Chicago Land and Trust Company v, United Structural Systems of Illinois, Inc , 2022 IL App (2d) 210299-U ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (2d) 210299-UNo. 2-21-0299
Order filed March 25, 2022
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
CHICAGO TITLE AND LAND TRUST, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
COMPANY, as Trustee for Land Trust ) of Kane County.
Agreement No. 8002353688, 3006 Fox Glen)
Ct., St. Charles, Illinois, )
NICHOLAS FITZ, P.C., and )
NICHOLAS FITZ, individually, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) No. 20-CH-359
)
UNITED STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS )
OF ILLINOIS, INC., RICK THOMAS, )
and ROBERT VANN, )
)
Defendants ) Honorable
) Kevin T. Busch,
(Robert Vann, Defendant-Appellee). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hutchinson and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Trial court did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s complaint against an
individual defendant. Affirmed.
¶2 Plaintiff, Nicholas Fitz, is the beneficiary of a land trust. He began an expansion project
on the land trust’s property, located at 3006 Fox Glen Court in St. Charles, with the intent that his
2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Ulaw firm would use the improved area to entertain clients and generate business. Ultimately, a
dispute arose between Fitz and one of the construction contractors, interfering with the permitting
process. As such, Fitz, his law firm (Nicholas Fitz, P.C.), and Chicago Title and Land Trust
Company (as trustee for Land Trust Agreement Number 8002353688, 3006 Fox Glen Court., St.
Charles, Illinois) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) sued contractor United Structural Systems of Illinois,
Inc. (USS), Rick Thomas (USS’s owner), and Robert Vann (St. Charles’s inspector) (collectively
“defendants”). Vann moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2020)). The trial court granted Vann’s
motion with prejudice and denied plaintiffs’ request for an opportunity to amend the complaint.
Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Complaint against Vann
¶5 On November 10, 2020, plaintiffs filed their complaint. In relevant part, the complaint’s
introductory paragraphs identified the parties, describing Vann as “an individual being sued in his
individual capacity and who at all relevant times in this complaint, was the Village of St. Charles
City Inspector but is now retired.”
¶6 Plaintiffs alleged that the property at issue is a 5,000-square-foot residence with a large
outdoor area. The outdoor area was to be expanded to include a large, self-supported balcony, a
veranda with outdoor kitchen, a pool, and a seating area for seasonal entertainment. Ultimately,
plaintiffs desired to entertain clients and generate business. The outdoor area expansion required
support by “heli coils” encased in concrete and rebar under the rear balcony. To that end, plaintiffs
alleged, they accepted USS’s proposal of $17,310 to install 10 helical piers and steel bolt caps to
support the balcony foundation pillars. The parties entered into a written contract, which was
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Uattached to the complaint. USS required an initial payment of $7,000 for materials, before work
was performed, and plaintiffs paid that amount.
¶7 Plaintiffs further alleged that the City of St. Charles 1 required that certain testing be
performed on the helical coils after their installation and that USS and Thomas agreed to perform
that work in accordance with the structural engineering plans that Vann had approved. Further,
plaintiffs alleged, the City required that USS submit compression logs prior to additional permits
being issued for work on the helical coil foundation by subsequent contractors.
¶8 Plaintiffs alleged that, “upon information and belief compression testing was performed by
USS for the helical coils and compression logs were created and given to Robert Vann.” However,
the compression logs were not given to plaintiffs, nor did USS tender any “official” compression
logs to the City. Plaintiffs alleged that they asked the City for the logs, but the City represented
none were received.
¶9 According to the complaint, the property was damaged and there were disputes about
correcting the damage. USS then demanded that plaintiffs pay $8,500 before it would release the
compression logs.
¶ 10 Around November 2017, plaintiffs alleged, Kevin Ciccone (relationship to plaintiffs not
specified in the complaint, although the record reflects that he is the president of plaintiffs’ general
contractor) asked Thomas about USS’s submission of the compression logs to the City. Thomas
stated that “Bob Vann is a friend of mine” and that he had “Vann on speed dial.” Further, “Ciccone
conversed with Robert Vann, then Inspector for the [City] of St. Charles. Robert Vann said that
1
The complaint actually repeatedly referred to St. Charles as a village, but it is a city and
we refer to it as such. See, e.g., http://www.stcharlesil.gov.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Uno compression logs would be provided until Rick Thomas and USS were paid. Robert Vann’s
conduct was intentional and willful and outside the scope of his employment.”
