Department of Transportation v. Greatbanc Trust Co. , 2019 IL App (1st) 171393 ( 2020 )


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    Appellate Court                              Date: 2020.12.07
    13:55:11 -06'00'
    Department of Transportation v. GreatBanc Trust Co.,
    
    2020 IL App (1st) 171393
    Appellate Court         THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, for and on Behalf of
    Caption                 the People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
    GREATBANC TRUST COMPANY, Formerly Known as First
    National Bank in Chicago Heights, as Trustee Under Trust Agreement
    Dated October 8, 1973, and Known as Trust Number 996; THE
    BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES of a Trust Agreement Dated
    October 8, 1973, and Known as Trust Number 996, With GreatBanc
    Trust Company, Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago
    Heights, as Trustee, Whose Names Are Unknown and Are Designated
    Unknown Owners; GREATBANC TRUST COMPANY, Formerly
    Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights, as Trustee Under
    a Trust Agreement Dated December 4, 1970, and Known as Trust
    Number 1447; THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES of a Trust
    Agreement, Dated December 4, 1970, and Known as Trust Number
    1447, With GreatBanc Trust Company, Formerly Known as First
    National Bank in Chicago Heights, as Trustee, Whose Names Are
    Unknown and Are Designated Unknown Owners; PETER KATTOS;
    MARQUETTE BANK a/k/a MARQUETTE; and UNKNOWN
    OWNERS, Defendants (Neal & Leroy, LLC, Appellee).–THE
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, for and on Behalf of the
    People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
    v. GREATBANC TRUST COMPANY, Formerly Known as First
    National Bank in Chicago Heights, as Trustee Under Trust Agreement
    Dated October 8, 1973, and Known as Trust Number 996; THE
    BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES of a Trust Agreement Dated
    October 8, 1973, and Known as Trust Number 996, With GreatBanc
    Trust Company, Formerly Known as First National Bank in Chicago
    Heights, as Trustee, Whose Names Are Unknown and Are Designated
    Unknown Owners; GREATBANC TRUST COMPANY, Formerly
    Known as First National Bank in Chicago Heights, as Trustee Under
    a Trust Agreement Dated December 4, 1970, and Known as Trust
    Number 1447; THE BENEFICIARY OR BENEFICIARIES of a Trust
    Agreement, Dated December 4, 1970, and Known as Trust Number
    1447, With GreatBanc Trust Company, Formerly Known as First
    National Bank in Chicago Heights, as Trustee, Whose Names Are
    Unknown and Are Designated Unknown Owners; PETER KATTOS;
    MARQUETTE BANK a/k/a MARQUETTE; and UNKNOWN
    OWNERS, Defendants (Peter Kattos, Defendant-Appellant and
    Cross-Appellee).
    District & No.   First District, Second Division
    Nos. 1-17-1393, 1-18-2310 cons.
    Filed            March 10, 2020
    Decision Under   Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 06-L-050813; the
    Review           Hon. Alexander P. White and the Hon. Thomas More Donnelly,
    Judges, presiding.
    Judgment         No. 1-17-1393, Affirmed.
    No. 1-18-2310, Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
    Counsel on       Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz,
    Appeal           Solicitor General, and Amanda Ripp, Special Assistant Attorney
    General, of Walker Wilcox Matousek, LLP, of counsel), for appellant
    Department of Transportation.
    Carl A. Gigante and Rebecca Kaiser Fournier, of Figliulo &
    Silverman, PC, of Chicago, for appellee Peter Kattos.
    Langdon D. Neal and Nicole Castillo, of Neal & Leroy, LLC, of
    Chicago, for appellee Neal & Leroy, LLC.
    Panel            JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with
    opinion.
    Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Coghlan concurred in
    the judgment and opinion.
    -2-
    OPINION
    ¶1       In the consolidated appeals from this eminent domain matter, the parties’ disputes center
    around a series of orders entered by the trial court on the withdrawal and subsequent refund of
    preliminary compensation funds deposited by plaintiff, the Illinois Department of
    Transportation (IDOT), pursuant to section 20-5-15 of the Eminent Domain Act (Act) (735
    ILCS 30/20-5-15 (West 2006)). In appeal No. 1-17-1393, IDOT argues that the trial court erred
    in (1) permitting Neal & Leroy, LLC (N&L), defendant Peter Kattos’s former counsel, to
    withdraw preliminary compensation funds; (2) not requiring N&L to participate in the refund
    of excess preliminary compensation funds; and (3) not permitting IDOT to conduct discovery
    or file a written response to N&L’s petition to vacate. In appeal No. 1-18-2310, Kattos argues
    that the trial court erred in awarding IDOT prejudgment interest on the preliminary
    compensation refund prior to a determination of the precise amounts owed by each of the
    refunding parties. In its cross-appeal in No. 1-18-2310, IDOT argues that the trial court
    incorrectly held that a pending appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to determine who was
    responsible for refunding the portion of preliminary compensation funds received by N&L.
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm in appeal No. 1-17-1393. In appeal No. 1-18-2310, we
    affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in Kattos’s appeal and determine that IDOT’s cross-
    appeal is moot.
    ¶2                                       I. BACKGROUND
    ¶3       In August 2006, IDOT filed a complaint to condemn a portion of real property located at
    the intersection of U.S. Route 6 and U.S. Route 45 in Orland Park, in which the named
    defendants had either an ownership or beneficial interest (subject property), for use in a road
    improvement project. The record is not clear on the precise relationship of the named
    defendants to the subject property. Although not specifically stated anywhere, it appears, based
    on information gathered in the record and from statements in the parties’ appellate briefs, that
    the two trusts for which GreatBanc Trust Company (GreatBanc) is the trustee were the record
    owners of the two parcels that comprised the subject property. The beneficiaries of those trusts
    were Ashton Drive, LLC (Ashton), and Petey’s Two Real Estate, LLC (Petey’s), both owned
    in part by Kattos but neither named as defendants.
    ¶4       In September 2006, pursuant to quick-take proceedings 1 instituted by IDOT, the trial court
    set the preliminary just compensation for the subject property at $3,202,000, which IDOT
    deposited with the Cook County Treasurer the following month. Thereafter, in January 2007,
    Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s filed a verified petition to withdraw the preliminary
    compensation (petition to withdraw). In their petition to withdraw, Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton,
    and Petey’s sought to withdraw the full amount of the deposited preliminary compensation. In
    support, they represented that they and defendant Marquette Bank (Marquette), who held a
    mortgage on a portion of the subject property, were the only parties who had any interest in
    1
    “Quick-take is a proceeding within an eminent domain proceeding, whereby title and possession
    to property is placed in the State prior to a final determination of just compensation. [Citation.] It is a
    means to prevent delays to public projects and to protect the rights of a landowner, by allowing the
    issue of compensation to be litigated at a later date.” Department of Transportation v. Anderson, 
    384 Ill. App. 3d 309
    , 314 (2008).
    -3-
    the subject property and that, should the trial court later determine that a refund of any portion
    of the withdrawn preliminary compensation is necessary, they would be responsible for
    refunding any amount exceeding the determination of just compensation. They asked that the
    trial court enter an order directing the disbursement of the preliminary compensation funds
    according to a letter of direction, which would include disbursement to Marquette to pay off
    the mortgage, payment to N&L for attorney fees and costs, and payments to Ashton and
    Petey’s.
