People v. Rodriguez , 2022 IL App (1st) 191929-U ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 191929-UFIFTH DIVISION
March 18, 2022
No. 1-19-1929
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )
) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of Cook County.
)
v. ) 93 CR 5960
)
DAVID RODRIGUEZ a/k/a ) Honorable Michael B. McHale,
LUIS DAVID PENA, ) Judge Presiding.
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Cunningham concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
Held: Rodriguez stated the gist of a constitutional claim in his
postconviction petition when he argued that his natural life sentence was
unconstitutional as applied to him; reversed and remanded.
¶1 In 1993, defendant, David Rodriguez, also known as Luis David Pena, pled guilty to the
first degree murders of Juan Melendez and Rafael Garcia. The trial court found Rodriguez
eligible for the death penalty, but after a hearing in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court
sentenced him to natural life in prison. In 2019, Rodriguez filed a pro se postconviction petition
arguing that his life sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate
No. 1-19-1929
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The court summarily dismissed the petition. On
appeal, Rodriguez claims that his petition should be remanded for second-stage postconviction
proceedings where he stated the gist of a constitutional claim that the natural life sentence he
received for offenses he committed when he was 18 years old was in violation of the
proportionate penalties clause as applied to him. For the following reasons, we reverse and
remand for second-stage postconviction proceedings.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Rodriguez was charged with two counts of first degree murder in connection with the
shooting deaths of Rafael Garcia and Juan Melendez. The court informed him that if he was
found guilty of murdering the victims, the only two sentences available would be either life
imprisonment without parole or the death penalty. On November 23, 1993, Rodriguez pled guilty
to two counts of first degree murder. The parties stipulated to the following facts in support of
petitioner’s guilty plea.
¶4 On November 2, 1992, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Melendez and Garcia arrived at 3049
West Belden Avenue in Chicago. The victims were members of the Latin Lovers gang, and
Rodriguez was a member of the Orchestra Albany Boys.
¶5 When the victims arrived at that location, an argument ensued. Rodriguez took out a .357
Magnum revolver and fired numerous times at the victims, both of whom were unarmed. The
victims were killed.
¶6 If called to testify, Jose Alvarado would testify that on the date in question he was 15
years old and lived with his family at 3022 West Belden in Chicago. He was sitting on the front
porch of his house on the night in question, when at about 6:30 p.m., he saw a white Cadillac
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pull up and park on Belden. He recognized the car as belonging to Garcia, who was also known
as “Ace.”
¶7 Garcia got out of the car with Melendez, who was also known as “Pee Wee.” After
Garcia parked, another car that Alvarado had never seen before pulled up and parked. Three or
four guys got out and started talking to the Melendez and Garcia. They were talking about a fight
that had happened earlier that day. They were accusing Melendez and Garcia of hitting someone
with a pipe.
¶8 One of the individuals then challenged Melendez to a fight. An individual that Alvarado
knew as “Too Short,” who had been on the street before the other car pulled up, pulled out a gun.
Alvarado would identify Rodriguez as “Too Short.” Rodriguez started firing the gun at Garcia
and Melendez. The victims tried to duck behind a car, but Rodriguez kept firing. Alvarado heard
four shots.
¶9 Daniel Napier would testify that on November 2, 1992, he was visiting with his friend on
Belden between Sacramento and Albany, when a Cadillac pulled up and parked. Two guys got
out of the car whom he recognized as Pee Wee and Ace. After they got out of the car, they got
into an argument with guys from the Orchestra Albany Street gang.
¶ 10 The argument was about a fight that had happened between the two gangs. During the
argument Napier saw a guy he knew as Too Short walking up with a gun in his right hand.
Rodriguez fired three or four shots at Garcia and Melendez, and everyone started running.
¶ 11 Robert Munoz would testify that on the date in question he was at Belden and Albany at
6:15 p.m. He saw an argument that was taking place next to a white Cadillac. He knew Ace from
the neighborhood, but they were involved in different gangs. Munoz was in the Orchestra Albany
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gang and Ace was a Latin Lover. Munoz also saw Too Short, who was recruited into the
Orchestra Albany Boys gang about a year before. Munoz would identify Rodriguez as Too Short.
¶ 12 Munoz would testify that he saw Rodriguez pull out a gun and start shooting at Ace and
Ace’s friend. Rodriguez fired four shots and ran towards Sacramento. Munoz did not see anyone
else with a gun.
