Longanecker v. East Moline School District No. 37 Board of Education , 2020 IL App (3d) 150890 ( 2020 )

2020 IL App (3d) 150890
Opinion filed June 3, 2020
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2020
JENNIFER LONGANECKER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Rock Island County, Illinois,
)
v. ) Appeal No. 3-15-0890
) Circuit No. 15-MR-35
EAST MOLINE SCHOOL DISTRICT )
NO. 37 AND ITS BOARD OF EDUCATION, ) Honorable
THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ) William S. McNeal,
EDUCATION, and ROBERT L. AUGUSTO, ) Judge, Presiding.
in His Official Capacity as Hearing Officer, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Carter concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice O’Brien dissented, with opinion.
____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Defendant East Moline School District No. 37’s Board of Education (Board)
dismissed the plaintiff, Jennifer Longanecker, a tenured fifth grade teacher at Glenview Middle
School (Glenview), for misconduct that the Board found warranted termination and was not
remediable. The Board rejected the recommendations and some of the factual findings
previously made by a hearing officer, who found that the charges against Longanecker had not
been proven and recommended that she be retained as a teacher.
¶2 Longanecker appealed her dismissal by filing a complaint for administrative
review in the circuit court of Rock Island County. Longanecker argued that the Board had
exceeded its authority under section 24-12 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 2014))
by (1) rejecting the hearing officer’s factual findings, which were not against the manifest weight
of the evidence, and (2) rejecting the hearing officer’s recommendation to reinstate Longanecker.
The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. The circuit court found that the Board’s decision
was the final administrative decision presented for review, that the Board had the statutory
authority to modify or reject the hearing officer’s findings, and that the Board’s factual findings
and final decision were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶3 This appeal followed.
¶4 FACTS
¶5 The following factual summary is taken from the testimony and other evidence
presented at the August 2014 hearing before the hearing officer.
¶6 Longanecker taught at Glenview from 2003 until her dismissal on March 13,
2014. At the time of her dismissal, Longanecker was tenured.
¶7 Beginning on January 29, 2014, Angela Mitchell, a student at Western Illinois
University, was assigned to Longanecker’s classroom as a “block” teacher. Mitchell spent
approximately three hours per day in Longanecker’s classroom observing and “practice
teaching.”
¶8 On February 27, 2014, Gaye Dunn, a school counselor at Glenview, delivered
Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) materials to Longanecker’s empty classroom at
2
approximately 9:14 a.m. The ISAT is a standardized assessment the federal government uses to
hold schools accountable pursuant to the No Child Left Behind Act. The ISAT was scheduled to
be administered at Glenview the following week, beginning with “Math Session One” on
Monday, March 3, 2014. Video taken by a security camera confirmed Dunn’s delivery of the
ISAT materials to Longanecker’s empty classroom on the morning of February 27, 2014, and
showed that no one else entered the classroom until Longanecker returned with her students.
¶9 Mitchell testified that, at approximately 10:30 a.m. on February 27, 2014,
Longanecker dismissed her students to go to gym class. After the students left, Longanecker and
Mitchell were in the classroom alone. Longanecker closed the door. According to Mitchell,
Longanecker then turned to the stack of ISAT test booklets on her desk, picked one up off the
top, and said to Mitchell, “[l]et’s look at these. We will go through them.” Longanecker then
opened a seal on the side of the test booklet, tuned to the first page, and began looking at a
Reading session of the test booklet. Longanecker commented to Mitchell that “[t[his is the same
passage that we used last year. These things don’t change.” Longanecker turned a few more
pages in the test booklet and stated to Mitchell that the students would need to know the “main
idea” and the “author’s purpose.” Longanecker pointed to the word “debris” in the test booklet
and said, “we will have to start using that. Throw that ‘debris’ out. Pick up that ‘debris’ off the
floor and throw it in the trash.” Longanecker told Mitchell that “this will work out great because
you won’t have to be here tomorrow.” As Mitchell exited the classroom, Longanecker stated,
“oh, yeah, you don’t have to stay here while I cheat.”
¶ 10 The following day, Mitchell spoke with her student advisor, Kim Moreno, about
Longanecker’s opening the ISAT test booklet. Moreno then called Dr. Ann Gregory, Western
Illinois University’s curriculum supervisor. On March 4, 2014, Gregory called Ronald Harris,
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Glenview’s Principal, and told him that she had been approached by “Angela,” one of the block
students, who had a “moral dilemma” regarding one of her host teachers. Gregory informed
Harris that “Angela” had witnessed a Glenview teacher open an ISAT test booklet. Harris
believed Gregory was referring to Longanecker because Mitchell was the only Western Illinois
University block student he recalled at Glenview. Harris called East Moline School District No.
37 (District) Superintendent Kristin Humphries about the matter. They decided that Harris,
Glenview Assistant Principal Jeff Evans, and East Moline Education Association (EMEA) Co-
President Laura Kalman would go to Longanecker’s classroom and examine her ISAT test
booklets.
¶ 11 Each ISAT test booklet had a unique serial number. When Harris, Evans, and
Kalman arrived at Longanecker’s classroom on March 4, 2014, Harris checked the serial
numbers of each ISAT test booklet in Longanecker’s classroom against a partial list of ISAT test
booklets provided by Dunn. Harris also checked whether the seals on the Reading test sessions of
each ISAT test booklet were intact. Because the Reading test sessions of the ISAT were not
scheduled to begin until March 6, 2014, the Reading test session seals on all ISAT test booklets
should have been intact when Harris checked them. Harris eventually came upon an ISAT test
booklet that had broken seals on all three reading sessions. This test booklet belonged to a
student identified in the record as “Student A.”
¶ 12 The witnesses’ testimony differed as to how Student A’s booklet was discovered.
According to a memorandum prepared by Evans on March 4, 2014, Longanecker found the test
booklet with the broken seal under a stack of newspapers on her desk and brought the booklet to
Harris. However, Longanecker testified that Harris found the test booklet in question in the pile
of booklets he was examining. Longanecker admitted that she brought an ISAT document to
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Harris from her desk, but she claimed that she brought Harris an ISAT Coordination Manual, not
Student A’s test booklet. Kalman testified that Harris found the test booklet with the improperly
broken seals “about halfway through” the pile of booklets he was examining, although she
conceded that she was not sure where the booklet was discovered. 1 According to a memorandum
prepared by Harris on March 5, 2014, Evans found a test booklet on Longanecker’s desk that
was kept separately from the rest of the test booklets. Harris stated that Evans picked up that test
booklet and added it to the pile of booklets that Harris was examining. According to Harris’s
account, when Harris came upon Student A’s test booklet with the broken seals, Evans believed
that this booklet was the one he had discovered on Longanecker’s desk.
¶ 13 Longanecker testified that, during the search of her classroom, she though that she
was being accused of “stealing” ISAT test booklets. However, she admitted saying to Harris, “I
don’t care about your ISAT tests enough to cheat.” In his March 5, 2014, memorandum, Harris
stated that, when he asked Longanecker if she could explain why the seals on Student A’s
booklet were broken, she responded, “I don’t know. Why don’t you ask him?” Thereafter, Evans
brought Longanecker and Kalman to a conference room in the school’s front officer where he
informed Longanecker that she was going to be placed on administrative leave pending an
investigation and that she needed to go home.
¶ 14 Immediately after discovered Student A’s test booklet in Longanecker’s
classroom on March 4, 2014, Harris interviewed Student A in an empty classroom across the hall
from Longanecker’s classroom. No one else was present during the interview. Harris testified
that he told Student A that he was not in trouble and that it was important to be honest. Student A
1
Kalman testified that Harris did not tamper with the seals on Student A’s test booklet and that
the booklet had not come from another classroom.
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told Harris that he did not break the seals on the Reading session of his ISAT test booklet. He
said that he had only broken the seals to the test sessions that had already been conducted (i.e.,
the Math test sessions) and that he knew not the break the seals of other test sessions. In his
March 5, 2014, memorandum, Harris noted that Student A was “very adamant about knowing
the rules of ISAT testing and said that he had ONLY opened the seals of to the 2 math testing
session and only when the directions were given to do so.” 2 Harris believed that Student A was
telling the truth and found him to be “very sincere.” Harris based this belief on his professional
experience with children, on Student A’s record (which did not include deceitful behavior), and
on the fact that Student A had no reason to lie.
¶ 15 When Student A testified at the hearing approximately five months later, he
initially stated that all of the seals on his ISAT test booklet were closed when he first received
the booklet on March 3, 2014, and that he opened two seals that morning. However, he later
testified that he did not remember what he opened. Although Student A initially stated that he
told Harris that he had accidentally opened the seals to the ISAT test booklet, he later testified
that he did not remember what he told Harris. When he was subsequently asked three more times
what he had told Harris, Student A gave no response. Student A also testified that his classmates
told him that he might have caused Longanecker to lose her job because “they [saw] my book
open on her desk.”
¶ 16 On March 6, 2014, the District held a meeting concerning Student A’s ISAT test
booklet. Longanecker, Humphries, and Harris, attended the meeting. Chris Mueller, the District’s
director of human resources, and Joseph Conrad, the Illinois Education Association UniServe
2
Harris apparently did not ask Student A whether all of the seals on the ISAT test booklet were
intact when Student A first received it.
6
director, were also present. Humphries gave Longanecker a copy of a letter outlining his
recommendation to the Board that Longanecker be dismissed and read the letter to Longanecker.
Humphries’s recommendation was based solely upon Longanecker’s alleged misconduct
involving Student A’s ISAT test booklet. Humphries advised Longanecker that he would present
his recommendation to the Board on March 13, 2014.
¶ 17 The following day, Evans and Dunn reviewed a surveillance video that confirmed
that Dunn had delivered ISAT test booklets to Longanecker’s classroom on February 27, 2014, at
9:14 a.m. The “ISAT School Test Booklet Security Checklist” that Dunn used to distribute ISAT
test booklets to teachers indicated that Dunn delivered booklets with security numbers
458790877 through 458790885 to Longanecker’s classroom. Student A’s booklet, which was
discovered in Longanecker’s classroom on March 4, 2014, bore security number 4587910063,
which was not listed on the security checklist as one of the booklets delivered to Longanecker.
