People v. Watson , 2022 IL App (1st) 192182 ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 192182SIXTH DIVISION
March 25, 2022
No. 1-19-2182
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Respondent-Appellee, ) Cook County
)
v. ) No. 11 CR 14650
)
PRINCE WATSON, ) The Honorable
) James B. Linn,
Petitioner-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Harris and Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Petitioner, Prince Watson, appeals from the circuit court of Cook County’s first-stage
summary dismissal of his pro se postconviction petition. On appeal, petitioner argues his petition
stated an arguable basis of a meritorious claim that the Truth-in-Sentencing Act is unconstitutional
as applied to juvenile offenders such as him, and that his 32-year sentence for first degree murder
violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶2 We find petitioner waived his constitutional claims by pleading guilty in exchange for a
32-year prison sentence for first degree murder and a 4-year prison sentence for each of two counts
of robbery. Waiver aside, petitioner’s petition did not set forth an arguable claim that the truth-in-
sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because a statutory requirement that a
No. 1-19-2182
juvenile offender serve 100% of a nonlife sentence for murder does not violate Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012) or the eighth amendment. Petitioner forfeited his claim that his 32-year
sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause because he did not set up that claim in his
postconviction petition, so we do not reach the merits of that claim. We affirm the circuit court’s
judgment dismissing the postconviction petition.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 28, 2011, petitioner was riding on the CTA’s Brown Line. As the train pulled
into the Fullerton station, petitioner forcibly took Amy Rojack’s iPhone and fled through the train
doors onto the platform and down the crowded stairs. As he ran down the stairs, petitioner pushed
Sally Katona-King, causing her to fall and suffer numerous serious injuries from which she later
died. Petitioner committed two similar robberies on April 6 and April 17, 2011. Petitioner was 17
years old at the time of the offenses. He was arrested and charged with first degree murder, robbery,
and aggravated battery for the offenses committed on March 28, and was charged with two counts
of robbery under separate indictments. Petitioner waived his rights to a jury and presentence
investigation report. He pleaded guilty to murder and two counts of robbery pursuant to a fully
negotiated plea. The circuit court heard testimony from Katona-King’s daughter and received
victim’s impact statements from two of Katona-King’s other children. The circuit court heard
argument in aggravation that included numerous juvenile robberies and probation violations.
¶5 The circuit court also heard argument in mitigation, including petitioner’s difficult
childhood. Defense counsel argued petitioner’s was born with alcohol and drugs in his system. His
mother died of an overdose when he was three years old and he was raised by his grandparents in
the Cabrini Green housing projects, where he was exposed to criminal behavior, drug use, and
abuse. He received treatment for mental health problems, but the treatment was inconsistent and
2
No. 1-19-2182
did not work. Counsel emphasized that petitioner was 17 years old at time of the offenses, and that
his crimes “were the essence of being a teenager ***. When you’re *** 17, you’re stupid and
there’s just no getting around that.” Despite dropping out of school in ninth grade, petitioner was
smart and intelligent. Petitioner never used a weapon or “attacked anyone” while stealing iPhones,
and his older brother was in prison for armed robbery. Petitioner “was unable to rise up above the
tragedies that happened to him: his sister’s murder, his mother’s drug overdose, the way he was
raised.” Counsel acknowledged that petitioner “would be sentenced to a long term in prison, and
that’s a shame,” because petitioner “did have promise, and hopefully *** still does have promise
and go and do his time *** but then come out and rise above the place that he’s brought his life to
currently ***.” The circuit court also considered a letter sent by defendant to Katona-King’s family
expressing regret and asking for forgiveness. The circuit court sentenced petitioner to 32 years’
imprisonment for murder to be served at 100%, and to 4-years’ imprisonment on each robbery
count pursuant to the negotiated plea, with all the sentences to run concurrently. Petitioner did not
file any postsentencing motions and did not file any appeals.