¶ 13 It would be stipulated that Rodriguez “fled to Puerto Rico on November 3, 1992; that a
warrant was lodged for his arrest; and that he was subsequently extradited back to Chicago.”
¶ 14 Assistant State’s Attorney Michael Holzman would testify that on February 27, 1993, he
had a conversation with Rodriguez where Rodriguez admitted, “in summary, to shooting Juan
Melendez and Rafael Garcia; and also admitted to fleeing to Puerto Rico; and as to what he had
done with the gun after he shot the victims.” ASA Holzman would testify that Rodriguez gave a
court-reported statement, which the State requested to be offered into evidence and published to
the court.
¶ 15 Rodriguez indicated in his statement that he was 18 years old, and a member of the
Orchestra Albany Boys. He was also known as “Too Short.” The Latin Lovers was a rival gang.
He admitted standing on Belden Street on November 2, 1992, armed with a chrome .357
Magnum handgun. Two members of Latin Lovers pulled up, exited the car, flashed gang signs,
and argued with another member of the Orchestra Albany Boys. Rodriguez pulled the gun from
his pocket and shot Ace twice in the chest. He shot Pee Wee in the leg and back. Afterwards, he
went to a nearby apartment, removed the shells from the gun and cleaned the gun. He threw the
shells down and sold his gun to an unknown man. The next day, he flew to his mother’s house in
Puerto Rico. He was extradited back to Chicago five days later.
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¶ 16 The court found that the factual basis supported Rodriguez’s guilty plea and found him
guilty of two counts of first degree murder. It found him eligible for the death penalty.
¶ 17 At Rodriguez’s sentencing hearing, evidence was presented in both aggravation and
mitigation. In aggravation, the State presented the testimony of Angela Adorno, a property
manager for Res Corp Realty. She testified that on September 13, 1991, she and her assistant
manager drove to a building she managed at 2744 North Spaulding Avenue where Rodriguez and
five other members of the Orchestra Albany Boys were standing outside and would not leave.
She saw Rodriguez participating in gang activity and “a lot of drug” activities from January 1991
to October 1991.
¶ 18 Nancy Glover testified that she lived at 2637 North Sawyer Avenue and in 1992 she
noticed that Rodriguez and his fellow gang members routinely congregated in the alley beside
her house. She saw Rodriguez approach cars and exchange small packages for cash, and she saw
him block a neighbor’s staircase as she attempted to enter her home with her children.
¶ 19 Chicago Police Officer James Arceo testified that on August 16, 1991, he and his partner
were at 2620 North Spaulding Avenue when he observed three people approach Rodriguez,
engage in a short conversation, and then exchange a “small package” for cash. Officer Arceo
arrested Rodriguez and recovered $78 and multiple packages of suspected cannabis from his
pockets. On September 13, 1991, Adorno approached him in the police station parking lot to tell
him that Rodriguez and others were causing a disturbance at the property she managed and
possibly selling narcotics.
¶ 20 Chicago Police Officer Frank Johnson testified that on August 4, 1992, four people in a
car told him that “two Puerto Ricans” on bicycles had just robbed them at gunpoint. Both
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suspects were eventually found and detained, and one of the victims identified Rodriguez as one
of the armed robbers.
¶ 21 In mitigation, Christina Lickmann testified that Rodriguez was a member of the
Orchestra Albany Boys, and she met him while working as a gang intervention counselor for
Armitage Baptist Church. Lickmann had persuaded Rodriguez to leave his gang before the date
in question, but he returned to the gang a few months later. While in custody for this case,
Rodriguez told Lickmann that he had given his life to God and that he had changed his attitude
towards his gang. The Orchestra Albany Boys had abandoned him since his arrest because he
had attempted to convince them to stop selling drugs, to leave the gang, and to give their lives to
God. Lickmann believed that Rodriguez had changed his life.
¶ 22 Pastor Charles Lyons of the Armitage Baptist Church testified that his church sponsored
a gang intervention program. Pastor Lyons testified that while Rodriguez was incarcerated, he
assisted the gang intervention program by writing letters encouraging other gang members to
stop gang activities.
¶ 23 Rodriguez stated that he was sorry for what happened and asked God and the court to
have mercy on him. Defense counsel argued that Rodriguez was a young man who gravitated to
gangs because he had no family near him, and that since the murders he had changed his life.