    ¶5        In response, IDOT did not object to the actual withdrawal of the preliminary compensation
    funds, but instead objected to the withdrawal of the preliminary compensation funds in the
    absence of an order specifying the identities of all of the fund recipients and the precise
    amounts they were to receive. IDOT also argued that the withdrawal order needed to specify
    that the withdrawal of the funds was conditioned on the refund of any excess funds following
    the determination of just compensation and that some preliminary compensation funds should
    be held back to ensure the demolition of a building on the subject property. In addition, IDOT
    questioned in a footnote of its written response whether N&L was an “interested party” under
    the Act. IDOT argued that if N&L was an “interested party,” then it was also subject to the
    refund provisions of the Act. IDOT did not, however, argue that N&L was precluded from
    receiving any of the funds because it was not an “interested party.”
    ¶6        Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the petition to withdraw the funds.
    Without specifying precise amounts, the trial court directed that the county treasurer disburse
    the preliminary compensation funds to a number of entities, including Marquette to pay off the
    outstanding mortgage on the subject property and N&L for attorney fees and costs, pursuant
    to a letter of direction to follow. The order also stated that any withdrawing party would be
    required to refund any amount that exceeded the final just compensation determination. Of the
    $3,202,000 in preliminary compensation, $3,102,000 was ultimately distributed—Marquette
    received $319,054.26, N&L received $284,067.95, Ashton received $1,313,069.42, and
    Petey’s received $1,185,808.37. The remaining $100,000 of the preliminary compensation was
    left on deposit with the county treasurer as security for the demolition holdback, as requested
    by IDOT.
    ¶7        On April 27, 2017, the trial court entered a final judgment order, setting the final just
    compensation for the subject property at $1,520,000. In that order, the trial court also directed
    that within 30 days, Marquette, N&L, Ashton, and Petey’s refund their pro rata share of
    $1,582,000, the amount the withdrawn preliminary compensation funds exceeded the final just
    compensation. 2
    ¶8        Shortly thereafter, N&L, which no longer represented Kattos, Ashton, or Petey’s, filed a
    petition for leave to file a limited appearance for the purpose of contesting the trial court’s
    jurisdiction over N&L. The trial court granted N&L leave to file its limited appearance, after
    which N&L filed a petition to vacate the final judgment order as void with respect to N&L
    (petition to vacate). In the petition to vacate, N&L argued that the final judgment order was
    void as to N&L because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over N&L since N&L was not a
    party to the case and did not receive proper notice of the entry of the judgment. N&L also
    2
    $3,202,000 (total preliminary compensation deposited) - $100,000 (demolition hold back) -
    $1,520,000 (final just compensation) = $1,582,000 (excess preliminary compensation distributed).
    -4-
    argued that no motion had been filed asking for judgment against N&L and that the trial court
    entered the final judgment order prior to the date originally set for its entry.
    ¶9         On May 17, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the petition to vacate. During that
    hearing, counsel for Kattos indicated that he intended to file a notice of appeal from the April
    27, 2017, final judgment order. N&L expressed concern that the filing of Kattos’s notice of
    appeal would divest the trial court of jurisdiction to review the issue of whether the final
    judgment order was void as to N&L and suggested that granting the petition to vacate would
    preserve Kattos’s right to appeal without causing prejudice to any of the parties. IDOT objected
    to the notion that it was necessary to vacate the final judgment order as to N&L in order to
    allow Kattos to proceed with his appeal. IDOT also requested the opportunity to respond to
    N&L’s petition to vacate before the trial court ruled on it.
    ¶ 10       Concerned that Kattos’s right to appeal might be jeopardized, the trial court agreed to
    vacate the final judgment order as to N&L so as to allow Kattos’s appeal to proceed. The trial
    court reasoned that this would preserve Kattos’s right to appeal, would not jeopardize N&L’s
    or IDOT’s position on the issue of whether N&L should participate in the refund of excess
    preliminary compensation funds, and would allow the appellate court to provide guidance on
    how the trial court should proceed. Later in the hearing, the trial court stated that it was also
    granting the petition to vacate on the basis that N&L was not a party to the action. The trial
    court denied IDOT’s request to file a response, stating that it found N&L to not be a party to
    the case, and thus, a written response from IDOT was unnecessary. The written order granting
    N&L’s petition to vacate was entered on May 17, 2017, and stated that N&L’s petition to
    vacate was granted over IDOT’s objection on the basis that N&L was not a party to the
    proceedings. Accordingly, the final judgment order was vacated as to N&L.
    ¶ 11       Thereafter, IDOT instituted appeal No. 1-17-1393. IDOT’s notice of appeal indicated that
    IDOT was appealing from the final judgment order of April 27, 2017, and the order of May
    17, 2017, granting N&L’s petition to vacate the final judgment order as to N&L and denying
    IDOT leave to file a response to the petition to vacate.
    ¶ 12       In June 2017, IDOT filed a motion for entry of judgment against Marquette and against
    Ashton and Petey’s as beneficiaries of the GreatBanc trusts. IDOT alleged that Marquette,
    Ashton, and Petey’s had failed to refund their pro rata share of the excess preliminary
    compensation funds, and thus, IDOT, pursuant to section 20-5-35 of the Act (735 ILCS 30/20-
    5-35 (West 2016)), was entitled to a judgment against them in the amounts of their respective
    pro rata shares of the excess preliminary compensation funds, plus interest. In its response,
    Marquette argued that it should not be subject to participating in the refund of the excess
    preliminary compensation because Kattos, Ashton, Petey’s, and GreatBanc sought the
    withdrawal of the preliminary compensation funds, not Marquette, and because Marquette was
    only paid preliminary compensation funds at the direction of Kattos, Ashton, Petey’s, and
    GreatBanc.
    ¶ 13       In October 2017, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered an order granting
    IDOT’s motion for judgment. Because Marquette was listed on the withdrawal order and
    received preliminary compensation funds, the trial court concluded that it was subject to
    participating in the refund of the excess preliminary compensation funds. Accordingly, the trial
    court held that IDOT was entitled to judgment against Marquette, Ashton, and Petey’s in
    amounts proportionate to the amounts they each received in preliminary compensation funds.
    -5-
    The trial court continued the matter for an evidentiary hearing to determine the precise amounts
    of the judgments to be entered.
    ¶ 14        Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted briefs regarding the appropriate
    amount of the judgments and the application of interest. Kattos argued that the trial court was
    divested of jurisdiction to make a determination of responsibility for refunding the preliminary
    compensation funds received by N&L because of IDOT’s pending appeal from the final
    judgment order and the order granting N&L’s petition to vacate. Kattos also argued that interest
    on the refund amounts had not yet started to accrue and that Ashton and Petey’s could not
    jointly and severally be liable for the refund amounts. Finally, Kattos argued that Marquette
    was entitled to the funds it received and that Ashton and Petey’s should be responsible for the
    refund portion attributable to the funds received by Marquette.
    ¶ 15        Marquette argued that it should not be required to refund any of the preliminary
    compensation funds it received because it had a lien on the subject property that took priority
    over the owners’ interest in the subject property and it did not receive any funds in excess of
    what it was owed on the mortgage. According to Marquette, if it was required to refund its
    portion of the preliminary compensation funds, it would be left in the position of being owed
    money on the subject property without having a mortgage to secure the lien. Marquette also
    noted that Ashton and Petey’s agreed, at the time of withdrawal, to be responsible for any
    refund of excess funds.