¶6 In July 2019, petitioner filed the pro se postconviction petition at issue and made the
following allegations. He was 17 years old on March 28, 2011. He was sentenced to 32 years’
imprisonment and was required to serve his sentence at 100% with no opportunity to earn credit
against the sentence pursuant to the Truth in Sentencing Act (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West
2012). Under this court’s decision in People v. Othman, 2019 IL App (1st) 150823 (Othman I), he
was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the truth-in-sentencing statute deprives juvenile
offenders of an opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitative potential, in violation of the due process
and proportionate penalties clauses in sections 2 and 11 of article I of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 11). The circuit court dismissed the postconviction petition at the first
3
No. 1-19-2182
stage, finding the petition lacked merit and was “outside the boundaries” of the supreme court’s
decision in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, petitioner argues his petition stated an arguable basis of a meritorious claim that
the Truth-in-Sentencing Act is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles such as him because it bars
him from receiving credit against his 32-year sentence for murder, despite his youth and
rehabilitative potential, and restrains consideration of the factors identified in Miller, 567 U.S. 460(2012) related to juvenile offenders. He further argues his petition stated the arguable basis of a
meritorious claim that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause because “[t]here is
no reason as to why the Miller factors should only apply to juveniles who have committed the most
serious crimes.” Petitioner also argues “the fact [petitioner] was sentenced pursuant to a negotiated
plea does not bar him from raising *** [his] claims in a post-conviction petition.”
¶9 At the first stage of proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-
1 et seq. (West 2018)), a petitioner only needs to state the gist of a constitutional violation, and the
circuit court may dismiss the petition at the first stage if the petition has no arguable basis in law
or fact. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 16 (2009). Summary dismissal is appropriate where the
claims in the petition are frivolous or patently without merit. Id. at 11-12. We review de novo the
circuit court’s summary dismissal of a postconviction petition. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214,
¶ 10.
¶ 10 A. Waiver
¶ 11 The State relies on People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33 to argue that petitioner’s
voluntary guilty plea waived all non-jurisdictional errors, including constitutional errors, and
therefore all the claims in petitioner’s petition are waived. Petitioner relies on this court’s decision
4
No. 1-19-2182
in People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 19 to argue that a juvenile’s negotiated plea
does not operate as a waiver of postconviction constitutional claims where those claims—such as
Miller-based claims directed at juvenile sentencing issues—did not exist at the time of the guilty
plea. We reject petitioner’s reliance on Daniels and find defendant’s guilty plea waived his
postconviction petition’s constitutional challenges.
¶ 12 In Sophanavong—which did not involve a juvenile offender—our supreme court
considered whether the defendant’s guilty plea foreclosed his ability to challenge the circuit court’s
failure to strictly comply with a statutory provision for foregoing a presentence investigation
report. 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 2. The defendant agreed to plead guilty to first degree murder in
exchange for a 55-year prison sentence. The parties agreed to waive the PSI report (id. ¶ 10), and
the circuit court sentenced the defendant to 55 years in prison (id. ¶ 11). In a second amended
motion prepared by counsel, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting he was
not in a coherent state of mind at the time of the plea and that his counsel was ineffective. Id. ¶ 14.
On appeal, the defendant argued for the first time that the circuit court did not comply with section
5-3-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-3-1 (West 2012)) by failing to order a PSI
report or be informed of his prior criminal offense dispositions. Id. ¶ 15. A majority of the appellate
court reversed and remanded. Our supreme court reversed the appellate court’s judgment. The
court found “the defendant long forfeited any claim of noncompliance with section 5-3-1 by failing
to raise the issue” in any of his motions to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. ¶ 25. The court also cited
People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 534 (2004) for the proposition that “a voluntary guilty plea waives
all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones.” Sophanavong, 2020
IL 124337, ¶ 33.
5
No. 1-19-2182
¶ 13 In People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, the supreme court considered whether a juvenile
offender who pleaded guilty to first degree murder pursuant to a fully negotiated plea could pursue
a successive postconviction petition challenging his 50-year prison sentence on eighth amendment
grounds under Miller. The circuit court denied the defendant’s postconviction petition and the
appellate court affirmed. Our supreme court likewise affirmed. The court first examined whether
the defendant’s guilty plea precluded a Miller-based claim, noting that the defendant conceded he
was not sentenced under a statutory sentencing scheme. The Jones court relied on Sophanavong
and Townsell to observe that the defendant’s plea agreement foreclosed any non-jurisdictional
claims of error. Id. ¶ 20. The State had not engaged in any form of misrepresentation or misconduct
to induce the defendant to plead guilty, so his knowing and voluntary guilty plea “waived any
constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law.” Id. ¶ 26 (citing
Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33; Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 545).