Defense counsel urged the court to consider Rodriguez’s age and lack of substantial criminal
record in favor of imposing a natural life sentence rather than the death penalty.
¶ 24 The trial court then sentenced Rodriguez, stating:
“Mr. Rodriguez, I have reviewed the transcript as to the stipulations that
were entered at the time of your plea of guilty. This is a very serious situation.
The lives of two young men have been taken for no good reason at all.
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They have been killed and they have been taken away from their families,
and my heart and my sympathy goes out to their families because what you did
has deprived them of something that we’ll never know what they could possibly
have been.
If I had the wherewithal to bring them back to their families I surely would
do so. Being asked now by the State to take a third life, that being yours. A
person who killed the other two, the law states that unless there is a factor in
mitigation sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, the death
penalty should be imposed.
Here I found that you were eligible for the death penalty. There is no
doubt in my mind that you killed the two individuals; and again, for no reason
whatsoever, and then after killing them, you fled the jurisdiction, went to Puerto
Rico. Did not come back here voluntarily. You had to be brought back and I
think that is a factor to be taken into consideration.
***.
Ultimately, you pled guilty here, and saying that you have found God. I
presided over many people who have been found guilty. I presided over cases of
people that have been found guilty of some kind of crime or another including
people in the same situation as yours, and this finding of God by people such as
yourself seems to me to be a very common phenomenon, especially in cases such
as yours when one is faced with the possibility of meeting his maker through the
imposition of the death penalty.
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I don’t know if your situation is any different than the others, but
oftentimes I find it to be put forth just so the death penalty won’t be imposed and
the finding of God is for a temporary period; and once the crisis is over, the
finding of God is gone, and one such as yours go back to being as you were
before.
***
I have read the pre-sentence report in this case. I have heard the factors in
aggravation and mitigation through the Defendant and stipulations here today,
and I have looked at your criminal, prior criminal background, and it appears to
contain nothing very serious. ***
I heard through live testimony about your drug transactions, selling of
narcotics, ***. Nothing of a violent nature, and I [will] take that into
consideration. I also do take into consideration the fact that you did plead guilty
to the charge.
Having heard everything that is relevant, I find that there is a factor in
mitigation sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty in this case
and because of that, I’m going to sentence you to a life sentence – a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole.”
¶ 25 On July 17, 2019, Rodriguez filed a pro se postconviction petition arguing that his life
sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause. He
stated that his actual date of birth was October 1, 1974, making him just over 18 years old at the
time of the shooting. He stated that he “tried to save his family name from shame and
embarrassment” and used an alias and a false date of birth. His real name is Luis David Pena and
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he was born in Caguas, Puerto Rico. Rodriguez attached his birth certificate to the petition. We
note that in the record, the signed statement that Rodriguez gave to prosecutors contains the
name “Luis David Rodriguez” and initially indicated his birth date as October 1, 1973. However,
the “1973” was crossed out and changed to “1974”, which was initialed by Rodriguez, the two
state’s attorneys, and a detective.
¶ 26 Rodriguez claimed in his postconviction petition that his natural life sentence, imposed
for a crime he committed at the age of 18, was unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties
clause as applied to him. Specifically, Rodriguez noted that his father was an alcoholic who beat
him, his mother neglected him, and he ended up living on the streets at a young age. He was peer
pressured into doing drugs and getting involved in gangs. He tried to escape but could not. His
father did not provide affection or encouragement, but instead offered him alcohol at a young
age. Because of his small stature, Rodriguez was bullied often, and had to learn to defend
himself. Rodriguez grew up alone in a very unstable environment, “living on the streets[,]
sleeping in other people’s homes[,] cars[,] or parks around the neighborhoods.” He ended up in a
gang “where violence, drugs, and alcohol [were] a means to escape the hurt and pain imposed at
home.”
¶ 27 Rodriguez cited to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), for the proposition that
certain considerations should have been a factor in his sentencing because his brain had not yet
fully developed at the time of the offense, and he suffered from the “same immatur[ity],
impulsive[ness], [and] recklessness” as juveniles “that make them less culpable in their crimes.”
Rodriguez asserted that he received a life sentence without being given the opportunity to
demonstrate that his conduct was not the result of him being “irretrievably corrupt” but rather
because he was impulsive, reckless, immature, and his brain was still developing.
