Inman v. Howe Freightways, Inc. , 2022 IL App (1st) 210274 ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 210274Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
Filed March 9, 2022
Third Division
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
LISA INMAN, Individually and as Administrator of the ) Appeal from the
Estate of Jesse Inman, Deceased, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 19 L 13312
)
HOWE FREIGHTWAYS, INC., an Illinois Corporation, ) Honorable
) James N. O’Hara
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge presiding.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case returns to us after we remanded the case for a new trial following the initial
appeal in Inman v. Howe Freightways, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 172459. On remand, defendant
Howe Freightways, Inc. (Howe), filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, a motion to reopen discovery, and a motion to release the appeal bond. The
circuit court denied all three motions. Thereafter, plaintiff Lisa Inman (plaintiff), individually and
on behalf of her late husband Jesse Inman’s estate (Inman), filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that there was no need for a new trial because, based on the circumstances of the litigation,
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
only Howe could be found liable upon retrial. The circuit court agreed and granted plaintiff
summary judgment.
¶2 Howe now appeals the circuit court’s orders and contends that the court erred in denying
its motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, its motion to reopen discovery, and its
motion to release the appeal bond as well as erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment. Additionally, Howe contends that the court erred in determining when postjudgment
interest began to accrue. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s judgments.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Trial Court Proceedings
¶5 In September 2011, James Langholf, a truck driver and employee of Howe, was driving
his semi-tractor trailer west on Interstate 80 in Iowa when he began to have engine trouble.
Langholf pulled over to the shoulder of the highway and turned off his vehicle. When he could not
restart it, he called Howe, who told him to call the manufacturer of his engine. Eventually,
Langholf called a towing company, which dispatched Inman and Daniel Walsh in separate tow
trucks to tow Langholf’s tractor and his trailer. When Inman and Walsh arrived at the scene, Inman
parked in front of Langholf, and Walsh parked behind Langholf. Shortly thereafter, a semi-tractor
trailer driven by Herbert Terrell, an employee of Hiner Transport, LLC (Hiner Transport), and
Hiner Equipment, LLC (Hiner Equipment) (jointly referred to as Hiner entities), sideswiped
Walsh’s tow truck and collided with the back of Langholf’s truck. The force of the collision pushed
Langholf’s truck into Inman’s tow truck, pinning Inman between the trucks. As a result of the
collision, all four men died.
¶6 In April 2012, plaintiff initiated the litigation and sued Howe; Julie Langholf, on behalf of
her late husband James Langholf’s estate; and Hiner Equipment. A few months later, Hiner
-2-
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
Equipment filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens and contended
that Poweshiek County, Iowa, was a more convenient location for the litigation than Cook County.
Howe did not file its own motion or join in on Hiner Equipment’s motion. The motion judge denied
Hiner Equipment’s motion in large part because the parties to the litigation and the potential
witnesses resided in multiple different states, such that Hiner Equipment failed to meet its burden
to show that Poweshiek County was a more convenient forum. 1
¶7 As the case proceeded, plaintiff added more defendants, including Hiner Transport, and
multiple counterclaims were filed between the parties. Meanwhile, Julie Langholf, individually
and on behalf of James Langholf’s estate, countersued the Hiner entities for the wrongful death of
her husband. But in September 2016, the motion judge entered an agreed dismissal order whereby
Julie Langholf dismissed her wrongful death counterclaims against the Hiner entities. However,
the dismissal order did not affect any counterclaims for contribution brought by Howe or Julie
Langholf against the Hiner entities or any counterclaims for contribution brought by the Hiner
entities against Howe and Julie Langholf.
¶8 During the course of litigation, the motion judge imposed sanctions against Howe for its
failure to timely disclose training and maintenance records related to James Langholf and his truck.
As a result, the motion judge deemed admitted three allegations in plaintiff’s then-operative third
amended complaint, which were that (1) Langholf failed to complete a required safety course
following a previous, preventable accident, (2) Howe failed to ensure that Langholf complied with
its internal policy of completing the safety course following his previous, preventable accident and
prior to receiving another dispatch, and (3) Howe and Langholf failed to properly install or
1
The motion judge in this case was Judge James N. O’Hara.
-3-
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
maintain his tractor. Later, the motion judge imposed another set of sanctions against Howe for its
failure to preserve Langholf’s tractor, including its engine and turbo. The motion judge deemed
admitted the allegation in plaintiff’s now fourth-amended complaint that Howe and Langholf
failed to properly repair or maintain the tractor engine, including its turbo. The motion judge also
deemed admitted the corresponding allegations from the third amended complaint—now in the
fourth amended complaint—that were part of the initial sanctions imposed against Howe.
¶9 Before trial, plaintiff and the Hiner entities entered into a high-low settlement agreement.
To this end, the Hiner entities filed a motion for a finding that the settlement agreement was
negotiated in good faith pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act) (740
ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2010)). Additionally, in relevant part, the Hiner entities sought to
dismiss any and all counterclaims for contribution between them and Howe and to bar any and all
future claims for contribution by any named or potential tortfeasor against them. Over Howe’s
objection, the motion judge (1) found that the settlement was negotiated in good faith, (2) ordered
that any and all counterclaims for contribution between the Hiner entities and Howe be dismissed
with prejudice pursuant to Contribution Act, and (3) held that any and all future claims for
contribution by any named or potential tortfeasor against the Hiner entities should be barred
pursuant to the Contribution Act.
¶ 10 As the trial neared, the trial judge ruled on various motions in limine, including plaintiff’s
motion in limine No. 32 and Howe’s motions in limine Nos. 35 and 37. 2 Plaintiff’s motion
in limine No. 32 sought to bar eyewitness Franklin Green from testifying at trial that Terrell passed
him on the highway before the accident and was not wearing a shirt, but after the accident, when
2
The trial judge in this case was Judge Thomas J. Lipscomb.
-4-
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
Green went to render aid at the scene, he observed that Terrell was pinned in his seat wearing a
shirt. The trial judge granted the motion and barred this testimony. Howe’s motion in limine No.
35 sought, in part, to bar plaintiff’s expert witness from offering an opinion that, despite the issues
with the engine of Langholf’s truck, Langholf could have reached the next highway exit. The trial
judge denied the motion as it related to this testimony. Howe’s motion in limine No. 37 sought to
bar, in part, any assertion that a violation of its purported internal policy requiring a driver to
complete a safety training course after a preventable accident but before receiving another dispatch
established a standard of care that, if breached, constituted negligence. The trial judge denied the
motion as it related to establishing a standard of care, relying on the motion judge’s earlier
sanctions order that deemed admitted the allegation regarding Howe’s failure to ensure that
Langholf complied with its internal policy of completing the safety training course.
¶ 11 In plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint, which was filed approximately a week before the
trial began, she did not name Julie Langholf, on behalf of James Langholf’s estate, as a defendant.
