Aalbers v. Lasalle Hotel Properties , 2022 IL App (1st) 210494-U ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 210494-USECOND DIVISION
March 22, 2022
No. 1-21-0494
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
KAYLA AALBERS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 17 L 012537
)
LASALLE HOTEL PROPERTIES, a Maryland )
Corporation; HEI HOSPITALITY, LLC, a )
Connecticut Limited Liability Company; BULLEY )
& ANDREWS, LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability )
Company; AJAX CONSULTING SERVICES, )
LLC, a Massachusetts Limited Liability Company, )
)
Defendants-Appellees )
)
and )
)
MR. DAVID’S FLOORING INTERNATIONAL, )
LTD., ) The Honorable
) Mary Colleen Roberts,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the
court.
Justices Howse and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.
No. 1-21-0494
ORDER
HELD: Trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants and
subsequent denial of plaintiff’s motion to reconsider were proper where plaintiff failed to
affirmatively and positively demonstrate the element of proximate cause with respect to
her negligence cause of action.
¶1 Plaintiff-appellant Kayla Aalbers (plaintiff) brought suit against LaSalle Hotel Properties,
a Maryland Corporation (LaSalle); HEI Hospitality, LLC, a Connecticut Limited Liability
Company (HEI); Bulley & Andrews, LLC, an Illinois Limited Liability Company (Bulley);
and Ajax Consulting Services, LLC, a Massachusetts Limited Liability Company (Ajax)
(defendants, or as named) following a fall and injuries she sustained at a hotel in Chicago.
Bulley filed a third-party complaint against Mr. David’s Flooring International, Ltd. (third-
party defendant or Mr. David’s). Following discovery, defendants and third-party defendant
filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted these motions. Plaintiff filed
a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. Plaintiff appeals from these two orders,
contending that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in defendants’ and third-
party defendant’s favors because it improperly found that she failed to identify a defective
condition that caused her fall and because the evidence presented created a question of fact as
to the breach of duty of care owed to her; she further contends that the court subsequently
erred in denying her motion to reconsider. She asks that we reverse and vacate said
judgments, reinstate this cause in the trial court, and award any further appropriate relief. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
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No. 1-21-0494
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2014, Hotel Chicago, located at 333 North Dearborn in Chicago, underwent a
renovation project, which included construction of new flooring in its lobby. 1 For the record,
LaSalle and HEI were named in the instant suit and final judgment as the hotel’s
owner/property management company, respectively. However, as explained in their joint
brief on appeal, this is a misnomer. HEI is known as Merritt Hospitality, LLC (Merritt) and
LaSalle is known as LHO Chicago River, LLC (LHO), and it is these entities who own and
operate Hotel Chicago. Merritt and LHO hired Ajax as the construction manager for the
project and contracted with Bulley to be the general contractor. Bulley subcontracted with
Mr. David’s for the lobby flooring portion of the project. Also participating in the project
was an architectural firm that drew up the plans and specifications for, among other things,
the lobby flooring.2 The flooring project began in November 2014 and was completed in
March 2015. Thereafter, the project architect issued certificates of substantial completion
and occupancy on the work performed, and Merritt and LHO once again assumed exclusive
control and possession of the lobby.
¶4 Nine months later, on December 10, 2015, plaintiff, who had been staying at the hotel,
exited the elevator in the lobby. As she walked through the lobby, she fell. A hotel
surveillance camera recorded the incident, and hotel security generated a post-accident
1
The portion of the renovation project concerning construction of new flooring in the hotel’s lobby is the only part
of the project relevant to the instant cause.
2
In conjunction with all the named defendants, plaintiff originally brought suit against the architectural firm, as
well. However, that firm is not a party to this appeal.
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No. 1-21-0494
report. Plaintiff suffered a lacerated lip, broken wrist, ruptured Achilles’ tendon and injured
her knee. She underwent multiple surgical procedures.
¶5 Plaintiff filed a complaint, and later an amended complaint, at law against defendants,
alleging negligence. She asserted that defendants carelessly designed and constructed the
premises, failed to take proper safety precautions with respect to dangerous conditions, and
negligently maintained the area where she fell. She also asserted that each defendant owed
her a duty to operate and maintain the hotel in a safe and reasonable manner so as to prevent
injury and that, pursuant to her claims, they breached this duty.
¶6 As litigation progressed, and along with the introduction of the surveillance video and
accident report, several depositions were taken. Plaintiff testified that she had been staying at
the hotel for business and had walked through the lobby several times. She noted that the
lobby floor was tiled and, immediately in front of the elevators, was carpeted. Plaintiff stated
that on the morning of her fall, the lighting in the lobby was adequate and she did not observe
anything obstructing or impeding her view of the floor. She exited the elevator to go to the
front desk and check out of the hotel. She was pulling her rolling her luggage behind her and
had a bag on her shoulder. As she was walking through the lobby, she was looking up at the
hotel’s Christmas tree, whereupon she fell. Plaintiff described her fall specifically as a “trip”
and not a slip, stating that “there was a piece of something” she “tripped on, like a ledge in
the area where the carpet and tile met * * * a lip.” Plaintiff admitted that she never saw a lip
or ledge in the flooring before she fell because she was not looking down while she walked,
and she never saw a ledge in the flooring after she fell because she went sliding when she fell
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No. 1-21-0494
and never looked at the area that day or anytime thereafter to see what potentially could have
caused her to fall. She insisted, however, that there had been “just like a little ledge that just
caught [her] toe” somewhere on the floor. In describing the location of her fall, plaintiff first
stated that she believed she fell where the carpet and tile met in the lobby, but then admitted
that, as she had not been looking down at the floor, she was unsure of the location. She
explained she could only say that she thought she fell where the carpet and tile met because
she had been walking on the carpet; however, she had fallen forward from some spot on the
carpet and eventually landed on the tile after sliding. She could not say how long the carpet
was nor could she say that she was at the end of the carpeted area where the carpet met the
tile when she fell. After admitting she did not see a ledge in the flooring at any point in time,
the following exchange took place:
“[Counsel:] Q. So then how do you know you fell on a ledge then?