¶ 11 Plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of “USS’s actions and conduct,” the City “pulled” the
permit, as Thomas said would happen, and no further action may be taken with respect to the
outdoor area and foundation. They alleged that the real property lost value, along with the intended
use of the outdoor area, and that plaintiffs have been denied use of their outdoor area. Further, the
purchased materials have aged beyond use and defendants’ “malfeasance and incompetence
caused a pestilence that resulted in damages in excess of $75,000.”
¶ 12 The complaint alleged seven counts, six of them against Vann. Specifically, in count II,
“waste” (also alleged against USS and Thomas), plaintiffs alleged that their property and outdoor
area required protection, and defendants’ malfeasance, incompetence, and affirmative actions
resulted in waste, disuse of the property, and interruption of other work. Further, Vann and
Thomas “acted together to prevent the release of the compression logs along with the revocation
or pulling of the permit so as to impede progress and completion of the work.” Plaintiffs sought
damages, costs, and interest.
¶ 13 In count III, “intentional interference with prospective advantage” (also alleged against
Thomas), plaintiffs alleged that they had a valid business expectancy to use the outdoor area to
entertain prospective clients, yet Vann and Thomas intentionally acted to (1) halt renovations; (2)
prevent the property owners from obtaining other permits; and (3) thwart plaintiffs’ ability to
entertain clients and generate business. They alleged that defendants’ actions were arbitrary,
capricious, and willful, and purposefully interfered with plaintiffs’ prospective advantage and
business expectancies. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages and costs in excess
of $75,000.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-U¶ 14 In count IV, “fraudulent concealment” (also alleged against Thomas), plaintiffs alleged
that, while they had believed that they were simply involved in a contractual dispute, it was
concealed that, by withholding and concealing the compression logs, Thomas and Vann were
acting in concert to prohibit the progression and completion of the construction. Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged, prior to Ciccone’s November 2017 conversations with Thomas and Vann,
plaintiffs justifiably believed that they were in a contractual dispute with USS and Thomas.
However, “[h]ad [they] known prior to November of 2017 of Messrs. Thomas and Vann’s covert
conduct they would have taken a course of action with the [City] of St. Charles to rectify the
situation.” Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages and costs in excess of $75,000.
¶ 15 In count V, “consumer fraud: deceptive trade practice” (also alleged against Thomas),
plaintiffs alleged that it was unfair and deceptive for defendants to act together and in concert to
withhold the compression logs as leverage so that USS and Thomas would get paid. Plaintiffs
alleged that it was concealed from them that defendants were acting in concert to prohibit the
progression and completion of the additions by withholding and concealing the compression logs.
They also alleged that the conduct was immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous, and,
further, that “Vann’s conduct offends public policy for Mr. Vann acted outside of the scope of his
public employment and placed the self-interest of his friend ahead of his responsibilities [to] the
citizens.” Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages and costs in excess of $75,000.
¶ 16 In count VI, “civil conspiracy” (also alleged against Thomas), plaintiffs alleged that
defendants acted in concert, knowingly and willingly, to deprive plaintiffs of the use, expected
use, and enjoyment of the property. The conspiracy included acts to (1) deprive plaintiffs by
pulling and/or revoking the construction permit; (2) deprive plaintiffs of the compression logs; (3)
deprive plaintiffs of the ability to continue and complete construction; (4) “engage in an intensified
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Uprogram of harassment”; and (5) “cause the plaintiffs misery.” Plaintiffs alleged that, on account
of defendants’ malicious conduct, they were entitled to compensatory and punitive damages and
costs in excess of $75,000.
¶ 17 Finally, in count VII, “injunctive relief” (also alleged against Thomas), plaintiffs alleged
that it is “evident from the admissions of Robert Vann to Mr. Ciccone that either Mr. Vann or Mr.
Thomas are in possession of the compression logs.” Plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ collective
or singular possession of the compression logs is unlawful, the logs are needed to complete
construction, and plaintiffs have the right to “return” of the compression logs. Plaintiffs alleged
that they had no adequate remedy at law to secure the return of the compression logs and that
defendants’ possession of the logs will cause irreparable harm. Plaintiffs requested a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction ordering defendants to return the logs pending
resolution of the case on the merits or, alternatively, ordering them to return the logs to plaintiffs
to prevent further waste on the property.
¶ 18 B. Motion to Dismiss
¶ 19 Vann filed a section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss the complaint and attached an affidavit,
sections of the City’s code, and certain business records, including emails between Vann and
Ciccone. In sum, Vann argued that the complaint allegations all concerned his performance as the
City’s Building and Code Enforcement Division Manager, and, further, that plaintiffs failed to
state claims upon which relief could be granted. Moreover, to the extent that plaintiffs’ claims
constituted civil actions, Vann argued that they were barred by the one-year statute of limitations
provided by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort
Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2020)). Alternatively, Vann argued that, to the extent
that plaintiffs’ claims against him arose from the issuance or revocation of a building permit, or
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Ufrom some negligent misrepresentation, sections 2-206 and 2-210 of the Tort Immunity Act
afforded him immunity (id. §§ 2-206, 2-210). Specifically, Vann moved to dismiss counts II, III,
IV, and VI against him pursuant to both sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code.