Nevertheless, on the day the trial began, the trial judge dismissed Julie Langholf and Hiner
Equipment as defendants, pursuant to plaintiff’s motion. As such, plaintiff’s causes of action
remained pending against only Howe and Hiner Transport. Though the Hiner entities had entered
into the high-low settlement with plaintiff, only Hiner Transport was required to participate in the
trial. Although no witnesses from any Hiner entity testified, Hiner Transport was represented by
counsel throughout the trial and would appear on the jury’s verdict form.
¶ 12 We provided a full recitation of the trial evidence in Inman, 2019 IL App (1st) 172459,
¶¶ 20-49. Following the trial, the jury returned a verdict, finding both Howe and Hiner Transport
liable and allocating 57% of that liability to Howe and 43% of that liability to Hiner Transport.
The jury awarded plaintiff $19,010,273 in total damages. In response to a special interrogatory
-5-
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
that asked the jury if any act or omission of Howe proximately caused the injuries and death of
Inman, the jury answered in the affirmative. On May 18, 2017, the trial judge subsequently entered
judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.
¶ 13 Thereafter, Howe filed a posttrial motion primarily arguing that it was entitled to a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because plaintiff failed to establish that the acts and
omissions alleged against it proximately caused Inman’s injuries and death. In the alternative,
Howe argued that it was entitled to a new trial on several grounds, including that (1) the jury’s
verdict and answer to the special interrogatory were against the manifest weight of the evidence,
(2) the motion judge erred in entering the discovery sanctions and the trial judge erred in refusing
to reconsider those sanctions, and (3) the trial judge erred with respect to its rulings on plaintiff’s
motion in limine No. 32 and Howe’s motions in limine Nos. 35 and 37. Further, in the alternative,
Howe sought a setoff of the damages award to account for plaintiff’s pretrial settlement with Hiner
Transport. The trial judge ultimately denied Howe’s posttrial motion, in most respects, but did
grant Howe a setoff in the amount of $1,275,000 against the total damages award. The next day,
upon plaintiff’s petition, the trial judge approved the settlement amount ($1,275,000) between her
and Hiner Transport, ordered the disbursements of the settlement proceeds, and dismissed Hiner
Transport from the litigation with prejudice.
¶ 14 B. Direct Appeal
¶ 15 On direct appeal, Howe raised numerous contentions of error about the trial court
proceedings. Although we found the majority of Howe’s contentions of error meritless, we did
find that the trial judge erred in granting plaintiff’s motion in limine No. 32, which prevented Green
from testifying that, prior to the accident, he observed Terrell shirtless and, after the accident,
observed Terrell with his shirt on. Because such evidence was a potentially crucial observation to
-6-
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
explain an unexplainable accident and it could have dramatically affected the jury’s allocation of
fault, we found the error warranted a new trial. We also found that the motion judge improperly
sanctioned Howe by deeming admitted that Langholf failed to complete a required safety course
following his preventable accident and Howe failed to ensure that Langholf complied with its
internal policy of completing the safety course following the preventable accident. Lastly, we
found that, on remand, the trial judge could reconsider Howe’s motion in limine No. 37 on the
merits.
¶ 16 Despite reversing on these issues, we affirmed the trial judge’s denial of Howe’s motion
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence at trial supported the jury’s
conclusion that Howe’s conduct was a proximate cause of Inman’s injuries and death.
Additionally, we affirmed the trial judge’s denial of a new trial where the jury’s general verdict,
including its apportionment of liability, and its answer to the special interrogatory on proximate
causation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We also affirmed the motion
judge’s sanctions imposed against Howe, which deemed admitted that Howe and Langholf failed
to properly maintain his tractor, including its engine and turbo. Lastly, we affirmed the trial judge’s
denial of Howe’s motion in limine No. 35, which sought, in part, to bar plaintiff’s expert witness
from offering an opinion that, despite the engine issues, Langholf’s truck could have reached the
next highway exit. We issued our decision in May 2019, and our supreme court denied Howe’s
petition for leave to appeal in September 2019. On November 6, 2019, the clerk of the appellate
court issued our mandate.
¶ 17 C. Remand
¶ 18 1. Howe’s Motions
-7-
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
¶ 19 In December 2019, on remand, the case returned to the original motion judge (hereinafter
referred to as the circuit court). That month, Howe filed a motion to release the appeal bond that
had been procured with Western Surety Company. Howe argued that, since the bonded judgment
was vacated by this court, the bond issued by Western Surety Company should be released. In
response, plaintiff argued that this court’s opinion in Inman, 2019 IL App (1st) 172459, did not
vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial on all issues, which would have included the
monetary judgment. According to plaintiff, none of this court’s rulings involved the issue of
damages, as Howe never contested them on appeal. Plaintiff asserted that allowing Howe’s request
to release the appeal bond would put her entire monetary judgment at risk.
¶ 20 Also in December 2019, Howe filed a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, arguing that such a motion was appropriate at that time because the
circumstances had changed making Poweshiek County, Iowa, a substantially more convenient
forum than Cook County. Specifically, Howe highlighted that Julie Langholf, an Illinois resident,
and the Hiner entities, who were Indiana-based companies, were no longer involved in the case.
Howe pointed out that the motion judge denied Hiner Equipment’s motion to dismiss based on
forum non conveniens in part because the parties were scattered across multiple states. But Howe
asserted that, because the Hiner entities and Julie Langholf were no longer involved in the
litigation, the circumstances had drastically changed. As such, Howe contended that these changed
circumstances in combination with the relevant factors involved in a forum non conveniens
analysis made Poweshiek County the more convenient forum.
¶ 21 Howe attached several exhibits to its motion, including evidence that its principal place of
business was in Rockford, as well as that Inman was an Iowa resident at the time of his death and
plaintiff still lived in Iowa. Howe also attached evidence that, prior to going out of business, the
-8-
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
Hiner entities’ principal place of business was in Indiana. Additionally, Howe attached an affidavit
from Christopher Starrett, currently an assistant district commander for the Iowa State Patrol, who
led the investigation into the cause of the accident in this case. Assistant District Commander
Starrett averred that he lived in Grinnell, Iowa, and worked in Des Moines, Iowa. Given the
distance from his home and work in Iowa, Assistant District Commander Starrett asserted that a
retrial in Cook County would be substantially inconvenient, especially because it would be the
second time he would be required to come to Cook County to testify as a witness. Conversely,
Assistant District Commander Starrett stated that a trial in Poweshiek County would be
substantially more convenient, given the proximity to his home and work. Howe similarly attached
affidavits from Elaine Schellhorn, an Iowa-based truck driver who witnessed the accident, and
Green, the Oklahoma-based truck driver who observed Terrell shirtless before the accident. Both
Schellhorn and Green averred that a trial in Cook County would be inconvenient for them
compared to a trial in Poweshiek County, given where they lived. Howe further attached trial
transcripts showing that Poweshiek County Deputy Sheriff Jonathan Cheney and Tisha Miller, an
emergency medical technician, both of whom received dispatches about the accident, lived in Deep
River, Iowa, and Brooklyn, Iowa, respectively. Lastly, Howe attached various court statistics for
the circuit court of Cook County in 2017 and the Iowa court system generally in 2016.
