People v. Mascote , 2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U ( 2023 )


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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    No. 2-21-0738
    Order filed May 15, 2023
    NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
    except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    SECOND DISTRICT
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
    OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Kane County.
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
    )
    v.                                     ) No. 19-CF-2030
    )
    DIEGO MASCOTE,                         ) Honorable
    ) Salvatore LoPiccolo, Jr.,
    Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    PRESIDING JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court.
    Justices Schostok and Birkett concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    ¶1     Held: The State did not shift the burden of proof to defendant through its remarks in
    rebuttal argument that if defendant had not been drinking, as he claimed to the
    arresting officer, then he would have agreed to a breathalyzer test. The remarks
    were an appropriate comment on defendant’s state of mind and a challenge to his
    credibility. Even if the remarks were improper, reversal is not warranted because
    any error was (1) cured by the trial court’s admonishments and instructions to the
    jury and (2) harmless in the context of the whole rebuttal argument.
    ¶2     Defendant, Diego Mascote, was charged with aggravated driving while under the influence
    of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2018)). At his jury trial, the arresting officer was the
    only witness who testified. The officer detailed the indicia of intoxication defendant exhibited the
    
    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    night he was arrested. After defendant rested without presenting any evidence, closing arguments
    began. In rebuttal, the State referenced that defendant refused to take a breathalyzer test. The
    State urged the jury to use common sense and argued that if defendant had not consumed any
    alcohol, as he told the officer, then he would have willingly taken a breathalyzer test. Defendant
    objected, and the court sustained the objection and admonished the jury. Also, before the jury
    deliberated, the court instructed the jury about the State’s burden of proof, among other things.
    Before sentencing, defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial,
    arguing, among other things, that the State made improper comments during rebuttal that shifted
    the burden of proof to defendant. The court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to 30
    months of probation and 180 days in jail. At issue in this appeal is whether the comments the State
    made in rebuttal were improper because they shifted the burden of proof to defendant. We
    determine they were not improper. Accordingly, we affirm.
    ¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND
    ¶4     When impaneling the jury, the trial court asked each venireperson whether he or she
    understood that (1) defendant was presumed innocent, (2) defendant did not have to present any
    evidence, and (3) the State had to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Each
    venireperson acknowledged and accepted these admonishments. After the jury was chosen, the
    court admonished the jury that neither opening statements nor closing arguments are evidence.
    ¶5     At trial, the only evidence presented was testimony from Elgin police officer Jonathan Cox,
    the arresting officer, and recordings taken from Cox’s squad car and body cameras.
    ¶6     Cox testified that, on the night of May 22, 2019, he was in an unmarked squad car parked
    on Mountain Street near the T-intersection with State Street. Mountain Street runs east-west and
    ends at State Street, which runs north-south. Mountain Street ascends a steep hill west of State
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    Street. Although the intersection is well lit, the area on Mountain Street to the west of the
    intersection is dark. Cox was parked on the hill west of the intersection, facing east and observing
    traffic on State Street. Cox’s objective was to arrest drivers using cell phones without hands-free
    technology.
    ¶7     At 10:05 p.m., Cox observed a car traveling east on Mountain Street and approaching his
    squad car from behind. The car was moving very slowly and did not have its headlights on. Cox
    looked over at the car, approximately 10 feet from Cox’s squad car, and saw defendant driving.
    Cox observed defendant drinking from a bottle of beer. Cox described the bottle as a large clear
    bottle with foil around the neck. Defendant turned on his car’s headlights as he drove past Cox’s
    squad car.
    ¶8     Cox activated the lights on his squad car and followed defendant. Defendant stopped at
    the stop sign on Mountain Street and State Street. Defendant then turned right onto State Street
    and proceeded south to the intersection of State Street and Highland Avenue. Because defendant
    was not pulling over, Cox activated his siren several times. Defendant stopped at a red traffic light
    at State Street and Highland Avenue. When the traffic light turned green, defendant turned right
    on Highland Avenue, heading west. Defendant then turned right into a parking lot, where only a
    few cars were parked. Defendant passed areas where he could have parked, opting to stop
    diagonally over two lined parking spaces on the south edge of the parking lot.
