People v. Craighead , 2015 IL App (5th) 140468 ( 2015 )

NOTICE
2015 IL App (5th) 140468
Decision filed 09/11/15. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-14-0468
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Peti ion for
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 97-CF-430
)
BRANDON CRAIGHEAD, ) Honorable
) John Baricevic,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Welch and Chapman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The State appeals from an order of the circuit court of St. Clair County granting
the postconviction request of defendant, Brandon Craighead, for a new sentencing
hearing. The issues raised in this appeal are: (1) whether defendant's postconviction
petition was timely filed and (2) whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct.
2455 (2012), retroactively applies to cases on collateral review. We affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for
the April 17, 1997, murders of Martin and Judy Dotson. Defendant, age 16 at the time of
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the murders, was tried as an adult pursuant to section 5-4(6)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-4(6)(a) (West 1996)). On March 6, 2000, the trial court
sentenced defendant to natural life in prison pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the
Unified Code of Corrections, which required a mandatory natural life sentence for any
defendant, "irrespective of the defendant's age at the time of the commission of the
offense, [who] is found guilty of murdering more than one victim." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-
1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 1996). On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's convictions
and sentence. People v. Craighead, No. 5-00-0198 (2003) (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). Our Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on June 4,
2003. People v. Craighead, 204 Ill. 2d 667, 792 N.E.2d 309 (2003) (table).
¶4 On October 4, 2004, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2004)). On
October 26, 2004, the trial court found the petition stated the gist of a constitutional
claim, appointed counsel, and ordered an amended petition be filed by December 23,
2004. Without objection by the State, counsel sought additional time to file an amended
petition. A first amended petition was filed on August 13, 2009.
¶5 The State filed a motion to dismiss on, inter alia, grounds of untimeliness, alleging
the last day for defendant to file a postconviction petition was March 2, 2004. In
response, defense counsel filed a motion to excuse late filing, alleging the late filing was
not due to defendant's culpable negligence. After a hearing in January 2011, the trial
court denied the State's motion to dismiss on grounds of untimeliness. The State did not
file a motion to reconsider.
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¶6 Defense counsel sought additional time to file a second amended petition and,
later, a third amended petition, both without objection by the State. Both amended
petitions incorporated Miller v. Alabama, which holds that a mandatory imposition of a
life sentence without parole on a person under the age of 18 at the time of the offense
violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Miller, 567 U.S. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. Defendant supplemented his petition with a
copy of People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, 6 N.E.3d 709, which holds Miller applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review.
¶7 The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's third amended postconviction
petition, alleging, inter alia, each of defendant's arguments was either refuted by or not
supported by the record or by affidavit, and all claims were barred for a variety of
procedural reasons. The State sought to preserve for appellate review the trial court's
January 2011 hearing on timeliness and the retroactivity of Miller. The State
acknowledged Davis, but asserted it was raising the retroactivity argument "in the likely
event that this issue is decided by the United States Supreme Court, given the fact that
other state high courts have ruled that Miller does not apply retroactively."
¶8 The trial court held a hearing, and the issue of retroactivity of Miller advanced to
the third stage, while the remaining issues remained at the second stage of postconviction
proceedings. On August 28, 2014, the trial court entered an order finding defendant was
entitled to a new sentencing hearing pursuant to Miller and Davis, but all other issues
were either "waived" or "without merit." The trial court also found the State preserved
the timeliness issue for appeal. The State now appeals.
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¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 The first issue raised on appeal is whether defendant's postconviction petition was
timely filed. The State argues the trial court should have dismissed defendant's
postconviction petition as untimely where he failed to prove lack of culpable negligence
for the late filing, and it raises five specific contentions as to why defendant failed to
meet his burden of proving he lacked culpable negligence in the late filing. On the other
hand, defendant insists the two issues raised by the State on appeal are intertwined.
Defendant contends we are not confined to the trial court's precise ruling made on
January 19, 2011, finding a lack of culpable negligence excused the delay and urges us to
consider the overall circumstances, including significant changes in both state and federal
law affecting defendant's initial petition, which remained pending in the trial court for
nearly a decade. We agree with defendant and, therefore, consider both the timeliness
issue and the issue of the retroactivity of Miller to cases on collateral review together.
¶ 11 A postconviction action is a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence
and " 'is not a substitute for, or an addendum to, direct appeal.' " People v. Simmons, 388
Ill. App. 3d 599, 605, 903 N.E.2d 437, 444 (2009) (quoting People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill.
2d 325, 328, 637 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (1994)). The Act contemplates the filing of only
one postconviction petition, and obtaining leave of the court is a condition precedent to
the filing of a successive postconviction petition. Simmons, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 605, 903
N.E.2d at 444-45. The purpose of a postconviction proceeding is to allow inquiry into
constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that were not and could not
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have been determined on direct appeal. People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d 506, 519, 749
N.E.2d 892, 901 (2001).
¶ 12 The Act provides for up to three stages of postconviction proceedings. People v.
Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 471-72, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1007-08 (2006). At the first stage,
the circuit court has 90 days to examine the petition and to determine, without input from
the State, whether it is frivolous or patently without merit, and, if so, to summarily
dismiss it. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2004). If the petition is not dismissed at the
first stage or if the circuit court fails to rule on it in 90 days, it proceeds to the second
stage. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2004). At the second stage, the circuit court must
determine whether the petitioner is indigent, and, if so, whether he or she wishes to have
counsel appointed. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2004). After appointed counsel makes any
necessary amendments to the petition, the State may file a motion to dismiss. 725 ILCS
5/122-5 (West 2004). To survive a second stage dismissal, the petitioner must make a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Quigley, 365 Ill. App. 3d 617,
618, 850 N.E.2d 903, 905 (2006). The circuit court must accept as true all of the
petition's well-pleaded facts. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380, 701 N.E.2d 1063,
1071 (1998). If a substantial showing is not made, the petition is dismissed; if a
substantial showing is made, the proceeding advances to the third stage and an
evidentiary hearing. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 381-82, 701 N.E.2d at 1072.
¶ 13 The instant case presents a unique set of circumstances. In 2004, defendant filed a
pro se postconviction petition. The first stage followed schedule in that within 90 days of
the filing, the circuit court (1) found defendant raised the gist of a constitutional claim,
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(2) appointed counsel, and (3) ordered the petition amended. The proceedings then went
awry, with continuances and failure to address the underlying issues presented in the
petition, resulting in a 10-year second stage. However, during those 10 years, case law
developed which further supported defendant's initial contention that his mandatory
natural life sentence was unconstitutional because the sentencing judge was precluded
from considering his status as a juvenile.
¶ 14 We point out that time is not an inherent element of the right to bring a
postconviction petition and the time limitations provided in the Act are to be considered
affirmative defenses that can be raised, waived, or forfeited by the State. People v.
Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101, 789 N.E.2d 734, 742 (2002). The State raised the issue of
timeliness; therefore, defendant was required to allege "facts showing that the delay was
not due to his *** culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2004). Here, the
trial court found that a lack of culpable negligence excused the delay in filing.
¶ 15 It is well settled "that the Act must be liberally construed to afford a convicted
person an opportunity to present questions of deprivation of constitutional rights."
People v. Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541, 546, 485 N.E.2d 307, 308 (1985) (citing People v.
Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96, 98, 281 N.E.2d 289, 290 (1972)). The record shows the State did not
file a motion to reconsider the January 19, 2011, ruling. The State did, however, ask to
have the issue "preserved" for review. Nevertheless, when defense counsel sought
additional time to file a second amended petition, ultimately filed on December 20, 2012,
the State did not object.
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¶ 16 On June 25, 2012, Miller was decided. Defense counsel amended the petition by
incorporating Miller. On July 1, 2014, approximately three months after our supreme
court's decision in Davis, which recognized the "new substantive rule" established in
Miller, and held it applies retroactively, defense counsel amended the petition by
supplementing it with a copy of Davis. The circuit court conducted a hearing and entered
a written order on August 28, 2014, ordering a new sentencing hearing. While we agree
with the trial court that there is a lack of culpable negligence on the part of defendant
which excuses the delay in filing, even assuming arguendo the circuit court incorrectly
ruled on that issue on January 19, 2011, we cannot ignore defendant's new claim based
upon Davis.
¶ 17 In general, a "claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the
original or an amended petition is waived." 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2012). However,
an exception to the waiver language contained in section 122-3 will be made in cases in
which fundamental fairness requires such an exception. See People v. Pitsonbarger, 205
Ill. 2d 444, 459, 793 N.E.2d 609, 621 (2002). Pitsonbarger adopted the cause-and-
prejudice test as the tool for determining whether fundamental fairness allows for the
relaxation of the waiver rule contained in section 122-3 of the Act. The cause-and-
prejudice test adopted by our supreme court in Pitsonbarger and codified in section 122-
1(f) of the Act states:
"Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without leave of
the court. Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause
for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction
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proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of this
subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that
impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-
conviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that
the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so
infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process."
725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2012).
Here, the new substantive rule proclaimed in Miller establishes cause because it was not
available earlier to counsel. Prejudice is established because the new rule has been
deemed by our supreme court to apply retroactively. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42, 6
N.E.3d 709. Therefore, we agree with defendant that even if the trial court erred in its
January 19, 2011, ruling and the trial court should have dismissed defendant's
postconviction petition as untimely filed, defendant's third amended petition nevertheless
warrants relief as a successive petition.
¶ 18 In Davis our supreme court firmly established that Miller applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review. Nevertheless, the State asks us to hold our decision in this
case in abeyance because the United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari in a case
from Louisiana, Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015), which
will consider the issue of the retroactivity of Miller. We decline the State's request to
hold our decision in abeyance.
¶ 19 Where our supreme court has declared the law on any point, it alone can modify or
overrule its previous opinion, and the appellate districts are bound to follow such
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decision. Agricultural Transportation Ass'n v. Carpentier, 2 Ill. 2d 19, 27, 116 N.E.2d
863, 867 (1953). Our supreme court's decision in Davis is clear, and it is binding on us.
Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the circuit court of St.
Clair County and remand for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to Miller and Davis.
¶ 21 Affirmed and remanded.
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2015 IL App (5th) 140468
NO. 5-14-0468
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 97-CF-430
)
BRANDON CRAIGHEAD, ) Honorable
) John Baricevic,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
__________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: September 11, 2015
__________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.
Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J., and
Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,
Concur
__________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Hon. Brendan F. Kelly, State's Attorney, St. Clair County Courthouse,
for 10 Public Square, Belleville, IL 62220, Patrick Delfino, Director,
Appellant Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Jennifer Camden, Staff Attorney,
Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, 730 East Illinois
Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
__________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Ellen J. Curry, Deputy
for Defender, Alexander G. Muntges, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office
Appellee of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 909 Water
Tower Circle, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
__________________________________________________________________________