People v. Harrison , 2023 IL App (4th) 220371-U ( 2023 )

NOTICE 2023 IL App (4th) 220371-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
NO. 4-22-0371 May 26, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Winnebago County
WILLIE JAMES HARRISON, ) No. 09CF791
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Joseph G. McGraw,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cavanagh and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to
withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s pro se motion to
reduce sentence.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Willie James Harrison, was found guilty of first
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-l(a)(2) (West 2008)) and sentenced to 40 years in prison.
Approximately nine and a half years later, defendant filed a pro se motion for a reduction in his
sentence. The trial court dismissed this motion for lack of jurisdiction and did not address the
merits. Defendant appeals from that dismissal. This court appointed the Office of the State
Appellate Defender (OSAD) to represent defendant on appeal. OSAD moves to withdraw on the
basis any argument the trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s motion would be without merit.
For the reasons that follow, we grant OSAD’s motion and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A grand jury indicted defendant on four counts of murder for the death of his
roommate following a March 2009 altercation in their residence. Defendant was indicted on one
count of first degree murder intending to kill (720 ILCS 5/9-l(a)(l) (West 2008)), one count of first
degree murder intending to do great bodily harm (id.), one count of first degree murder knowing
the act created a strong probability of death (id. § 9-l(a)(2)), and one count of first degree murder
knowing the act created a strong probability of great bodily harm (id.). Following a bench trial,
the trial court found defendant guilty of one count of first degree murder (id.) and sentenced him
to 40 years’ imprisonment.
¶5 Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him,
and the appellate court affirmed. People v. Harrison, 2014 IL App (2d) 120827-U, ¶ 37 (finding
“the trial court properly exercised its judgment in sentencing defendant to 40 years’
imprisonment”).
¶6 While his direct appeal was pending, defendant filed his first postconviction
petition, which the trial court dismissed. Defendant did not appeal that dismissal. Thereafter, the
court denied defendant leave to file two successive postconviction petitions. Defendant appealed
those two denials, and OSAD was appointed as appellate counsel in both appeals. In both appeals,
the appellate court granted OSAD’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s denial of
leave to file the successive postconviction petition. People v. Harrison, No. 2-13-0349 (2014)
(unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)); People v. Harrison, No.
2-17-0610 (2019) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).
¶7 Relevant to this appeal, on January 24, 2022, approximately nine and a half years
after his sentencing, defendant filed a pro se “Motion for resentencing under Bill 2129 (SB 2129)”
in the trial court. The sole substantive assertion of that motion is “Sentencing Judges may at their
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discretion resentence an incarcerated person to a lesser sentence under SB 2129.” (SB 129 (102d
Ill. General Assem., Senate Bill 2129, 2021 Sess.) became Public Act 102-102 (Pub. Act 102-102
(eff. Jan. 1, 2022) (adding 725 ILCS 5/123) and was renumbered in May 2023 as 725 ILCS 5/122-
9.)
¶8 During the hearing on defendant’s motion, the State argued both (i) the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over the case at that point and (ii) because the statute expressly confers the right
to file this type of motion to the local state’s attorney’s office only, defendant did not have standing
to file such a motion on his own behalf. The court held it lacked jurisdiction to entertain
defendant’s motion, effectively dismissing it.
¶9 Defendant appeals from that dismissal. This court appointed OSAD to represent
defendant on appeal. OSAD now moves to withdraw on the basis any argument the trial court erred
in dismissing defendant’s motion would be without merit.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 “A timely filed notice of appeal is both jurisdictional and mandatory.” People v.
Hansen, 2011 IL App (2d) 081226, ¶ 6, 952 N.E.2d 82. Here, the final judgment appealed from,
namely the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s pro se motion for a reduction in his sentence, was
entered on April 21, 2022. On April 29, 2022, he filed a pro se notice of appeal with the clerk of
the circuit court of Winnebago County. Defendant’s notice of appeal was timely under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021).