    ¶9     Cox approached defendant’s car and told him that he was stopped because he was
    (1) driving with his headlights off and (2) drinking while driving. 1 In speaking with defendant,
    1
    Seated in the front passenger seat was defendant’s girlfriend, Irene. Defendant told Cox
    that he had picked Irene up from a nearby nursing home where she worked and was driving her
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    Cox immediately detected an odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath. Cox also noticed that
    defendant’s speech was extremely slurred and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. When Cox
    asked defendant to hand over the beer bottle from which he saw defendant drinking, defendant
    denied that he drank in the car or at any time that night. He said that he had been drinking only
    water and there was no beer in the car. Defendant also told Cox that he did not have a driver’s
    license. A subsequent search revealed that defendant’s privilege to drive was suspended.
    ¶ 10   Cox asked defendant to step out of the car to perform field sobriety tests. Defendant did
    so. Cox attempted to administer the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, but defendant
    repeatedly turned his head away from Cox, motioning to the car. Cox considered this a refusal.
    Cox then arrested defendant for driving (1) under the influence of alcohol and (2) while his
    privilege to drive was suspended.
    ¶ 11   Cox then searched defendant’s car. Cox found a bottle of Modelo beer on the floorboard
    by the front passenger seat. The bottle was more than half full of beer.
    ¶ 12   Thereafter, Cox transported defendant to the Elgin Police Department. Defendant, whose
    speech was mumbled and slurred, was upset and somewhat confrontational. Cox asked defendant
    to complete a breathalyzer, and defendant refused. Defendant’s refusal was not recorded on Cox’s
    body camera.
    ¶ 13   Cox asserted that, in his opinion, defendant was unfit to drive. Cox based that opinion on
    defendant’s (1) drinking while driving, (2) extremely slurred speech, (3) nonsensical answers to
    questions, (4) glassy and bloodshot eyes, and (5) breath, which smelled of alcohol.
    home. Defendant pleaded with Cox to let Irene drive the car home. Irene began crying as the
    encounter continued.
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    ¶ 14    After the State rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied that
    motion, and defendant presented no evidence.
    ¶ 15    During its rebuttal, the State cited various facts that showed that alcohol lowered
    defendant’s ability to think and act with ordinary care. The State wanted to
    “break [defendant’s signs of impairment] down step-by-step, because this is a case where
    you don’t have field sobriety tests and you don’t have a breathalyzer, and you don’t have
    those things because this defendant was trying to hide his signs of impairment.”
    ¶ 16    After detailing the indicia of defendant’s intoxication, the State returned to defendant’s
    refusal to take a breathalyzer test:
    “There was a quick little bit of testimony that [defendant] refused the [breathalyzer]
    test. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you have to think about that refusal in the totality of the
    circumstances here. You have to think about that, I guess a better word is, in context of
    everything else; okay?
    So this defendant tells the officer that he hasn’t drank any alcohol. Nothing. Zero.
    He goes as far as to explain that he was drinking water. You heard that as he was being
    walked to the squad car. So once again, common sense; life experiences. If that’s true
    what the defendant said, that he’d only been drinking water, would his response, when
    given the opportunity to take a breathalyzer test, to be no? That’s not believable, ladies
    and gentlemen.
    There’s a reason, because he knew the result on that test would not benefit him. It
    would look bad. If it was as the defendant was saying, that I had nothing to drink other
    than water, he would be screaming, get me to the nearest breathalyzer.
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    MS. WILLETT [(ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER)]: Objection, Judge. That
    statement is not based on the evidence.
    THE COURT: Sustained.
    MR. MERKEL [(ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: Ladies and gentlemen,
    if you had nothing to drink, there would be no reason to not take the breath test.
    MS. WILLETT: Objection, Judge.
    THE COURT: Counsel may argue, but arguments of lawyers are not to be taken as
    statements of law. Instructions on the law will come from me after the final arguments are
    completed.
    So go ahead.
    MR. MERKEL: Ladies and gentlemen, common sense and life experiences.
    Imagine being arrested for DUI and told you were under arrest for DUI and you had nothing
    to drink. Use your common sense and life experiences. How you would [sic] react in that
    situation?