¶ 20 C. Hearing and Court’s Ruling
¶ 21 On May 6, 2021, the court held a hearing on Vann’s motion. As a preliminary matter, the
court allowed plaintiffs to voluntarily non suit count V (consumer fraud/deceptive trade practice)
against Vann.
¶ 22 Next, after hearing argument, the court found that the complaint was based almost entirely
on alleged fraud. However, the court found, none of the pleaded allegations satisfied the level of
specificity needed to establish claims such as fraudulent concealment or civil conspiracy.
Moreover, as to count II, “[t]he waste claim. It is impossible for plaintiff[s] to establish a waste
claim against [Vann] because [Vann] wasn’t in a position to control the property. His position as
a City inspector issuing permits or denying permits could not, as a matter of law, [have] resulted
in waste to the property.” Regarding count III (intentional interference with prospective
advantage), the court found the claim lacked allegations that could substantiate such a claim, as
plaintiffs did not plead that Vann knew what the prospective advantage was and with whom. As
for counts IV and VI (fraudulent concealment and civil conspiracy, respectively), the court found
both lacking any specific allegations of fraud.
¶ 23 The court dismissed with prejudice all counts for failing to state a claim and, further, as
outside the statute of limitations. It noted, “when a party knowingly pleads an action that is
obviously outside the statute of limitations, that party must specifically plead why they’re exempt
from the statute of limitations. [Plaintiffs] have not. [Plaintiffs] haven’t even gotten close to
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Upleading any allegations that rise to the level of alleging fraudulent concealment or civil
conspiracy.”
¶ 24 As the court had dismissed counts IV and VI based on the statute of limitations, but also
for lacking specific allegations of fact, plaintiffs’ counsel requested, at the end of the hearing, the
opportunity to amend the complaint with regards to the “defraud counts.” The court responded, “I
dismissed it with prejudice.” The written order reflects that the court dismissed counts II, III, IV
and VI for failing to allege facts sufficient to state a claim and also pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5)
for failing to timely file within the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs appeal.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
¶ 27 Preliminarily, although not raised by the parties, we briefly comment on our jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Fligelman v. City of Chicago, 264 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1037 (1994) (appellate court has an
independent obligation to verify jurisdiction). We note that Vann moved to dismiss all counts
against him except count VII, which concerned injunctive relief. The record does not reflect that
the count was nonsuited (like count V), nor was count VII addressed by either party in the motion
to dismiss briefing, at hearing on the motion, or the court’s dismissal order. Nor do the parties
mention count VII in the briefing before this court. The May 6, 2021, dismissal order dismisses
counts II-IV and VI, then sets a date for a hearing on claims against only USS and Thomas. Thus,
it is not clear whether count VII remains pending against Vann and, if it does, then contrary to
plaintiffs’ jurisdictional statement (left uncorrected by defendant), our jurisdiction is not proper
under Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), as the order
was not a final one disposing of all claims. Nevertheless, dismissal of this appeal is unnecessary
because Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) provides that we do have
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Ujurisdiction over judgments that dispose of fewer than all claims against fewer than all parties if
the order expressly reflects that there is no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal.
The written order here just barely meets Rule 304(a)’s standards, as it states that the judgment is
“final and immediately appealable.” Cf., Palmolive Tower Condominiums, LLC v. Simon, 409 Ill.
App. 3d 539, 544 (2011) (noting that circuit court’s finding that an order was “final and
appealable,” without reference to an immediate appeal or the justness of delay, is insufficient to
trigger Rule 304(a)). Thus, our jurisdiction is proper.
¶ 28 Next, we define our standard of review. Vann’s motion was filed pursuant to section 2-
619.1 of the Code and included arguments for dismissal under both sections 2-615 and 2-619 of
the Code. See, e.g., Downey v. Wood Dale Park District, 286 Ill. App. 3d 194, 199 (1997)
(combined motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code is proper if movant indicates
under which section of the Code each part of the combined motion to dismiss is brought). The
court dismissed the complaint, citing 2-615 (failure to state a claim) and 2-619 (affirmative
matter/statute of limitations) bases. We review de novo dismissals under both 2-615 and 2-619.