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¶ 28 Rodriguez included in his petition a separate document entitled, “Memorandum of New
Illinois Supreme Court Law Decision,” which cited People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, People v.
House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, and People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327.
¶ 29 He also attached several scientific studies that explained the developing science related to
emerging adults. Rodriguez included scientific research that explained the hallmarks of
adolescence that continue into young adulthood – impulsiveness, recklessness, and immaturity –
are only further exacerbated in young adults who are exposed to abuse or other chronically
traumatic experiences as a child.
¶ 30 On August 1, 2019, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition. The written order, in
its entirety, stated:
“Petitioner acknowledges that he was 18 years of age at the time of the offense.
For purposes of 8th Amendment issues, an individual’s 18th birthday marks the
bright line between juveniles and adults. Petitioner has been sentenced as an adult.
See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932. Similarly, People v. Buffer, 2019 IL
122327 does not support petitioner’s claim. The issues raised and presented by the
petitioner are frivolous and patently without merit. His petition filed July 17,
2019, is dismissed.”
¶ 31 The trial court did not address Rodriguez’s only claim in his postconviction petition –
that his sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause
of the Illinois Constitution. Rodriguez now appeals.
¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 On appeal, Rodriguez contends that his pro se postconviction petition stated the gist of
constitutional claim when he alleged that his life sentence for a crime he committed when he was
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18 years old was unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause of
the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The State responds that the trial court’s
order dismissing the petition as frivolous and patently without merit should be affirmed because,
“given the petitioner’s malicious and cold-blooded instigation and commission of the double
murder, there was no arguable basis to conclude, not withstanding petitioner’s status as a young
adult, that the resulting life sentence was so shocking to the moral sense of the community that it
does not withstand under the proportionate penalties clause.” We agree with Rodriguez and
remand his postconviction petition for second-stage proceedings.
¶ 34 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) provides
a framework for an incarcerated individual to collaterally attack his conviction by establishing
the substantial denial of a constitutional right at trial or at sentencing that resulted in that
conviction. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018). Claims are limited to those that were not, and
could not have been, previously litigated. People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 499 (2010).
Proceedings under the Act occur in three stages. At the first stage, the circuit court determines,
without input from the State, whether a petition is frivolous or patently without merit. People v.
Gaultney, 174 Ill. 410, 418 (1996); 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). At the second stage,
the court appoints counsel to represent the defendant and, if necessary, to file an amended
petition. Id. At this stage, the State must either move to dismiss or answer the petition. Id.; 725
ILCS 5/122-4, 5 (West 2018). If the petition and the accompanying documentation make a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the defendant may then proceed to the third
stage, where the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2018).
¶ 35 Rodriguez’s petition was dismissed at the first stage. Our supreme court has stated that to
survive first-stage scrutiny, a petition need only state the “gist” of a constitutional claim. People
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v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). Formal legal argument and citation to authority are not
required (id.), and all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the record must be
taken as true (People v. Romero, 2015 IL App (1st) 140205, ¶ 26). A petition may be summarily
dismissed as “frivolous or patently without merit” only when it has “no arguable basis either in
law or in fact.” People v. Boykins, 2017 IL 121365, ¶ 9. We review the summary dismissal of a
postconviction petition de novo. People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 184 (2010).
¶ 36 We begin with a brief overview of the current law on this issue. The eighth amendment
of the United States Constitution, which is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, prohibits government from imposing “cruel and unusual punishments” for criminal
offenses. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). The eighth amendment guarantees
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. Id. The right flows from the
“precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). “By protecting even those
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to
respect the dignity of all persons.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. The Supreme Court explained:
“The prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ like other expansive
language in the Constitution, must be interpreted according to its text, by
considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose
and function in the constitutional design. To implement this framework, we have
established the propriety and affirmed the necessity of referring to ‘the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine
which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.” Id. at 560-
61.
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¶ 37 When the offender is a juvenile and the offense is serious, there is a genuine risk of
disproportionate punishment. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 33. In Roper, Graham, and
Miller, the United States Supreme Court addressed that risk and concluded that youth matters in
sentencing. Roper held that the eighth amendment prohibited capital sentences for juveniles who
commit murder. 543 U.S. at 578-79. Graham held that the eighth amendment prohibited
mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses. 560 U.S at 83. And
Miller held that the eighth amendment prohibited mandatory life sentences for juveniles who
commit murder. 567 U.S. at 489-90. Our supreme court in Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 43,
adopted the Miller factors.