    Ladies and gentlemen, based on all the reasons that we have laid out, not using his
    headlights, drinking while driving, not stopping immediately, slurred speech, odor of
    alcohol, bloodshot, glassy eyes, failure to be able to write down his date of birth, leaning
    for assistance, and everything else that you’ve heard today and seen on the video, ladies
    and gentlemen, we’re asking that you find the defendant guilty. Thank you.”
    ¶ 17   The trial court then instructed the jurors that (1) their verdict must be based solely on the
    evidence presented, (2) they could consider a witness’s interest and bias, as well as the
    reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in light of all the evidence, (3) neither opening
    statements nor closing arguments are evidence, (4) opening statements and closing arguments must
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    be based on the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, (5) any statement
    made during opening statements or closing arguments that is not based on the evidence must be
    disregarded, (6) defendant is presumed innocent, (7) this presumption of innocence remains with
    defendant throughout every stage of the trial and during deliberations, (8) this presumption is not
    overcome unless, from all of the evidence, the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
    defendant is guilty, (9) defendant is not required to prove his innocence, (10) the State bears the
    burden of proving defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (11) the State bears this burden
    throughout the case, (12) the jury must determine whether defendant made various statements to
    Cox, and (13) if the jury determines the statements were made, they must decide what weight to
    give the statements.
    ¶ 18   The jury deliberated and found defendant guilty of aggravated DUI. Defendant moved for
    a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, arguing that the State improperly shifted the
    burden of proof to him when it argued during rebuttal that defendant would have taken a
    breathalyzer test if he had not consumed any alcohol.
    ¶ 19   After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court found:
    “[T]he State’s argument was a consciousness of guilt argument.           This court
    instructed the jury that the State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
    that the defendant does not have to prove his innocence. The Court asked all of the Zehr
    questions [(see People v. Zehr, 
    103 Ill. 2d 472
     (1984))] during jury selection, and every
    juror acknowledged the burden of proof is on the State and that the defendant does not have
    to prove his innocence. The comment did not shift the burden to the defendant.”
    ¶ 20   Thereafter, defendant was sentenced. This timely appeal followed.
    ¶ 21                                      II. ANALYSIS
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    ¶ 22   At issue here is whether the State’s comments that defendant would have submitted to a
    breathalyzer test if he had not been drinking were improper because they shifted the burden of
    proof to defendant. In addressing this issue, we first observe that the parties disagree about whether
    a de novo or abuse-of-discretion standard of review should apply. We will not resolve here which
    standard governs. Whether we review the issue de novo or for an abuse of discretion, the result is
    the same. See People v. Alvidrez, 
    2014 IL App (1st) 121740
    , ¶ 26 (“While it is not clear whether
    the appropriate standard of review for this issue [i.e., the propriety of the State’s closing argument]
    is de novo or abuse of discretion, we need not resolve the matter, because our holding in this case
    would be the same under either standard.”). That is, viewing the State’s remarks in the context of
    the entire rebuttal, as we must, we conclude that the remarks were not improper. People v. James,
    
    2021 IL App (1st) 180509
    , ¶ 39.
    ¶ 23   “Generally, the State is accorded wide latitude in the content of its closing arguments and
    it ‘may comment on the evidence and on any fair and reasonable inference the evidence may
    yield.’ ” People v. Graves, 
    2012 IL App (4th) 110536
    , ¶ 43 (quoting People v. Runge, 
    234 Ill. 2d 68
    , 142 (2009)). “However, [the State] must refrain from making improper, prejudicial comments
    and arguments.” James, 
    2021 IL App (1st) 180509
    , ¶ 39.
    ¶ 24   An example of an improper comment is one that shifts the burden of proof from the State
    to the defendant. Because a defendant “ ‘is under no obligation to produce any evidence, *** the
    [State] cannot attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defense[ ]’ ” by arguing that the defendant
    failed to present evidence. People v. Curry, 
    2013 IL App (4th) 120724
    , ¶ 80 (quoting People v.
    Beasley, 
    384 Ill. App. 3d 1039
    , 1047-48 (2008)). Indeed, “it is reversible error for the [State] to
    attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defense.” People v. Leger, 
    149 Ill. 2d 355
    , 399 (1992).