¶ 18 On March 11, 2014, Humphries and Harris met with Mitchell. During that
meeting, Mitchell described the February 27, 2014, incident during which Longanecker had
allegedly opened an ISAT test booklet. She also told Humphries and Harris that Longanecker
had improperly guided students to the correct answers during “MAP” (Measures of Academic
Progress) assessment sessions and had instructed Mitchell to do the same. The MAP assessment
is a computer based assessment given to students three times per year in a computer lab. It is
used to monitor student growth, identify areas of need, and make adjustments to student
education if necessary. The MAP proctor handbook expressly prohibits a test proctor from
defining words or providing any hints or clarifications to students taking the assessment.
Mitchell told Humphries and Harris, and later testified, that Longanecker violated this
prohibition during the mid-year MAP testing session. Mitchell testified that, while the students
7
were taking the mid-year MAP assessment, some students asked questions like, “is the answer A
or B?” According to Mitchell, Longanecker would sometimes respond to these questions by
“pick[ing] out two that [the students] should have chosen from” (for example, Longanecker
would respond, “no, it’s B or C”). Mitchell further claimed that, when Mitchell was left alone
with the students during the second day of MAP testing, Longanecker told Mitchell that she
could answer student questions, narrow down answers for students the way Longanecker had, or
define a word for students. The March 11, 2014, meeting with Mitchell was the first time the
District became aware of any improprieties regarding the MAP assessments. After Harris
discussed the matter with Mitchell on March 11, 2014, he drafted a memorandum summarizing
Mitchell’s allegations regarding Longanecker’s improper administration of the MAP testing.
Mitchell’s testimony on this subject before the hearing officer was consistent with Harris’s
memorandum.
¶ 19 LaVonne Peterson, the associate superintendent for curriculum and instruction,
investigated Mitchell’s allegations regarding the MAP assessments. Peterson concluded that an
examination of “RIT scores” (a disaggregation of Longanecker’s students’ scores on the MAP
test) revealed several examples of growth that would not be typical. While only 50% of students
nationwide are expected to meet their growth target, 77.5% of Longanecker’s students made it
halfway to their year-end growth goal by the time of the winter MAP test. Only 62% of other
teachers’ students reached that growth level at the time of the winter test. Moreover, 61% of
Longanecker’s students had already reached their year-end growth goal by the time of the winter
MAP test, whereas only 42% of other teachers’ students had done so. Peterson characterized
these results as an “outlier” that corroborated Mitchell’s allegations about how Longanecker
conducted the MAP tests. Peterson found it “crazy” that Longanecker’s class had an average
8
growth of 10 RITs, as compared to 4 RITs and 6 RITs for two other teacher’s classes. Peterson
testified that, when looking at the group as a whole, the high scores for Longanecker’s students
were a “red flag” that provided “strong evidence” of misconduct, particularly when combined
with Mitchell’s eyewitness testimony. Peterson testified that she believed Mitchell’s account.
¶ 20 When asked during the hearing whether any of the individual score reports for
Longanecker’s students gave him reason to believe that Longanecker or anyone else had
provided inappropriate assistance to the students during MAP testing, Harris responded, “[n]o.”
He also agreed that there was no evidence other than Mitchell’s allegations that Longanecker
provided such inappropriate assistance to her students. However, on redirect examination, Harris
testified that, when analyzing MAP data, he looked at how the class was doing overall and grade
level ability as opposed to individual student scores.
¶ 21 One of Longanecker’s students, who is identified in the record as “Student B,”
also testified at the hearing. Student B was an 11-year-old, fifth grade student who received a 30-
point jump in his Language Arts MAP score between the Fall 2013 and Winter 2014 testing
sessions. Student B testified that he did not remember asking Longanecker any questions about
the MAP test while he was taking it. He stated that he did not need to ask questions because he
knew how to take the test. Student B testified that Mitchell was present when he took the
February 2014 MAP test. According to Student B, neither Mitchell nor anyone else gave him any
help with the answers.
¶ 22 During her March 11, 2014, meeting with Humphries and Harris, Mitchell also
raised concerns regarding Longanecker’s handling of the “Language!” program. “Language!” is
remedial reading program that replaces core instruction for students who need additional support.
Mitchell stated that Longanecker had the students take the Language! program assessments “as a
9
whole” and fill in the bubbles in their test books together until the last few questions, which each
student would answer on his or her own. According to Mitchell, Longanecker rarely taught from
the Language! book, and she told the students to take their Language! books out and open them
on their desks “[i]n case anyone was to walk in” the classroom. Mitchell claimed that
Longanecker performed “practice runs” where she would knock on the classroom door,
pretending to be administration, and the students would open their Language! books. Mitchell
also stated that, during Language! testing sessions, Longanecker would sometimes go over
questions on the board after the test and would have the students change their answers the correct
answers to make it look as if the students had answered the questions correctly. Although
portions of the Language! assessments are designed to be read aloud by the teacher, with the
exception of certain “example” questions, the Language! assessments are not designed to be
answered cooperatively or with the assistance of the teacher.
¶ 23 Longanecker testified that students would not be able to take the Language! tests
on their own. However, she denied giving the students any inappropriate assistance during the
Language! assessments. Longanecker stated that helping children with any type of assessment
would harm the children.
¶ 24 Evans testified that, when he visited Longanecker’s classroom during Language!
sessions, he observed the students singing, clapping, and performing other activities, all of which
were part of the Language! program. Peterson stated that, when she visited Longanecker’s class
during Language! sessions, it was always energetic and the kids were excited and looking
forward to the lesson. However, Peterson noted that she had received complaints from other
teachers and from the District’s Language! consultant that Longanecker had lagged in her
administration of the Language! program.
10
¶ 25 The District charged Longanecker with (1) opening the Reading section of an
ISAT test booklet several days before the Reading test was scheduled, with the intention of
basing her instruction of students on the questions to be administered in the ISAT; (2) helping
students take the 2013-14 MAP tests in a manner that would guide them to the correct response
and instructing Mitchell to guide students to the correct answers during testing; and (3) allowing
or directing students to work on the Language! assessments and fill in answers together as a
whole, with the exception of the last few questions on the assessment. The District found that
this misconduct warranted dismissal and was not remediable. It adopted a resolution authorizing
charges and dismissal and subsequently adopted a notice of charges and dismissal, which it sent
to Longanecker. Longanecker timely requested a hearing before a hearing officer, which was
conducted in August 2014.
¶ 26 The hearing officer concluded that the District had failed to meet its burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the charged misconduct occurred. The hearing
officer found “no corroborating testimony or exhibits *** to substantiate Mitchell’s testimony
that Longanecker intended to base her instruction of students on the questions to be administered
in the [ISAT] standardized test.” Moreover, although the hearing officer did not expressly find
that Mitchell’s testimony lacked credibility, he noted that while Mitchell was able to provide a
very detailed account of Longanecker’s alleged tampering with the ISAT test booklets on
February 27, 2014, she was unable to remember several other events that occurred on that day.
The hearing officer further noted that, although Mitchell began working with Longanecker on
January 29, 2014, she did not report any misconduct by Longanecker with respect to the MAP
and Language! tests until she met with Harris and Humphries on March 11, 2014. Having found
that the District had failed to prove the charged misconduct, the hearing officer also found that
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the District had failed to show that Longanecker had engaged in irremediable conduct warranting
her dismissal. Accordingly, the hearing officer ordered the District to reinstate Longanecker to
her teaching position and reimburse her for lost wages and benefits and for the costs of the
action, including her attorney’s fees.
¶ 27 On December 15, 2014, the Board adopted a resolution reversing the hearing
officer’s ultimate conclusion and finding that every charge of misconduct brought against
Longanecker had been proven. The Board noted that it had considered the hearing officer’s
findings of fact and had “incorporate[d] those findings of fact herein.” However, based upon its
independent consideration of the witness testimony and other evidence presented during the
hearing, the Board found that the hearing officer’s factual findings were against the manifest
weight of the evidence, and it modified the hearing officer’s findings in several material respects.
First, the Board found that Mitchell’s testimony was “credible” and that “any implication
otherwise is not supported by the evidence.” The Board concluded that Mitchell’s inability to
recall “minor events that took place nearly six months prior [to the dismissal hearing]” “[did] not
detract from her detailed and credible testimony about the misconduct she witnessed
[Longanecker] commit that same day.”
¶ 28 Further, the Board found that Longanecker was not a credible or truthful witness.
In support of this finding, the Board noted that (1) Longanecker’s testimony concerning the
events of February 27, 2014, contained many inconsistencies; (2) Longanecker testified that 95%
of her students had ADD or ADHD but later admitted that this was a “guess” that was not
substantiated by any medical records or individualized educational plans; (3) On January 29,
2014, Longanecker sent an e-mail claiming that she had finished books A and B of the
Language! program but later admitted that it would have been impossible to finish books A and
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B by that date (She further admitted that she corrected her initial misstatement only after two
staff members e-mailed her about the claim.); and (4) Longanecker admitted that she lied in two
separate e-mails wherein she stated that she respected Harris.
¶ 29 The Board further found that Student A’s hearing testimony “contained numerous
inconsistencies and cannot be considered as reliable evidence.” However, the Board found
Harris’s testimony regarding his interview with Student A—and Harris’s account of Student A’s
statements in his March 4, 2014, memorandum—to be credible.
¶ 30 In addition, the Board found that the evidence did not show that any school
administrator harbored any animus toward Longanecker. 3 The Board noted that Humphries had
issued a letter of commendation to Longanecker in October 2013 and testified that he did not
consider Longanecker to be a “problem employee.” The Board further observed that, although
Harris sent Longanecker a letter of reprimand on February 3, 2014, he testified that he felt he and
Longanecker had a good relationship and that there was a good atmosphere between them even
after the reprimand.