¶ 22 In response, plaintiff posited that Howe’s alleged changed circumstances did not support
the filing of a forum non conveniens motion following this court’s remand for a new trial. Plaintiff
asserted that Howe had slept on its right to file such a motion by waiting to file it upon remand,
rather than filing its motion at various other times in the proceedings. To this end, plaintiff argued
that Howe waited too long to file the motion and, in any event, the relevant factors involved in a
forum non conveniens analysis did not favor transfer to Poweshiek County.
-9-
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
¶ 23 In January 2020, Howe filed a motion to reopen discovery but noted that the motion was
brought in the event that the circuit court denied its motion to dismiss based on
forum non conveniens. Howe contended that this court did not limit the remand for a new trial on
only the issue of liability and, thus, the issue of damages was still relevant for a new trial. As such,
Howe argued that it should be allowed to re-depose plaintiff on the issue of damages and question
her on her current relationship status because a widow was not entitled to damages for loss of
society and sexual relations if she remarried. Additionally, Howe posited that it should be allowed
to question plaintiff about the general well-being of her and her children and any mental health
treatment she or her children have received since the time of her trial testimony. Howe also
suggested that plaintiff be allowed to depose two mechanics, if she chose, and sought the ability
of all parties to update their Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) disclosures.
¶ 24 In response, plaintiff argued that Howe had mispresented the language of the appellate
court mandate and opinion and that, by failing to raise the issue of damages in its posttrial motion
or on appeal, Howe had forfeited any argument over the jury’s damages award. Plaintiff asserted
that, based on this court’s opinion, we remanded the case for a new trial on the allocation of fault
only.
¶ 25 In October 2020, the circuit court held oral argument on Howe’s various motions, and two
months later, the court entered a written order on them. Concerning Howe’s forum non conveniens
motion, the court observed that Howe admitted that the Hiner entities and Julie Langholf were
dismissed from the case “ ‘prior to trial.’ ” According to the court, the circumstances changed at
that moment rather than at the time Howe filed its motion. The court remarked that Howe’s motion
was “potentially untimely,” but nevertheless discussed the forum non conveniens balancing test
and based its ultimate ruling on that test. The court first found that plaintiff’s chosen forum of
- 10 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
Cook County was entitled to some weight. The court noted that, while plaintiff did not file the
lawsuit in her home state, which was Iowa, she did file the lawsuit in a state connected to the
litigation by way of Howe’s residency in Illinois and its driver, Langholf, being an Illinois resident
prior to his death. Next, the court discussed various private interest factors utilized during a
forum non conveniens analysis.
¶ 26 Concerning the first factor—the convenience of the parties—the court observed that
plaintiff, an Iowa resident, wanted to try the case in Illinois and Howe, an Illinois resident, wanted
to try the case in Iowa. Because of this, the court found the factor did not favor transferring the
case. Concerning the second factor—the relative ease of access to sources of testimonial,
documentary, and real evidence—the court observed that the availability of documentary evidence
had little bearing on the outcome of the motion given that the “evidence has already been shared.”
In regard to the ease of access to sources of testimonial evidence, the court stated that seven
relevant witnesses resided in Iowa, four resided in Illinois, and one resided in each of Oklahoma,
Alabama, Florida, and Virginia. Although the court noted that evidence depositions could be used
in lieu of live, trial testimony for certain witnesses, as was done during the original trial, it asserted
that critical witnesses resided in both Illinois and Iowa. As such, the court concluded that Iowa
was not a substantially more convenient location for the access to sources of testimonial evidence.
The court next discussed two other factors—the availability of compulsory process to secure the
attendance of unwilling witnesses and the cost of attendance. It observed that there was no reason
to believe that the Iowa witnesses would be unwilling to travel to Illinois if they were needed.
¶ 27 The circuit court next discussed the various public interest factors utilized during a
forum non conveniens analysis. Regarding the first factor—the administrative difficulties
presented by adding further litigation to the court docket in an already congested forum—the court
- 11 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
concluded that the Poweshiek County court system was less congested than Cook County’s court
system. Although the court found this factor favored dismissal, it asserted that the factor was not
dispositive and should be given less weight than other factors. Concerning the second and third
factors—the unfairness of imposing the expense of trial and the burden of jury duty on residents
with little connection to the litigation, as well as the interest in deciding localized controversies
locally—the court remarked that the alleged acts and omissions of Howe’s employees—including
David Grimm, its Illinois-based director of safety and maintenance—were crucial in analyzing the
events that culminated in Inman’s death. As such, the court found that Illinois had a sufficient
interest in the litigation and using Cook County jurors was fair. After balancing all the factors, the
court concluded that Howe had not established that the factors strongly favored transfer to
Poweshiek County. Therefore, the court denied Howe’s motion.
¶ 28 After denying Howe’s forum non conveniens motion, the circuit court denied Howe’s
request to reopen discovery and found that it was not appropriate in light of the appellate court
mandate. Lastly, the court asserted that any decision as to whether damages should be at issue in
the new trial was reserved for the trial judge. Consequently, the court denied Howe’s request to
release the appeal bond pending further proceedings.
¶ 29 After the circuit court denied Howe’s forum non conveniens motion, Howe filed a petition
for leave to appeal to this court under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020),
which we denied.
¶ 30 2. Plaintiff’s Motion
¶ 31 Following the denial of Howe’s motions, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment,
contending there were two bases for summary judgment. First, plaintiff highlighted that a jury had
found Howe negligent in causing Inman’s injuries and death, specifically allocating its fault at
- 12 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
57%. Plaintiff further highlighted that this court affirmed the jury’s finding that Howe’s acts and
omissions were a proximate cause of Inman’s injuries and death, which therefore became the law
of the case. Plaintiff argued that, because she and the Hiner entities entered into a good faith
settlement that Howe never challenged in its posttrial motion or on appeal, Howe was barred from
introducing any evidence against the Hiner entities under Illinois law. As such, plaintiff concluded
that Howe was entirely responsible for the remaining judgment after the setoff. Second, plaintiff
argued that, under Crim v. Dietrich, 2020 IL 124318, Howe’s failure to contest the jury’s damages
award, the issue of sole proximate cause, and the good faith settlement between her and the Hiner
entities in its posttrial motion and on appeal resulted in Howe’s forfeiture of those issues and
divested all courts of jurisdiction to hear any argument on them. Plaintiff accordingly contended
that summary judgment should be entered nunc pro tunc to May 18, 2017, the date the trial judge
entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, as there was nothing left to retry. In response, Howe posited
that plaintiff misunderstood this court’s opinion and that we did not leave the jury’s damages award
undisturbed because our specific directions on remand did not expressly limit the retrial to liability.
¶ 32 In February 2021, the circuit court entered a written order on plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment. The court observed that this court affirmed the jury’s finding that Howe was
a proximate cause of Inman’s injuries and death and only reversed on an evidentiary issue—
Green’s precluded testimony—that pertained specifically to the allocation of fault among Hiner
Transport and Howe. As such, according to the circuit court, the only issue to be decided at a new
trial was how to allocate liability given the inclusion of Green’s previously precluded testimony.