¶ 38 However, these protections afforded by the eighth amendment apply directly only to
juveniles. As our supreme court has noted, the United States Supreme Court “has clearly and
consistently drawn the line between juveniles and adults for the purpose of sentencing at the age
of 18.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58. It stated that “claims for extending Miller to
offenders 18 years of age or older have been repeatedly rejected.” Id. ¶ 61.
¶ 39 The trial court in this case summarily dismissed Rodriguez’s postconviction petition
based on the foregoing legal precedent, stating, “Petitioner acknowledges that he was 18 years of
age at the time of the offense. For purposes of 8th Amendment issues, an individual’s 18th
birthday marks the bright line between juveniles and adults. Petitioner has been sentenced as an
adult.” Rodriguez’s argument, however, was not brought pursuant to the eighth amendment, but
rather to the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 40 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution specifically provides that
“[a]ll penalties shall be determined according to the seriousness of the offense and with the
objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Our
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supreme court has explained that this emphasis on rehabilitative potential provides “a limitation
on penalties beyond those afforded by the eighth amendment.” People v. Clemons, 2012 IL
107821, ¶¶ 39-41. And it has acknowledged that young adult offenders are “not necessarily
foreclosed” from raising as-applied challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on
juvenile maturity and brain development under the proportionate penalties clause.” Harris, 2018
IL 121932, ¶¶ 46, 48. See Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (the as-applied, youth-based
sentencing claim of an 18-year-old offender would be more appropriately raised in
postconviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal); see also Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48
“The court has thus opened the door to the possibility that a young-adult offender might
demonstrate, through an adequate factual record, that his or her own specific characteristics were
so like those of a juvenile that imposition of a life sentence absent the safeguards established in
Miller was ‘cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral
sense of the community.’ ” People v. Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st) 191743, ¶ 27 (quoting People v.
Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348 (2009)).
¶ 41 In People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, the 19-year-old petitioner raised an as-applied
challenge to his life sentence under the proportionate penalties clause in a postconviction
petition. Our supreme court found that because there was not an evidentiary hearing on that issue
in the trial court, the petitioner therefore did not provide or cite to any evidence relating to how
the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development applied to his specific facts and
circumstances, and the trial court made no factual findings critical to determining whether the
science concerning juvenile maturity and brain development applied to petitioner specifically.
While the appellate court cited articles from a newspaper and an advocacy group in support of its
decision to find the petitioner’s sentence unconstitutional, our supreme court noted that “no trial
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court has made factual findings concerning the scientific research cited in the articles, the limits
of that research, or the competing scientific research, let alone how that research applies to
petitioner’s characteristics and circumstances.” Id. ¶ 29. Because the court determined that the
record in that case required further development, it remanded the case for second-stage
postconviction proceedings. Id. ¶ 32.
¶ 42 Similarly in Harris, 2018 IL 121932, the 18-year-old defendant claimed that his life
sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause. Our
supreme court noted that “[a]ll as-applied constitutional challenges are, by definition, dependent
on the specific facts and circumstances of the person raising the challenge,” and that it is
therefore paramount that the record be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and
circumstances for appellate review. Id. ¶ 39. The court stated:
“A court is not capable of making an ‘as applied’ determination of
unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings of
fact. Without an evidentiary record, any finding that a statute is unconstitutional
‘as applied’ is premature.” Id.
¶ 43 The Harris court noted that the record “includes only basic information about defendant,
primarily from the presentence investigation report. An evidentiary hearing was not held, and the
trial court did not make any findings on the critical facts needed to determine whether Miller
applies to defendant as an adult.” Id. ¶ 46. The court stated that the “critical point” is “whether
the record has been developed sufficiently to address the defendant’s constitutional claim.” Id. ¶
41. As the court in Harris emphasized, “a reviewing court is not capable of making an as-applied
finding of unconstitutionality in the ‘factual vacuum’ created by the absence of an evidentiary
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hearing and findings of fact by the trial court.” Id. (quoting People v. Minnis, 2016 IL 119563, ¶
19).