¶ 31 The Board also found that Longanecker’s misconduct was irremediable and
warranted her dismissal. The Board concluded that Longanecker’s misconduct harmed students
and damaged student-teacher relationships. It noted that helping students answer questions on the
MAP and Language! assessments defeated the purpose of those assessments. The Board noted
that Longanecker’s actions were particularly harmful to Student A (whom Longanecker had
implicated), particularly considering Student A’s testimony that other students had told him that
3
Although the hearing officer did not explicitly find that any administrator had animosity toward
Longanecker, he set forth several of his findings of fact under the heading “School District
Administrators’ Animus Toward Longanecker.” The Board modified the hearing officer’s implicit finding
on this issue.
13
he had caused Longanecker to lose her job. The Board observed that, as a veteran teacher,
Longanecker was expected to set a good example for other teachers and for student teachers like
Mitchell. The Board found that, contrary to that expectation, Longanecker had acted in a manner
that was “unconscionable” and that “broke one of our foundational principles in education.”
Further, the Board concluded that Longanecker’s misconduct had damaged the reputation of both
the school and the District.
¶ 32 The Board found Longanecker’s conduct to be irremediable because no prior
warning could have prevented or corrected her misconduct. It noted that the “ISAT Test
Administration Manual” and the ISAT test booklets each contained numerous warnings against
opening ISAT test booklets prior to the administration of the test. Moreover, Longanecker
admitted that she knew that opening an ISAT test booklet before the administration of the ISAT
was prohibited.
¶ 33 Longanecker appealed the Board’s decision to the circuit court of Rock Island
County, which affirmed the Board’s decision. The circuit court noted that, pursuant to section
24-12(d)(9) of the School Code, it “[gave] consideration to the hearing officer’s Findings of Fact
and recommendation, as well as the School Board’s decision and Findings of Fact.” 105 ILCS
5/24-12(d)(9) (West 2014). However, the court concluded that the 2011 amendments to section
24-12 of the School Code granted the Board the discretion to overrule the hearing officer’s
decision and required the court to affirm the Board’s decision unless it found that the Board’s
decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court found that the Board’s
decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and affirmed the Board’s decision.
¶ 34 ANALYSIS
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¶ 35 As an initial matter, we note that Longanecker’s brief on appeal does not comply
with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 342(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005). That rule
provides, in relevant part, that
“[t]he appellant’s brief shall include, as an appendix, *** a copy of the judgment
appealed from, [and] any opinion, memorandum, or findings of fact filed or entered
by the trial judge or by any administrative agency or its officers.” (Emphasis
added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 342(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2005).
Although Longanecker included a copy of the circuit court’s order in her appendix, she failed to
include a copy of the Board’s decision, in violation of Rule 342(a). Moreover, the table of
contents to the record on appeal included in Longanecker’s appendix does not state the nature of
each document, the names of all witnesses, and the pages on which their testimony begins, as
required by Rule 342(a).
¶ 36 When a brief or appendix fails to follow the requirements set forth in Rule 342(a),
we may dismiss the appeal. Perez v. Chicago Park District, 2016 IL App (1st) 153101, ¶ 8. Our
supreme court’s rules are not advisory suggestions but mandatory rules that must be followed.
In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57. Because the parties included citations
to the relevant record materials in their briefs on appeal, Longanecker’s violation of Rule 342(a)
has not precluded meaningful review of the Board’s decision in this case. Accordingly, although
we have the discretion to dismiss this appeal, we elect to address the issues Longanecker raises
on their merit. However, we admonish Longanecker’s counsel, and all appellants, to ensure that
their briefs on appeal are in full compliance with Rule 342(a).
¶ 37 We now turn to the merits of the Longanecker’s appeal. Longanecker argues that
the Board violated section 24-12 of the School Code by failing to incorporate all of the hearing
15
officer’s findings of fact and by summarily rejecting the hearing officer’s factual findings and its
recommendation that Longanecker be reinstated. Longanecker acknowledges that section 24-12
(as amended in 2011) makes the Board the final decision maker in teacher dismissal cases.
However, she contends that the statute “sharply limit[s] a school board’s authority to review a
*** hearing officer’s findings and conclusions, in a manner similar to what a court may do in
administrative review.” Specifically, Longanecker argues that amended section 24-12(d)(8)
authorizes the Board to “modify or supplement” the hearing officer’s findings of fact only if the
hearing officer’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, i.e., only where an
opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(8) (West 2014). Moreover, she
notes that amended section 24-12(d)(9) provides that, when the Board dismisses a teacher for
cause against the hearing officer’s recommendation (as here), the reviewing court “shall give
consideration” both to the Board’s decision and supplemental findings of fact (if any), “and the
hearing officer’s findings of fact and recommendation.” (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/24-
12(d)(9) (West 2014). Longanecker argues that the Board violated these statutory requirements
and applied an improper standard of review by (1) “fail[ing] to give the arbitrator’s findings and
conclusion the deference to which they are entitled under a manifest weight of the evidence
standard,” (2) “blatantly reweigh[ing] the evidence,” (3) “[making] its own self-serving
credibility determinations,” and (4) “substitut[ing] its preordained conclusion that ***
Longanecker must be terminated for the independent judgement of the professionally trained
[Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE)] hearing officer.” In essence, Longanecker maintains
that the Board lacked the statutory authority to reject the hearing officer’s findings and
recommendation because they were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
16
¶ 38 Longanecker’s arguments are foreclosed by our supreme court’s decision in
Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL
120236, which was issued after the parties’ presented oral arguments in this appeal. In Beggs, as
in this case, a board of education terminated a teacher against the recommendation of the hearing
officer. Our supreme court confirmed that it is the school board’s decision, and not the hearing
officer’s findings and recommendation, that is the final decision for purposes of administrative
review and that is entitled to deference by reviewing courts. Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 57.
¶ 39 In so ruling, our supreme court rejected our appellate court’s prior conclusion that
the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation were entitled to a “certain level of deference”
in teacher dismissal cases. Id. ¶¶ 59-62. Echoing Longanecker’s arguments in this case, our
appellate court had held that the hearing officer’s findings must be accorded deference because
the hearing officer is “the impartial entity charged with hearing evidence and evaluating witness
credibility” and because amended section 24-12 of the School Code (1) requires the school board
to incorporate the hearing officer’s factual findings, (2) prohibits the school board from departing
from the hearing officer’s findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence,
(3) requires hearing officers to have certain qualifications, (4) requires a reviewing court to “give
consideration” to both the school board’s decision and the hearing officer’s findings of fact and
recommendation when conducting its review. Id. ¶ 58. Our supreme court disagreed, ruling that
the school board’s decision is entitled to the normal deference accorded to a final agency
decision maker under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2012)).
Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶¶ 45, 56-57. Although our supreme court acknowledged that section
24-12(d)(8) of the School Code requires the Board to incorporate the hearing officer’s factual
findings, it noted that the same section allowed the Board to supplement or modify the hearing
17
officer’s findings “if, in the Board’s opinion, it believes they are against the manifest weight of
the evidence. (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 59. The supreme court observed that the appellate
court had “largely ignored the ‘in its opinion’ language of the statute, which clearly indicates the
legislature’s intent to vest the Board with discretion to depart from the hearing officer’s
findings.” Id. Although the supreme court acknowledged that the statute sets forth a manifest
weight of the evidence standard to “steer” the Board’s review of the hearing officer’s findings,
the court concluded that “[t]his does not equate *** with a requirement that a reviewing court
give deference to the hearing officer’s findings” because “the statute plainly vests the Board with
final decision-making authority after the hearing officer’s ‘recommendation’ is reported to the
Board.”
¶ 40 Moreover, although the supreme court acknowledged that section 24-12(d)(9) of
the School Code also directs the reviewing court to “give consideration to” the hearing officer’s
findings of fact and recommendation (together with the Board’s supplemental factual findings
and final decision), it ruled that “this provision *** simply reinforces the existing statutory and
case law requirement that the court on administrative review should consider the entire record.”
Id. ¶ 61. The supreme court noted that, just as the agency is required to “consider” the findings of
its hearing officer, “[a] court on review is also expected to consider the entire record, including
consideration of the hearing officer’s findings of fact that involve credibility determinations.” Id.
Nevertheless, the supreme court made it clear that (1) “on administrative review the court still
only reviews the agency’s findings of fact under the manifest weight of the evidence standard,
not the hearing officer’s recommendation and factual findings,” and (2) “[t]his is the case even
when the findings of fact depend on the credibility of the witnesses—and even if the hearing
officer, rather than the board, observed those witnesses.” Id.; see also Abrahamson v. Illinois
18
Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 95 96-99 (1992); Acorn Corrugated Box
Co. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 181 Ill. App. 3d 122, 136-40 (1989); Caracci v. Edgar,
160 Ill. App. 3d 892, 895-96 (1987). The same result obtains even where, as in Beggs (and as in
this case), the statute governing the agency directs the agency to “adopt the hearing officer’s
findings of fact if they are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 61; see also Acorn Corrugated Box Co., 181
Ill. App. 3d at 136.
¶ 41 Our supreme court also rejected our appellate court’s assertion (which
Longanecker repeats here) that the Board “is a partisan entity” while “the hearing officer alone is
the impartial and disinterested entity.” Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 62. Our supreme court found
this assertion to be “both incorrect and an improper basis for departing from the traditional
standard of review of agency decisions.” Id. The court noted that it was “well settled that an
administrative hearing ‘is not a partisan hearing with the agency on one side arrayed against an
individual on the other’ ” (id. (quoting Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 94)); “[r]ather, it is an
administrative investigation instituted for the purpose of ascertaining and making factual
findings.” (id.). Our supreme court further noted that “board members comprising the agency
decision maker are assumed to be people of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of
judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 42 Accordingly, contrary to Longanecker’s suggestion, we review the Board’s
decision only (not the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation), and we accord no
deference to the hearing officer’s factual findings and recommendation, except for those findings
19
that are incorporated and not rejected or modified by the Board. 4 Our review of the Board’s
decision is a two-step process. First, we review the Board’s factual findings (including the
factual findings of the hearing officer that were incorporated unmodified into the Board’s
decision as well as the Board’s supplemental findings) to determine whether those findings were
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 63. Factual determinations are against the
manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Id. ¶ 50. Second,
we must determine whether those findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for the agency’s
conclusion that cause for discharge does or does not exist. Id.; see also Department of Mental
Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm’n, 85 Ill. 2d 547, 551 (1981). A
school board’s determination of cause to discharge is subject to reversal where it is “arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service.” Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 63. This is
a mixed question of law and fact which we review under the clearly erroneous standard of
review. Id. We will uphold the Board’s discharge decision unless, after applying the governing
legal standard for discharge to the established facts, we are “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 43 The Board’s finding that Longanecker committed the misconduct charged in this
case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Regarding Longanecker’s alleged
4
Justice O’Brien’s dissent is premised on the assumptions that the hearing officer’s findings are
entitled to deference, that the Board may not depart from the hearing officer’s findings unless such
findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that a reviewing court should reverse any
attempt by the Board to modify or supplement the hearing officer’s findings if, in the court’s opinion, the
hearing officer’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., infra ¶¶ 64-65,
74, 76. As discussed above, our supreme court explicitly rejected each of these propositions in Beggs.