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    ¶ 25    While a comment that shifts the burden of proof is improper, a comment on a defendant’s
    refusal to take a breathalyzer test is not. “[E]vidence of a [defendant’s] refusal to take a test
    designed to determine the [defendant’s] blood-alcohol content is admissible and may be used to
    argue the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.” People v. Johnson, 
    218 Ill. 2d 125
    , 140 (2005).
    Nevertheless, a comment in closing or rebuttal that “goes beyond [this] legitimate purpose and
    ‘blur[s] the distinction between the defendant’s state of mind and the State’s burden of proof ***
    should not be permitted.’ ” 
    Id.
     (quoting People v. Johnson, 
    353 Ill. App. 3d 954
    , 960 (2004)).
    ¶ 26    This is not to say that every improper remark the State makes constitutes reversible error.
    “Even if [the State’s] closing remarks are improper, they do not constitute reversible error unless
    they result in substantial prejudice to the defendant, such that absent those remarks the verdict
    would have been different.” James, 
    2021 IL App (1st) 180509
    , ¶ 39; see also People v. Flores,
    
    128 Ill. 2d 66
    , 95 (1989) (even if the State’s remarks gave “an improper impression to the jury[ ]”
    on the burden of proof, the remarks did not deny defendant a fair trial and, thus, did not require
    reversal).
    ¶ 27   Here, defendant challenges three specific statements: (1) “If it was as the defendant was
    saying, that [he] had nothing to drink other than water, he would be screaming, get me to the
    nearest breathalyzer;” (2) “Ladies and gentlemen, if you had nothing to drink, there would be no
    reason to not take the breath test;” and (3) “Imagine being arrested for DUI *** and you had
    nothing to drink. Use your common sense and life experiences. How you would [sic] react in that
    situation?”
    ¶ 28    Viewing the rebuttal argument in its entirety, as we must, we conclude that the State was
    simply asking the jurors to consider the evidence in light of their own experiences and common
    sense. Nothing about this was improper. See People v. Jackson, 
    391 Ill. App. 3d 11
    , 42-43 (2009)
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    (the State’s argument based on common sense and life experience was not improper). First, the
    State asked the jury to consider whether, if defendant had not in fact been drinking, he would have
    been very eager to take a breathalyzer test. This was not only an appropriate comment on
    defendant’s state of mind, but the State was also asking the jury to draw a proper inference on
    defendant’s credibility. See People v. Williams, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 122745
    , ¶ 12 (“[The State is]
    allowed to comment on the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence, including a
    defendant’s credibility or the credibility of the defense’s theory of the case.”). Second, the State
    argued that defendant did not want to submit to a breathalyzer test, because he knew the test results
    would not be favorable. Again, the State was properly commenting on defendant’s state of mind,
    asking the jury to draw reasonable inferences. Id.; see also People v. Custer, 
    2020 IL App (4th) 180128
    , ¶ 35 (long-settled rule of law provides that, because the jury may draw reasonable
    inferences from the evidence, it is proper for the State in closing to urge the jury to draw reasonable
    inferences). Likewise, nothing prevents the State from asking the jurors what they would do if
    they were in the defendant’s position. Williams, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 122745
    , ¶ 12. All the
    challenged comments concerned defendant’s state of mind or consciousness of guilt. The State
    did not suggest that defendant was required to take a breathalyzer test to prove his innocence. We
    determine that none of these statements was improper in so far as transferring the burden of proof
    to the defendant.
    ¶ 29   Two cases guide us in determining that the State’s comments were proper. In Johnson, the
    defendant had been drinking and golfing with friends before the police stopped his car because he
    had crossed the center line to see if he could pass a car in front of him. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d at 127-
    28, 134. The State commented to the jury during its opening statement that it
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    “ ‘believe[d the jury was] going to hear that [the defendant] was given the
    opportunity to prove to the officer that he was not overly impaired by being offered to take
    what is called a breath alcohol test to determine how much alcohol was on his breath at the
    time, yet the defendant failed to do so.’ ” 
    Id. at 128
    .
    The defendant did not object. 
    Id.