The court highlighted that, because of plaintiff’s settlement with the Hiner entities, Hiner Transport
was no longer a party to the case and could not be listed on a verdict form. In other words,
according to the court, the only defendant who could be at fault in a new trial would be Howe
- 13 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
because the Contribution Act and the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.
(West 2010)) barred claims of contribution against codefendants who settle in good faith.
Consequently, the court granted plaintiff summary judgment and entered a final judgment in her
favor and against Howe in the amount of $17,235,273 (the jury’s damages award minus the setoff).
Although plaintiff had requested that summary judgment be entered nunc pro tunc to May 18,
2017, the court did not make such a finding in granting plaintiff summary judgment.
¶ 33 Howe subsequently appealed the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment to
plaintiff as well as the court’s denial of its forum non conveniens motion, motion to reopen
discovery and motion to release the appeal bond.
¶ 34 Howe also filed a motion to continue the stay of enforcement of the bonded judgment based
on the previously approved appeal bond. In arguing for the stay of enforcement, Howe, in part,
posited that the postjudgment interest in the case began to accrue when the circuit court granted
summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor in February 2021, not when the court entered judgment on
the jury’s verdict in May 2017. Plaintiff responded and did not object to Howe’s request for a
continued stay of enforcement of the judgment or the amount of the current bond. Rather, plaintiff
objected to Howe’s contention that the postjudgment interest in the case began to accrue when the
circuit court granted summary judgment in plaintiff’s favor in February 2021. Instead, plaintiff
argued that postjudgment interest began to accrue in May 2017, when the court entered the
uncontested and unchallenged judgment in the case. The circuit court granted Howe’s motion to
continue the stay of enforcement of the judgment based on the previously approved appeal bond,
but it found that the postjudgment interest in the case began to accrue on the date of the original
judgment in May 2017. Howe subsequently filed another notice of appeal that appealed the same
- 14 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
orders in its initial notice of appeal but added the circuit court’s order finding that postjudgment
interest began to accrue in May 2017.
¶ 35 While both appeals were pending, but before briefing began, we consolidated the appeals
on Howe’s motion. This consolidated appeal followed.
¶ 36 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 37 A. Forum Non Conveniens
¶ 38 We first address the circuit court’s denial of Howe’s motion to dismiss based on the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, as a successful motion to dismiss would obviate the need to
discuss the remaining issues in the case. Howe contends that the court erred in denying the motion
because it was timely brought where the circumstances had changed making Poweshiek County,
Iowa, substantially more convenient than Cook County.
¶ 39 When two potential forums exist for litigation, “the equitable doctrine of
forum non conveniens may be invoked to determine the most appropriate forum.” Dawdy v. Union
Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (2003). The doctrine grants the circuit court the ability to
decline jurisdiction of a case, even if it has proper jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter,
when “it appears that another forum can better serve the convenience of the parties and the ends
of justice.” Fennell v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 12. The doctrine is premised
upon “considerations of fundamental fairness and sensible and effective judicial administration.”
Gridley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 217 Ill. 2d 158, 169 (2005). Although
the doctrine may be applied on an intrastate basis—meaning between two counties in Illinois—
this case involves the doctrine being analyzed on an interstate basis, where the focus is “whether
the case is being litigated in the most appropriate state.” Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 13.
- 15 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
¶ 40 The general principles of the forum non conveniens doctrine are well recognized, but each
case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts. Id. ¶ 21. In determining whether to transfer
a case under the doctrine, the circuit court must balance multiple private and public interest factors.
Id. ¶¶ 15-17. The private interest factors include (1) the convenience of the parties, (2) the relative
ease of access to testimonial, documentary, and real evidence, (3) the availability of compulsory
process to secure the attendance of unwilling witnesses, (4) the costs to secure the attendance of
willing witnesses, (5) the possibility of viewing the site where the accident occurred, if appropriate,
and (6) “all other practical considerations that make a trial easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.” Id.
¶ 15. The public interest factors include (1) the interest in deciding controversies locally, (2) the
unfairness of imposing the burden of jury duty on residents of a forum with little connection to the
litigation, and (3) the administrative difficulties caused by adding litigation to already congested
court dockets rather than resolving the case at its origin. Id. ¶ 16. The court must not place too
much emphasis on any one factor, but rather must balance all private and public interest factors
together and determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “the balance of factors
strongly favors” dismissal of the litigation. Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 41 Before weighing the various private and public interest factors, the circuit court must
determine how much weight to give the plaintiff’s chosen forum. See id. ¶ 18. “Unless the factors
weigh strongly in favor of transfer or dismissal, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.” Id. In other words, “the battle over forum begins with the plaintiff’s choice already in
the lead.” First American Bank v. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d 511, 521 (2002). Generally, if the plaintiff
is not a resident of the chosen forum or the accident at issue in the litigation did not occur in the
chosen forum, the plaintiff’s choice is afforded less deference. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 26;
Langenhorst v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 219 Ill. 2d 430, 442-43 (2006). “A plaintiff’s ‘home
- 16 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
forum’ for purposes of an interstate forum non conveniens motion is the plaintiff’s home State.”
Kwasniewski v. Schaid, 153 Ill. 2d 550, 553 (1992). The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate
“that the plaintiff’s chosen forum is inconvenient to the defendant and another forum is more
convenient to all parties.” Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 20.
¶ 42 Another wrinkle in this forum non conveniens analysis is the time at which Howe filed its
motion. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187(a) (eff. Jan 1, 2018), a motion to dismiss based
on forum non conveniens “must be filed by a party not later than 90 days after the last day allowed
for the filing of that party’s answer.” However, because Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 (eff. Feb.
16, 2011) allows for good cause extensions of time to perform acts required by the supreme court
rules, this court has previously declined “to read Rule 187 as an absolute prohibition against filing
such a motion beyond the limit prescribed.” In re Marriage of Clark, 232 Ill. App. 3d 342, 350
(1992). This is because the defendant should not be put in a position where it has to “make the
choice as to filing a forum non conveniens motion when the basis therefor may not have been clear
or deferring filing at the risk of having the motion denied because of delay.” Kemner v. Monsanto
Co., 112 Ill. 2d 223, 241 (1986). As such, “Illinois law provides that a challenge to forum may be
renewed where the circumstances affecting any of the forum non conveniens factors have
changed.” Eads v. Consolidated R. Corp., 365 Ill. App. 3d 19, 29 (2006). Still, “[a] defendant who
believes that the forum chosen by the plaintiff is inconvenient should not allow the lengthy periods
of time which were involved in these cases to pass without asking the court to decline jurisdiction
and dismiss the case.” Bell v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 147 (1985).