Supra ¶¶ 38-40, 42 (quoting and discussing Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶¶ 57, 59-62). We review only the
Board’s ultimate findings under the deferential manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, not the hearing
officer’s findings or recommendation. Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 61. That remains the case even when, as
here, the Board’s findings of fact depend on the credibility of the witnesses and even if the hearing
officer, rather than the board, observed those witnesses. Id.
20
 misconduct in administering the ISAT, Mitchell testified that she saw Longanecker open the
Reading test seals on an ISAT test booklet on February 27, 2014, prior to the administration of
the ISAT Reading test. Mitchell further testified that Longanecker made comments to her
indicating that she intended to use the ISAT booklet to “cheat” and that she would base her
instruction on the questions contained in the ISAT booklet. The Board found Mitchell’s
“detailed” testimony on this subject to be credible. The District’s investigation corroborated
Mitchell’s testimony in certain key respects. It is undisputed that, on March 4, 2014 (two days
prior to the administration of the ISAT Reading test), an ISAT test booklet with the seals to the
Reading test sessions broken was found in Mitchell’s classroom. Later that day, Student A, one
of Longanecker’s students, acknowledged that this test booklet at issue was his. Harris testified
that, when he interviewed Student A that day, Student A told Harris that he did not break the
seals on the Reading session of his ISAT test booklet.
¶ 44 Longanecker suggests that Mitchell’s account of Longanecker’s alleged
misconduct regarding the ISAT booklet was not credible because Mitchell’s recollection of other
events transpiring on February 27, 2014, was “hazy” and was contradicted by other evidence.
Aside from Longanecker’s alleged misconduct regarding the ISAT test booklet, Mitchell could
remember little else that occurred on that day with any clarity. She thought that she gave a poetry
pretest to students that day but could not recall exactly when she did so. She could not recall
Dunn delivering the ISAT test booklets to Longanecker’s classroom. Although she vaguely
remembered attending an assembly with the students at some point, she could not recall whether
that assembly took place on February 27, 2014. During her testimony, Mitchell stated that she
could not say what happened during the lesson on February 27, 2014 or “that day’s activities
with the students” because “it was a stressful day.” Longanecker and Evans confirmed that there
21
was a River Bandits assembly on February 27, 2014. Moreover, Longanecker testified that
Mitchell would not have given the students a poetry pretest on February 27 because the poetry
unit did not begin until March 3. Longanecker’s testimony on this point is supported by the
record, because Mitchel did not e-mail her first poetry lesson plan to Longanecker until February
28.
¶ 45 The Board concluded that Mitchell’s inability to recall “minor events that took
place nearly six months prior [to the dismissal hearing]” “[did] not detract from her detailed and
credible testimony about the misconduct she witnessed [Longanecker] commit that same day.”
We cannot say that this credibility finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Minor discrepancies in a witness’s testimony are not unusual (In re Jonathan C.B., 2011 IL
107750, ¶ 237) and do not destroy the witness’s credibility (People v. Mays, 81 Ill. App. 3d
1090, 1099 (1980)). Seeing her supervising teacher open an ISAT test booklet and declare her
intention to cheat on the ISAT test would be a shocking and stressful event for Mitchell or for
any student teacher. It is not surprising that Mitchell would have a clear memory of those events
but only a “hazy” memory of other, more mundane events that occurred on the same day when
she testified approximately five months later. 5
5
The dissent misconstrues the Board’s finding (and our judgment) on this issue as suggesting that
stressful events would diminish Mitchell’s memory of the relevant events. Infra ¶ 66 (stating that “[t]he
majority, like the Board, speculates that Mitchell’s lack of detail regarding” her allegations of misconduct
against Longanecker “was to be expected based on the stress of the situation”). The dissent then notes that
“[w]hile Mitchell did testify it was a very stressful period, there was no testimony that stress induces
memory loss or allows a person to remember only certain events occurring in the same time period.” Infra
¶ 68. Contrary to the dissent’s argument, however, the Board’s point (and our point) was not that stress
causes memory loss but rather that stressful and exceptional events (like hearing one’s boss admit to
cheating) are normally recalled in greater detail than are more mundane, everyday events, such as a
particular pretest or assembly took place. It was the latter type of events that Mitchell had difficulty
recalling, not the former, which stands to reason.
22
¶ 46 Longanecker argues that the Board failed to prove that Student A’s ISAT test
booklet (which was the only test booklet found with prematurely opened seals) was delivered to
Longanecker’s classroom on February 27, 2014. Although Dunn testified that she “assumed” that
the test booklet at issue was assigned to Longanecker, she admitted that she “did not know that.”
A printed list of ISAT test booklets delivered to Longanecker’s classroom identified by serial
number did not include the serial number of Student A’s test booklet (although someone wrote
that serial number on the list by hand). Contrary to Longanecker’ argument, these facts do not
render the Board’s misconduct finding against the manifest weight of the evidence. Student A
acknowledged that the test booklet at issue was his, and he was one of Longanecker’s students.
Moreover, during his initial interview with Harris, Student A testified that he did not open the
Reading test seals on his test booklet when he took the ISAT Math test on March 3, 2014.
Further, it is undisputed that the test booklet at issue was found in Longanecker’s classroom on
March 4, 2014, two days before the students took the Reading test, with the Reading test seals
opened. These facts, coupled with Mitchell’s testimony, supported a reasonable inference that
Longanecker had possession of Student A’s test booklet and prematurely opened the Reading
test seals on that booklet with the intent to cheat on the test. Given the ample evidence
supporting that inference, the dissent’s discussion of flaws in Glenview’s testing procedures and
the purported lack of proof that Dunn delivered test booklet No. 4587910063 to Longanecker’s
classroom (see infra ¶¶ 74-77) does not render the Board’s finding on this issue against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 47 Longanecker contends that the Board unfairly “cherry-picked” Student A’s
testimony, finding his March 4, 2014, statement to Harris credible but finding his subsequent
hearing testimony to be inconsistent, unreliable, and unworthy of credence. During his hearing
23
testimony, Student A testified that, when he first received his ISAT test booklet during the first
day of testing on March 3, 2014, all of the seals on the booklet were closed. This suggests that
Longanecker did not prematurely open the Reading test seals on Student A’s test booklet on
February 27, 2014, as Mitchell alleged. Longanecker contends that the Board’s decision to credit
Student A.’s initial denial that he had opened the Reading test seals but reject his subsequent
testimony that all of the seals were intact on March 3, 2014, is “very convenient” and
demonstrates the Board’s bias and animus against Longanecker. According to Longanecker, the
Board (1) credited only testimony that supported its preferred conclusion and improperly
disregarded any contrary testimony and (2) summarily rejected any findings by the hearing
officer that undermined the case against Longanecker instead of being “steered” by the manifest
weight of the evidence standard when considering the hearing officer’s findings, as required by
section 24-12 and Beggs.
¶ 48 We do not find these arguments to be persuasive. The Board’s decision to credit
Student A’s initial statement to Harris but not his subsequent hearing testimony was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Student A made his initial statement on the day after the
incident in question, while his recollection of the event was presumably fresh and accurate. He
did not testify at the hearing until several months later. Moreover, Student A’s hearing testimony
was rife with inconsistencies. Student A initially testified that all of the seals on his ISAT test
booklet were closed when he first received the booklet on March 3, 2014, and that he opened
only two seals that morning. However, he later testified that he did not remember what he
opened. In addition, although Student A initially testified that he told Harris that he had
accidentally opened the seals to the ISAT test booklet, he later testified that he did not remember
what he told Harris. When Student A was later asked three more times what he had told Harris,
24
he gave no response. Moreover, Student A testified that his classmates told him that he might
have caused Longanecker to lose her job because “they [saw] my book open on her desk.” This
suggested a potential motive for Student A to testify falsely in an attempt to protect
Longanecker. For all these reasons, the Board’s findings that Student A’s initial statement to
Harris was reliable and that his hearing testimony was unreliable were not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. 6
¶ 49 There was also sufficient evidence to support the Board’s finding that
Longanecker had committed misconduct by improperly assisting students during MAP testing.
Mitchell testified that, during the MAP testing, she observed students ask Longanecker questions
like “is the answer A or B?” and Longanecker would respond “no its B or C” or “kind of pick out
two that they should have chosen from.” Before Mitchell supervised the students by herself on
the second day of MAP testing, Longanecker told Mitchell that she (Mitchell) could answer
student questions and define words for them. The MAP proctor handbook explicitly prohibits a
proctor from defining words for students or giving them hints or clarifications. Mitchell’s claim
that Longanecker improperly assisted students on the MAP testing was corroborated by the
unusually and disproportionately high aggregate MAP scores of Longanecker’s students, which
Peterson characterized as “crazy” and a “red flag” that strongly supported Mitchell’s testimony.
Although the dissent cites evidence that arguably undermines Peterson’s conclusion (see infra
¶ 70-71), it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the Board to credit Peterson’s
6
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, we have not relied on any testimony by Student A that his
test booklet “had broken seals” when he took the Math test on March 3. Rather, we have merely found
that the Board did not err in relying on Student A’s initial statement to Harris that he had opened only the
math session seal, not the reading session seals, and that it was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence for the Board to credit that testimony over the self-contradictory, equivocal, and possibly biased
testimony that Student A gave several months later at the hearing.