[Plaintiff] A. Well, I felt it. I felt it with my toe. I felt it as I went.
Q. I see. So other than feeling the ledge, you have never seen the ledge?
A. No.
Q. Fair statement?
A. Fair statement.
***
Q. * * * How do you know it was a ledge as opposed to some other encumbrance
on the floor?
A. There was something that caught my foot as I fell.
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No. 1-21-0494
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, something that caught my foot.
Q. And I want to make sure I have you correctly. I don’t want to go back and
forth. But you felt something catch your foot; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You did not see what caught your foot before you fell, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You did not see what caught your foot after you fell, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So you couldn’t tell me the size of whatever you tripped on, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You couldn’t describe it in any way, shape or form the thing that you believe
caused you to trip, true?
A True.
***
Q. Couldn’t say if it was metallic, wood or otherwise, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You couldn’t even say what it physically is other than to say that it may have
been a ledge, correct?
A. Correct.”
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No. 1-21-0494
After her fall, plaintiff was attended to by a hotel security guard as well as two friends with
whom she was travelling. Plaintiff testified that no one saw her fall and no one ever told her
what caused her fall. Again, she never inspected the flooring around where she tripped at
any time before or after her fall.
¶7 Mark Dienhart, the hotel’s general manager, testified that, per his job requirements and in
addition to weekly walk-throughs of the hotel with department heads, he personally walks the
premises, including the lobby, twice a day to look for any defects, obstructions, or problems.
He confirmed he was present that morning and that he had done his first walk of the day
earlier, before plaintiff’s fall, and did not note any problems in the flooring. He also
confirmed that there was no construction taking place in the lobby, as the renovation
projected had been completed some nine months earlier. Dienhart was notified of plaintiff’s
fall immediately after it happened and he, along with the hotel’s regional director of
operations Allison Beckner, inspected the area soon thereafter. Dienhart stated that he first
reviewed security footage to determine where plaintiff had fallen. He then went to the lobby
with Beckner and he got down on the floor in that area, which comprised the carpet in front
of the elevator bank and the tile next to it, to see if there was a reason for plaintiff’s fall.
Among other concerns, for example, he searched for rips in the carpet and cracks in the tile,
and he touched the flooring to see if there was any sort of residue in or around the area.
Dienhart explained that if he had identified any concern, he would have closed the area.
Upon his inspection, however, he found no potential hazard and confirmed with Beckner that
she did not find any, either. Dienhart further testified that, even though he did not find any
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No. 1-21-0494
issues with the area, he decided, “from a follow-up standpoint,” to notify the contracted
partners who had worked on the flooring during the hotel renovation project “so they could
also investigate and validate that there was nothing wrong” with it. Dienhart averred that a
contractor was called to conduct a thorough investigation of the area to make sure it was safe
and not in need of repair. Dienhart testified that no changes were made to any of the lobby
flooring, including the carpet and tile, as a result of plaintiff’s fall. Finally, Dienhart noted
for the record that in the nine months between the completion of the flooring renovation
project and plaintiff’s fall, thousands of people had walked through that same particular
lobby area and no one had slipped, tripped, or fallen, nor had anyone made any complaint
about that area, the carpet, or the tile.
¶8 Several witnesses testified with respect to the flooring renovation project itself. Briefly,
Gregory Marquez, Bulley’s safety and risk management director, testified that he was
responsible for the oversight and implementation of safety for the project. Bulley did not
design the project nor select the flooring or carpeting; the architectural firm had done so.
Likewise, Bulley did not perform the installation; it subcontracted with Mr. David’s to do so.
Marquez stated that, as far as he knew, Bulley and Mr. David’s complied with all the
specifications and requirements of the project, as upon the flooring’s completion, the
architectural firm issued certificates of substantial completion and occupancy and did not
issue a punch list with respect to the carpet, tile, or any other portion of the flooring in the
lobby. During his deposition, Marquez viewed photographs of the area and testified that they
clearly show the carpet and tile are at the same level in the lobby and that there is no height
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No. 1-21-0494
differential between them. He further confirmed that this is how the flooring was when he
walked through the project upon its completion in early 2015. He had walked in and around
the lobby and did not see any problems or defects in the flooring or carpet. He also stated
that he never received any reports of any tripping incidents in the lobby in the nine months
between the completion of the project and the instant incident. Karel Steiner, Ajax’s owner,
testified that Ajax’s role in the project was to be Merritt and LHO’s representative and to
report the project’s progress and maintain the schedule and budget. Steiner stated that Ajax
was not responsible for project safety or the final renovations, and confirmed that upon the
flooring project’s completion in early 2015, all parties involved were paid for their work.
Finally, John Novotny, Mr. David’s project manager, testified that after finishing its portion
of the lobby flooring renovation in early 2015, Mr. David’s received payment and was never
called back for any problems or defects.
¶9 Upon this evidence, defendants and third-party defendant filed separate motions for
summary judgment. Although they argued slightly differently with respect to any duty of
care owed to plaintiff due to their different roles in the flooring project, each presented the
same principal argument with respect to proximate causation, namely, that plaintiff had been
unable to identify any defect in the flooring that was to blame for her fall.