    ¶ 16        On September 26, 2018, the trial court entered two orders. In the first order, the trial court
    found that the amount of just compensation due to Marquette was $319,054.26. Because the
    amount of preliminary compensation funds that Marquette received did not exceed
    $319,054.26, the trial court concluded that Marquette did not have to participate in the refund
    of excess funds to IDOT. In the second order entered that day, the trial court held that interest
    began accruing on the excess preliminary compensation funds upon the entry of the final
    judgment order on April 27, 2017, and that Ashton and Petey’s were jointly and severally liable
    for the amount of the refund. The trial court took under advisement the issue of allocating
    N&L’s share of the refund.
    ¶ 17        One month later, on October 24, 2018, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and
    order. In it, the trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over N&L and its pro rata share
    of the refund due to IDOT’s pending appeal. Accordingly, it made no determination as to
    N&L’s share of the excess preliminary compensation funds and instead entered judgment
    against Ashton and Petey’s in the amount of $1,297,932.05, their share of the excess
    preliminary compensation funds, plus their share of interest, which the trial court calculated at
    $174,127.41. The trial court also ordered that the judgment would continue to accrue interest
    at the rate of 9% per annum until paid, in accordance with section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2006)).
    ¶ 18        Thereafter, Kattos instituted appeal No. 1-18-2310, in which he contests the trial court’s
    determination that IDOT was entitled to interest starting on April 27, 2017. IDOT filed a cross-
    appeal, this time challenging the trial court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to make
    any determinations regarding the allocation of N&L’s portion of the refund.
    ¶ 19                                     II. ANALYSIS
    ¶ 20      In appeal No. 1-17-1393, IDOT argues that the trial court erred in (1) permitting N&L to
    withdraw preliminary compensation funds, (2) not requiring N&L to participate in the refund
    -6-
    of excess preliminary compensation funds, and (3) not permitting IDOT to conduct discovery
    or file a written response to N&L’s petition to vacate. In appeal No. 1-18-2310, Kattos argues
    that the trial court erred in awarding IDOT prejudgment interest on the preliminary
    compensation refund prior to a determination of the precise amounts owed by each of the
    refunding parties. In its cross-appeal in No. 1-18-2310, IDOT argues that the trial court
    incorrectly held that a pending appeal deprived it of jurisdiction to determine who was
    responsible for refunding the portion of preliminary compensation funds received by N&L.
    We address each of these in turn.
    ¶ 21                                     A. Appeal No. 1-17-1393
    ¶ 22                                            1. Jurisdiction
    ¶ 23        Before addressing the merits of IDOT’s contentions, we must first address N&L’s
    argument that we lack jurisdiction over IDOT’s appeal. With respect to IDOT’s contentions of
    error in the order granting the petition to withdraw, N&L argues that because the order granting
    the petition to withdraw was not final and IDOT did not obtain a finding under Illinois Supreme
    Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), we lack jurisdiction to review it. N&L also argues that
    we lack jurisdiction over this issue because IDOT did not mention it or the January 18, 2007,
    order granting the petition to withdraw in its notice of appeal. In addition, N&L argues that we
    lack jurisdiction to review IDOT’s contention that the trial court erred in vacating the final
    judgment order as to N&L because once the final judgment order was vacated as to N&L, the
    merits of the claim remained pending against N&L and an Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a)
    (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) finding was required. N&L’s contentions are without merit.
    ¶ 24        We agree—and IDOT does not dispute—that the order granting the petition to withdraw
    was not a final order because it did not dispose of the parties’ rights on some separate and
    definite part of the controversy (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. John J. Rickhoff Sheet
    Metal Co., 
    394 Ill. App. 3d 548
    , 556 (2009)); rather, the order simply permitted the conditional
    withdrawal of preliminary compensation funds, but left open the final determination of the
    actual compensation due to the property owners. N&L believes, however, that because the
    order granting the petition to withdraw was not final, a Rule 304(a) finding was required. This
    is not the case. Rule 304(a) is a mechanism by which a party may appeal a final order that does
    not resolve all claims against all parties (id.); it does not, as N&L seems to believe, make an
    otherwise nonfinal order final (MidFirst Bank v. McNeal, 
    2016 IL App (1st) 150465
    , ¶ 25).
    Any Rule 304(a) finding entered with respect to the January 18, 2007, order would have no
    effect on the finality of the order and would not solve the jurisdictional defect N&L claims
    exists. Thus, the existence or nonexistence of a Rule 304(a) finding in the January 18, 2007,
    order is not fatal to our jurisdiction because such a finding is completely irrelevant in this
    context.
    ¶ 25        The fact that the January 18, 2007, order was not final at the time that it was entered also
    does not preclude us from exercising jurisdiction because the January 18, 2007, withdrawal
    order was a step in producing the final judgment order and thus became reviewable once the
    trial court entered the final judgment order on April 27, 2017, which set the final just
    compensation for the subject property. See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage
    Standard Bank & Trust Co., 
    157 Ill. 2d 282
    , 288-89 (1993) (judgment on jury’s verdict on final
    compensation and ordering refund of excess preliminary compensation funds withdrawn was
    final and appealable order); Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 
    76 Ill. 2d 427
    , 433 (1979)
    -7-
    (an appeal from a final judgment draws into question all non-final orders that produced the
    judgment). For the same reason, IDOT’s failure to specifically include the January 18, 2007,
    order in the notice of appeal is not fatal to our jurisdiction. See Burtell, 
    76 Ill. 2d at 435
     (orders
    unspecified in notices of appeal are reviewable if they are a step in the procedural progression
    leading to the specified judgment).
    ¶ 26        As far as N&L’s claim that we lack jurisdiction to review IDOT’s contention that the trial
    court erred in vacating the final judgment order as to N&L, we also find it to be without merit.
    According to N&L, we lack jurisdiction to review the trial court’s grant of the petition to vacate
    because the result of that order was to leave the refund claim against N&L pending, thus
    necessitating a Rule 304(a) finding. The final judgment order of April 27, 2017, contained a
    Rule 304(a) finding, but N&L argues that the finding in that order does not cover the May 17,
    2017, order granting the petition to vacate because the final judgment order, having been
    vacated as to N&L, essentially does not exist with respect to N&L. We disagree.
    ¶ 27        The final judgment order, as originally entered, provided that N&L, Marquette, Ashton,
    and Petey’s were each to refund their pro rata share of the excess preliminary compensation
    funds. N&L then filed its petition to vacate directed against the final judgment order, which
    the trial court granted on the basis that N&L was not a party to the action. By removing N&L
    from the final judgment order on N&L’s postjudgment motion, the trial court essentially
    modified the final judgment order to require only Marquette, Ashton, and Petey’s to share in
    the refund of the excess preliminary compensation funds. Although IDOT frames its argument
    in terms of the order granting the petition to vacate being error, IDOT’s contention, at its core,
    is that the trial court erred in not requiring N&L to participate in the refund of the excess
    preliminary compensation funds, a result that springs from the modified final judgment order.
    Following the resolution of N&L’s postjudgment motion, the final judgment order became
    final and appealable. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) (providing that the time for
    filing a notice of appeal is tolled until the resolution of the last pending postjudgment motion).
    To the extent that there were other matters that remained pending, the Rule 304(a) finding in
    the final judgment order was sufficient to permit IDOT’s appeal. See Waters v. Reingold, 
    278 Ill. App. 3d 647
    , 652 n.5 (1996), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Niccum v. Botti,
    Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 
    182 Ill. 2d 6
    , 8 (1998) (“[W]here the judgment order
    contains a Rule 304(a) finding, the mere filing of a post-trial motion against that judgment will
    not invalidate that prior Rule 304(a) finding or necessitate a second Rule 304(a) finding in the
    order disposing of the post-trial motion.”)