25
opinion that the anomalous MAP scores supported Mitchell’s allegations that Longanecker had
improperly coached her students. In any event, the Board could have reasonably found that
Longanecker had improperly assisted her students with respect to MAP testing based on
Mitchell’s testimony alone, which the Board properly found to be credible. 7
¶ 50 As Longanecker notes, Student B testified that he did not recall asking any
questions or receiving any help during MAP testing. However, even assuming that Student B
received no such assistance, that does not preclude the possibility that Longanecker improperly
assisted other students during MAP testing.
¶ 51 After considering all of the evidence presented, including Mitchell’s testimony,
the aberrant aggregated MAP test scores of Longanecker’s students, and Peterson’s and Harris’s
testimony about those scores, the Board could have reasonably found that the charges of
misconduct relating to Longanecker’s administration of MAP testing were proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. An opposite conclusion is not clearly apparent. Thus, the Board’s
finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 52 The evidence also supports the Board’s finding that Longanecker committed
misconduct by improperly assisting students during Language! testing. Mitchell testified that
Longanecker had the students take the Language! program assessments “as a whole” and fill in
the bubbles in their test books together until the last few questions, which each student would
answer on his or her own. Mitchell further stated that, during Language! testing sessions,
7
The dissent contends that Mitchell’s testimony does not support the Board’s finding on this issue
because Mitchell admitted that she “did not know what was going on” during the first day of MAP
testing. Infra ¶ 72. From this, the dissent concludes that Mitchell “did not know what actions were proper
or improper” when she saw Longanecker interact with her students that day. Infra ¶ 72. However,
Longanecker’s understanding of what she witnessed it not dispositive. As noted above, Longanecker’s
conduct, as described by Mitchell, clearly violated MAP testing rules as confirmed by the MAP proctor
handbook, which expressly prohibits a proctor from defining words for students or giving them hints or
clarifications.
26
Longanecker would sometimes go over questions on the board after the test and would have the
students change their answers to the correct answers to make it look as if the students had
answered the questions correctly. According to Mitchell, Longanecker rarely taught from the
Language! book, and she told the students to take their Language! books out and open them on
their desks “[i]n case anyone was to walk in” the classroom. Mitchell claimed that Longanecker
performed “practice runs” where she would knock on the classroom door, pretending to be
administration, and the students would open their Language! books. Although portions of the
Language! assessments are designed to be read aloud by the teacher, with the exception of
certain “example” questions, the Language! assessments are not designed to be answered
cooperatively or with the assistance of the teacher.
¶ 53 Longanecker denied all of the charged misconduct (i.e., she denied providing her
students with any improper assistance on any assessments). However, the Board found that
Longanecker’s testimony lacked credibility. In support of this finding, the Board noted several
instances of dishonesty on Longanecker’s part. For example, although Longanecker admitted
that a booklet was found on her desk during the March 4, 2014, search of her classroom, she
claimed that it was an ISAT test administration manual rather than an ISAT test booklet. That
claim is implausible because the test administration manual and the test booklets have differing
color schemes, the test administration manual has no seals, and Evans and other witnesses
testified that a test booklet with broken seals was found in Longanecker’s classroom. Moreover,
Longanecker initially testified that she walked her students to P.E. class at 10:30 a.m. on
February 27, 2014, but later admitted on cross-examination that she sent four e-mails between
10:21 a.m. and 10:34 a.m. on that date. The Board found that these and other untruthful
statements by Longanecker (see, e.g., the statements recounted supra ¶ 28) undermined
27
Longanecker’s credibility. Given Longanecker’s untruthful statements and given the partial
corroboration of some of Mitchell’s claims by other evidence, we cannot say that the
Commission’s credibility findings or its decision to credit Mitchell’s testimony over
Longanecker’s were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 54 In attacking the Board’s credibility and misconduct findings, the dissent
repeatedly relies upon our appellate court’s recent decision in Burgess v. Illinois State Board of
Education, 2020 IL App (3d) 170076. Infra ¶¶ 67, 70, 73, 85, 88. However, Burgess is
distinguishable. In Burgess, we found certain of the Board’s factual findings and credibility
determinations to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, where, inter alia, (1) the Board
credited one witness (a man named Doerrer) over another without any fact-finding or
explanation (Burgess, 2020 IL App (3d) 170076, ¶ 75) despite the fact that Doerrer’s credibility
was undermined by other evidence (id. ¶¶ 75-76), (2) the Board chose to believe three of the
Board’s witnesses who testified that the plaintiff had made a threatening statement to another
teacher during a union meeting (a finding that contradicted the hearing officer’s finding) despite
the fact that several other witnesses who were within 2 to 10 feet of the plaintiff at the time did
not hear the plaintiff make the alleged statement and there was concrete evidence in the record
suggesting that the three Board witnesses at issue were biased against the plaintiff but no
evidence that the other witness harbored any bias for or against the plaintiff (id.), and (3) the
Board chose to believe Doerrer’s testimony that the plaintiff made another offensive comment to
him immediately following another union meeting despite Doerrer’s credibility problems and
despite the fact that another Board witnesses who was standing right in front of Doerrer at the
time testified that he did not hear any such comment. (id. ¶ 80.) Under these particular
circumstances, we held that the Board’s credibility determinations and its findings that the
28
plaintiff had made the two alleged statements at issue were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Here, by contrast, there is no evidence suggesting that Mitchell was biased against
Longanecker, and Mitchell’s testimony on certain critical matters was corroborated by other
evidence. Supra ¶¶ 44, 47, 50. Moreover, as noted above, Longanecker’s credibility was
undermined by certain false statements she made, and her denials of Mitchell’s account of the
relevant incidents were not corroborated by other witnesses or other record evidence. 8
Accordingly, Burgess differs from this case in several material respects, and its holding does not
support Longanecker’s argument.
¶ 55 The Board’s finding that Longanecker’s misconduct was not remediable was also
amply supported by the evidence. If the Board finds that the charges of misconduct against a
teacher have been proven, it must determine whether the teacher’s conduct is remediable.
Gilliland v. Board of Education of Pleasant View Consolidated School District No. 622, 67 Ill.
2d 143, 153 (1977). Conduct is irremediable if it (1) causes damage to the students, faculty, or
school and (2) could not have been corrected if the teacher’s superiors had warned her. Id.
Misconduct causes damage to the students, faculty, or school where, inter alia, it is harmful to
the individual student-teacher relationship or to the reputation of the faculty and the school.
McBroom v. Board of Education of District No. 205, 144 Ill. App. 3d 463, 473 (1986).
¶ 56 Because the hearing officer found that the charges against Longanecker had not
been proven, he made no finding as to whether Longanecker’s alleged misconduct was
remediable. However, the Board issued several supplemental factual findings supporting its
conclusion that Longanecker’s conduct was not remediable. Specifically, the Board found that
8
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Student B’s testimony that he did not recall asking any
questions or receiving any help during MAP testing does not contradict Mitchell’s testimony that
Longanecker gave such help to some of her students nor does it support Longanecker’s denials of such
misconduct.
29
Longanecker’s misconduct damaged Glenview’s students, faculty, and staff because (1) helping
students answer MAP and Language! assessments defeated the purpose of those assessments and
jeopardized the students’ education; (2) by implicating Student A in some of her misconduct,
Longanecker damaged the student-teacher relationships she had with Student A and with her
other students, as Student A testified that other students told him that he had caused Longanecker
to lose her job; (3) Longanecker’s misconduct set a terrible example for Mitchell and for
Glenview’s staff and students; (4) Longanecker’s misconduct caused the District to report
Longanecker’s opening of Student A’s test booklet as a testing irregularity to the ISBE, which
could potentially have resulted in the suppression of the students’ scores and could have
jeopardized the school’s federal funding under the No Child Left Behind Act; and
(5) Longanecker’s misconduct was unconscionable, embarrassing, and damaged the reputation of
Glenview and the District as a whole. The Board also found that no warning could have
prevented or corrected Longanecker’s misconduct because the ISAT test booklet contains
numerous warnings against opening test booklets prematurely, as does the ISAT test
administration manual that Longanecker acknowledged receiving. Moreover, Longanecker
testified that she knew that opening a test booklet before the administration of a test is
prohibited. 9 Although she denies that the charges against her were proven, Longanecker does not
challenge the Board’s determination that the alleged misconduct, if it occurred, would be
irremediable. Nor do we find the Board’s finding on this issue to be against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
9
In addition, the MAP proctor handbook explicitly prohibits a proctor from defining words for
students or giving them hints or clarifications, and Longanecker testified that she would “do harm” to the
students if she helped them with “any type of assessment.”
30
¶ 57 Having found that the Board’s factual findings were not against the manifest
weight of the evidence, we must determine whether Board’s findings provide a sufficient basis
for its conclusion that cause for discharging Longanecker existed. As noted above, a school
board’s determination of cause to discharge is subject to reversal where it is “arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service.” Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 63. This is
a mixed question of law and fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard of review.
Id. We will uphold the Board’s discharge decision unless, after applying the governing legal
standard for discharge to the established facts, we are “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 58 We find no such mistake here. The facts, as found by the Board, clearly provided
cause for the Board’s decision to discharge Longanecker. The Board found that Longanecker
improperly opened a sealed ISAT test booklet with the expressed intention to cheat on the test
and improperly assisted her students in the MAP and Language! assessments despite her
knowledge that such conduct was prohibited and was harmful to students. As shown above, these
serious acts of misconduct damaged the students, faculty, and school in several respects.