¶ 10 The trial court granted the motions. After discussing the elements of a negligence cause
of action and the burdens of the parties, particularly in relation to slip-and-fall cases, the
court turned to Kimbrough v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 202 Ill. App. 3d 968 (1981), finding it
to be directly on point. Applying Kimbrough, the trial court found that, although plaintiff’s
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No. 1-21-0494
testimony established she fell on the hotel’s floor, she failed to show either a defective
condition existed in the flooring that caused her to fall or, if there was such a condition, all or
any defendant here3 caused it. With respect to the former, the court noted that plaintiff could
not describe the appearance, shape, size, or material composition of the alleged condition that
caused her fall; she only stated it was “something” like a lip or ledge that she felt but never
saw. The court also noted that the surveillance video likewise failed to identify what caused
her to fall. From this, the court concluded that plaintiff’s claim was conjecture which could
not, and did not, prove a defect. Next, with respect to its finding of lack of causation, the
court noted that, even assuming there was a defective condition in the flooring, plaintiff
failed to show any defendant caused it. The court found that the evidence showed Ajax had
no role in designing, building, or inspecting the floor; Mr. David’s followed the architectural
firm’s plans and specifications; Bulley received certificates of substantial completion of the
flooring in March 2015 for the work; and plaintiff never argued that Merritt or LHO caused a
defect in the floor after they assumed control of the lobby and flooring once the project was
completed nine months earlier. After also briefly discussing the element of duty and finding
none on the part of defendants for various reasons, the court ultimately concluded that
plaintiff “has not shown some condition caused her to fall and she has not shown that
defendants caused that condition (if one existed[)].” Accordingly, it entered summary
judgment in favor of each defendant on each of their motions.
3
As we have already specified each defendant’s role in this cause and since, for purposes of the remainder of our
decision, all defendants litigated this matter in essentially the same manner, we refer to them (as did the trial court)
collectively as “defendants” without the need to distinguish between “defendants” and “third-party defendant” Mr.
David’s.
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No. 1-21-0494
¶ 11 Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider. She asserted that the trial court misapplied
Kimbrough because unlike the plaintiff in that case, she was able to identify the exact
condition that caused her fall, i.e., “a lip or ledge protruding from the floor,” as well as its
precise location, i.e., in the carpet and tile area near the elevators. Additionally, she argued
that the court misapplied existing law by failing to recognize defendants’ duty of care and,
therefore, each of them were the “cause” of her injuries. She sought to introduce
photographs of the flooring that were taken post-incident to which she had access but never
reference during summary judgment, and she cited for the first time Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 385 along with two cases in support of a new argument that duty continues with
contractors indefinitely even after the property owner has accepted completed work.
¶ 12 In reviewing her motion, the trial court again held in favor of defendants. The court
noted that plaintiff’s initial argument in her motion regarding the misapplication of
Kimbrough “is the same argument she asserted in her response to [d]efendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment,” with the only difference being citations to case law she had not
previously cited. As this did not consist of newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, or
trial court error, the court declared that this was a not a basis for reconsideration. With
respect to the remainder of her motion, the court noted that it presented “many new
arguments” that were “based on existing evidence in the record” -- “arguments she did not
present” earlier in her response the defendants’ motions for summary judgment even though
she could have. As these arguments were now untimely, the court declared it could not
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No. 1-21-0494
consider them and they were subject to waiver. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff’s
motion to reconsider.
¶ 13 ANALYSIS
¶ 14 Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants,
as well as its denial of her motion to reconsider. Primarily, she contends that the court erred
in finding she failed to identify a defective condition causing her fall by misapplying
Kimbrough and by failing to consider evidence corroborating her identification of the
defective condition. She further contends that the evidence presented creates a question of
fact as to defendants’ breach of duty of care, as each of them in their own way “were a cause
of” her fall and “caused her injuries.” Additionally, in her reply brief on appeal, she insists
that her motion to reconsider was based solely on her claim of the misapplication of law and
not new argument and, thus, contrary to the court’s ruling, waiver did not apply. We
disagree with plaintiff’s contentions.
¶ 15 We begin with the standard of review with respect to summary judgment which, as the
parties acknowledge and agree, is well established. Summary judgment is proper when the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions of record, construed strictly against the
moving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35
(2001); accord Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-44 (1986). While a plaintiff need not
prove her entire case during this stage of litigation, she is nevertheless required, as the
nonmoving party, to present some factual basis and evidentiary facts to support the elements
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No. 1-21-0494
of her cause of action. See Bellerive v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 245 Ill. App. 3d 933, 936
(1993). Plainly, “ ‘[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or guess is insufficient to withstand
summary judgment’ ” (Cole v. Paper Street Group, LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 180474, ¶ 41,
quoting Sorce v. Naperville Jeep Eagle, Inc., 309 Ill. App. 3d 313, 328 (1999)), and a
plaintiff cannot rely solely on the allegations in her complaint in order to raise a genuine
issue of material fact. See CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Bukowski, 2015 IL App (1st) 140780, ¶ 19;
accord Rucker v. Rucker, 2014 IL App (1st) 132834, ¶ 49; see also Morrissey v. Arlington
Park Racecourse, LLC, 404 Ill. App. 3d 711, 724 (2010) (conclusions or statements based
only on information or belief are insufficient to withstand pleading challenge); Winnetka
Bank v. Mandas, 202 Ill. App. 3d 373, 387-88 (1990) (the plaintiff has a duty to present a
factual basis which would arguably entitle her to judgment in her favor based on the law).
Ultimately, while summary judgment has been called a “drastic measure,” it is an appropriate
tool to employ in the expeditious disposition of a lawsuit in which “ ‘the right of the moving
party is clear and free from doubt.’ ” Morris, 197 Ill. 2d at 35, quoting Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at
240. Appellate review of a trial court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo (see Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992)), and reversal will
occur only if we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists (see Addison v. Whittenberg,
124 Ill. 2d 287, 294 (1988)).
¶ 16 To properly state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant owed her a duty, that the defendant breached that duty, and that this breach was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s resulting injuries. See Bermudez v. Martinez Trucking, 343
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No. 1-21-0494
Ill. App. 3d 25, 29 (2003). Proximate cause is an essential element of a negligence claim.
See Bermudez, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 29. The plaintiff has the burden to “affirmatively and
positively show” that the defendant’s alleged negligence caused the injuries for which she
seeks recovery. Bermudez, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 29, citing McInturff v. Chicago Title & Trust
Co., 102 Ill. App. 2d 39, 48 (1968) (the plaintiff must show “a relationship between the act or
omission and the injury or damage suffered that the act or omission may be said to be the
proximate cause of such injury or damage”). “Thus, the plaintiff must establish with
‘reasonable certainty’ that the defendant’s acts or omissions caused the injury.” Berke v.