See, e.g., Zahl v. Krupa, 365 Ill. App. 3d 653, 658 (2006). Further, when reviewing a dismissal
under either section, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and make all reasonable inferences
therefrom. Id.¶ 29 B. Dismissal With Prejudice Was Proper
¶ 30 On appeal, plaintiffs ask that we reverse and vacate the court’s order dismissing the
complaint against Vann and remand so that they can file an amended complaint. Plaintiffs assert
that, had they been afforded leave to amend, they could have alleged additional facts to support
their causes of action and establish their exemption from the “allegedly expired” statute of
limitations. They note that discovery might uncover information reflecting that the statute of
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Ulimitations did not commence until they knew or reasonably should have known that they were
injured. Plaintiffs emphasize that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply because they sued Vann
in his individual capacity for actions and conduct that were intentional, malicious, and exceeded
his authority and position. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Vann, “the Building Code and
Enforcement Division Manager of St. Charles,” sought to defraud plaintiffs and concealed his
deception. Further, plaintiffs alleged that Vann misrepresented that no compression logs were
submitted to maintain the permit, when they allege that Thomas had, in fact, provided the logs.
They argue that they further alleged that Vann maliciously pulled the permit for the construction
project at the subject property to aid Thomas in his contract dispute with plaintiffs. As such,
plaintiffs contend, the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to immunize Vann nor, by extension,
does the one-year statute of limitations apply.
¶ 31 We note that, although, in their prayer for relief, plaintiffs request that we reverse the
dismissal of the entire complaint, plaintiffs’ counsel below requested leave to amend only counts
IV and VI, which he referred to as the “defraud” counts. Further, in their brief’s statement of the
issues, plaintiffs question whether they should be permitted to “amend and re-plead fraudulent
concealment or civil conspiracy.” Thus, it is not clear whether plaintiffs seek leave to amend only
those counts or the entire complaint. In any event, plaintiffs argue that, had the court given them
leave to amend, they might have been able to cure the defects. Vann responds, in part, that
plaintiffs were not entitled to amend because their request came after a final judgment, since the
court dismissed the complaint “with prejudice.” We need not address Vann’s argument in this
regard. We conclude that, even if plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend was a valid one, the trial
court properly denied it and dismissed the claims as barred by the statute of limitations.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-U¶ 32 Specifically, section 2-616(a) of the Code provides that, at any time before final judgment,
amendments to the pleadings may be allowed on just and reasonable terms. See 735 ILCS 5/2-
616(a) (West 2020). “Courts are given broad discretion in liberally allowing amendments of
pleadings to foster the policy of resolving controversies on their merits.” Boffa Surgical Group
LLC v. Managed Healthcare Associates Ltd., 2015 IL App (1st) 142984, ¶ 32. However, the ability
to amend the pleadings is not unlimited; “[a]mong the factors to be considered in deciding that
discretion was properly exercised is whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective
pleading; whether it could cause prejudice or surprise to other parties; the timeliness of the
proposed amendment; and whether previous opportunities to amend the pleadings could be
identified.” Talas v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 103, 107 (1985). Here, by
dismissing four counts as falling outside the applicable statute of limitations, the court inherently
determined that no amendment could cure the pleading’s defects and would, therefore, be
untimely.
¶ 33 Section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act provides that no civil action may be commenced
against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury “unless commenced within one year
from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.” 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a)
(West 2020). Section 8-101(c) clarifies that a “civil action” includes “any actions, whether based
upon the common law or statutes or Constitution of this State.” Id. § 8-101(c). Section 1-202
defines “employee” as a present or former servant or employee. 745 ILCS 10/1-202 (West 2020).
As such, here, at all times relevant to the complaint, Vann was a City employee as defined by the
Tort Immunity Act. In fact, the complaint alleges this. Further, there is no dispute that the claims
plaintiffs pursued against Vann are “civil actions” as defined by the Tort Immunity Act. Moreover,
the complaint allegations, taken as true, reflect that, in November 2017, Vann made his comments
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Uto Ciccone that the compression logs would not be provided until Thomas and USS were paid. In
addition, documents attached to the motion to dismiss (which plaintiffs did not rebut) reflect that,
in April 2018, Ciccone wrote to Vann concerning the building department’s request for the
compression results, stating that USS would not provide them and urging that the building
department should “subpoena” them. Vann emailed back, reiterating the permit review and plan
requirements, as well as noting that the department did not have the resources to pursue legal action
against contractors to provide information that is the property owner’s obligation to provide.
Although the complaint alleged that the permit was later “pulled,” it did not specify the date.