Moreover, they represent a violation of Longanecker’s core duties as a teacher. Accordingly,
Longanecker’s termination was justified and cannot be considered arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unrelated to the requirements of Longanecker’s service. 10
10
This case is readily distinguishable from Beggs, where the only misconduct supported by the
evidence was a single incident when the plaintiff teacher delayed teaching for 15 minutes at the start of
class on a single occasion. 2016 IL 120236, ¶¶ 68-69. The plaintiff had returned to class that day after an
extended leave of absence that she had taken in order to care for her mother, who was dying. On the day
of her return to the classroom, the plaintiff delayed instruction for no more than 15 minutes while she was
“getting her bearings” and “attempting to determine what had been covered by the substitute [teacher]
during [the] plaintiff’s near-monthlong absence.” Id. ¶ 69. Our supreme court found that this single
incident was an “understandable and minor breach,” and not a clear and material breach, of the remedial
warning notice that the school board had previously given the plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 71-72. Under these
circumstances, our supreme court held that the Board’s decision to discharge the plaintiff was clearly
31
¶ 59 In sum, we hold that the Board’s factual findings were not against the manifest
weight of the evidence and that the facts, as found by the Board, provided a sufficient basis for
the Board’s conclusion that there was cause to discharge Longanecker. We have considered the
other arguments raised by Longanecker and find them to be without merit. We therefore affirm.
¶ 60 CONCLUSION
¶ 61 For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County,
which upheld the Board’s decision, is affirmed.
¶ 62 Affirmed.
¶ 63 JUSTICE O’BRIEN, dissenting:
¶ 64 I agree with the majority that we review the decision of the Board. But unlike the
majority, I believe that analysis begins with a review of the Board’s determination that the
findings of the hearing officer were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The statutory
scheme allows for the Board to modify or supplement the hearing officer’s finding of fact but
only if, in its opinion, the hearing officer’s finding of fact is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. 105 ILCS 5/24-12(d)(8) (West 2014). In order to review the Board’s decision, it is
necessary to review the entire record as instructed by the supreme court in Beggs v. Board of
Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 61.
¶ 65 Unlike the majority, I find the hearing officer’s findings are not against the
manifest weight of the evidence and were not subject to modification and supplementation by the
Board. Further, I find the Board’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In
order for the Board to modify and supplement the hearing officer’s findings, it was required to
erroneous. Here, by contrast, the multiple proven acts of misconduct by Longanecker were far more
serious, more connected to Longanecker’s core teaching duties, and more harmful to the students, the
faculty, and the school.
32
determine that those findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. In doing so, we
look to see if the modified and supplemented findings were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Below are what I consider inaccuracies in the Board’s findings and interpretations of
the hearing officer’s findings and the majority’s determinations regarding them.
¶ 66 The majority finds that the Board’s determination that Longanecker engaged in
the charged misconduct was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, relying in large part
on the testimony of the student teacher, Mitchell, as support for the finding. The majority does
not explain how the hearing officer’s rejection of Mitchell’s testimony was against the manifest
weight of the evidence as required before the Board can modify and supplement the hearing
officer’s findings. The majority discredits the hearing officer and Longanecker’s challenge to
Mitchell’s credibility based on her “hazy” recollection of events. The Board presented its
supplemental finding that Mitchell was credible and her lack of memory did not affect her
credibility. The majority, like the Board, speculates that Mitchell’s lack of detail regarding all the
events of the day of the alleged cheating except Longanecker’s actions regarding the test booklet
was to be expected based on the stress of the situation. Mitchell could not recall whether there
was an assembly that day (there was) or whether she had crafted lesson plans for a poetry pretest
(the unit had not yet started). Significantly, Mitchell was unable to recall whether the students
worked up until the bell for physical education class rang. If Mitchell’s version of events is to be
believed, Longanecker opened the test booklet as soon as the students left the classroom
unattended to proceed to physical education class, which would be part of the time frame the
Board credits Mitchell’s credibility, that is, when Longanecker supposedly opened the test
booklet and blatantly told Mitchell about her plans to cheat.
33
¶ 67 Unlike the majority and the Board, I believe the facts demonstrate that if any
version of events lacked credibility it was the version testified to by Mitchell, who was able to
remember only details harmful to Longanecker and nothing else from the same less-than-five-
minute period. Despite that her claims contradicted other established facts, the Board
inexplicably credited Mitchell, a student teacher with limited classroom and testing procedure
experience, above Longanecker, a long-term tenured teacher who had earned commendations for
her teaching skills and apparently had hosted other student teachers without incident as
evidenced by her waiver inquiry to the student teacher coordinator. See Burgess v. Illinois State
Board of Education, 2020 IL App (3d) 170076, ¶ 75 (rejecting Board’s “hierarchy” of witness
credibility and “sleight-of-hand acceptance” of testimony where its findings were not supported
by the facts). Because the Board’s, and by implication, the majority’s conclusions are contrary to
the evidence, they are based on pure speculation. While Mitchell did testify it was a very
stressful period, there was no testimony that stress induces memory loss or allows a person to
remember only certain events occurring in the same time period. In addition, despite the apparent
stress of Longanecker’s alleged misconduct, Mitchell met with her student teaching supervisor
the following day and did not mention the incident with Longanecker. Mitchell’s stress did not
relieve her of the responsibility to present accurate testimony. This supplemental finding is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 68 The majority considers Mitchell’s testimony was supported by that of Student A,
to whom the test with the broken seals was assigned. It looks to the Board’s conclusion that
Student A told Harris, the principal, that he did not break the seals on the reading portion of the
test, as testified by Harris. The Board outright rejected the testimony of Student A at the hearing,
where he provided several different versions of what happened and then stopped answering
34
questions. The Board rejected the hearing officer’s determination regarding Student A and
substituted its conclusion that Harris’s testimony as to what Student A told him was more
reliable than the student’s version. The Board at once rejects and accepts Student A’s claims,
finding the one that accords with Harris’s version of events to be more credible while finding
Student A himself to not be credible. This finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Also unsupported by the evidence is the majority’s reliance on the testimony of Student A that
his test booklet had broken seals as support that Longanecker opened the tests to determine what
material to teach her class. Again, based on the finding that Student A was not credible, the
majority errs in using his testimony to support the otherwise unsubstantiated claims of the
student teacher.
¶ 69 The majority further considers that there was sufficient evidence, based in large
part on Mitchell’s claims, to support the Board’s findings that Longanecker engaged in
misconduct regarding the MAP testing and Language! program. The majority notes the test
procedures specifically prohibit a proctor from engaging in the activities Mitchell claimed
occurred. As discussed below, the administration of the MAP test and the ISAT were not in
accord with any testing protocols and the MAP score increases by Longanecker’s students were
considered suspect only when viewed in light of Mitchell’s allegations. Mitchell’s claims
regarding the alleged Language! misconduct were contradicted by the testimony of the
superintendent and principal, each of whom witnessed the program being employed in
Longanecker’s classroom. The majority considers that Mitchell’s testimony, as well as the
increase in MAP scores, establishes that the Board’s findings were not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. I disagree.
35
¶ 70 The hearing officer found Mitchell’s claims that Longanecker violated the MAP
testing procedures unsupported by the evidence. In turn, the Board rejected as against the
manifest weight of the evidence the hearing officer’s findings that the Board did not prove
Longanecker’s misconduct regarding the MAP testing and Language! program. The Board
rejected the hearing officer’s conclusions and supplemented the findings, determining that the
evidence proved Longanecker engaged in misconduct. In dismissing the hearing officer’s
findings, the Board placed substantial weight on the testimony of Mitchell. She claimed
Longanecker inappropriately answered students’ questions during the examination and directed
her to do the same. Contrary to Mitchell’s claims, Student B, who had significant gains on his
MAP scores, said Longanecker did not ask questions or help him during the test. No witnesses
corroborated Mitchell’s allegations to the contrary. The Board did not find and no evidence
supports its elevation of Mitchell’s version of events over the student. Instead, the Board
surmised that Longanecker aided other students, which raised their scores. The Board’s
conclusion was not based on the evidence and did not explain how it was reasonable. See
Burgess, 2020 IL App (3d) 170076, ¶ 75 (finding Board’s recognition of credibility of one
witness over another without fact finding or explanation “extremely suspect”). The Board places
stock in the specificity of associate superintendent Peterson’s testimony explaining the MAP
scores, determining that the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s finding that the MAP
scores did not alert the administration to any testing improprieties. The hearing officer found that
the principal stated that individual scores did not indicate any cheating took place; the Board
determined that Harris said he only looked at the class scores as a whole. In contrast, Peterson
testified that a benefit of the MAP testing was that it allowed the students’ individual progress to
be tracked.
36
¶ 71 Regardless of whether individual or the classroom scores were considered, the
evidence demonstrated the MAP scores fluctuated and that another teacher had similar gains as
Longanecker. Although the Board found the hearing officer misstated the evidence by looking at
individual scores, the evidence nevertheless demonstrated that at least one other teacher had
similar gains as Longanecker. Indeed, Peterson stated in an e-mail that the other teacher’s “class
[was] comparable.” Harris himself testified that the jump in MAP scores did not mean the
students received inappropriate help. That Peterson added more information regarding the test
results does not negate that evidence. Moreover, Peterson expressly opined that the increase in
MAP scores only raised a red flag in light of Mitchell’s allegations. In contrast, the hearing
officer noted that there was no data to support Mitchell’s accusations. In fact, although the Board
takes offense at the hearing officer’s conclusion, contending that the testimony was directed only
at the Language! scores, the data showed Longanecker’s MAP scores were comparable to the
other teacher’s class, leaving Mitchell’s claims that Longanecker cheated on the MAP tests
unsubstantiated. Peterson acknowledged during her testimony that she had not yet evaluated the
MAP and Language! scores before she determined that Longanecker should be dismissed.
¶ 72 The Board again employs circular reasoning regarding Mitchell’s credibility. It
uses her statements to support evidence, which it then claims supports her version of events.
However, even Mitchell’s own testimony does nothing to support her allegations of impropriety
during MAP testing. She specifically testified that she did not know what was going on the first
day of testing. From that, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that Mitchell did not know
what actions were proper or improper on the first day of MAP testing. She testified that children
would call out questions and Longanecker would either answer or direct the students to the
correct answer. But the nature of the testing, as set forth in the MAP proctor handbook, negates a
37
conclusion that the entire class would benefit from such conduct on the part of Longanecker. The
MAP testing is individualized with each child receiving a different test, so the conduct described
by Mitchell would not have benefitted the entire class but only the child asking the specific
question. Therefore, even accepting all of Mitchell’s testimony as accurate, it does not confirm
that the increase in the MAP test scores of a majority of the students was a result of any improper
assistance or coaching of the class by Longanecker.