Manilow, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397, ¶ 34, quoting Mann v. Producer’s Chemical Co., 356
Ill. App. 3d 967, 972 (2005). While proximate cause is generally a question of fact, it
becomes a question of law when the facts alleged indicate that a party would never be
entitled to recover. See Bermudez, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 29-30, citing Barham v. Knickrehm,
277 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1039 (1996). Accordingly, if the plaintiff fails to establish the element
of proximate cause, she has not sustained her burden and fails to establish a genuine issue of
material fact, rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendant appropriate as a matter
of law. See Berke, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397, ¶ 32; accord Hussung v. Patel, 369 Ill. App.
3d 924, 931 (2007).
¶ 17 The plaintiff may establish proximate cause via the presentation of circumstantial, rather
than direct, evidence. See Berke, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397, ¶ 35, citing Mann, 356 Ill. App.
3d at 974; accord Bermudez, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 30. Such evidence may comprise facts and
circumstances that, in the light of ordinary experience, reasonably suggest that the
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No. 1-21-0494
defendant’s negligence operated to produce the injury. See Berke, 2016 IL App (1st)
150397, ¶ 35. However, while it is true that it is not necessary that only one conclusion flow
from the evidence, “a fact cannot be established through circumstantial evidence unless the
circumstances are so related to each other that it is the only probable, and not merely
possible, conclusion that may be drawn.” Berke, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397, ¶ 35, citing
Weigman v. Hitch-Inn Post of Libertyville, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 789, 796 (1999). In other
words, the conclusion must be one that can reasonably be drawn, and the mere possibility of
a causal connection is simply insufficient to raise the requisite inference of fact. See
Bermudez, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 30, citing Nowak v. Coghill, 296 Ill. App. 3d 886, 896 (1998).
Therefore, where the nonexistence of a fact to be inferred appears to be just as probable as its
existence, any conclusion derived therefrom is solely a matter of speculation, conjecture, or
guess which, as we have already discussed, cannot support the element of proximate cause
nor, in turn, a legally cognizable claim of negligence. See Berke, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397,
¶ 35, citing Mann, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 974; see also Kellman v. Twin Orchard County Club,
202 Ill. App. 3d 968, 974 (1990) (“[t]he occurrence of an accident does not support an
inference of negligence, and, absent positive and affirmative proof of causation, [a] plaintiff
cannot sustain the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact”).
¶ 18 Because we find that plaintiff here failed to uphold her burden to affirmatively and
positively show the element of proximate cause, we hold that there were no genuine issues of
material fact with respect to her negligence cause of action and, thus, that the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment was proper.
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No. 1-21-0494
¶ 19 The instant cause turns on the applicability of Kimbrough v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 92
Ill. App. 3d 813 (1981). The crux of plaintiff’s argument on appeal is that, not only is
Kimbrough distinguishable from her situation, but also that the trial court misread that case
and misapplied the law announced therein to find that she failed to prove the element of
proximate cause. Defendants, meanwhile, all agree that Kimbrough governs this matter and
that the trial court correctly applied its holding. Accordingly, we focus now on Kimbrough,
the seminal decision on proximate causation in slip-and-fall cases.
¶ 20 In Kimbrough, the plaintiff sued the defendant after she slipped on a ramp while leaving
the defendant’s store. No one witnessed her fall. In her deposition, the plaintiff testified that
on the day of the accident, she took one step onto the ramp to leave when her feet went out
from under her. At the time, she was holding her young child’s hand in one hand and a
grocery bag and her wallet in the other. Upon further questioning, she averred that she could
not remember what she fell on or what made her fall, she never went back to see what she
might have fallen on, and she never looked at the ramp before she stepped on it. She noted
that, after she fell, she saw what appeared to be grease spots on the ramp and she had some
grease on her pants. However, she could not be exact about where she fell on the ramp, and
she admitted she did not know if her foot actually touched the grease spots before she fell;
ultimately, she stated she “had no idea why she fell.” Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 816-17.
Based on this, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted. See
Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 818-19.
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¶ 21 On appeal, the Kimbrough court affirmed. In so doing, it reinforced several legal
principles regarding the sufficiency of negligence pleadings in slip-and-fall cases that remain
controlling to this day. Chief among them is the plaintiff’s burden to establish the element of
proximate cause, and to do so by pointing to an identifiable defect that caused the fall. As
the Kimbrough court plainly stated, “[l]iability cannot be predicated upon surmise or
conjecture as to the cause of the injury; proximate cause can only be established when there
is reasonable certainty that the defendant’s act caused the injury * * * [and n]o liability can
exist unless the defendant’s alleged negligence is the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”
Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 817. With this, it reinforced the principle that merely showing
a slip and fall on the defendant’s premises is not enough to satisfy pleading requirements.
See Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 818. Instead, the Kimbrough court declared, in no
uncertain terms, that “[t]he plaintiff must go further and prove that some condition caused the
fall and that this condition was caused by the defendant.” Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 818.
¶ 22 Turning, then, to the evidence before it, the Kimbrough court noted that the plaintiff
repeatedly stated she did not know how she fell. See Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 817. She
could not show that there was some object lying on the ramp or that there was any defect in
the ramp, nor could she show that such an object or defect caused her fall. See Kimbrough,
92 Ill. App. 3d at 817. While she afterwards saw something on the ramp that looked like
grease, she admitted she did not know if it was grease, if it was slippery and, most
significantly, if she had even stepped on it. See Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 817. As it was
not enough to show simply that she fell, and as she could not go further to prove via any
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No. 1-21-0494
evidence that some condition caused her to fall and that this condition was caused by the
defendant, she could not prove her case. See Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 818.