     The arresting officer testified for the State, and the defendant
    “presented a number of witnesses in his defense.” 
    Id. at 132
    . In closing argument, like during its
    opening statement, the State commented that the defendant, in refusing to take a breath test,
    “ ‘wouldn’t take the chance to prove it once and for all.’ ” 
    Id. at 136
    . Again, the defendant did
    not object. 
    Id.
     The defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence, and after the
    appellate court affirmed his conviction, he appealed to our supreme court. 
    Id. at 136-37
    .
    ¶ 30   The supreme court considered whether the State’s comments were improper. 
    Id.
     at 137-
    38. The court concluded that they were improper because they “suggest[ed] that [the] defendant
    failed to prove his innocence to the police officer by failing to take the breath test[.]” 
    Id. at 140
    .
    The court explained that the State’s comments went beyond merely commenting on the
    defendant’s refusal to take a breath test and constituted an argument that the defendant failed to
    prove his innocence. 
    Id. at 140-41
    .
    ¶ 31   In Graves, three officers testified for the State. Graves, 
    2012 IL App (4th) 110536
    , ¶ 6.
    Their testimony revealed that the defendant was stopped after he failed to make a complete stop at
    a stop sign, made a wide right turn, and drove into the oncoming lane of traffic for “25 or 50 feet.”
    
    Id.
     After the defendant was stopped, an officer observed several indicia of intoxication, and the
    defendant failed various tests, including field sobriety tests. 
    Id. ¶¶ 7-8
    . The defendant was arrested
    for driving while under the influence and given the opportunity to take a breathalyzer test. 
    Id. ¶ 9
    .
    The defendant refused to take the test and denied drinking. 
    Id.
     During closing argument, the State
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    pointed out to the jury that the defendant was given a chance to complete a breath test and knew,
    based on the admonishments he was given, that his privilege to drive would be suspended for a
    longer time if he refused. 
    Id. ¶ 44
    . The State continued, “ ‘[Defendant] chose the longer
    suspension. Why? Because he knew he would be over the legal limit.’ ” 
    Id.
     Similarly, in rebuttal,
    the State argued, “ ‘We know that the [d]efendant refused to submit to chemical testing. [We]
    maintain that is because he knew he would be over the legal limit. He was told the ramifications
    of this. He chose not to submit [to] that breath test.’ ” 
    Id.
     The defendant was convicted of
    aggravated driving while under the influence, and he appealed. 
    Id. ¶¶ 12, 14
    .
    ¶ 32   On appeal, the defendant argued that the State made improper comments during closing
    that his refusal to take a breath test was proof that his blood-alcohol content was over the legal
    limit. 
    Id. ¶ 42
    . The appellate court disagreed, finding that the State’s comments were akin to an
    argument that the defendant’s refusal to take a breath test showed the defendant’s consciousness
    of guilt. 
    Id. ¶ 45
    . In distinguishing Johnson, the court observed that, unlike in Johnson, the State
    did not argue that defendant’s refusal to take a breath test constituted a missed opportunity for the
    defendant to prove his innocence. 
    Id.
    ¶ 33   This case is closer to Graves than Johnson. At no point did the State argue, like in Johnson,
    that defendant failed to take advantage of an opportunity to prove anything, including proving his
    innocence to Cox by taking a breathalyzer test. Rather, like in Graves, the State’s comments that
    defendant would have submitted to a breathalyzer if the results would benefit him concerned
    defendant’s state of mind or consciousness of guilt.