¶ 73 As with the MAP testing, Mitchell’s testimony about the Language! program does
not negate the hearing officer’s finding that the Board did not prove misconduct. Mitchell
claimed that Longanecker seldom used the program but prompted her students to pretend they
were using it by pulling their books out of their desks if the principal came to the door. In
contrast, principal Harris, superintendent Humphries and assistant superintendent Peterson all
testified that they observed on several occasions the Language! program in action in
Longanecker’s class, describing the lessons as energetic and the students as engaged. As
described by Peterson, the program was designed with a class component, where the teacher was
required to read portions of the assignments aloud, which makes Mitchell’s claims that
Longanecker’s conduct consisted of cheating incredible. See Burgess, 2020 IL 170076, ¶ 80
(finding of misconduct not supported by evidence where testimony was not corroborated and “in
light of the fact” the witness was not as credible as the Board deemed him). I do not consider that
the hearing officer’s conclusions that the Board did not prove Longanecker engaged in
misconduct in administering the MAP and Language! tests to be against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
¶ 74 The Board rejects the hearing officer’s conclusion that the test security checklist
did not show that Dunn delivered the test booklet No. 4587910063 to Longanecker’s classroom.
38
The Board acknowledged the hearing officer’s findings that Dunn failed to sign the security
checklist were correct but concluded instead that Dunn’s testimony that she delivered the test
booklets was sufficient to establish that test booklet No. 4587910063 was among the test
booklets she delivered. This conclusion is improbable and not based on the evidence. The Board
must not substitute its findings for that of the hearing officer unless the hearing officer’s findings
were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Here, the Board itself acknowledged the
hearing officer’s findings were correct but proceeded to replace them with its own findings. See
Beggs, 2016 IL 120236, ¶¶ 66-67 (determining Board’s rejection of hearing officer’s findings
was not supported by the evidence and reversing Board’s termination of teacher). The Board
focuses on the hearing officer’s statement that test booklet No. 4587910063 was not “on the
original Security Checklist that Dunn delivered” to Longanecker’s classroom, asserting that there
was no evidence to support the checklist itself was delivered. The location of the security
checklist was not at issue and it is unlikely the hearing officer would direct a finding toward it.
The reasonable interpretation of the hearing officer’s finding is that the test booklet at issue was
not delivered to Longanecker’s classroom. This interpretation is supported by the testimony of
Kalman, who testified that Harris wrote No. 4587910063 on the security checklist during the
meeting in Longanecker’s classroom during the investigation into her alleged misconduct. There
was absolutely no evidence presented to support the Board’s conclusion that booklet No.
4587910063 was part of the group delivered to Longanecker’s classroom. Indeed, it is
undisputed that the specific test booklet number was not included on the booklets assigned to
Longanecker.
¶ 75 The Board finds the video supports that test booklet No. 4587910063 was
delivered to Longanecker’s classroom. The video does not support or corroborate that the
39
booklet was delivered. Thus, the Board’s finding that the hearing officer’s finding was against
the manifest weight of the evidence was inconsistent with the evidence. It is undisputed that the
video shows Dunn delivered test booklets to Longanecker’s classroom around 9:14 a.m. on
February 27, 2014. Contrary to the Board’s findings, she testified that she had a test security
checklist that listed the numbers of the tests assigned to Longanecker’s students and provided it
to the associate principal Evans when he asked for it. She did not leave it in Longanecker’s
classroom or deliver it with the test booklets. She did not testify that the list included the
handwritten numbers as the Board found and she did not testify that the test booklet numbers that
were handwritten on the security checklist were delivered or assigned to Longanecker. Dunn said
she could not answer off the top of her head, although she assumed the tests found in
Longanecker’s room were assigned to her and would have been so indicated on the master list
she kept in her office. However, she could not say to whom the test booklet in question was
assigned. The security checklist which indicated which tests were assigned to Longanecker did
not include test booklet No. 4587910063 with the broken seals. The Board concludes Dunn
“clearly testified” the handwritten books were assigned to Longanecker. Dunn’s answer, “I don’t
know,” does not show she “clearly testified” and does not establish that the hearing officer’s
findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 76 I consider that Dunn’s testimony, in addition to the other evidence presented,
established that the school district failed to follow any of the required testing procedures. The
fact of the matter is the evidence is replete with every indication that tests, including the ISAT,
were not administered correctly in every aspect. The school personnel were not provided training
or copies of the testing manual as required. Dunn left the tests in unlocked classrooms although
the tests were supposed to be kept locked up at all times. She herself was unaware that she held
40
the position of test coordinator and believed the school principal was the test coordinator. The
security checklist included a block of tests purportedly assigned to Longanecker which were not
found in her classroom as noted by a question mark and reference to another teacher written on
the checklist by Harris, the principal. Kalman, the union co-president and fellow teacher,
testified there were problems with the tests in the fifth grade, with “subs and tests being
shuffled.” The Board relies on Kalman’s statement that Student A was always in Longanecker’s
class, which it then inexplicably determines reflects that the test booklet at issue was not
“shuffled.” The evidence does not support the Board’s conclusion that test booklet No.
4587910063 was delivered to Longanecker’s room, indicated on the master list and assigned to
Student A.
¶ 77 The evidence further reflects that the school’s testing procedures were haphazard
and not in compliance with test policies. Another teacher at the school gave the wrong section of
the test. Two other teachers encountered issues with the test booklet seals and another teacher
had the wrong names and booklets. That the testing security was deficient was acknowledged by
a series of e-mails between administrators where the school principal admitted the district could
be vulnerable on its test security measures. The Board’s determination that the video and Dunn’s
testimony supports its conclusion that the hearing officer’s finding that test booklet No.
4587910063 was not assigned to Longanecker is incorrect and not based on the evidence. The
Board further concludes that despite evidence of testing improprieties across the board, the
hearing officer’s finding of no misconduct was contrary to the evidence and modified the finding
based on its perspective that the opposite conclusion was clearly evident. Importantly, the
numerous and systemic testing improprieties cast all the district’s claims regarding test security
41
in doubt. The only viable conclusion is that the school’s testing procedures were unreliable and
not based on the applicable regulations.
¶ 78 The Board similarly rejects outright the hearing officer’s conclusion that the
evidence revealed an animus directed toward Longanecker by the administration. The record
established several teachers who had indicated issues with Harris throughout his one-year tenure
as principal, although at least some of his behavior about which the teachers complained
included incidents prior to his principalship. One teacher suggested Harris continued to retaliate
against her once he became principal. Other examples supporting animus include a number of e-
mails between the administrators about the alleged broken seals in which they disparaged
Longanecker and complained about her strong personality and the effect her having cancer had
on interactions with other teachers and discussed their concerted goal to dismiss her. The Board
looks to a letter of commendation Longanecker received from Humphries in October 2013 and
an e-mail she wrote in January 2014 in response to a reprimand she received for an unconnected
incident in which she praised Harris and indicated her respect for him as evidence there was no
animus. However, the Board also considered the e-mail indicative of Longanecker’s lack of
credibility, noting that she in fact did not respect Harris despite her claims in the e-mail. The
Board also took offense to Longanecker’s assertions that the majority of her students had
attention deficit disorder (ADD) or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) despite the
fact that the majority of her students did not have individualized assessment programs (IEP)
demonstrating ADD or ADHD and her claims that she finished books A and B in the Language!
program. In contrast with the administration’s descriptions of Longanecker as a drama queen, I
fail to see how two examples of exaggeration coincide with a lack of any credibility on matters
of importance. Moreover, Longanecker acknowledged she erred in her claims of finishing two
42
books in Language!, agreeing that it would be physically impossible. Oddly, the Board relies on
the fact that she did not correct herself until another teacher questioned her progress, which
would seem a reasonable response when one unknowingly makes a mistake.
¶ 79 The Board’s other supplemental facts were not supported by the evidence. First,
the Board noted that neither the fifth grade teacher down the hall from Longanecker’s classroom
nor the physical education teacher who met the students at the drop-off corner supported
Longanecker’s claims that she walked her class to physical education at the time Mitchell
claimed Longanecker was unsealing a test booklet. The teachers could not remember specifically
if Longanecker escorted her students on February 27, 2014, but both witnesses testified that it
was the regular practice of the fifth-grade teachers, including Longanecker, to walk their students
to the drop-off point. The majority relies on this testimony as evidence supporting the Board’s
finding that Longanecker lacked credibility. This testimony neither confirms nor discredits
Longanecker’s story about walking her students to physical education and does not support the
Board’s finding that Longanecker did not walk her students to the meeting point that day, which
directly contradicts Mitchell’s claims. The Board is limited to supplementing the findings only
when the hearing officer’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The hearing
officer did not include the testimony of the two teachers in his findings, presumably because they
did not add to or detract from the facts at issue.
¶ 80 The Board challenges the hearing officer’s observation to Longanecker’s inquiry
during Humphries’s testimony that the video from the hallway could have shown Longanecker
walking her students to the physical education class meeting place. Humphries stated that
nothing was offered by Longanecker in support of her claim that she escorted her students. The
Board supplemented the hearing officer’s findings, characterizing Humphries’s testimony on this
43
point as an important fact. It considered that the bill of particulars was served on Longanecker on
March 18, 2014, and alleged that she opened the test booklet when the students left for physical
education. The Board further surmises that because the technology director testified videos were
preserved for 30 days, Longanecker had ample time to secure the video in support of her version
of events and her failure to do so leaves Humphries’s testimony uncontradicted. Humphries
himself testified that Longanecker’s failure to provide evidence in her behalf indicated to him
that “she herself felt that she was guilty.” Although he ran the investigation, he could not
“recollect” whether he asked for the video to confirm Longanecker’s or Mitchell’s version of
events. He did not know who asked for the video footage but suggested that “someone must
have” requested the video. He was aware that “some people” viewed it. He did not watch it
because he considered that there was no conflicting evidence to which the video would speak.