¶ 43 The resolution of a forum non conveniens motion lies within the sound discretion of the
circuit court and may only be reversed if the court abused its discretion in balancing the applicable
- 17 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
factors. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21. An abuse of discretion occurs only “where no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the circuit court.” Id.¶ 44 Initially, we note that, in the order denying Howe’s forum non conveniens motion, the
circuit court found Howe’s motion “potentially untimely” but ultimately based its denial of the
motion on the balancing test of the forum non conveniens factors. Because the court did not base
its denial on the timeliness, or lack thereof, of Howe’s motion, we will proceed directly to the
forum non conveniens balancing test of the private and public interest factors, which is where the
court utilized its discretion. First, however, we must decide how much deference plaintiff’s chosen
forum of Illinois should receive. In the present case, there is no dispute that, at the time Inman
died, he was a resident of Iowa. Likewise, there is no dispute that plaintiff remains a resident of
Iowa. Furthermore, the accident in this case occurred in Iowa. Because the accident did not occur
in Illinois, and neither Inman nor plaintiff were or are residents of Illinois, plaintiff’s choice to file
her lawsuit in Illinois is entitled to less deference. See id. ¶ 26; Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 442-43.
But less deference does not mean no deference. See Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518. As such, plaintiff’s
chosen forum of Illinois is still entitled to some deference.
¶ 45 1. Private Interest Factors
¶ 46 With the level of deference to plaintiff’s chosen forum decided and the principles of a
forum non conveniens analysis in mind, we turn to the private interest factors, beginning with the
convenience of the parties. As we noted, plaintiff resides in Iowa, while Howe—the lone remaining
defendant—resides in Illinois. Given this, the first factor does not favor dismissal, as the circuit
court found. See Erwin v. Motorola, Inc., 408 Ill. App. 3d 261, 275-76 (2011) (finding that the
convenience of the parties did not favor dismissal in favor of Texas because the defendant “could
- 18 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
not genuinely contend that litigating the case in Illinois, where it maintained its corporate
headquarters, would prove inconvenient to it”).
¶ 47 We next look at the relative ease of access to testimonial, documentary, and real evidence.
First, as the circuit court noted, because the documentary evidence in this case has already been
shared, the relative ease of access to such evidence has little bearing on the outcome of Howe’s
motion. Moreover, generally, due to modern technology, the location of documentary evidence is
a less significant consideration than ever before. See Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 36 (observing
that “the location of documents, records and photographs has become a less significant factor in
forum non conveniens analysis in the modern age of Internet, email, telefax, copying machines,
and world-wide delivery services, since those items can now be easily copied and sent”). As such,
the location of documentary evidence does not favor dismissal. Regarding real evidence, the
parties do not identify any such evidence. Thus, the relative ease of access to it has no effect on
the analysis. Consequently, the relative ease of access to testimonial evidence is what matters most
in this case.
¶ 48 During the initial jury trial, there were 15 witnesses, 4 of which were expert witnesses and
4 of which were the plaintiff and past and current employees of Howe. The remaining witnesses
were (1) Justin Schwarz, an Iowa-based dispatcher for Hanifen towing company, who dispatched
Walsh and Inman to Langholf’s stalled truck, (2) Dr. Michele Catellier, the Iowa-based medical
examiner, (3) Schellhorn, the Iowa-based truck driver, who witnessed the accident, (4) Green, the
Oklahoma-based truck driver, who observed Terrell shirtless before the accident, (5) Deputy
Sheriff Cheney, the Iowa-based sheriff, who received a dispatch about the accident, (6) Miller, the
Iowa-based emergency medical technician, who received a dispatch about the accident, and (7)
Assistant District Commander Starrett, the Iowa-based assistant district commander for the Iowa
- 19 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
State Patrol, who led the investigation into the cause of the accident. As will be discussed more
fully later, our remand in this case was for a new trial on only the allocation of fault, not on the
issue of damages. As damages would not be an issue for the new trial, Dr. Catellier and Miller
would likely not be needed as trial witnesses because their testimony focused on Inman’s injuries
as a result of the accident. This means that of the nonexpert witnesses and the witnesses not a party
or related to the parties, only Schwarz, Schellhorn, Green, Deputy Sheriff Cheney, and Assistant
District Commander Starrett would be needed for a new trial. Of those five witnesses, Schwarz,
Schellhorn, and Green all testified via a videotaped evidence deposition. There is no reason these
three witnesses could not do the same for a subsequent trial (see Taylor v. Lemans Corp., 2013 IL
App (1st) 130033, ¶ 21), meaning only Deputy Sheriff Cheney and Assistant District Commander
Starrett could be inconvenienced by traveling to Illinois for a new trial. Indeed, as Assistant District
Commander Starrett averred in his affidavit, given his work and residence in Iowa, traveling to
Illinois for a second time to be a witness in this case would be substantially inconvenient for him.
Regardless, for Deputy Sheriff Cheney and Assistant District Commander Starrett, their testimony
could be had by videoconference technology if travel were truly that inconvenient. See In re R.D.,
2021 IL App (1st) 201411, ¶ 24.
¶ 49 Beyond those witnesses, there were four party witnesses or witnesses related to the parties,
including plaintiff, who likely would not need to testify again due to her testimony being primarily
related to damages. The remaining three witnesses were Ken Howe, Howe’s president, who resides
in Illinois; David Grimm, Howe’s director of safety and maintenance, who lives in Illinois; and
Margaret O’Brien, Howe’s previous director of safety and maintenance, who now lives in Florida.
Although none of them were eyewitnesses to the accident, all three are critical to the issue of
Howe’s liability. And for these three witnesses, nothing in record indicates that participating in a
- 20 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
new trial in Illinois would be inconvenient for them. Moreover, for O’Brien, traveling from Florida
to Illinois would undoubtedly be more convenient than traveling from Florida to Iowa.
¶ 50 Lastly, there were four expert witnesses in this case—two for plaintiff and two for Howe.
It is true, as Howe notes, that the circuit court appeared to assign equal weight to the location of
the expert witnesses as the lay witnesses. And as Howe highlights, Illinois courts are cautious to
afford the same weight to the location of expert witnesses as lay witnesses, especially because
expert witnesses are compensated for any inconvenience in travel. See Fennell, 2012 IL 113812,
¶¶ 33-34; Laverty v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 404 Ill. App. 3d 534, 539 (2010). Nevertheless,
given that many witnesses in the initial trial testified via evidence depositions and some witnesses
needed to resolve the issue of liability reside in Illinois and Florida, the circuit court came to the
correct ultimate conclusion that the relative ease of access to testimonial evidence did not favor
dismissal.
¶ 51 We next turn to the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of unwilling
witnesses. It is undisputed that an Illinois court would not have subpoena power over an unwilling
witness from Iowa and, thus, could not compel any nonparty witnesses located in Iowa. See
Gridley, 217 Ill. 2d at 174. Because there are more nonparty witnesses residing in Iowa than
Illinois, Iowa has an advantage in regard to the availability of compulsory process to secure the
attendance of unwilling witnesses. Regarding the costs to secure the attendance of willing
witnesses, we generally look at the transportation costs to bring the various witnesses to the
potential forums. See Evans v. Patel, 2020 IL App (1st) 200528, ¶ 45. Because the majority of the
nonparty witnesses live in Iowa, the costs to secure the attendance of willing witnesses also favors
Iowa.