Accordingly, the court concluded that because the plaintiff could not meet the pleading
requirements with respect to proximate cause, her claim could not stand. See Kimbrough, 92
Ill. App. 3d at 818-19 (a plaintiff’s failure to prove one element of negligence, i.e., causal
connection between condition and fall, entitles the defendant to summary judgment on entire
negligence claim).
¶ 23 Not only was Kimbrough well-reasoned and correctly decided, but it has also
consistently remained on sound and solid legal footing as the mainstay of slip-and-fall
summary judgment cases. And, its applicability to the instant cause is inherently undeniable.
¶ 24 Just as the plaintiff in Kimbrough, plaintiff here cannot point to any defective condition
that caused her to fall in the lobby and/or that this condition was caused by any of the
defendants. In her deposition testimony, plaintiff stated she tripped on a lip or ledge in the
flooring, which she felt with her foot. However, she could not describe either the location of
her fall or what caused her to fall. As to location, she first testified that she believed she fell
where the carpet met the tile in the lobby near the elevators and, thus, that the ledge she felt
must have been where the two different flooring types butted next to each other. Yet, she
later admitted that she was not sure that was true. She admitted that, at the start of her fall,
she was looking up at the hotel Christmas tree and was not looking down and the floor. She
further explained that she fell forward while walking on the carpet and went sliding,
eventually ending up somewhere on the tile. She could not say that she was at the end of the
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No. 1-21-0494
carpet where it met the tile when she fell, how long the carpeted area was, or how far she slid
forward. Therefore, she did not know whether she fell on the carpet, on the tile, or at the spot
where the carpet met the tile.
¶ 25 Even more significant here, though she insisted that she tripped on a ledge in the floor,
plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she never saw a ledge in the floor before, during, or
after her fall. Again, she stated that she generally does not look at the floor when she walks
and certainly was not doing so before her accident here, as she was looking up at the
Christmas tree. She further stated was not looking at the floor during her fall. And, she
affirmed that she never inspected the floor after her fall that day, or at any other time, to find
the ledge she claimed caused her fall. She never saw a ledge, never touched a ledge (save
with her toe as she alleged), and could not describe the ledge in any way. Then, when
questioned further, she stated she felt “something” catch her foot, but she could not say what
that something was; she thought it was a ledge, but she could not say what it physically was
and she could not answer why she thought it was a ledge as opposed to, for example, perhaps
some other encumbrance on the floor. As she admitted during her deposition, she could not
describe “in any way, shape or form the thing” she believed caused her to trip. She did not
know its size, shape, or location, and she could not say if it was made of wood, metal, or
something else. Additionally, no one witnessed her fall; no one saw her fall and no one told
her what caused her fall.
¶ 26 These facts are very similar to those experienced by the plaintiff in Kimbrough. The
plaintiff’s argument there boiled down to her assertion that, since there were grease spots on
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No. 1-21-0494
the ramp, she must have fallen because of them. Yet, this was nothing more than mere
conjecture, especially since the plaintiff admitted not only that she did not know how or why
she fell, but also that she was not sure she ever even touched the grease spots. Here,
plaintiff’s testimony, and lack of any specification therein, demonstrates that the alleged
cause of her fall is even more nebulous. Unable to describe the location of her fall or any
detail about the alleged ledge she claims caused it, her argument essentially boils down to her
assertion that, because she felt her foot catch on something, therefore, there must have been a
ledge in the floor that made her trip. However, equally plausible (and never dismissed by
plaintiff in her testimony) is that the “ledge” she felt was her other foot, or her suitcase she
was rolling behind her as she was walking, or even a strap on the bag she had on her
shoulder, among a number of other scenarios. Whatever this “ledge” was, it remains
unidentified in any way to this day. Plaintiff assumes that, by merely stating its existence, it
must have been defect in the flooring. However, in light of her testimony that she never saw
anything wrong with the carpet or tile in the area where she fell—coupled with manager
Dienhart’s testimony that he got down on the floor immediately after plaintiff’s fall to inspect
the area, touched the carpet and tile with his hands, and found no rips, cracks, residue, or
other defect; there were no falls or complaints about the area in the nine months between the
completion of the flooring project and plaintiff’s fall; and the flooring project passed
inspection, was issued the appropriate certifications, and was never altered after plaintiff’s
fall—all show that plaintiff’s assumption is nothing more than plain conjecture. Plaintiff
claims there was a hazard—a ledge—but she never proved it because she never went further
20
No. 1-21-0494
to show that some actual condition caused her fall, as required by Kimbrough to survive
summary judgment. See Kimbrough, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 818. Accordingly, and contrary to
plaintiff’s insistence, we find no error in the trial court’s application of Kimbrough to the
instant case.
¶ 27 In her brief on appeal, plaintiff strongly maintains that the trial court not only misapplied
Kimbrough, but also that Kimbrough is completely inapplicable here. She asserts it “only
applies to cases where the record completely lacks an identifiable defect on the property
which allegedly caused the fall and resulting injuries.” Her reasoning for this is that the
plaintiff in Kimbrough stated she had “no idea” why she fell, whereas in this case, plaintiff
“identified” “a lip or ledge protruding from the floor” and, accordingly, this identification of
a “defect” constituted “sufficient evidence of a condition that caused her to fall.” In support
of her assertion, she provides a bullet-point list of some 10 slip-and-fall cases she classifies
as Kimbrough-inapplicable because the plaintiffs therein, just as she did, identified what
caused them to fall, thereby overcoming summary judgment. However, neither her
interpretation of Kimbrough nor her citations provide support for her claim.