¶ 81 Humphries described his obligation in the investigation as to look at all sides but
determined that Longanecker did not offer any evidence, and since there were no cameras in her
classroom, he was not sure what the video would have shown. He did, however, acknowledge
the hallway video would have shown if Longanecker escorted her students. In his view, his
expectation as the investigator as to whether others such as Longanecker should bring him
information depended on the circumstances. For example, he sought out an interview with
Mitchell but did not seek out the video because there were no assertions that Longanecker
offered the video “in hopes of exoneration.” According to Humphries, “there’s been nothing
offered.” He could not explain why the video was not viewed but he was never asked to look at it
or offered a reason why he should look at it. He did recall viewing a still photo from video
footage supporting that Dunn dropped the tests off in Longanecker’s classroom but did not know
who asked for that video. In his view, he would have expected Longanecker to provide evidence
44
in her defense, although it was not her responsibility to exonerate herself. He found her absence
of explanation telling and considered that Longanecker never admitted nor denied the charges
against her. In his experience, guilty people deflect, for example, with anger or agitation, like
Longanecker did, although he also admitted a person falsely accused would be angry and
agitated.
¶ 82 The Board also added as critical testimony that the bell schedule shows physical
education class was 41 minutes long with 3 minutes for the passing period. In its reasoning, the
length of the physical education period apparently contradicted Longanecker’s claims regarding
the time sequence surrounding her class going to the physical education meeting place on
February 27 and supported its finding that Longanecker lacked credibility, which the majority
accepts. The Board considered its interpretation of the time periods made Longanecker’s
testimony of her actions during that period not possible or likely and thus unsupported by the
evidence. However, contrary to the Board’s finding, Longanecker’s testimony was not that
“nothing happens” when the bell rings but that the students are required to wait for her or the
student teacher to release them to line up to leave the classroom for physical education class.
Further, she said she did not leave the room at precisely 10:30 a.m. with the students, that the
bell rang at 10:32 a.m., that a lesson could continue past the bell, and that the student preparation
time to line up to leave took approximately one to four minutes. Longanecker stated that she
would delegate some duties to the student teacher, such as preparing the students for physical
education class, and that the students would never leave the room without her. I see no
connection between the events as described by Longanecker and the testimony of the other fifth
grade and the physical education teachers, and I am not persuaded that the hearing officer’s
failure to include the other teachers’ statements was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
45
In addition, I find no connection between the teachers’ testimony and Longanecker’s credibility.
As stated above, the supplemented findings do not confirm or deny Longanecker’s version of
events that morning and the Board had no reason to add them to the order and to reject the
hearing officer’s findings on this issue. Indeed, the fact that there is evidence Longanecker sent
e-mails during this time period, which she could have done after walking her students to the
physical education class meeting place as she testified, discredits Mitchell’s recollection of
events and makes the Board’s conclusions speculative and in contradiction to the evidence.
¶ 83 Next, the Board accords weight to the fact that Longanecker received an e-mail
from the student teacher’s supervisor the Monday after the alleged cheating stating that Mitchell
would be absent the rest of the week “due to a personal issue” and finds it supports the student
teacher’s claims that Longanecker indicated she was going to “teach to the test.” According to
the Board’s reasoning, the e-mail on March 4 regarding the student teacher alerted Longanecker
that the student teacher reported Longanecker’s misconduct and allowed Longanecker time to
destroy any lesson plans prepared based on the ISAT materials. The e-mail does not contain any
language from which Longanecker could determine that Mitchell had made an allegation against
her. To the contrary, the e-mail to Longanecker included information apparently in response to a
request from Longanecker regarding waivers she received from Western Illinois University that
were missing or expired in addition to the information regarding Mitchell. In response,
Longanecker indicated that she hoped all was well with Mitchell. There is nothing, not one
single word, in the e-mails to provide any support for the Board’s finding that the e-mails alerted
Longanecker that Mitchell had reported her misconduct and caused her to destroy improper
lesson plans. The Board’s findings in this regard are blatant speculation. There is simply nothing
in the record that shows the e-mail from Mitchell’s teaching advisor to Longanecker somehow
46
“alerted” her to destroy her lesson plans. Testimony by the district’s technology director
established that he searched Longanecker’s computer and did not find any evidence that she
tailored her lesson plans or classroom activities to the ISAT. The search by the technology
director would uncover any destroyed documents and did not. Although the Board surmises that
Longanecker knew to use only handwritten lesson plans, there is no support anywhere in the
record for the Board’s finding, which, again, is pure speculation and is insufficient to overturn
the hearing officer’s findings.
¶ 84 The hearing officer found there was no evidence to support Mitchell’s testimony
that Longanecker intended to tailor her lessons to the ISAT. The Board, however, rejected the
hearing officer’s findings, despite a search of Longanecker’s computer by the technology
director and a review of the items on the walls of Longanecker’s classroom, which uncovered no
evidence to support Mitchell’s claims. In contrast, the Board determined that the hearing officer
overstated the importance of the lack of supporting evidence. In its view, the evidence
established that Longanecker was aware that Mitchell had reported her misconduct before Harris
or the other administrators knew, allowing her the opportunity to destroy the teaching materials.
The Board bases its theory on the facts that Mitchell claimed Longanecker opened the test
booklet on February 27 and that Longanecker received an e-mail on March 4 from Mitchell’s
supervisor informing her that Mitchell would be absent from student teaching. According to the
Board, the e-mail alerted Longanecker that Mitchell had reported her alleged misconduct.
However, the e-mail merely stated that Mitchell’s absence was due to “a personal issue.” It is
improbable to interpret the e-mail as an indication that Mitchell had reported Longanecker for
cheating and a forewarning for her to destroy the alleged instructional materials she alleged
created in response to her review of the test.
47
¶ 85 Similarly speculative are the Board’s supplemental findings that the test booklet
and the instruction manual are impossible to confuse. I do not know how this arbitrary statement
can be taken as a finding of fact. Longanecker testified that she brought the instruction manual to
Harris as he was going through the tests. Evans said Longanecker found a test booklet and he
saw broken seals on it when she brought it to Harris. The Board finds significant that
Longanecker admitted that a “booklet” was found in her classroom separated from the other test
booklets. Longanecker actually testified that she found the test manual on her desk and brought it
to Harris while he was examining the test booklets for open seals. According to the Board, it
would be impossible to confuse the two booklets, despite that they both had orange and white
covers. The Board points to Evans’s testimony that he could see the broken seals as support that
it was “clearly evident” the booklet Longanecker discovered was the booklet at issue. The
testimonies concerning the discovery of test booklet No. 4587910063 were anything but “clearly
evident.” Harris testified that Evans found the booklet with open seals on Longanecker’s desk
among other papers and brought it to him. He said the booklet was placed on the top of the pile.
Evans claimed the open-sealed test booklet was found in the front of the classroom under a pile
of papers near Longanecker’s desk and that Longanecker found it and brought it to him and
Harris, who added it to the top of the pile to be reviewed. Kalman testified she did not see where
booklet No. 4587910063 was found. The Board’s findings that “it is clearly evident that
[Longanecker] brought from [her] desk an ISAT test booklet with open seals” is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. See Burgess, 2020 IL App (3d) 170076, ¶ 79 (rejecting Board’s
conclusion where there was “no consensus” misconduct occurred). Opposing testimony was
presented, negating the possibility that anything was “clearly evident,” and aside from the
Board’s own judgment, there was no evidence that “it would be impossible to confuse” the
48
manual and test booklet. Moreover, the majority reliance on this finding as evidence that
Longanecker lacked credibility is without merit.
¶ 86 The Board supplemented the hearing officer’s findings with its interpretation of
Longanecker’s response to the investigation into the test booklets. The Board affords substantial
weight to Longanecker’s comments before the group entered her classroom to examine the test
booklets where she told a colleague she thought she was being accused of stealing test booklets.
She commented that she did not care enough about the test to cheat. The Board concludes this
supports that Longanecker engaged in misconduct and cheated on administering the tests. In my
view, this comment is reasonable in light that the principal had just informed Longanecker that
she had to account for all the test booklets. I find her comments that she did not care enough
about the test to cheat or steal the booklets do not aid the Board’s conclusion that they supported
Mitchell’s version of events. They are not an admission of cheating. Furthermore, as discussed
above, Mitchell’s testimony was not supported by any evidence that Longanecker adapted her
lessons to the test as Mitchell stated.
¶ 87 It is also contrary to the Board’s supplemental finding that Mitchell’s version is
further supported by e-mails Longanecker sent during the time the Board presumes she was
walking her students to the physical education meeting point. It was probable that Longanecker
delegated, as was her practice, the physical education preparation to Mitchell while she caught
up with her e-mails on the computer located in her classroom. Longanecker suggested that she
could have stopped in the office after escorting her students and sent the e-mails from there. The
administration did not present any evidence about the e-mails Longanecker said she sent, such as
from which computer they originated. The time of the e-mails does not contradict Longanecker’s
timetable of events and does not support Mitchell’s version. Actually, the time of these e-mails
49
stands in direct conflict with Mitchell’s testimony that Longanecker opened the test booklet as
soon as the students were dismissed for physical education class. The timing of the e-mails
refutes Mitchell’s testimony in that regard. The Board’s opposite determination is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 88 The Board’s findings of fact and the manner in which it made credibility
determinations are very similar to the scenario set forth in Burgess, 2020 IL App (3d) 170076,
¶¶ 75, 77, where this court rejected the Board’s ultimate findings of fact as against the manifest
weight of the evidence where there was no basis for finding the Board’s witnesses more credible
other than bias. The same is true here. A complete review of the record in this matter
demonstrates the Board’s supplemental findings were against the manifest weight of the
evidence and further its ultimate decision to terminate Longanecker was clearly erroneous. I
would reverse the Board’s decision, adopt the hearing officer’s findings and order Longanecker
reinstated as set forth in the hearing officer’s opinion.
50