- 21 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
¶ 52 The penultimate private interest factor is the possibility of viewing the site where the
accident occurred. Although the circuit court noted this factor as one generally relevant to a
forum non conveniens analysis, it did not specifically include the factor in its analysis. This “factor
is not concerned with the necessity of viewing the site of the injury, but rather is concerned with
the possibility of viewing the site, if appropriate.” (Emphases in original.) Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at
178. Certainly, upon retrial on the issue of liability, it is possible that a site visit could occur, given
the importance of the highway to the case, and such a visit would be more practical if the case
were tried in Iowa versus Illinois. See Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 39 (finding that if the “case were
tried in St. Clair County, and the circuit court determines that viewing the premises is appropriate
or necessary, it would be irrational for a jury composed of St. Clair County residents to travel to
Mississippi or Louisiana to view the premises, when such viewing could be accomplished more
expeditiously if this case were tried in Mississippi”). As such, this factor weighs in favor of
dismissing the case.
¶ 53 The final factor is “all other practical considerations that make a trial easy, expeditious,
and inexpensive.” Id. ¶ 15. None of the parties have identified any other practical consideration
involved in this forum non conveniens analysis, and the circuit court likewise did not identify any.
However, we observe that, due to where this case is procedurally, it is undeniable that the case
would proceed easier, more expeditiously and inexpensive in Illinois rather than in Iowa, where
the case would have to begin anew.
¶ 54 2. Public Interest Factors
¶ 55 We now turn to the relevant public interest factors, beginning with the interest in deciding
controversies locally. Although the situs of the accident generally is the most important factor in
giving an action a local interest (see Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 183; Peile v. Skelgas, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d
- 22 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
323, 343 (1994)), plaintiff’s allegations of negligence focused not only on Langholf’s conduct on
the highway in Iowa but also on Langholf’s conduct in maintaining his semi-tractor engine and
the conduct of Howe in ensuring that Langholf completed safety training. These latter allegations
of negligence against Langholf, an Illinois resident prior to his death, and Howe, an Illinois-based
company, give Illinois a local interest in the case. See Koss Corp. v. Sachdeva, 2012 IL App (1st)
120379, ¶ 134 (finding that allegations of “inadequate policies, procedures, and training” of a local
company give that locality an interest in the case). While the location of the accident occurred in
Iowa, there are nevertheless Illinois connections to the litigation, such that Illinois does have an
interest in deciding the case, as the circuit court concluded.
¶ 56 The second public interest factor is the unfairness of imposing the burden of jury duty on
residents of a forum with little connection to the litigation. As the case does have some connection
to Illinois, it would not be unfair to impose the burden of jury duty on residents of Illinois, as the
circuit court found. See Ammerman v. Raymond Corp., 379 Ill. App. 3d 878, 892 (2008) (observing
that, where a locality has an interest in deciding a controversy, “[i]t thus follows that jurors residing
in [that locality] have an interest in hearing and resolving such a claim”).
¶ 57 Next, we address the final public interest factor—the administrative difficulties caused by
adding litigation to already congested court dockets rather than resolving the case at its origin.
Although the circuit court agreed with Howe that Poweshiek County’s court system is less
congested than Cook County’s, this is true based on the sheer volume of cases. But Howe did not
present any evidence that the Poweshiek County’s court system would resolve the case more
quickly than Cook County’s. See Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 517 (“Court congestion is a relatively
insignificant factor, especially where the record does not show the other forum would resolve the
case more quickly.”) Yet, the circuit “court is in the better position to assess the burdens on its
- 23 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
own docket” when deciding a forum non conveniens motion. Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 451. As
the circuit court found that court congestion favored dismissal, we have no basis to find the court
came to an incorrect conclusion on this factor.
¶ 58 3. Overall Balancing
¶ 59 In sum, some of the private interest factors—in particular, those relating to the availability
of compulsory process to secure the attendance of unwilling witnesses and the costs to secure the
attendance of willing witnesses—favor Iowa as the more convenient forum for this litigation.
However, this is negated by the fact that the relative ease of access to testimonial evidence did not
favor dismissal and the case would have to start anew in Iowa, resulting in the private interest
factors as a whole not favoring dismissal. Furthermore, as the circuit court found, Illinois does
have a significant connection to this litigation through the allegations of negligence against Howe
and Langholf that occurred in Illinois, which, in turn, does not impose an unfair burden of jury
duty on residents of Illinois, here those residents in Cook County. Given this, even when
considering that the relative court congestion between Cook County and Poweshiek County
favored dismissal, the public interest factors as a whole do not favor dismissal. Because the private
interest factors and public interest factors as a whole do not favor dismissal, the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Howe’s motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens.
¶ 60 B. Motion to Reopen Discovery
¶ 61 Howe next contends that the circuit court erred by denying its motion to reopen discovery
to allow it to redepose plaintiff on the issue of damages. In support of this argument, Howe argues
that this court did not limit the remand for a new trial on only the issue of liability and, thus, the
damages were still relevant in a new trial. In denying Howe’s motion, the circuit court found that
reopening discovery was not appropriate in light of the appellate court mandate and further that
- 24 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
any decision about whether the damages would be at issue at the new trial was reserved for the
trial judge. However, later, when considering plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the court
decided that damages were not at issue at the new trial.
¶ 62 The circuit court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to reopen discovery, and
such a decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL
App (1st) 100622, ¶ 19. An abuse of discretion occurs only “where no reasonable person would
take the view adopted by the circuit court.” Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21. In the instant case, the
court exercised its discretion to deny Howe its motion to reopen discovery based on its
interpretation of the appellate court mandate. When determining how to proceed on remand, the
circuit court must review “the appellate court’s mandate, as opposed to the appellate court
opinion.” PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 308 (1981). “However, if the
direction is to proceed in conformity with the opinion, then, of course, the content of the opinion
is significant.” Id.¶ 63 The appellate court mandate in this case stated: “Affirmed in part and reversed in part;
cause remanded with directions.” Inman, 2019 IL App (1st) 172459, ¶ 174. Given the mandate’s
explicit instruction that the remand was “with directions,” the content of the opinion is undoubtedly
significant. In several parts of that opinion, we made clear that, had the jury been able to consider
Green’s observation of Terrell being shirtless just seconds before the accident, such evidence
probably would have affected the jury’s apportionment of fault. For instance, in the introduction
of the case, we observed that such evidence “very likely would have changed the jury’s
apportionment of liability between Howe and Hiner.” Id. ¶ 4. Furthermore, in the analysis of the
propriety of the trial judge’s grant of plaintiff’s motion in limine No. 32, we asserted that “[t]he
preclusion of Green’s testimony about Terrell’s appearance before the accident had a potentially
- 25 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
dramatic [e]ffect on the jury’s verdict, specifically its apportionment of fault.” Id. ¶ 158. And, in
concluding that analysis, we stated that “the jury was deprived of a potentially critical piece of
evidence in determining the respective faults of Howe and Hiner” and “[t]he jury’s inability to
consider this significant piece of evidence undoubtedly appears to have affected the outcome of
the trial, specifically the comparative fault of Howe and Hiner.” Id. Given this language in our
opinion, it is clear that our mandate for a new trial was only on the issue of liability, not on the
issue of damages. Indeed, Howe never raised the issue of damages on appeal, and this court
axiomatically never considered the issue. Thus, our mandate could not encompass a remand for a
new trial on the issue of damages. See Crim, 2020 IL 124318, ¶ 40 (“[T]he appellate court’s
mandate could not remand the matter for a new trial on an issue never raised and not considered.”).