    ¶ 28        In sum, we conclude that N&L’s contentions directed against our jurisdiction over appeal
    No. 1-17-1393 are without merit and that we do, in fact, have jurisdiction to review IDOT’s
    contentions in this appeal.
    ¶ 29                      2. N&L’s Receipt of Funds and Participation in Refund
    ¶ 30       Turning to the merits of IDOT’s contentions in this appeal, IDOT’s primary arguments are
    that the trial court erred in allowing N&L to withdraw preliminary compensation funds and in
    not requiring N&L to participate in the refund of the excess preliminary compensation funds.
    Because our resolutions of these issues are somewhat intertwined, we address them together.
    ¶ 31       With respect to IDOT’s contention that the trial court erred in allowing N&L to withdraw
    preliminary compensation funds because N&L was not a party to the proceedings with an
    interest in the subject property, we conclude that IDOT has waived this contention for failing
    -8-
    to timely raise it in the trial court. Although the petition to withdraw identified N&L as one of
    the proposed recipients of preliminary compensation funds, in its response to the petition to
    withdraw, IDOT failed to raise any argument that N&L should not be allowed to receive any
    of the funds because it was not a party with an interest in the subject property. Even the footnote
    in IDOT’s response that questioned whether N&L was an interested party did so in the context
    of whether N&L would be subject to the refund provisions of the Act, not whether N&L was
    precluded from receiving any of the preliminary compensation funds. We also observe that
    IDOT has failed to include a transcript from the hearing on the petition to withdraw, making it
    impossible for us to determine whether IDOT raised this contention during the hearing or to
    conduct a meaningful review of IDOT’s claim. See Foutch v. O’Bryant, 
    99 Ill. 2d 389
    , 391-92
    (1984) (“[A]n appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the
    proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on appeal,
    it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had
    a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record
    will be resolved against the appellant.”). Accordingly, because there is nothing in the record
    demonstrating that IDOT raised this issue in the trial court, we must conclude that IDOT has
    waived it on appeal. Schanowitz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
    299 Ill. App. 3d 843
    , 848 (1998) (“It is well settled that an appellant who fails to raise an issue in the trial
    court waives the issue on appeal.”).
    ¶ 32        Even putting waiver aside, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing N&L to
    receive preliminary compensation funds and emphasize that although N&L did receive some
    of the preliminary compensation funds, it did not withdraw them; rather, Kattos, GreatBanc,
    Ashton, and Petey’s did. We recognize that it is unlikely that the trial court based its decisions
    on this reasoning, given the fact that the trial court vacated the final judgment order as to N&L
    on the basis that N&L was not a party to the case and, years later, rejected Marquette’s
    contention that it was not subject to the refund provisions of the Act because it was not the
    withdrawing party. Regardless of whether the trial court relied on this basis in its rulings—or
    even whether the trial court would agree with our conclusion—we are free to affirm on any
    basis supported by the record, regardless of the trial court’s reasoning. See Alpha School Bus
    Co. v. Wagner, 
    391 Ill. App. 3d 722
    , 734 (2009) (“[W]e may affirm the judgment of the trial
    court on any basis in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied upon that basis or
    whether the trial court’s reasoning was correct.”). For the reasons that follow, our review of
    the record leads us to conclude that N&L did not itself withdraw preliminary compensation
    funds, but instead was paid attorney fees from preliminary compensation funds withdrawn by
    Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s. In turn, because it was Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton,
    and Petey’s that withdrew the preliminary compensation funds, the trial court did not err in not
    requiring N&L to participate in the refund of the excess preliminary compensation funds.
    ¶ 33        In quick-take proceedings, to permit the petitioner to take immediate title to the subject
    property, the trial court is required to set an amount of preliminary compensation that the
    condemning party is required to deposit with the county treasurer. 735 ILCS 30/20-5-10, 20-
    5-15 (West 2006). Once IDOT deposited the preliminary compensation with the county
    treasurer in this case, the Act provides that “any party interested in the property may apply to
    the court for authority to withdraw, for his or her own use, his or her share (or any part thereof)
    of the amount preliminarily found by the court to be just compensation and deposited by the
    -9-
    plaintiff.” 
    Id.
     § 20-5-20. If the trial court authorizes the withdrawal of preliminary
    compensation funds, it must do so
    “upon the condition that the party making the withdrawal shall refund to the clerk of
    the court, upon the entry of a proper court order, any portion of the amount withdrawn
    that exceeds the amount finally ascertained in the proceeding to be just compensation
    (or damages, costs, expenses, or attorney fees) owing to that party.” Id.
    The Act further provides:
    “If the amount withdrawn from deposit by any interested party under the provision of
    Section 20-5-20 of this Act exceeds the amount finally adjudged to be just
    compensation (or damages, costs, expenses, and attorney fees) due to that party, the
    court shall order that party to refund the excess to the clerk of the court and, if refund
    is not made within a reasonable time fixed by the court, shall enter judgment for the
    excess in favor of the plaintiff and against that party.” Id. § 20-5-35.
    ¶ 34       We think it clear—and the parties do not dispute—that only those parties with an interest
    in the subject property are permitted to make withdrawals on the preliminary compensation
    funds. See id. § 20-5-20 (providing that “any party interested in the property” may petition for
    withdrawal of preliminary compensation funds). The parties also agree that N&L does not have
    an interest in the subject property. IDOT contends that this means that the trial court erred in
    permitting N&L to withdraw preliminary compensation funds, but N&L argues that it did not
    withdraw funds, Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s did. As stated above, we conclude
    that the record supports N&L’s position.
    ¶ 35       The record indicates that the petition to withdraw was filed by Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton,
    and Petey’s, not N&L in its personal capacity. In the petition to withdraw, Kattos, GreatBanc,
    Ashton, and Petey’s specifically stated that they sought to withdraw the entire amount of the
    preliminary compensation funds and that they, with Marquette, were the only parties who had
    an interest in the subject property. According to the petition to withdraw, all the statements and
    representations contained in it were made for the purpose of inducing the county treasurer to
    “pay to the Defendants [defined as Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s] the money it holds
    as the preliminary just compensation award in the above cited lawsuit.” (Emphasis added.) In
    addition, in the petition to withdraw, Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s promised as
    follows:
    “In the event that a proper Court Order is entered herein at a later time requiring a
    refund to the Clerk of the Court of all or any portion of this amount so withdrawn, the
    Defendants [defined, again, as Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s] herein will
    refund any amount so ordered which exceeds that amount finally ascertained in the
    proceeding to be just compensation or otherwise owing to the defendant fee owner.”
    In closing, Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s requested that the trial court enter an order
    directing that the county treasurer, in amounts to be set out in a letter of direction, disburse the
    preliminary compensation funds to Marquette to pay off the mortgage it held on the subject
    property, pay N&L for attorney fees and costs, and distribute funds to Ashton and Petey’s. The
    petition to withdraw was verified by Kattos and representatives of Ashton and Petey’s.
    ¶ 36       The record also contains the letter of direction sent to the county treasurer, directing the
    disbursement of the preliminary compensation funds. The disbursement letter was sent by
    N&L in its capacity as then-counsel for Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s. In the letter,
    - 10 -
    N&L requested that the county treasurer disburse the funds “[p]ursuant to the instructions of
    our clients, [Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s].” These instructions included requests
    that $318,100.56 plus any per diem be disbursed to Marquette pursuant to its mortgage payoff
    letter and $284,067.95 be disbursed to N&L for attorney fees and costs. The remainder of the
    withdrawn preliminary compensation funds were disbursed to Ashton and Petey’s.