¶ 44 Here, we find that Rodriguez’s postconviction stated the gist of a constitutional claim
where he argued that his life sentence was unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties
clause as applied to him. Rodriguez attached his birth certificate to the petition that indicated his
real name to be Luis David Pena, and that he was born on October 1, 1974, making him just
barely 18 years old when he committed this offense. Rodriguez pointed to his troubled
upbringing, his abusive alcoholic father, having to live in the streets and sleeping in parks or
other people’s homes and cars. Rodriguez explained his susceptibility to peer pressure, his abuse
of drugs, and how he came to join a gang.
¶ 45 Rodriguez’s petition also referenced scientific studies that explained the developing
science relating to emerging adults and conclude that the hallmarks of youth – impulsiveness,
recklessness, and immaturity – are further exacerbated when children are exposed to abuse or
other traumatic experiences. Accordingly, there was evidence presented that at least arguably
indicates that at the time of the offense, Rodriguez was sufficiently similar to a juvenile such that
the trial court should have considered his age and other factors before sentencing Rodriguez to a
life sentence. See Boykins, 2017 IL 121365, ¶ 9 (a petition may be summarily dismissed as
“frivolous or patently without merit” only when it has “no arguable basis either in law or in
fact.”)
¶ 46 The State maintains that the summary dismissal of Rodriguez’s petition should be
affirmed because “given petitioner’s malicious and cold-blooded instigation and commission of
the double murder, there was no arguable basis to conclude, notwithstanding petitioner’s status
as a young adult, that the resulting life sentence was so ‘shocking’ as to the ‘moral sense of the
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community’ that it does not withstand under the proportionate penalties clause.” The State relies
on the fact that Rodriguez was an adult, that he was the triggerman, and that he secured passage
to Puerto Rico to avoid capture, thereby nullifying his challenge under the proportionate
penalties clause. The State claims that People v. McClurkin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171274, supports
its argument.
¶ 47 In McClurkin, the defendant was 24 years old at the time of the offense. Id. ¶ 5. He was
convicted of the first degree murders of two victims. Id. The jury found the defendant eligible for
the death penalty, but the trial court sentenced him to natural life after concluding that mitigating
evidence precluded the death penalty. Id. ¶ 8. In requesting leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, the defendant claimed that his mandatory life sentence was
unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause because the trial court
did not consider his history of abuse, his personality disorder, and his young age at the time of
the offense. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. The trial court denied the defendant leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, and this court affirmed. This court noted that defendant had felony
criminal convictions in 1991 and 1994, including armed violence, with prison terms of six and
four years respectively. Id. ¶ 7. It stated that the “defendant was a 24-year-old adult – no longer a
teenager as in House – when he committed the murders.” Id. ¶ 21. It noted that the defendant
also had a criminal history of committing violent crimes. Id. The defendant’s diagnosis of
personality disorder was before the trial court during sentencing, and “personality or behavioral
disorders may be aggravating as well as mitigating factors in sentencing.” Id. ¶ 22. This court
found that the defendant did not show the requisite prejudice for filing a successive petition. Id. ¶
23.
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¶ 48 We find McClurkin to be unpersuasive here where Rodriguez’s postconviction petition
was not a successive petition, but rather his first postconviction petition, he had just turned 18
years old at the time of the offense, not 24 years old, he did not have a significant criminal
history, and most importantly, he did not have the opportunity to present any of the evidence
contained in his postconviction petition at his sentencing hearing. In People v. Daniels, 2020 IL
App (1st) 171738, the defendant raised an as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenge to
his life sentence in a post-conviction petition, and this court noted that, “[n]owhere did the
Harris court suggest – and nowhere does House suggest, we might add – that a defendant’s
degree of participation in a crime or discretionary sentence should utterly disqualify him or her
from raising such a claim.” Id. ¶ 31. This court in Daniels further noted that because the
defendant “directed this court’s attention to at least some contemporaneous documentation
regarding his mental health and personal characteristics that he might use to support” his
constitutional claim, he was entitled to further proceedings. Id. ¶ 34. We likewise find that
Rodriguez is entitled to further proceedings.
¶ 49 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For the foregoing reasons, we find that Rodriguez stated the gist of a constitutional claim
in his postconviction petition where he argued that the imposition of a natural life sentence was
unconstitutional as applied to him. We remand for second stage proceedings.
¶ 51 Reversed and remanded.
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