¶ 14 Both Sophanavong and Jones were decided after this court’s decision in Daniels. In
Daniels, this court considered whether the defendant’s guilty plea operated as a waiver of his right
to pursue an as-applied proportionate penalties claim in a successive postconviction petition. The
State argued that our supreme court’s decision in People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286 (2002)
foreclosed the defendant’s postconviction claim because his conviction stemmed from a fully
negotiated plea. The Daniels court rejected the State’s argument, observing that our supreme
court’s holding in Jackson was limited to Apprendi-based sentencing objections. Daniels, 2020 IL
App (1st) 171738, ¶ 17; Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 548. The Daniels court found “[t]he State has
simply not convinced us that the outcome in this case, which involves what should have been
considered at sentencing and what was a permissible sentence, is controlled by the holding in
Jackson, a case concerned solely with who should make factual findings related to sentencing.”
6
No. 1-19-2182
(Emphases in original.) Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 17. The Daniels court also observed
that waiver only occurs when there is a voluntary and knowing relinquishment of a known right,
which could not have occurred in Daniels because the defendant was sentenced 20 years before
our supreme court “recognize[d] the potential viability of youth-based claims made by young-adult
offenders ***.” Id. ¶ 18. The Daniels court concluded the defendant’s guilty plea was not a
knowing waiver of his right to bring an as-applied proportionate penalties claim. Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 15 Sophanavong and Jones undermine this court’s finding in Daniels that the rule in Jackson
is limited to Apprendi-based sentencing objections. Instead, our supreme court found in
Sophanavong and Jones that guilty pleas operate as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional challenges.
Thus, while the Daniels court reasoned that a guilty plea only waives challenges to Apprendi-based
sentencing errors, the supreme court has not taken such a narrow view of waiver.
¶ 16 Furthermore, the Daniels court found the juvenile criminal defendant could not have
waived his Miller-based challenge when he pleaded guilty because there was no voluntary
relinquishment of a known right, since the right to Miller-compliant sentencing did not yet exist.
But in Jones, our supreme court rejected the defendant’s argument that when he entered his plea
agreement, “he did not anticipate that the 50-year prison term stipulated in it would later be
declared to be a de facto life sentence that required the trial court’s use of discretion and
consideration of his youthful characteristics and rehabilitative potential.” Jones, 2021 IL 126432,
¶ 19. The court explained that “plea agreements are contracts, and principles of waiver apply
equally to them.” Id. ¶ 21 (citing People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 87 (2011)). “Entering into a
contract is generally ‘a bet on the future.’ ” Id. (quoting Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171, 175
(4th Cir. 2016)). “ ‘[A] classic guilty plea permits a defendant to gain a present benefit in return
7
No. 1-19-2182
for the risk that he may have to [forgo] future favorable legal developments.’ ” (Alterations in
original.) Id. (quoting Dingle, 840 F.3d at 175).
¶ 17 In Dingle, a juvenile defendant pleaded guilty to murder and to a life sentence with the
possibility of parole to avoid the death penalty, although he ultimately was not eligible for parole.
After the Supreme Court found that the eighth amendment barred capital punishment for juvenile
offenders (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)), Dingle sought to withdraw his guilty plea.
The district court denied Dingle relief and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The Dingle court found that Roper did not retroactively invalidate Dingle’s guilty plea. The Dingle
court observed that while the death penalty factored into the plea discussions, nothing suggested
that Roper “would stretch beyond the proscribed sentence to reopen guilty pleas with a different
sentence.” Dingle, 840 F.3d at 174. The Dingle court emphasized that plea agreements involve a
choice to accept the risks and rewards of the deal (id.), and that the Supreme Court observed in
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) that “a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made
in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions
indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.”