Consequently, the circuit court correctly interpreted the appellate court mandate, and therefore, it
properly exercised its discretion to deny Howe’s motion to reopen discovery.
¶ 64 C. Motion for Summary Judgment
¶ 65 Howe next contends that the circuit court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and
admissions on file establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010); Carney v. Union
Pacific R.R. Co., 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 25. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, the court strictly construes the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits against the moving
party and liberally construes them in favor of the nonmoving party. Carney, 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 25.
A genuine issue of material fact exists “where the material facts are disputed or, if the material
facts are undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed
- 26 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
facts.” Mashal v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112341, ¶ 49. We review summary judgment rulings
de novo. Carney, 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 25.
¶ 66 Critical to analyzing the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment are multiple statutes.
First,
“[t]he Contribution Act creates a statutory right of contribution in actions ‘where 2 or more
persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property,
or the same wrongful death’ [citation], to the extent that a tortfeasor pays more than his
pro rata share of the common liability [citation].” Johnson v. United Airlines, 203 Ill. 2d
121, 128 (2003) (quoting 740 ILCS 100/1, 2(a), 2(b) (West 1996)).
However, section 2(c) of the Contribution Act provides that
“[w]hen a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good
faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or the same
wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for
the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it reduces the recovery
on any claim against the others to the extent of any amount stated in the release or
the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever
is greater.” 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 2010).
If a tortfeasor settles with a claimant under section 2(c) of the Contribution Act, the settling
tortfeasor becomes “discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.” Id.§ 2(d). As such, “a defendant who enters a good-faith settlement with the plaintiff is discharged
from any contribution liability to a nonsettling defendant.” BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting
& Coring Co., 214 Ill. 2d 356, 365 (2005). Moreover, under section 2-1117 of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-1117 (West 2010)), settling defendants cannot be apportioned fault and, thus, cannot appear
- 27 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
on the verdict form for allocating liability. See Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 232 Ill.
2d 369, 382 (2008) (Ready I) (plurality opinion).
¶ 67 Another critical statute is section 2-1202 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1202 (West 2010)),
which governs posttrial motions in jury cases. Crim, 2020 IL 124318, ¶ 25. Under section 2-
1202(b) (735 ILCS 5/2-1202(b) (West 2010)), “[r]elief desired after trial in jury cases, *** must
be sought in a single post-trial motion.” Furthermore, section 2-1202 requires that such posttrial
motions be filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment and “contain the points relied upon,
particularly specifying the grounds in support thereof, and must state the relief desired.” Id. § 2-
1202(b), (c). If a party “fails to seek a new trial in his or her post-trial motion, either conditionally
or unconditionally,” that party forfeits “the right to apply for a new trial, except in cases in which
the jury has failed to reach a verdict.” Id. § 2-1202(e). There are two exceptions to this requirement.
Crim, 2020 IL 124318, ¶ 26. The first exception is, as provided by the statute, when the jury fails
to reach a verdict. Id. The second exception occurs in cases where the circuit court grants a directed
verdict on all issues of the case. Id.¶ 68 In Crim, two plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against a doctor on behalf of
their son raising two claims: one for failing to obtain informed consent before birth and the other
for professional negligence relating to the delivery. Id. ¶ 4. The case proceed to a jury trial, where,
during the trial, the trial court granted the doctor’s motion for a directed verdict on the informed
consent claim. Id. ¶ 7. Following the trial, the jury found in favor of the doctor on the professional
negligence claim. Id. The plaintiffs did not file any posttrial motions, but they did appeal,
contending the trial court erred in granting the doctor’s motion for a directed verdict on the
informed consent claim, without presenting any argument concerning the jury’s verdict on the
- 28 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
professional negligence claim. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of a
directed verdict on the informed consent claim and remanded the matter for a new trial. Id. ¶ 11.
¶ 69 On remand, the parties disagreed on the scope of the retrial, with the doctor arguing that
the remand only concerned the informed consent claim, while the plaintiffs argued that a retrial
was required on all issues. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. The trial court invited the parties to propose a certified
question, which they did, and the court subsequently certified: “ ‘Whether the ruling of the
Appellate Court [citation], reversing the judgment and remanding this case for a new trial requires
a trial de novo on all claims.’ ” Id. ¶ 14. The appellate court granted the doctor’s application for an
interlocutory appeal, and it answered the question in the affirmative because the appellate court in
Crim v. Dietrich, 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, issued a general remand without specific instructions.
Id. ¶¶ 15, 22. The doctor subsequently petitioned our supreme court for review, which it granted.
Id. ¶ 15. Initially, our supreme court found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a new trial on the
professional negligence claim—the sole claim on which the jury rendered a verdict—because they
failed to file a posttrial motion as required by section 2-1202 of the Code. Id. ¶ 33. Our supreme
court also rejected an argument made by the plaintiffs that, because the appellate court in Crim
issued a general remand, they were entitled to a new trial on all issues automatically. Id. ¶ 40. In
rejecting this argument, our supreme court observed that, when the appellate court in Crim held
that the circuit court erred in granting the doctor’s motion for a directed verdict on the informed
consent claim, the appellate court only “ruled on the merits of the case before it.” Id. As such,
according to our supreme court, “the appellate court’s mandate could not remand the matter for a
new trial on an issue never raised and not considered.” Id.
¶ 70 Under this body of law, we note there are certain facts that are not in dispute. First, in our
original opinion, we affirmed the jury’s finding that Howe was a proximate cause of Inman’s
- 29 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
injuries and death. See Inman, 2019 IL App (1st) 172459, ¶ 82. Second, Hiner Transport is no
longer involved in the case because of the good faith settlement it reached with plaintiff and
subsequent dismissal from the case by the trial judge. Third, although Howe objected to the
settlement, it never raised an issue about the settlement in its posttrial motion or challenged the
settlement on appeal, thereby forfeiting its challenge to it. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1202 (West 2010);
Crim, 2020 IL 124318, ¶¶ 24-25, 33, 38. Fourth, Howe never challenged the jury’s damages award,
either in its posttrial motion or on appeal, thereby forfeiting its right to request a new trial on the
issue of damages. See Crim, 2020 IL 124318, ¶¶ 24-25, 33, 38. Given these facts, as the circuit
court correctly observed in its analysis on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the only issue
to be decided at a new trial is how to allocate liability given the new testimony of Green and the
application of the amended discovery sanctions. But because of Hiner Transport’s good faith
settlement and subsequent dismissal from the litigation, Hiner Transport would not be a party at
the retrial. And, under Ready I, 232 Ill. 2d at 382, Hiner Transport cannot be listed on the verdict
form. As a result, the only party who could be liable at retrial would be Howe (see 740 ILCS 100/2
(West 2010)), and therefore, it has to bear the entirety of the judgment, as the circuit court
concluded.
