characteristics, rather than the
emerging adult theory, and suggested that theory ignores situations where there exist clear and
well-documented reasons why there may be a further delay in brain development, as in defendant’s
case. Dr. Killian opined “a sentence of life without parole is not appropriate for Mr. Ramirez under
the particular circumstances of the case.” The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) classifies RAD as a “trauma and stress-related condition of early childhood
caused by social neglect and maltreatment.” According to Dr. Killian, defendant fits the pattern of
RAD “due to the physical and sexual abuse that he received from a string of adults in the home of
his mother and continuing with the abuse that he continued to receive in the foster care system, all
of which had a profound effect on him.”
¶ 30 In addressing the issue of mitigation, Dr. Killian wrote, “Mr. Ramirez obviously suffered
severe trauma in his childhood, being taken from his biological mother because of chronic abuse
*** In addition, Mr. Ramirez described a lot of emotional abuse from his adoptive parents.” He
believed defendant could rehabilitate himself to the point of being a functional member of society
and not pose a threat. But he further opined that defendant is currently too young to assess how he
may be in 20, 30, or even 40 years. Although predictions of future human behaviors are difficult
to make, the following factors weigh in defendant’s favor: (1) he had virtually no history of
criminal behavior; (2) there is very little indication of violence with other people; and (3) statistics
show that aggressive, violent behavior decreases dramatically by the age of 40. Dr. Killian
concluded, “it would be my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it would be
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wrong to incarcerate Mr. Ramirez for life without parole and find that there is no likelihood of
rehabilitation based on the facts and circumstances of this case.”
¶ 31 During the forensic psychiatric exam, defendant told Dr. Killian he killed his adoptive
parents “because they were really horrible people, to put it bluntly.” Dr. Killian asked why it was
necessary to kill them, even if they were terrible, and defendant answered, “I tried suicide because
I couldn’t stand being with them and I realized that they’re the ones who should be dead.” He told
Dr. Killian he could not live while his adoptive parents were still alive. Dr. Killian also asked
defendant whether he would have still murdered his adoptive parents, knowing he would likely
get caught, and defendant stated yes, he would have still murdered his parents, but only if his
codefendant was not going to be charged. He felt guilty about his codefendant being caught. When
asked if he had any thoughts about hurting anyone else, defendant said, “There have always been
two sides of me; I love helping people and I will do random acts of kindness, and then sometimes,
for no reason, I want to beat somebody. It’s like the two sides of my brain are fighting with each
other.” Dr. Killian’s proffered testimony states, “I am not suggesting that he needn’t/shouldn’t be
punished. I believe he should go to prison for a long time.”
¶ 32 Defendant’s allegation that the trial court failed to consider his youth, traumatic and
abusive upbringing, significant mental health issues, and potential of rehabilitation is flatly
contradicted by the record. The trial court reviewed several documents, including Dr. Killian’s
report and proffered testimony, which contained discussion of defendant’s individual
characteristics, such as his age, traumatic and abusive upbringing, mental health issues, and
potential for rehabilitation, and it specifically expressed its compassion for defendant’s traumatic
upbringing. But “our supreme court has repeatedly held that evidence of a defendant’s mental or
psychological impairments may not be inherently mitigating, or may not be mitigating enough to
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overcome the evidence in aggravation.” People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 192289, ¶ 57. In
this case, defendant enlisted a friend to help him murder his adoptive parents. The two discussed
murdering his adoptive parents several times and discussed various methods over a period of
months. They went to a hardware store to purchase items in preparation days before the murder.
Defendant waited until his parents slept, entered their home, maced them, beat them over the head
with a bat, stabbed them in the stomach and throat, inflicting multiple blunt-force and sharp-force
injuries that killed them within minutes, and then wrapped their bodies and dumped them off a
bridge. He attempted to clean the blood, but then staged the home to look like the scene of a
burglary. He called 911 to report his parents missing days later. One police officer testified
defendant showed more concern for a missing cat than for his missing parents. He confessed to
the murders, but then misled police about the location of the bodies. Even considering defendant’s
individual characteristics, the mandatory sentence of life without parole was not so wholly
disproportionate to the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community. Leon Miller, 202
Ill. 2d at 238. Accordingly, we decline to find the sentencing statute unconstitutional as it applies
to defendant.
¶ 33 C. Defendant’s Alternative Arguments
¶ 34 Because we have concluded the record is sufficient to review defendant’s as-applied
proportionate-penalties claim, we need not address defendant’s alternative arguments, which rest
on the premise that the record is not sufficient.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
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