¶ 18 Relying on Dingle and Brady, the Jones court found “the petitioner’s knowing and
voluntary guilty plea waived any constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the
applicable law.” Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶ 26. The same is true here. Petitioner was facing first
degree murder, aggravated battery, and three robbery charges. He agreed to plead guilty to murder
in exchange for a 32-year prison sentence and to two robbery charges in exchange for four-year
sentences on each charge. Petitioner’s postconviction petition contains no facts challenging the
propriety of his guilty plea, and at no time did he seek to withdraw his guilty plea. By accepting a
8
No. 1-19-2182
plea agreement and pleading guilty, petitioner waived the postconviction claims raised in his
petition.
¶ 19 B. Petitioner’s Constitutional Challenge to the Truth-In-Sentencing Statute
¶ 20 Waiver aside, petitioner argues his petition stated the arguable basis of a meritorious claim
because this court in Othman I, 2019 IL App (1st) 150823 found the truth-in-sentencing statute
was unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders like him. Petitioner acknowledges that the
portion of this court’s decision in Othman I was vacated pursuant to a supervisory order from our
supreme court and is therefore nonprecedential but insists the reasoning in Othman I is sound. He
contends the truth-in-sentencing statute mandates service of a murder sentence at 100%, which
when applied to juvenile offenders, “defies the central principle *** in Miller *** : that mandatory
sentencing schemes designed for adult offenders preclude consideration of youth and its hallmark
features.” He asserts the truth-in-sentencing statute “restricts consideration of the Miller factors”
and “is an implicit admission that juveniles are incapable of change, in direct contradiction to the
teachings of Miller and its progeny.” We disagree.
¶ 21 In Miller, the Supreme Court expanded on a line of cases narrowing the circumstances
under which a juvenile offender might be subject to society’s harshest criminal punishments. The
Supreme Court held “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life
in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
Before imposing life in prison on a juvenile offender, the sentencing court must “take into account
how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them
to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480. Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law, and
thus applies retroactively. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016). Miller, however,
did not foreclose a sentencing court from imposing a discretionary life sentence, but instead
9
No. 1-19-2182
requires consideration of the offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing a
life sentence. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 39; People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 33. Under our
supreme court’s precedent, Miller’s requirements apply to mandatory and discretionary life
sentences (People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40), and to de facto life sentences that require a
juvenile offender to serve more than 40 years in prison (People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 39).
¶ 22 We note petitioner’s 32-year sentence, even if served at 100%, is not a life sentence under
any constitutional measure: he was not mandatorily sentenced to life in prison as prohibited by
Miller, nor was he sentenced to a discretionary de facto life sentence as defined by Buffer.
Petitioner argues, however, that the truth-in-sentencing statute as applied to juvenile offenders
prevents him from obtaining an early release based on rehabilitation, in violation of the principles
in Miller. To state an as-applied constitutional challenge, petitioner must show the statute violates
the constitution as it applies to him. People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 117 (2006). We find
petitioner’s as-applied challenge fails.
¶ 23 This court has rejected similar challenges to the truth-in-sentencing statute as applied to
juvenile offenders. People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶¶ 58-60 (rejecting as-applied
to challenge because the Supreme Court has never held that “the eighth amendment prohibits a
juvenile defendant from being subject to the same mandatory minimum sentence as an adult, unless
the mandatory minimum sentence was death or life in prison without the possibility of parole.”);
People v. Banks, 2015 IL App (1st) 130985, ¶ 22 (relying on Pacheco to reject a juvenile offender’s
as-applied challenge); People v. Brakes, 2021 IL App (1st) 181737, ¶¶ 4, 39-42 (rejecting as-
applied challenge where, with eligibility for sentencing credit, the defendant could serve 39 years
in prison). And as we observed in Brakes, “a juvenile defendant’s sentence (whether served at
100%, 85%, or 50%) may be subject to a constitutional challenge only if it will keep the juvenile
10
No. 1-19-2182
in prison for more than 40 years.” 2021 IL App (1st) 181737, ¶ 42 (citing People v. Dorsey, 2021
IL 123010, ¶ 64). We find that petitioner’s as-applied challenge to the truth-in-sentencing statute
must fail because requiring a juvenile to serve 100% of a term-of-years, non-de facto life sentence
for murder does not violate the principles set forth in Miller.