However, the record reflects that, on October 26, 2018, Vann informed plaintiffs that, because
information necessary to complete review of the application had not been received, the application
for construction of the residential addition was voided. Accordingly, at the very latest, by October
26, 2018, plaintiffs clearly knew of their injury. Yet, plaintiffs did not file their complaint until
November 10, 2020, more than two years later.
¶ 34 Plaintiffs seek to remove their allegations from the Tort Immunity Act’s purview by
asserting that Vann’s conduct was willful and wanton. They seek leave to “amend and re-plead
fraudulent concealment or civil conspiracy with more specific factual allegations to determine
whether the matter is within the applicable statute of limitations.” (Emphasis added.) They
emphasize that they sued Vann in his individual capacity and alleged that Vann was acting
willfully, wantonly, and engaged in fraud; thus, it is improper to dismiss the claims on the basis
that Vann was operating in his official capacity, such that the Tort Immunity Act and its one-year
statute of limitations applies.
¶ 35 First, these arguments more concern pleading requirements to state a claim under section
2-615, as opposed to the statute of limitations dismissal under section 2-619. For example,
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Uplaintiffs cite McKay v. Kusper, 252 Ill. App. 3d 450, 460 (1993), as authority for the proposition
that immunity applies only to officials who make discretionary judgments based upon the public
needs (arguing that Vann’s actions did not concern public needs), and that “immunity does not
extend to a public employee’s acts based on corrupt or malicious motives or willful and wanton
acts.” Similarly, plaintiffs also cite Loman v. Freeman, 229 Ill. 2d 104, 112 (2008), for the
proposition that whether an action is one against the State depends on the issues involved and relief
sought, and a State employee who breaches a duty is no more entitled to immunity than is a private
individual who breaches that same duty. Their reliance is misplaced, as plaintiffs conflate the
concepts of immunity, which the trial court did reach, and statutory limitations. See, e.g., Griffin
v. Willoughby, 369 Ill. App. 3d 405, 412 (2006) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that, if the
defendant would not be immune for his actions, the limitations period in section 8-101 of the Tort
Immunity Act should not apply and noting that the limitations period and the likely success of an
immunity defense are not connected).
¶ 36 Second, we also note that plaintiffs did not plead willful and wanton conduct; rather,
although the word “willful” occasionally appears in the complaint, the “defraud” counts IV and
VI alleged “malicious” conduct. Our supreme court has held that there is no “corrupt or malicious
motives” exception contained in the Tort Immunity Act. Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG
Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 494 (2001). Further, there are specific pleading requirements to
sufficiently allege the willful and wanton conduct exceptions to the Tort Immunity Act, none of
which were pleaded here. See, e.g., Floyd v. Rockford Park District, 355 Ill. App. 3d 695, 700
(2005) (“To sufficiently plead willful and wanton conduct, a plaintiff must allege not only duty,
breach, and proximate cause [citation], but also that the defendant engaged in a course of action
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-Uthat showed a deliberate intention to harm or an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the
plaintiff’s welfare.”).
¶ 37 In any event, focusing on the court’s section 2-619 dismissal based on the statute of
limitations, plaintiffs assert that the one-year statute of limitations cannot apply to “malicious
actions an individual undertakes outside of the authority of employment,” but they cite no authority
for this proposition. Moreover, courts have held that, to recover against a local employee, acting
within the scope of employment, a plaintiff must file suit within one year, even if the plaintiff is
seeking to recover against the employee in only his or her individual capacity. See, e.g., Sperandeo
v. Zavitz, 365 Ill. App. 3d 691, 694 (2006); see also Delgadillo v. Paulnitsky, 2007 WL 1655252,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2007) (citing Sperandeo and noting, “Illinois courts have made clear that
the Tort Immunity Act’s one-year statute of limitations applies even where an employee is sued in
his individual capacity”). Here, regardless of the complaint’s statement that Vann was being sued
in his individual capacity, the allegations reflect that his involvement was entirely connected to
the scope of his employment and his position and authority within the City’s building department.
Indeed, all of plaintiffs’ claims against Vann seek damages and stem from information required
by the building department, communications with Vann over those requirements, the failure to
release and “officially” submit the logs with the building department, and the resultant harm from
the ultimately-voided permit application. In other words, but for his position as the City’s Building
and Code Enforcement Division Manager, Vann’s conduct and communications would be
irrelevant; an individual not in Vann’s position would have had no ability to cause the harm
plaintiffs allege against him. As such, the claims clearly are barred by section 8-101’s statute of
limitations, and the court’s dismissal of them with prejudice was proper. Therefore, as this issue
is dispositive, we need not reach the propriety of the court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim.
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2022 IL App (2d) 210299-U¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
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