¶ 28 First, not only does plaintiff mischaracterize the holding of Kimbrough, but her attempt to
manipulate its facts in an effort to distinguish her case is, based on the evidence here, wholly
disingenuous. In fact, and contradictorily, it actually reveals that her cause is even more
speculative than that presented in Kimbrough. As an initial matter, plaintiff provides no legal
support for her assertion that the principles in Kimbrough only apply when there is a
complete lack of an identifiable defect. Incidentally, while the plaintiff there did admit she
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No. 1-21-0494
had no idea why she fell, she was nonetheless able to identify and prove the existence of
grease stains on the ramp where she fell and even on the pants she wore that day. She,
indeed, identified a defect. The problem was, however, that she could not show that this
defect—the grease stains—actually caused her fall, as she testified that she was unsure she
ever even stepped on them. Here, plaintiff’s case is no less speculative simply because she
testified that she believed she tripped over a ledge in the flooring she claimed must have
existed since she felt it with her foot. Again, she was completely unable to describe the ledge
(including its location or constitution) as anything more than “something” that caused her to
fall. She never saw this ledge before, during or after her fall, and could not prove it existed.
There were no witnesses to her fall, and Dienhart testified that he saw no defect (including
lips or ledges, unevenness, rips in the carpet, cracks in the tile, or residue of any kind) in or
on the floor upon his immediate inspection after her fall. Plaintiff may have alleged a hazard,
but she provided no evidence to identify it, let alone demonstrated that it caused her fall or, in
turn, that defendants caused it. Ironically, plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Kimbrough by
saying it only applies to cases where the record completely lacks an identifiable defect
reveals that her case fits exactly into that category. Regardless, it is clear to us that plaintiff’s
case suffers from the same shortcomings as that of the plaintiff in Kimbrough.
¶ 29 Furthermore, the laundry list of cases plaintiff cites in support of her insistence that
Kimbrough is inapplicable are markedly distinguishable and do not advance her claim.
While she is correct in noting that the courts therein overturned summary judgment, the facts
of those cases are inconsistent with those in her own case. For example, and briefly,
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No. 1-21-0494
summary judgment was reversed in Bellerive, 245 Ill. App. 3d 933 (1993), because the
plaintiff identified worn, unlevel and uneven marble steps on the stairway of a hotel as the
cause of her fall. In Canzoneri v. Village of Franklin Park, 161 Ill. App. 3d 33 (1987), and
Lapidus v. Union Oil Co., 181 Ill. App. 3d 116 (1989), the plaintiffs identified that the
sidewalks they were walking on when they fell were uneven and/or broken, and this was the
cause of their falls. Plaintiff then cites a series of cases where summary judgments were
reversed because the plaintiffs identified as the cause of their falls foreign substances on the
ground where they fell. These include Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 186 Ill. App. 3d
725 (1989) (the plaintiff and three witnesses identified a broken bag of garden soil spilling
into snow and slush that created a layer of dirty water and mud at site of fall); Heider v. DJG
Pizza, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 181173 (the plaintiff identified a patch of wet concrete at the
location of the fall); and Ishoo v. General Growth Props., Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 110919(the plaintiff testified she slipped on a puddle of liquid cleaning fluid left on the floor);
Wiegman, 308 Ill. App. 3d 789 (1999) (three occurrence witnesses testified that the plaintiff
slipped on water that collected at the bottom of a stairway); Grewe v. West Washington
County Unit District #10, 303 Ill. App. 3d 299 (1999) (occurrence witness who aided the
plaintiff after her fall in a lobby testified to a slick, gray substance on his clothes); Van Holt v
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 283 Ill. App. 3d 62 (1996) (the plaintiff identified, and
accident report confirmed, oily and slimy spot on floor where she fell); Housh v. Swanson,
203 Ill. App. 3d 377 (1990) (after fall on deck, antenna wire found on ground was partially
wrapped around the plaintiff’s legs which she identified as cause of her fall).
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No. 1-21-0494
¶ 30 What makes all of these cases distinguishable from plaintiff’s is that the plaintiffs therein
all identified specific conditions responsible for their falls. In other words, based on their
testimony, they were able to point, with reasonable certainty, to specific defective conditions
in the premises at issue that caused their falls, warranting the reversal of summary judgment.
Here, there was no such testimony to show any defective condition in the flooring of the
lobby where the fall occurred. Other than saying it was “something” which she admitted she
never saw and could not describe, plaintiff never identified in her testimony a substance,
item, or defect that constituted a dangerous condition. Without more, this hardly puts her
cause on par with the cases she cites, all of which establish causation for the injuries
sustained.
¶ 31 We would be remiss if we did not highlight Haslett v. United Skates of America, Inc.,
2019 IL App (1st) 181337, a case almost directly on point with plaintiff’s which recently
appeared before this very panel of this Court.4 In Haslett, the plaintiff fell and injured her
back while roller skating at the defendants’ facility. She brought a negligence suit alleging,
in part, that the defendants failed in their duty to maintain and secure the rink. With respect
to proximate causation, she insisted that the cause of her fall was a piece of hard candy over
which she rolled while skating on the rink floor. During her deposition, the plaintiff
described that she felt her skate roll over something before she fell. She also noted that after
her fall, her mother retrieved the skates she was wearing (which were her own) and, upon her
inspection some three days after returning home from the hospital, she noticed “ ‘red
4
Our decision in Haslett was issued by the members of this panel when they sat in the Third Division of this Court.
Since then, the members of the panel have moved and all currently sit again together in the Second Division.
24
No. 1-21-0494
crumbled up’ ” pieces of candy on the front wheels, which she believed came from a Jolly
Rancher candy that must have been the cause her fall. Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337,
¶11. However, the plaintiff acknowledged she never saw any candy on the rink floor before
her fall (she had made at least one entire trip around the rink), during her fall (when she was
lying on the rink floor), or after her fall (while she awaited assistance). See Haslett, 2019 IL
App (1st) 181337, ¶10. She could only say that she “ ‘felt rolling over something’ ” and
admitted she never saw any object over which she could have tripped; she could not state
how large the candy was, how long it had been on the rink floor, where it came from, or how
it got there. Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337, ¶10. She further noted that no one
witnessed her fall and no one told her that she tripped over a piece of candy. Haslett, 2019
IL App (1st) 181337, ¶10. Additionally, the rink assistant manager testified that before the
plaintiff’s fall, the rink had been swept and checked for debris, as was customary before each
skating session. See Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337, ¶18. This was confirmed by the
testimony of a floor guard and the rink’s general manager. See Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st)
181337, ¶¶ 22, 29. Immediately after her fall, the assistant manager went out onto the rink to
inspect the area and found it to be clean, dry, and devoid of any foreign objects, debris, or
defects. See Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337, ¶18. He further testified that no one
reported any candy on the floor at any time before or after the plaintiff’s fall, and no foreign
objects were removed from the skating floor that day. See Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st)
181337, ¶19. Upon this evidence, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
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No. 1-21-0494
defendants, finding that there simply was no evidence to indicate any defect in or on the
floor. See Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337, ¶34.