¶ 12 Counsel for OSAD asserts he (1) read the record on appeal, (2) reviewed the facts
and applicable law, and (3) discussed the case with another attorney. OSAD concludes an appeal
in this case would be without arguable merit. Specifically, OSAD argues even if the trial court had
jurisdiction to substantively consider defendant’s motion, defendant did not have standing to file
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this particular motion on his own behalf. According to OSAD, there is “no nonfrivolous argument”
that can be made on appeal. We granted defendant leave to file additional points and authorities,
and he has responded. For the reasons that follow, we agree this appeal presents no meritorious
claims, grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 13 At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the State argued both the trial court lacked
jurisdiction and a defendant does not have standing to file a motion for reduction of sentence
pursuant to section 122-9 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act). 725 ILCS 5/122-9 (West
2022). OSAD notes on appeal that even if the court had jurisdiction to take up defendant’s motion,
section 122-9 “is very clear” defendant lacks statutory standing to petition for such relief. It is
well-established that “we review the trial court’s judgment, not its reasoning, and we may sustain
the judgment on any basis in the record.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Brown, 2022 IL App (4th)
220171, ¶ 9; see In re Estate of Funk, 221 Ill. 2d 30, 86, 849 N.E.2d 366, 397 (2006) (“A reviewing
court may sustain the decision of a lower court on any grounds which are called for by the record
regardless of whether the lower court relied on the grounds and regardless of whether that court’s
reasoning was correct.”). Thus, we need only consider the standing issue in the context of
defendant’s section 122-9 motion to resolve defendant’s appeal.
¶ 14 In order to resolve the standing claim, we must interpret section 122-9 of the Act.
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of legislature. People v.
Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 13, 986 N.E.2d 1185. “The most reliable indicator of legislative intent
is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “We may not, under the
guise of statutory interpretation, supply omissions, remedy defects, annex new provisions,
substitute different provisions, exceptions, limitations or conditions, or otherwise change the law
so as to depart from the language employed [by the legislature].” (Internal quotation marks
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omitted.) People v. Lewis, 361 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1013, 838 N.E.2d 996, 1002 (2005). Matters of
statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review. People v. Davison, 233 Ill.
2d 30, 40, 906 N.E.2d 545, 551 (2009).
¶ 15 Section 122-9, entitled “Motion to resentence by the People,” provides, in relevant
part, the following:
“(a) The purpose of sentencing is to advance public safety through
punishment, rehabilitation, and restorative justice. By providing a means to
reevaluate a sentence after some time has passed, the General Assembly intends to
provide the State’s Attorney and the court with another tool to ensure that these
purposes are achieved.
(b) At any time upon the recommendation of the State’s Attorney of the
county in which the defendant was sentenced, the State’s Attorney may petition the
sentencing court or the sentencing court’s successor to resentence the offender if
the original sentence no longer advances the interests of justice. The sentencing
court or the sentencing court’s successor may resentence the offender if it finds that
the original sentence no longer advances the interests of justice.” (Emphases
added.) 725 ILCS 5/122-9(a), (b) (West 2022).
¶ 16 Section 122-9(b) plainly provides the state’s attorney alone with the authority to
file a motion to resentence. It confers no such authority on a defendant. As our supreme court has
explained, “[t]here is common-law standing, which requires an injury in fact to a legally
recognized interest [citation], and there is statutory standing, which requires the fulfillment of
statutory conditions to sue for legislatively created relief. [Citation.]” People v. Johnson, 2021 IL
125738, ¶ 31, 182 N.E.3d 728. “Proceedings instituted under the Act implicate statutory standing
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principles.” Id. ¶ 32. By virtue of the plain language of section 122-9(b), which confers on the
state’s attorney alone the ability to file a motion thereunder, a defendant cannot satisfy the statutory
conditions to pursue this legislatively created relief and, thus, is without the necessary statutory
standing to do so. As defendant clearly lacked statutory authority to file a section 122-9 motion
for resentencing on his own behalf, we agree with OSAD that any argument on appeal to the
contrary would be without merit.
¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw as counsel and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 19 Affirmed.
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