    ¶ 37        There is nothing in the record that suggests that N&L requested the withdrawal of the
    preliminary compensation funds or participated in the ultimate determination of how the funds
    were to be disbursed. Rather, everything in the record indicates that Kattos, GreatBanc,
    Ashton, and Petey’s alone sought to withdraw the preliminary compensation funds for their
    own benefit—namely, to pay off the debts owed to Marquette and N&L with the remainder of
    the funds to be retained by Ashton and Petey’s. Although they requested that some of the funds
    be disbursed directly to Marquette and N&L, it does not change our opinion that the funds
    were ultimately withdrawn by and used for the sole benefit of Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and
    Petey’s. It appears that the purpose of having the funds directly disbursed to Marquette and
    N&L was simply to eliminate the intermediate step of depositing the funds in the accounts of
    Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s and then making subsequent payments to Marquette
    and N&L. We see nothing in the record that persuades us that N&L participated in the
    withdrawal of the preliminary compensation funds other than in its representative capacity as
    then-counsel for Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s.
    ¶ 38        Because we conclude that N&L was not a party with an interest in the subject property and
    did not withdraw any of the preliminary compensation funds, but instead that the funds were
    all withdrawn by Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s—parties that had an interest in the
    subject property—IDOT’s contention that the trial court erred in allowing N&L to withdraw
    preliminary compensation funds is without merit.
    ¶ 39        This brings us to IDOT’s contention that the trial court erred in not requiring N&L to
    participate in the refund of the excess preliminary compensation funds. As discussed above,
    the Act requires that the withdrawal of preliminary compensation funds be conditioned on the
    refund of any withdrawn funds that exceed a subsequent determination of final just
    compensation. Id. Once a determination of final just compensation is made, the trial court is
    required to order the necessary refunds by the interested parties who withdrew the funds, and
    if the refunds are not made in a timely fashion, the trial court must enter an order against the
    delinquent withdrawing parties. Id. § 20-5-35. Nowhere in the Act is there a requirement that
    any ultimate recipient of preliminary compensation funds—regardless of whether they
    withdrew the funds or simply received them from a withdrawing party—must participate in
    the refund of excess preliminary compensation funds.
    ¶ 40        For the reasons discussed above, we have concluded that N&L is not a withdrawing party.
    As a result, because the Act provides that the withdrawing parties refund the excess
    preliminary compensation, we also conclude that the Act does not require N&L to participate
    in the refund of the excess preliminary compensation funds. That obligation belonged to the
    withdrawing parties—Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s.
    ¶ 41        IDOT argues that because the trial court ordered the disbursement of some of the
    preliminary compensation funds directly to N&L, the law firm was necessarily a withdrawing
    party. We disagree. According to IDOT, the identity of the withdrawing party cannot be made
    solely based on who filed the petition to withdraw because that would require a petitioning
    party to participate in a refund even if it did not receive any of the funds, while permitting a
    - 11 -
    party who received funds to escape the refund obligation simply because it did not file the
    petition.
    ¶ 42        Although we disagree that the simple receipt of preliminary compensation funds renders
    an entity a withdrawing party, we do not suggest that the mere filing of the petition is a
    definitive determination of who the withdrawing party is. First, as mentioned, there is nothing
    in the language of the Act that equates a withdrawing party with whoever ultimately receives
    some of the preliminary compensation funds, no matter how far removed. Second, although
    the fact that Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s filed the petition to withdraw was a factor
    in our conclusion that they were the withdrawing parties, it was far from the only, or even the
    most persuasive, factor. Rather, particularly convincing was the fact that the preliminary
    compensation funds paid to N&L were paid on behalf of Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and
    Petey’s as compensation for attorney fees and costs owing to N&L. In other words, although
    the funds were disbursed directly to N&L, the disbursement was made for the benefit of Kattos,
    GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s. Again, other than eliminating the unnecessary step of
    depositing the preliminary compensation funds in an account belonging to Kattos, GreatBanc,
    Ashton, and Petey’s, we see no difference between what happened here and the withdrawing
    parties using the withdrawn preliminary compensation funds to personally write the checks to
    pay their debts to N&L or other creditors. IDOT makes no contention that, in such a
    circumstance, N&L and the other creditors would be required to participate in the refund of
    excess preliminary compensation funds. Requiring any recipient of preliminary compensation
    funds to participate in the refund of excess funds would lead to absurd results, as it would
    create a line-drawing issue: how far removed from the initial withdrawal of the preliminary
    compensation funds may a fund recipient be held responsible for the refund? Must they be paid
    directly by the withdrawing party, or is it sufficient if they simply receive some of the funds
    after they have been passed between multiple entities as part of separate and distinct arms-
    length transactions completely unrelated to the subject property? We hardly think that such a
    result was intended by the language of the Act; instead, we believe that in circumstances such
    as are present in this case, the withdrawing party is the party with the interest in the subject
    property for whose benefit the withdrawn preliminary compensation is used. See Alvarez v.
    Pappas, 
    374 Ill. App. 3d 39
    , 44 (2007) (“In interpreting a statute, we also must presume that
    when the legislature enacted a law, it did not intend to produce absurd, inconvenient or unjust
    results.”).
    ¶ 43        Because, under the circumstances present here, N&L was not a withdrawing party, it was
    not required to participate in the refund of the excess preliminary compensation funds, and the
    trial court did not err in relieving N&L from the obligation to participate in the refund.
    ¶ 44        Since the filing of our initial opinion in this appeal, IDOT filed a petition for rehearing with
    respect to our determination that the trial court did not err in not requiring N&L to participate
    in the refund of the excess preliminary compensation funds because N&L was not a
    withdrawing party. Although we have denied IDOT’s petition for rehearing, we pause to
    comment on some of IDOT’s contentions. Most of IDOT’s arguments are simple restatements
    of the arguments raised in its briefs on appeal, such as that only parties with an interest in the
    property are permitted to withdraw preliminary compensation funds and that N&L’s name on
    the distribution order proves that it was a withdrawing party. Our analysis above addresses
    these contentions, and we see no need to repeat ourselves.
    - 12 -
    ¶ 45        We do, however, wish to comment on IDOT’s contention that by not requiring N&L to
    participate in the refund of the excess compensation, we and the trial court have (1) ignored
    authority that withdrawing parties must participate in the refund of excess compensation,
    (2) rewritten the statute to allow law firms and other creditors to make withdrawals from
    preliminary compensation funds, and (3) ignored the fact that IDOT is entitled to
    reimbursement. First, we have not ignored the requirement that withdrawing parties must
    participate in the refund of excess compensation. In fact, we specifically discuss and uphold
    that requirement in our above analysis. N&L, however, is not a withdrawing party for all the
    reasons discussed above and, thus, is not subject to that requirement. Second, we have not
    rewritten the statute. At no point in our decision have we suggested that anyone other than
    parties with an interest in the property may seek withdrawal of preliminary compensation
    funds. Once again, we point out that our conclusion is that N&L was not a withdrawing party,
    not that N&L, as a creditor of an interested party, was entitled to make withdrawals.
    ¶ 46        Finally, and most importantly, IDOT’s perception that it will have to forfeit recovery of
    the excess refund distributed to N&L is incorrect. To state our holding in the simplest of terms:
    N&L was not a withdrawing party. Therefore, N&L is not required to participate in the refund.
    Kattos, GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s were the withdrawing parties. Accordingly, Kattos,
    GreatBanc, Ashton, and Petey’s are the parties that are obligated to refund the entirety of the
    excess compensation. In other words, IDOT seeks to recover the remaining excess
    compensation from the wrong entity; but it is not our holding that IDOT cannot recover at all.