¶ 32 On appeal, we affirmed, concluding that the plaintiff could not meet her burden with
respect to proximate causation. Briefly, we noted that “at a bare minimum, a plaintiff who
claims to have been injured by a hazard on the defendant’s premises must prove the existence
of the hazard itself.” Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337, ¶43. The plaintiff in Haslett,
however, “failed to present any evidence whatsoever of the existence or presence of any such
hazard on the rink floor.” Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337, ¶43. No one, not even she,
testified to seeing hard candy or anything else on the floor before, during, or after her fall and
the only circumstantial evidence presented—the candy crumbs on her skates—was not
discovered until at least three days later and, thus, there was no way to demonstrate that this
had anything to do with her fall. See Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337, ¶¶ 44, 47. Citing
Kimbrough, we held that, without more, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was
proper, since the plaintiff could not establish the existence of a hazardous condition on the
floor. See Haslett, 2019 IL App (1st) 181337, ¶¶ 46-47, citing also Barker v. Eagle Food
Centers, Inc., 261 Ill App. 3d 1068, 1072 (1994) (where the plaintiff alleged she slipped on
water on the defendant’s floor but admitted she did not see any and could not present any
evidence to show that was the cause of her fall other than to state that the defendant’s
produce department regularly sprayed fruits and vegetables with water, summary judgment in
the defendant’s favor was proper), and Palumbo v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 182 Ill.
App. 3d 283 (1989) (the plaintiff could not recover for fall she attributed to hazard on the
26
No. 1-21-0494
defendant’s aisle floor where, although she noted later that day her coat was wet, she could
not present any testimony or evidence as to water or such, and evidence otherwise showed
that the floor had been examined after her fall and contained no liquid or debris).
¶ 33 Applying Haslett to the instant cause, it quickly becomes clear that the same outcome is
merited. In fact, plaintiff’s testimony here fails even more than that of the plaintiff in Haslett
to establish either the presence of a dangerous condition on the lobby floor, or that any such
hazard or defect therein proximately caused her fall. While the Haslett plaintiff could not
identify or describe any candy (or other object) on the rink floor to support her claim that this
must have caused her fall, she did testify to red crumbled up pieces of hard candy on the
front wheels of her skates, albeit some three days after her fall. We found, however, that, in
light of the lack of eyewitness testimony or personal knowledge about candy anywhere in the
facility or complaints of candy in the vicinity of the fall or its existence anywhere else on the
rink floor at any time before, during, or after her fall, this was not enough to establish the
required element of proximate cause to support a negligence claim. In the instant cause,
plaintiff has not provided this Court with any “red candy crumbles” of her own in an attempt
to somehow support her claim. Instead, all she has provided is speculative testimony that she
fell on something she classified as a ledge but admittedly did not see and could not describe.
This, in combination with a lack of eyewitness testimony or personal knowledge about any
supposed ledge, any complaints about a ledge in the lobby flooring in the nine months
between the construction project and her fall, or the existence of a ledge anywhere in the
flooring, cannot support a negligence claim here.
27
No. 1-21-0494
¶ 34 In her brief on appeal, plaintiff insists she presented “numerous sources of” evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, that more than sufficiently demonstrate proximate cause and
that the trial court improperly disregarded them. We disagree, for various reasons. First,
plaintiff cites the hotel surveillance video footage of her fall, which she states clearly
“illustrates a carpeted area of flooring right outside of the elevator that transitions to floor tile
and as [she] walked over it, her foot became caught” and she fell. However, the trial court
noted for the record that the video did not comprise circumstantial evidence because, while it
showed the general location of plaintiff’s fall and her actually falling, it never showed what
caused her to fall; it did not show a ledge or lip in the floor, as she alleged. We agree. The
video shows plaintiff fall and that the fall occurred near the elevator bank. However, that is
all it shows. It in no way shows her foot catching on anything or, more importantly, the
“something” she testified allegedly caused her to fall. The mere fact that the video shows she
fell near an area where carpet and tile met, which has never been disputed, does not prove
that either the carpet, the tile, their conjunction, or a lip or ledge—which is not at all visible
in the video— or anything else caused her to fall.
¶ 35 Plaintiff next refers in her brief to photographs that were taken after the incident showing
a metal strip or casing, also known as a Schluter Strip, capping the end of the carpet before it
transitions to the tile. She insists these photos prove proximate cause, as “[t]his is exactly
what [she] described as the condition that caused her fall.” Again, this is incorrect. The
presence of the Schluter Strip in the lobby flooring was never disputed. However, plaintiff
never mentioned it in her complaint, in her deposition, or at any other point during the
28
No. 1-21-0494
proceedings. She references it for the first time in her brief on appeal. Moreover, her own
testimony belies her new claim of “proof.” She directly admitted that she could not describe
the “something” she fell on, and could not say what it was made of, including, and
specifically, if it was “metallic, wood or otherwise.” She never testified that the Schluter
Strip was the lip or ledge she claimed caused her fall, that it looked defective in any way, or
that anyone ever complained of it. Her claim now that the Schluter Strip was, indeed, the
“condition that caused her fall” is wholly disingenuous.