¶ 24 Petitioner relies primarily on the reasoning set forth in a now-vacated portion of this court’s
decision in Othman I, 2019 IL App (1st) 150823, which heavily relied on a special concurrence to
this court’s decision in People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931. In Othman I, a jury found the
defendant guilty of murder and he was sentenced to 55 years’ imprisonment. 2019 IL App (1st)
150823, ¶ 1. The defendant was 17 years old at the time of the offense. Id. On appeal, a divided
panel of this court reversed the conviction due to several trial errors and remanded for a new trial.
Id. ¶¶ 34-75. The Othman I majority went on to address several constitutional arguments directed
at the defendant’s sentence and found the 55-year sentence was an unconstitutional de facto life
sentence (id. ¶¶ 79-81), the sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois
constitution (id. ¶¶ 83-86), and the truth-in-sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied to
juvenile offenders (id. ¶¶ 91-109). On the truth-in-sentencing issue, the majority found “every
major case on the issue of juvenile sentencing strongly condemns sentencing policies that prevent
a juvenile from seeking to demonstrate rehabilitation and parole at some point during his prison
sentence.” Id. ¶ 92. The majority acknowledged that no court had found the truth-in-sentencing
statute to be unconstitutional but opined that because the truth-in sentencing statute did not
distinguish between juvenile and adult offenders and required serving 100% of a sentence for
murder, the statute did not permit a juvenile offender to demonstrate rehabilitation, thus
“ ‘deny[ing] them the fundamental right to demonstrate rehabilitation.’ ” Id. ¶ 107 (quoting People
v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931, ¶ 80 (Pucinski, J., specially concurring)).
11
No. 1-19-2182
¶ 25 The supreme court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Othman I, 2019 IL App
(1st) 150823, appeal allowed, No. 124971 (Nov. 26, 2019). During briefing, the court granted a
joint motion for supervisory order filed by the State and the defendant and ordered the appellate
court to vacate the portions of its opinion addressing the sentencing issues and to remand to the
circuit court for a new trial. People v. Othman, 2020 IL App (1st) 150823-B, ¶¶ 3-5 (Othman II).
¶ 26 Several panels of this court have noted that the now-vacated discussion of the Truth-in-
Sentencing Act in Othman I is nonprecedential. People v. Richblood, 2021 IL App (1st) 201247-
U, ¶ 19 (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23); People v. Williams, 2021 IL App
(1st) 200213-U, ¶ 32 (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23); People v. Harris,
2021 IL App (4th) 200095-U, ¶ 45 (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23). In
Brakes, this court observed that, even if the Othman I court’s reasoning on the truth-in-sentencing
statute issue survived our supreme court’s supervisory order—which it did not—Othman I’s
analysis of the truth-in-sentencing statute was dicta because that court found the defendant’s 55-
year sentence to be substantively unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause. 2021
IL App (1st) 181737, ¶ 41. In other words, the truth-in-sentencing analysis in Othman I is, at best,
nonprecedential dicta, which is not binding on any court. The Brakes court also observed the
Othman I court’s conclusion that the truth-in-sentencing statute was unconstitutional was further
flawed by the fact that a juvenile challenging a de facto life sentence must challenge the substantive
sentence rather than the truth-in-sentencing statute requiring serving of the sentence at 100% (id.
¶ 41 (citing Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409, ¶ 58)), and that our supreme court’s decision in
Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010 stands for the proposition that a juvenile’s sentence is only subject to
constitutional challenges if the juvenile is required to actually serve more than 40 years in prison
(Brakes, 2021 IL App (1st) 181737, ¶ 42 (citing Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 64)).
12
No. 1-19-2182
¶ 27 In Dorsey, our supreme court considered whether a juvenile offender’s eligibility for day-
for-day good conduct credit against an aggregated 76-year prison sentence was relevant in
determining whether the sentence was a de facto life sentence. The petitioner, who was 14 years
old at the time of the murder and attempted murder offenses, was sentenced in 1998 to 40 years in
prison for murder, and to 18 years in prison on each of two attempted murder convictions, resulting
in a 76-year aggregate sentence without the possibility of parole. The petitioner’s motion for leave
to file a successive postconviction petition argued his 76-year sentence triggered Miller’s
protections. The circuit court denied leave to file the successive postconviction petition and the
appellate court affirmed. Our supreme court likewise affirmed. After reviewing Miller and its
progeny, the court explained that, under the sentencing scheme applicable to the petitioner, he was
eligible for day-for-day good conduct credit against his sentence. The court observed that the
petitioner “has an opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation so that he only needs to
serve 38 years of his aggregate 76-year sentence.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 53. He was therefore
not sentenced a de facto life sentence. Id. The court further observed “that it is in a defendant’s
power to shorten his sentence by earning good-conduct credit and that earning such credit allows
a defendant the opportunity to exhibit maturity and rehabilitation.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 53.