    It is unclear to us how IDOT reached the conclusion that it must recover from N&L or not
    recover at all; however, that is not the import of our holding.
    ¶ 47                    3. Denial of Leave to Conduct Discovery and File Response
    ¶ 48       IDOT also argues that the trial court erred in denying IDOT leave to conduct discovery on
    and file a written response to N&L’s petition to vacate. We review the trial court’s decision in
    this respect for an abuse of discretion. See Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Meseljevic, 
    406 Ill. App. 3d 435
    , 441 (2010) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the question
    of whether the trial court erred in denying a party leave to file an untimely response to a
    motion); People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Firstar Illinois, 
    365 Ill. App. 3d 936
    ,
    942 (2006) (“The trial court has power over the conduct of discovery, and its decision will not
    be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”).
    ¶ 49       Although the record reflects that IDOT orally requested leave to file a written response to
    the petition to vacate, the record also reflects that counsel for IDOT made only a single, vague,
    oral, quasi-request regarding conducting discovery, simply stating, “I also hate to say the word,
    but discovery may be also out there as well.” There was no indication on what issue IDOT felt
    discovery was necessary, why it was necessary, or even if it ultimately was necessary or just
    possibly necessary. On appeal, IDOT contends that the fee agreement between Kattos, Ashton,
    and Petey’s and N&L did not establish that N&L was owed fees at the time of the withdrawal
    and that N&L did not possess a lien for their fees at the time. According to IDOT, had it known
    this information, it could have recovered the full amount of the excess preliminary
    compensation “many years ago.” Although unclear, we presume that IDOT is somehow
    attempting to argue that discovery would have produced this information. It is even more
    unclear to us, however, how the trial court’s denial of IDOT’s request for discovery could have
    allowed IDOT to recover the excess preliminary compensation funds “many years ago” when
    - 13 -
    the determination that there were excess preliminary compensation funds was only made at the
    end of April 2017, mere weeks before the trial court denied IDOT discovery in May 2017.
    Moreover, as discussed below, whether N&L had a legally enforceable claim for fees is
    irrelevant to the determination of whether N&L was required to participate in the refund.
    Because IDOT failed to make a definitive request for specific discovery or offer an explanation
    of its necessity, and because IDOT on appeal fails to offer a plausible claim of prejudice
    resulting from the denial of the request for discovery, we cannot say that the trial court abused
    its discretion in denying the request.
    ¶ 50        With respect to IDOT’s request to file a written response to N&L’s petition to vacate,
    IDOT’s argument on appeal focuses on its contention that N&L was not legally entitled to
    recover attorney fees and costs at the time of withdrawal. According to IDOT, given the
    opportunity to file a written response to N&L’s petition to vacate, it could have advised the
    trial court of this information. Whether N&L had a legally enforceable claim to attorney fees
    and costs at the time of the withdrawal of the preliminary compensation, however, is irrelevant
    to the question of whether N&L was required to participate in the refund of excess preliminary
    compensation funds. N&L’s primary argument in its petition to vacate—and the trial court’s
    basis for granting the petition to vacate—was that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over N&L
    because N&L was not a party to the proceeding. Whether N&L had a legally enforceable claim
    against Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s had no bearing on that question whatsoever, and thus is
    irrelevant to the question. See Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (defining relevant evidence
    as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
    the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
    evidence”). Likewise, our basis for affirming the trial court’s granting of the petition to vacate
    the final judgment order as to N&L—that N&L was not a withdrawing party—is unaffected
    by a determination that N&L did not have a legally enforceable claim for attorney fees and
    costs against Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s. IDOT certainly cites no authority that a withdrawing
    party—here Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s—may only use preliminary compensation funds to
    pay legally enforceable debts. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) (requiring that the
    argument section of appeals briefs “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the
    reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on”);
    Sakellariadis v. Campbell, 
    391 Ill. App. 3d 795
    , 804 (2009) (“The failure to assert a well-
    reasoned argument supported by legal authority is a violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7)
    [citation], resulting in waiver.”); Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 
    145 Ill. App. 3d 712
    , 719 (1986) (“A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues on appeal clearly defined
    with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument presented. The appellate court is
    not a depository in which the appellant may dump the burden of argument and research.”). To
    the extent that Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s might have paid money to N&L that they did not
    owe, that is an issue to be resolved between them and N&L in separate litigation. Because the
    contentions that IDOT claims it would have included in a written response have no bearing on
    the issue that was before the trial court, IDOT was not prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of
    its request to file a written response and any error in the trial court’s denial is not reversible.
    See In re Carthen, 
    66 Ill. App. 3d 780
    , 785 (1978) (“Generally, error is not reversible without
    a showing of prejudice.”).
    - 14 -
    ¶ 51                                     B. Appeal No. 1-18-2310
    ¶ 52                                           1. Jurisdiction
    ¶ 53       In appeal No. 1-18-2310, Kattos argues that the trial court erred in awarding IDOT
    prejudgment interest on the preliminary compensation refund prior to a determination of the
    precise amounts owed by each of the refunding parties. In its cross-appeal in No. 1-18-2310,
    IDOT argues that the trial court incorrectly held that a pending appeal deprived it of jurisdiction
    to determine who was responsible for refunding the portion of preliminary compensation funds
    received by N&L.
    ¶ 54       When we initially issued our decision in this appeal, we held that we lacked jurisdiction
    over both Kattos’s appeal and IDOT’s cross-appeal in No. 1-18-2310 because a petition for
    attorney fees filed by Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s remained pending in the trial court and the
    October 24, 2018, order did not contain the necessary Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff.
    Mar. 8, 2016) finding. Since then, however, the parties filed petitions for rehearing on this
    matter. In his petition, Kattos argues that the notices of appeal are now effective under Illinois
    Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017) because the petition for attorney fees was
    subsequently resolved. IDOT, on the other hand, argued that our conclusion that we lacked
    jurisdiction was incorrect because petitions for attorney fees are collateral to final judgments
    and thus have no effect on jurisdiction, and because our finding of no jurisdiction in appeal
    No. 1-18-2310 was inconsistent with our findings of jurisdiction in appeal No. 1-17-1393 and
    in People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. GreatBanc Trust Co., 
    2018 IL App (1st) 171315
     (GreatBanc I).
    ¶ 55       We agree with Kattos that the resolution of the pending attorney fees petition removed the
    impediment to our jurisdiction and rendered the previously filed notices of appeal effective.
    Under Rule 303(a)(2), a notice of appeal filed before the resolution of any separate claim
    becomes effective upon resolution of that pending claim. Accordingly, once Kattos’s fee
    petition was resolved, his and IDOT’s notices of appeal became effective and we obtained
    jurisdiction. Therefore, we may now address the merits of Kattos’s appeal and IDOT’s cross-
    appeal.
    ¶ 56       Before doing so, however, we pause to briefly address IDOT’s contention that our initial
    decision was inconsistent with appeal No. 1-17-1393 and GreatBanc I. According to IDOT,
    because we found jurisdiction in appeal No. 1-17-1393 and GreatBanc I, we were required to
    find jurisdiction in appeal No. 1-18-2310 and to do otherwise was inconsistent. IDOT,
    however, fails to recognize that the order appealed from in appeal No. 1-17-1393 and
    GreatBanc I was the April 27, 2017, order, while the order appealed from in this appeal, appeal
    No. 1-18-2310, is the October 24, 2018, order. Unlike the October 24, 2018, order, the April
    27, 2017, order contained a Rule 304(a) finding, which permitted an immediate appeal from
    that order despite the pendency of Kattos’s petition for attorney fees. Because of that Rule
    304(a) finding, we had jurisdiction in appeal No. 1-17-1393 and GreatBanc I, while the lack
    of a Rule 304(a) finding in this appeal precluded our jurisdiction while the fee petition
    remained pending.