¶ 36 The final pieces of evidence plaintiff cites in support of her assertion that she presented
sufficient proof of proximate cause include a post-accident incident report prepared by a
hotel representative which she insists “verifies the accuracy” of her testimony, “confirmed
repairs” made to the hotel floor after the incident by third-party defendant Mr. David’s, and
certain testimony from Mr. David’s project manager Novotny which she characterizes as
indicating that he found the flooring renovation project to have been “difficult.” However,
none of these supports her claim. As presented in the record, the post-accident report states
only that she tripped and fell near where the carpet and tile met outside the elevator bank;
again, it does not detail, or even alleged, any defect nor any evidence of a defect in that area.
Plaintiff’s assertion that there were “confirmed repairs” to the floor by Mr. David’s after her
fall is similarly unavailing. She points to no such evidence of this in the record, and no one
from Mr. David’s so testified. The only person who did testify about the floor after the fall
was hotel manager Dienhart, who inspected it immediately and found no defects or residue.
Although he notified contracted partners who had worked on the project nine months earlier,
29
No. 1-21-0494
he did so only “from a follow-up standpoint” and he clearly confirmed that there were never
any complaints and no changes were ever made to the lobby flooring, including the carpet or
tile, as a result of plaintiff’s fall. And, any reference to testimony that Novotny had difficulty
with the flooring project is a mischaracterization. Upon our review, his testimony centered
only on the subfloor preparations required for the tile used in the project, and nothing about
the carpet or where these met. Also, he never testified that he had difficulty laying the tile,
but rather, only that the subfloor preparation was modified a bit from the project
specifications because of the size of the tiles (i.e., they were large). Moreover, and
ultimately, certificates of completion and occupancy were issued on the project, and plaintiff
never testified that she fell because the tile floor itself was not level.
¶ 37 Accordingly, none of this “evidence” cited by plaintiff in her brief on appeal supports her
assertion that she proved proximate causation. Contrary to her argument, the trial court did
consider this evidence and found it did not assist her in satisfying her pleading burdens.
Having considered it ourselves, we reach the same conclusion. None of this “evidence”
proves that a dangerous condition existed or caused her fall, either directly or even
circumstantially. Therefore, we find there was no trial court error in the consideration of
evidence here. See Kellman, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 974-75 (circumstantial evidence, including
condition of shower stall, position of body after fall and medical testimony, was insufficient
to raise inference that the decedent’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s negligence in
maintaining stall and basin, as none of this addressed the issue of what actually caused the
decedent to slip and fall; thus, entry of summary judgment was proper); accord Haslett, 2019
30
No. 1-21-0494
IL App (1st) 181337, ¶ 44 (candy crumbs discovered on skates three days after fall did not
comprise sufficient circumstantial evidence that cause of fall was candy on rink); Barker, 261
Ill. App. 3d at 1072 (that produce department regularly sprayed fruits and vegetables was not
sufficient circumstantial evidence to demonstrate proximate cause where this did not show
that there was actually water on the floor and that it caused the plaintiff’s fall).
¶ 38 Ultimately, and based on our thorough review of pertinent legal principles, the evidence
presented, and relevant case law, we hold that, as plaintiff cannot show with any reasonable
certainty that there was a defective condition in the flooring or that any such condition
caused her fall, she has failed to prove proximate causation and, thus, summary judgment in
favor of defendants was properly granted.5
¶ 39 As a final matter, we again note that, in addition to the grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants, plaintiff also appeals from the denial of her motion to reconsider.
Briefly, “ ‘[t]he purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court’s attention newly
discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the original hearing, changes in
existing law, or errors in the court’s application of the law.’ ” Cole, 2018 IL App (1st)
180474, ¶ 51, quoting Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough, 2014 IL 114271, ¶ 36. A
ruling on a motion to reconsider is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not
5
We acknowledge for the record that in their briefs on appeal, plaintiff goes on to argue, and defendants go on to
refute, the remaining elements of plaintiff’s negligence claim, mainly, duty and breach thereof. However, we need
not discuss these, as we have conclusively found that plaintiff cannot show proximate cause. See Pavlik v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 323 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1063 (2001), citing Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358 (1989) (“If the
plaintiff cannot establish any one of these elements of her [negligence, slip-and-fall] cause of action, summary
judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate.”).
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No. 1-21-0494
be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. See Cole, 2018 IL App (1st) 180474, ¶ 51,
citing Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 347 (2002).
¶ 40 In the instant cause, the trial court, in issuing its decision denying her motion to
reconsider, noted that plaintiff’s initial argument therein was that it had misapplied existing
law, namely, the Kimbrough decision. In response, the court found that it would render the
same decision, particularly as plaintiff was simply rehashing the same assertions while
discussing cases she had not cited before. Further, the court noted that plaintiff also
presented “many new arguments” in her motion to reconsider, including with respect to duty,
all based on existing evidence in the record. In response to this, the court found that
plaintiff’s “new legal theories and factual arguments are subject to waiver.”
¶ 41 On appeal, plaintiff insists in her opening and reply briefs that the basis for her appeal
from the denial of her motion to reconsider is, and always was (even in the trial court), only
the former of the two arguments, i.e., the misapplication of existing law. Accepting this, as
she insists, we hold that, as discussed at length herein, we agree with both the trial court’s
application of Kimbrough and its grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor.
Therefore, we find no basis to conclude that the trial court misapplied the law in any way
and, likewise, no basis to overturn its denial of her motion to reconsider. See, e.g., Cole,
2018 IL App (1st) 180474, ¶ 51 (upon review of denial of motion to reconsider in negligence
suit stemming from slip-and-fall on icy stairs, summary judgment in favor of defendant was
proper where, as the plaintiff failed to provide an identifiable cause for alleged water
accumulation, there was no basis to conclude that trial court misapplied existing law).
32
No. 1-21-0494
¶ 42 CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that summary judgment in favor of defendants here
was proper due to plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate the proximate cause element of her
negligence cause of action, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her
motion to reconsider. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
33