    ¶ 34   That said, even assuming that the State’s comments were improper, a conclusion we do not
    reach, any error was (1) cured by the trial court’s admonishments and instructions and
    (2) harmless. First, even if the comments were improper, the trial court cured any error with the
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    admonishments and instructions it gave the jury. When each venire panel was called, the court
    ensured that each member of the panel knew and accepted that (1) defendant was presumed
    innocent, (2) defendant did not have to present any evidence, and (3) the State had to prove
    defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After a jury was chosen and before the trial began,
    the trial court admonished the jury that neither opening statements nor closing arguments are
    evidence. When the State remarked in rebuttal that defendant would have agreed to a breathalyzer
    test if he had not been drinking, defendant objected, and the court sustained that objection. The
    court admonished the jury that they would be instructed on the law after closing arguments. The
    court’s instructions to the jury included, among other things, that (1) neither opening statements
    nor closing arguments are evidence, (2) defendant is presumed innocent, (3) the State bears the
    burden of proving defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (4) the State bears this burden
    throughout the case, and (5) defendant is not required to prove his innocence. Given all this, to
    the extent that the State’s comments about defendant’s failure to take a breathalyzer test were
    improper, a conclusion we do not reach, we must hold that the court’s admonishments and
    instructions would have cured any error. People v. Herndon, 
    2015 IL App (1st) 123375
    , ¶ 36
    (“The trial court may cure any errors by giving the jury proper instructions on the law to be applied,
    informing the jury that arguments are not evidence, or sustaining the defendant’s objections and
    instructing the jury to disregard the inappropriate remark.”).
    ¶ 35    Second, if the comments constituted error, any error was harmless. Johnson is instructive
    on this point. Although our supreme court determined that the State’s comments were improper,
    it concluded that any error was harmless, as “the jury[’s] verdict was unaffected by the improper
    comments.” Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d at 143. In reaching that result, the court observed that (1) the
    State did not rely on the defendant’s refusal to take a breath test to prove its case, (2) the defendant
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    and his witnesses confirmed that the defendant had been drinking, (3) the State’s improper
    comments were brief, (4) the State did not stress “the notion that defendant ‘failed to prove his
    innocence’ ” but, in fact, began and ended its closing argument by explaining its burden of proof,
    and (5) the State painstakingly pointed out all the indicia of intoxication the defendant exhibited.
    
    Id. at 142-43
    .
    ¶ 36   Here, as in Johnson, the State did not rely on defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer test
    to prove its case. Rather, as the State noted in rebuttal, there was only a “quick little bit of
    testimony that [defendant] refused the [breathalyzer] test.” Although, unlike in Johnson, defendant
    never admitted drinking alcohol, Cox saw defendant drinking from a bottle of beer and found that
    bottle in defendant’s car in an area where defendant could easily reach it. Moreover, like in
    Johnson, the State did not stress defendant’s failure to take a breathalyzer test. The State’s
    comments at issue consisted of three statements in eight pages of transcribed argument. The State
    ended its rebuttal by delineating all the indicia of intoxication presented in its case and never
    specifically mentioning defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer test.
    ¶ 37   In conclusion, we determine that the State’s comments about defendant not taking a
    breathalyzer test referred to defendant’s state of mind or consciousness of guilt. Because the
    comments did not shift the burden of proof to defendant to prove his innocence, we hold that the
    comments were not improper. That said, even if the comments were improper, any error was
    (1) cured by the trial court’s admonishments and instructions and (2) harmless.
    ¶ 38   We would be remiss if we did not further address the third comment made by the State,
    “Ladies and gentlemen, common sense and life experiences. Imagine being arrested for DUI and
    told you were under arrest for DUI and you had nothing to drink. Use your common sense and
    life experiences. How you would [sic] react in that situation?” The comment does not shift the
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    2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U
    burden of proof, but asking, “How you would [sic] react in that situation” has been deemed
    improper in the context of arousing passions or prejudice. “It is improper to ask jury members to
    place themselves in the position of a party litigant when such a request is calculated to arouse their
    passions and prejudices [Citation]. *** Even if counsel’s reference technically asked the jury to
    put themselves in the position of a party litigant, we do not believe that the prejudice or passions
    of the jury were so clearly being appealed to that a reversal would be warranted on this ground
    alone.” Offutt v. Pennoyer Merchants Transfer Co., 
    36 Ill. App. 3d 194
    , 204 (1976) (citing Bruske
    v. Arnold, 
    44 Ill. 2d 132
    , 137-38 (1969), Cert. denied, 
    398 U.S. 905
    ). In the future, we suggest
    querying whether or not a reasonable person (rather than a juror) would react in that situation.
    ¶ 39                                    III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 40   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
    ¶ 41   Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2-21-0738

Citation Numbers: 2023 IL App (2d) 210738-U

Filed Date: 5/15/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/15/2023