    ¶ 57       Despite IDOT’s contentions to the contrary, in neither appeal No. 1-17-1393 nor
    GreatBanc I did we state or imply that the Rule 304(a) finding in the April 27, 2017, order was
    unnecessary. In both appeals, we specifically noted the inclusion of the Rule 304(a) finding in
    the order. In GreatBanc I, further discussion of jurisdiction was unnecessary because
    jurisdiction was apparent and uncontested. In appeal No. 1-17-1393, we included a discussion
    - 15 -
    of jurisdiction and explicitly stated that the Rule 304(a) finding in the order eliminated any
    concerns that pending matters would affect jurisdiction. Thus, it is unclear on what IDOT bases
    its contention that we held that the Rule 304(a) finding was unnecessary in GreatBanc I and
    appeal No. 1-17-1393. In no way are our decisions in the litigation between the parties
    inconsistent with one another. The pending attorney fees petition made a Rule 304(a) finding
    necessary. The April 27, 2017, order contained a Rule 304(a) finding, while the October 24,
    2018, order did not. Accordingly, we had jurisdiction over the appeals from the April 27, 2017,
    order but did not over the appeal from the October 24, 2018, order.
    ¶ 58                                           2. Kattos’s Appeal
    ¶ 59       Kattos argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding IDOT prejudgment interest
    for the period between the final judgment order entered on April 27, 2017, and the entry of the
    October 24, 2018, order. According to Kattos, prejudgment interest during this period was
    inappropriate because the amount of refund owed by each party was not determined until the
    October 24, 2018, order. We agree in part.
    ¶ 60       Before getting to the substance of Kattos’s appeal, however, me must first dispose of
    IDOT’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to review this claim because Kattos lacks standing
    to bring this appeal. According to IDOT, because it was Ashton and Petey’s and not Kattos
    that were ordered to participate in the refund of the excess compensation, Kattos lacked
    standing. Although it is true that, technically, Ashton and Petey’s should have initiated this
    appeal, we do not find any deficiency in the proper naming of the appellant to warrant
    dismissal.
    ¶ 61       “ ‘Illinois courts have repeatedly refused to dismiss an appeal because of a technical
    deficiency in the notice of appeal so long as the notice fulfills its basic purpose of informing
    the victorious party that the loser desires a review of the matter by a higher court.’ ” In re
    Estate of Weeks, 
    409 Ill. App. 3d 1101
    , 1108-09 (2011) (quoting In re Estate of Weber, 
    59 Ill. App. 3d 274
    , 276 (1978)). As mentioned above, Kattos is part owner of Ashton and Petey’s.
    Throughout this litigation, Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s have been represented by the same
    counsel, and the parties have consistently treated Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s as a single unit
    with aligned interests. The naming of Kattos as the appellant on the issue of interest did not
    deprive IDOT of the notice to which it was entitled, and IDOT makes no contention that the
    identification of Kattos rather than Ashton and Petey’s caused it any prejudice whatsoever.
    Nor do we see how any prejudice could result, as the merits of the interest issue are unaffected
    by whether the claim is made by Kattos or by Ashton and Petey’s. Accordingly, we reject
    IDOT’s contention that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See id. at 1109 (“Petitioners’
    failure to name themselves as appellants in the notice of appeal, while technically deficient,
    did not deprive intervenor of the notice to which she was entitled. Intervenor does not allege
    she was prejudiced in any way by petitioners’ naming the estate rather than themselves as
    appellants.”).
    ¶ 62       Turning now to the substance of Kattos’s appeal, section 2-1303(a) of the Code of Civil
    Procedure provides for pre- and post-judgment interest in relevant part as follows:
    “Judgments recovered in any court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum from
    the date of the judgment until satisfied ***. When judgment is entered upon any award,
    report or verdict, interest shall be computed at the above rate, from the time when made
    - 16 -
    or rendered to the time of entering judgment upon the same, and included in the
    judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(a) (West 2016).
    This provision applies in the context of eminent domain proceedings. Illinois State Toll
    Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 
    157 Ill. 2d 282
    , 297 (1993). In
    such a case, it is unnecessary that judgment be entered before interest may begin to accrue. Id.
    at 299. Rather, under section 3-1303, “prejudgment” interest begins to accrue on the date on
    which the withdrawing parties’ obligation to refund excess preliminary compensation arises,
    i.e., when just compensation is determined to be less than the preliminary compensation and
    the withdrawing parties are directed to refund the excess. Id. The interest that accrues after the
    award until the entry of judgment is to be included in the amount of the judgment entered. Id.
    at 300. Following the entry of judgment, “postjudgment” interest continues to accrue on the
    judgment amount until the debtor tenders full payment, including any accrued interest. Id. at
    301.
    ¶ 63        Kattos’s argument on appeal is that interest could not begin to accrue in this case until the
    October 24, 2018, order because, until then, no determination was made as to the specific
    amount of the refund each party owed. Kattos points out that although the April 27, 2017, order
    directed repayment of the excess compensation by Ashton, Petey’s, N&L, and Marquette,
    according to their pro rata share, both N&L and Marquette were later released from their
    refund obligations, and no ultimate determination has ever been made as to who is responsible
    for refunding N&L’s share of the excess compensation. Kattos argues that because of this, it
    was impossible for it to halt the accrual of interest on Ashton’s and Petey’s shares of the refund
    by tendering the amount owed.
    ¶ 64        Kattos is correct that an award of interest requires that the amount of money owed to be
    certain. Kramer v. Mt. Carmel Shelter Care Facility, Inc., 
    322 Ill. App. 3d 389
    , 392-93 (2001).
    That being said, however, we disagree with Kattos that there was no determination of a certain
    amount owed by Ashton and Petey’s prior to October 24, 2018. In the April 27, 2017, order,
    the trial court ordered Ashton, Petey’s, Marquette, and N&L to each refund their pro rata
    shares of the excess compensation. Although the trial court did not do the math for the parties,
    their pro rata shares were, in fact, specific amounts. All Kattos had to do was multiply the total
    refund amount ($1,582,000) by Ashton’s and Petey’s respective shares of the preliminary
    compensation received (42.3% by Ashton and 38.2% by Petey’s) to arrive at the specific dollar
    amounts owed by Ashton and Petey’s. When this simple math is performed, it is apparent that
    Ashton was to repay $669,186 and Petey’s $604,324 for a combined total of $1,273,510. There
    is nothing vague or uncertain about these amounts, and Kattos’s unwillingness to perform the
    calculations does not render them so. Moreover, although the trial court subsequently relieved
    Marquette and N&L of any obligation to participate in the refund of the excess compensation,
    Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s never disputed any portion of $1,273,510 Ashton and Petey’s were
    ordered to pay in the April 27, 2017, order. Nor did the release of Marquette or N&L alter the
    fact that Ashton and Petey’s were responsible for at least $1,273,510. Accordingly, the fact
    that Ashton and Petey’s had to pay $1,273,510 of the excess compensation was certain and
    definite as of April 27, 2017, and the trial court did not err in awarding interest on $1,273,510
    starting on April 27, 2017. Certainly, Kattos, Ashton, and Petey’s could have halted the accrual
    of interest on that portion of the award by paying it in full. See id. at 393, 396 (where a portion
    of the judgment was later reduced, interest accrued on the remaining portion of the judgment
    from the date it was originally entered because the debtor could have halted the accrual of
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    interest by payment of the full amount or by simply subtracting the reversed amount with
    corresponding interest); see also Shackelford v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 
    2017 IL App (1st) 162607
    , ¶ 16 (an arbitration award of $16,000 that was subject to “ ‘all applicable
    set-offs and liens to be resolved by the Parties and their Attorneys’ ” was not so indefinite that
    interest under section 2-1303 could not accrue on the balance from the date of the award).