¶ 71 Nevertheless, generally, a defendant such as Howe would be allowed to use a sole
proximate cause defense and argue that a third party was the sole proximate cause of another’s
injuries and death. “ ‘[T]he plaintiff exclusively bears the burden of proof to establish the element
of causation through competent evidence ***.’ ” Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 238 Ill.
2d 582, 591 (2010) (Ready II) (quoting Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 233 Ill. 2d 416, 444 (2009)). But
“ ‘a defendant has the right to rebut such evidence and to also establish that the conduct of another
causative factor is the sole proximate cause of the injury.’ ” Id. In this case, however, such a
- 30 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
defense is impossible. For one, Howe cannot place blame upon Hiner Transport because it has
been dismissed from the litigation due to the good-faith settlement with plaintiff. See Ready I, 232
Ill. 2d at 382. Second, we have affirmed the jury’s finding that Howe was a proximate cause of
Inman’s injuries and death. See Inman, 2019 IL App (1st) 172459, ¶ 82. What this leaves, as the
circuit court concluded, is a situation where it had no option but to grant plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment, as no genuine issue of material fact exists as to who could be 100% liable at
a retrial. See Ready II, 238 Ill. 2d at 594 (finding that “[n]o reasonable jury would have concluded
that United was not a proximate cause of the accident, and if United was a proximate cause, the
settling defendants could not have been the sole proximate cause”). Consequently, the circuit court
correctly determined that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment.
¶ 72 D. Motion to Release Appeal Bond
¶ 73 Howe next contends that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to release the appeal
bond following the appellate court remand for a new trial. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
305(a) (eff. July 1, 2017), a party may obtain a stay of enforcement of an adverse judgment if that
party timely files a notice of appeal and posts a bond with the circuit court. The appeal bond
generally must be sufficient monetarily “to cover the amount of the judgment and costs plus
interest reasonably anticipated to accrue during the pendency of the appeal.” Id. An appeal bond
secures the appellee’s judgment while the appellant pursues its appeal. See Rhodes v. Sigler, 44
Ill. App. 3d 375, 378-79 (1976). Additionally, the bond prevents the appellee from executing on
his or her judgment during the pendency of the appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 305(a) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 74 Howe initially procured an appeal bond through Western Surety Company that became
effective on October 2, 2017, and secured plaintiff’s judgment while Howe appealed. Ultimately,
after the initial appeal, our remand for a new trial, Howe’s unsuccessful motion to release the
- 31 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
appeal bond, its unsuccessful forum non conveniens motion, and plaintiff’s successful motion for
summary judgment, Howe filed a motion to continue the stay of enforcement of the bonded
judgment based on the previously approved appeal bond. Therein, Howe posited that the original
appeal bond was more than sufficient security for the judgment entered by the circuit court on
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. As such, Howe requested that the original appeal bond
remain in place through the exhaustion of all its appeals. The circuit court granted Howe’s motion
to continue the stay of enforcement of the judgment, meaning the appeal bond remains in effect
based on its request. As such, this issue has become moot. See In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349-50
(2006).
¶ 75 E. Postjudgment Interest
¶ 76 Howe lastly contends that the circuit court erred in awarding plaintiff postjudgment interest
from May 18, 2017, the date that the trial judge entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. Rather,
according to Howe, postjudgment interest could only begin to accrue on February 11, 2021, the
date that the circuit court entered judgment on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
¶ 77 In Illinois, judgment creditors are entitled to 9% interest per annum on unpaid portions of
a judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2010). The circuit court has no discretion in awarding
interest; rather, the court is required to award interest on a judgment. Longo v. Globe Auto
Recycling, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1039 (2001). The only way the judgment debtor may stop
the accrual of interest is by tendering payment of the judgment, costs, and the interest accrued to
date, “notwithstanding the prosecution of an appeal, or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the
judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2010). “An award of interest on a money judgment requires
that the amount of money to be paid was certain and the judgment debtor enjoyed the improper
use of the money during the period for which interest is to be awarded.” Browning, Ektelon
- 32 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
Division v. Williams, 348 Ill. App. 3d 830, 833 (2004). If the damages are certain, then interest
begins to accrue at the time the court enters the original judgment. See Kramer v. Mount Carmel
Shelter Care Facility, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 389, 393 (2001) (interest accrued at time of original
judgment where damages remained definite and certain). However, if the damages are uncertain
at the time of the original judgment, then interest begins to accrue at the time the court enters a
subsequent judgment. See Poe v. Industrial Comm’n, 230 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8-9 (1992) (interest
accrued at time of new judgment where no definite amount of damages had been set previously).
The date from which interest begins to accrue depends on the unique circumstances of each case
(Kramer, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 392) and is a question of law that we review de novo. Decker v. St.
Mary’s Hospital, 266 Ill. App. 3d 523, 525 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Star Charters
v. Figueroa, 192 Ill. 2d 47 (2000).
¶ 78 Before trial, based on plaintiff and the Hiner entities’ high-low settlement, the motion judge
found that the settlement was negotiated in good faith and ordered that any and all counterclaims
for contribution between the Hiner entities and Howe be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to
Contribution Act. Once the motion judge found as such, the amount of liability for the Hiner
entities became capped. As a result, when the jury reached its verdict and awarded plaintiff
damages, Howe knew that it would bear the full amount of the damages award less the setoff from
plaintiff and the Hiner entities’ settlement. Therefore, the damages were certain from the time the
trial judge entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Nothing about our findings on
appeal, our remand, or the circuit court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment on remand
changed the amount of damages for which Howe was liable. Consequently, the circuit court
properly found that postjudgment interest began to accrue on the date of the original judgment in
May 2017.
- 33 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
¶ 79 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 80 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 81 Affirmed.
- 34 -
Nos. 1-21-0274; 1-21-0282 (cons.)
No. 1-21-0274
Cite as: Inman v. Howe Freightways, Inc., 2022 IL App (1st) 210274Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19-L-13312;
the Hon. James N. O’Hara, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Michael Resis, Andrew Seiber, and Ellen Green, of
for SmithAmundsen LLC, and Glenn F. Fencl and David M.
Appellant: Macksey, of Johnson & Bell Ltd., both of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys Joseph A. Power Jr., Robert R. Thomas, and Sean M. Houlihan,
for of Power Rogers, LLP, of Chicago, and Michael T. Reagan, of
Appellee: Ottawa, for appellee.
- 35 -