The court found: “a judicially imposed sentence that is more than 40 years but offers day-for-day,
good-conduct sentencing credit does not cross the Buffer line if it offers the opportunity to
demonstrate maturity and obtain release with 40 years or less of incarceration.” Id. ¶ 64. Dorsey
makes plain, as we observed in Brakes, that Miller-based claims cannot survive when the
substantive sentence is not a de facto life sentence.
¶ 28 In sum, we find petitioner did not state a viable as-applied challenge to the truth-in-
sentencing statute. He received a term of years that does not amount to a de facto life sentence.
13
No. 1-19-2182
Further, the requirement that he serve 100% of a murder sentence does not offend the principles
set forth in Miller where he will serve 32 years in prison.
¶ 29 C. Petitioner’s Proportionate Penalties Claim
¶ 30 Petitioner next argues his petition stated an arguable basis for a meritorious claim that his
32-year prison sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. He
asserts that Miller has only been applied in Illinois “where juveniles have been convicted of
intentional murder,” whereas he was convicted of a crime “where death result[ed] from reckless
actions but there was no intentional act of violence.” He contends that applying the same
sentencing scheme to “juveniles who committed intentional murder and a juvenile who committed
an unintentional act that resulted in death” violates the proportionate penalties clause.
¶ 31 The State argues petitioner forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in his petition. The State
contends petitioner’s petition alleged the truth-in-sentencing statute was unconstitutional, but he
did not assert anywhere in his petition that his substantive sentence violated the proportionate
penalties clause. Defendant responds that his petition did raise a proportionate penalties claim
because he argued that the truth-in-sentencing statute as applied to him violated article I, section
11 of the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 32 The first stage of postconviction proceedings presents a ‘low threshold,’ requiring only that
the petitioner plead sufficient facts to assert an arguably constitutional claim.” People v. Johnson,
2021 IL 125738, ¶ 25 (citing People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 184 (2010)). But “a claim not raised
in a petition cannot be argued for the first time on appeal.” People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 505
(2004) (citing People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 147 (2000); People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 158
(1993)). We must therefore examine the petition to determine whether petitioner’s appellate
arguments are based on a claim that was presented to the circuit court.
14
No. 1-19-2182
¶ 33 In his pro se petition, petitioner made the following allegations. He was 17 years old at the
time of the offense. He pleaded guilty “and was sentenced under Illinois Truth in Sentenc[ing]
law *** to serve 32 years at 100%.” His petition was not filed within any of the time frames
prescribed by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, but the delay in filing was not due to his culpable
negligence and relied on newly decided caselaw. He argued he was entitled to a new sentencing
hearing and for his new sentence to be served at 50% because the truth-in-sentencing statute
deprived him of the ability to demonstrate rehabilitation. He argued that under Othman I and
People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 339 (2002), he had “demonstrated a claim that his sentence under
Illinois’[s] Truth in Sentencing Act violates Illinois Constitution Art. 1, sections 2 and 11.”
¶ 34 It is clear that petitioner’s petition asserted a claim directed at the application of the truth-
in-sentencing statute to his sentence, and not at the substance or imposition of the 32-year sentence
itself. We therefore agree with the State that petitioner forfeited any claim under the proportionate
penalties clause by failing to set up that claim in his petition.
¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
15
No. 1-19-2182
No. 1-19-2182
Cite as: People v. Watson, 2022 IL App (1st) 192182Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CR-
14650; the Hon. James B. Linn, Judge, presiding.
Attorney James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Chan Woo Yoon, of
For State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (John E.
For Nowack, Enrique Abraham, and Matthew Connors, Assistant
Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
16