    ¶ 65        Although we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that interest began to
    accrue as of April 27, 2017, on the initial $1,273,510, Ashton and Petey’s were ordered to pay,
    on October 24, 2018, the trial court increased the amount of the excess compensation that
    Ashton and Petey’s were required to pay to $1,297,932.05. Despite not ordering Ashton and
    Petey’s to pay this increased amount until October 24, 2018, the trial court determined that
    interest began accruing on the increased amount as of April 27, 2017. This was error.
    ¶ 66        Where an award or judgment on which interest has already begun to accrue is subsequently
    increased, interest on the increased amount begins only as of the day that the increase is
    awarded. See Owens v. Stokoe, 
    170 Ill. App. 3d 179
    , 183 (1988) (where the original judgment
    against the debtor was $10,000 but was increased to $40,000 on appeal, interest on the
    additional $30,000 did not begin to accrue until the appellate court’s decision, even though
    interest on the original $10,000 began to accrue as of the jury’s verdict); Toro Petroleum Corp.
    v. Newell, 
    33 Ill. App. 3d 223
    , (1974) (where the amount of the judgment was increased on
    appeal, interest began to accrue on the original amount from the date of the original judgment
    and interest accrued on the increased amount from the date of the appellate court’s decision).
    This is because a judgment debtor cannot be expected to pay—and thereby halt interest on—
    an amount that it has not yet been ordered to pay. Owens, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 183. Here, prior
    to October 24, 2018, Ashton and Petey’s could not be expected to pay the additional
    $24,422.05 the trial court ordered them to contribute to the excess compensation refund
    because they had not yet been ordered to pay it. Accordingly, because Ashton and Petey’s did
    not have the opportunity to halt the accrual of interest on the increased amount until October
    24, 2018, it was improper for the trial court to allow interest to accrue on that amount beginning
    on April 27, 2017. Therefore, although the trial court properly concluded that interest on the
    initial $1,273,510 began to accrue on April 27, 2017, interest on the additional $24,422.05 did
    not begin to accrue until October 24, 2018.
    ¶ 67        Kattos points out that the allocation of N&L’s previous share of the excess compensation
    remains unresolved, suggesting that this fact somehow renders the other amounts owed by
    Ashton and Petey’s indefinite or uncertain. Kattos, however, does not explain how this is so.
    As explained above, the amount owed by Ashton and Petey’s as of April 27, 2017, was easily
    ascertainable through simple calculations, and the October 24, 2018, order explicitly stated the
    amount to be paid by Ashton and Petey’s. Kattos makes no contention that resolution of the
    outstanding excess compensation that was once allocated to N&L will reduce the amount owed
    by Ashton and Petey’s. At most, if Ashton and Petey’s are eventually required to refund the
    remainder of the excess compensation, it will simply increase the amount owed by them. As
    discussed above, however, subsequent increases in the amount owed by a judgment debtor do
    not accrue interest until those additional amounts are actually awarded. Accordingly, any
    allocation of the remaining excess compensation does not alter the amount currently owed by
    Ashton and Petey’s.
    ¶ 68        Kattos also argues that the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Department of
    Transportation v. New Century Engineering & Development Corp., 
    97 Ill. 2d 343
     (1983),
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    stands for the proposition that interest could not begin to accrue until the entry of an order
    allocating responsibility for refunding the excess compensation and that, here, the allocation
    of the refund was not certain until the October 24, 2018, order. As discussed above, we disagree
    that there was any uncertainty in the April 27, 2017, order. That order plainly allocated the
    entirety of the excess compensation in pro rata shares, which were easily determined through
    basic math. Although uncertainty later arose over Marquette’s and N&L’s participation in the
    refund, at no point was there any dispute or uncertainty as to the amounts the trial court ordered
    Ashton and Petey’s to refund.
    ¶ 69       Our determination that interest on the initial $1,273,510 began to accrue on April 27, 2017,
    while interest on the subsequent $24,422.05 did not begin to accrue until October 24, 2018,
    protects the respective parties while serving the purposes of section 2-1303. As of April 27,
    2017, it was determined that Ashton and Petey’s wrongfully held $1,273,510, and thus, IDOT
    was entitled to be made whole by depriving Ashton and Petey’s of the unfair use of that money,
    which actually belonged to IDOT. See Kramer, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 393 (“The rationale behind
    section 2-1303 of the Code is to make the judgment creditor whole by requiring the judgment
    debtor to give up the use of the money, thereby allowing the judgment creditor to use the funds
    to earn interest if he chooses to do so while the matter is pending. [Citation.] It is simply not
    fair to allow the judgment debtor to continue to use the money that is rightfully the
    plaintiffs’.”). At the same time, the interests of Ashton and Petey’s are protected because they
    could have paid this initial amount at any time after April 27, 2017, and such payment would
    have stopped the further accrual of interest on that amount. In addition, because Ashton and
    Petey’s did not have the opportunity to pay the additional $24,422.50 prior to October 24,
    2018, our decision protects them from paying an unfair amount of interest.
    ¶ 70       In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in awarding interest on the initial
    $1,273,510 beginning on April 27, 2017, but did err in awarding interest on the additional
    $24,422.05 beginning on April 27, 2017. Rather, interest on the additional $24,422.05 should
    not have begun to accrue until October 24, 2018. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
    judgment in that respect and remand for the trial court to recalculate the interest owed by
    Ashton and Petey’s in accordance with this decision.
    ¶ 71                                      3. IDOT’s Cross-Appeal
    ¶ 72        In its cross-appeal, IDOT argues that the trial court incorrectly held that IDOT’s pending
    appeal in appeal No. 1-17-1393 deprived it of jurisdiction to determine who was responsible
    for refunding the portion of preliminary compensation funds received by N&L. We conclude
    that IDOT’s cross-appeal has been rendered moot by our resolution of appeal No. 1-17-1393.
    ¶ 73        “An appeal is moot if no actual controversy exists or if events have occurred that make it
    impossible for the reviewing court to grant the complaining party effectual relief.” In re
    Marriage of Peters-Farrell, 
    216 Ill. 2d 287
    , 291 (2005). In the October 24, 2018, order, the
    trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the excess preliminary compensation funds
    previously allocated to N&L because IDOT’s appeal No. 1-17-1393, which focused on
    whether N&L was required to participate in the refund of the excess preliminary compensation
    funds, was pending. We have now resolved appeal No. 1-17-1393 as discussed above. Thus,
    regardless of whether the trial court was correct in its conclusion, there is no relief we can
    afford IDOT in this respect because any impediment to the trial court’s jurisdiction created by
    the pendency of appeal No. 1-17-1393 has now been removed. Accordingly, IDOT’s cross-
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    appeal is moot.
    ¶ 74                                      III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 75      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed in
    appeal No. 1-17-1393, and appeal No. 1-18-2310 is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
    remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    ¶ 76      No. 1-17-1393, Affirmed.
    ¶ 77      No. 1-18-2310, Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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