Wilson v. Scott , 2023 IL App (3d) 220241-U ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 220241-UOrder filed June 26, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
CATHY BEDOYA WILSON, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Du Page County, Illinois.
)
v. ) Appeal No. 3-22-0241
) Circuit No. 19-L-1045
CAITLYN R . SCOTT, )
) The Honorable
Defendant-Appellee. ) Robert W. Rohm,
) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Brennan and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: We uphold the jury verdict entered for the defendant in this personal
injury case because the evidence adduced at trial did not support the
giving of the second paragraph of revised Illinois civil IPI 15.01
addressing sole proximate cause and the jury’s verdict was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence, manifestly inadequate or unfair. In
addition, the plaintiff failed to surmount the high bar required to merit the
entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
¶2 The plaintiff, Cathy Bedoya Wilson, and the defendant, Caitlyn R. Scott, were involved
in a car accident that Wilson alleged aggravated her preexisting injuries. Wilson filed a personal
injury complaint against Scott, who admitted that her negligence caused the accident but denied
that Wilson’s alleged damages were caused by the collision. At trial, the court declined Wilson’s
request that the jury be given the long form of the revised jury instruction on proximate cause,
and the jury returned a verdict for defendant Scott. After her posttrial motion was denied, Wilson
filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the propriety of the jury instruction on proximate
cause and asserting that the jury’s verdict did not comport with the evidence adduced at trial.
Based on our review of the trial record, we affirm the verdict.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In September 2019, Wilson filed a tort complaint against Scott in the Du Page County
circuit court. The complaint alleged that Wilson suffered personal and pecuniary injuries as the
result of a car accident in Downers Grove, Illinois, on September 20, 2017, when Scott made a
negligent left turn into her vehicle. At the time of the accident, Wilson was 75 years old. In
Scott’s amended answer, she admitted liability in causing the accident but disputed the claim that
her negligence was the direct and proximate cause of Wilson’s alleged injuries.
¶5 Although Wilson declined hospital treatment immediately after the accident, she went to
the emergency room later that evening. When called to testify in Wilson’s case-in-chief, Scott
described the collision as a “very hard” impact that caused both airbags to deploy in her car and
her windshield to crack. She admitted that both cars were rendered undriveable and had to be
towed from the scene. When defense counsel later recalled Scott to testify, she recounted Wilson
being visibly upset after the accident, pacing and pointing her finger. Scott stated that Wilson
never indicated that she was injured at the scene of the accident.
¶6 Wilson’s primary care physician, Dr. Umang Patel, also testified. Wilson had been his
patient since at least 2004. Dr. Patel testified that when he saw Wilson on October 13, 2017, she
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told him she had been in a car accident and was experiencing headaches on both sides of her
head, as well as severe neck and back pain. He observed muscle tenderness in her neck, back,
and shoulders, tightness in her neck, upper and lower back muscles, straightening of her cervical
spine that indicated spasms in her neck muscles, and tender trapezius muscles on both sides. In
his opinion, the accident caused Wilson to suffer a concussion, and a sprain of her neck, thoracic
spine, and lumbar spine. He believed that the trauma from the accident could have caused pain
by aggravating Wilson’s age-related degenerative disc disease. In December, Wilson was seen
by one of Dr. Patel’s partners, who noted that she continued to suffer from headaches and to
have severe neck and back pain.
¶7 Dr. Patel testified that prior to the accident in June 2017, Wilson reported joint pain, and
pain in her shoulder and chest wall, back, and neck due to a fall from her bed in July 2016. After
that fall, she reported lower back pain that extended down her left leg when sitting and standing,
as well as tingling in her leg. She also reported pain on the left side of her neck, head, and back
that radiated into her left arm during the two months preceding her June 2017 appointment. She
was unable to sleep on her left side and could not turn her head, lift groceries, or read at that
time. Dr. Patel diagnosed her with non-severe cervical radicular pain and lumbar radicular pain
and referred her to physical therapy that began in mid-August 2017; her last physical therapy
session was August 31.
¶8 After the collision the following month, Dr. Patel again referred Wilson to physical
therapy for treatment of her low back pain, trouble walking and other gait abnormalities, and
sprains of the ligaments on her cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine. That treatment began on
October 23 and ended on January 2, 2018. Dr. Patel concluded that to a reasonable degree of
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medical certainty, the car accident caused Wilson’s back and neck pain to worsen and also
caused her headaches, concussion, and neck and back pain.
¶9 Wilson’s physical therapist testified that her complaints before and after the car accident
differed. Before the accident, she had pain in the left side of her neck, head, and upper back that
radiated down her left arm. After the collision, she reported neck and back pain, bilateral
shoulder pain, pain when sitting, standing, and bending over. She also stated that she could not
lay on her back and had pain whenever she moved her neck. During her last physical therapy
session after the car accident, Wilson showed improvement but still experienced pain in her right
upper back and right lateral side, and tightness in various muscles located in her neck and upper
back. She demonstrated reduced mobility in her lower back and pelvis, especially on the right
side, decreased cervical and lumbar extension, and other deviations in her pelvis and upper trunk.
Wilson was again referred for physical therapy that began on August 10, 2020, and ended on
October 19. At that time, she attributed her need for therapy to the car accident, not to her 2016
fall out of bed.
¶ 10 Wilson’s daughter, Katherine Craff, testified about her mother’s activity level before and
after the collision. She stated that prior to the crash, they went shopping together and that her
mother was very active. After Wilson’s husband unexpectedly passed away from a stroke a week
after her car accident, Katherine stayed with Wilson for the next year. During that time, Wilson
complained of pain throughout her body, trouble sleeping, and difficulties with bending, sitting,
and prolonged standing. In the month after the car accident, Katherine noticed a reduction in her
mother’s activity level. Wilson did not do as much gardening due to pain while bending, and she
suffered from headaches and back pain. Craff reported that Wilson’s pain continued at the time
of trial and that Wilson took Tylenol to sleep. Her energy level and interest in activities she had
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previously enjoyed, such as gardening, cooking, and cleaning, diminished, which frustrated
Wilson.
¶ 11 Another of Wilson’s adult children, Leslie Covarrubias, testified that she and Wilson
often went shopping, attended parties, gardened, and worked on projects, such as installing
mosaic tile on a patio, before the car accident. Wilson had also previously vacationed at Leslie’s
Michigan cottage with her. Overall, Wilson was very active and energetic in 2016. After falling
out of bed that year, Wilson took Tylenol for some soreness but did not stop participating in
activities she had always enjoyed. Her soreness and pain continued into August 2017, a month
before the accident.
¶ 12 After the car accident, Wilson called Leslie and asked to be picked up because her car
could not be driven. Leslie noticed that her mother was not herself and seemed a little confused.
Before Wilson’s car was towed, Leslie helped her transfer items into Leslie’s vehicle. Leslie then
drove her mother home and returned to work. After work, she visited Wilson, who was in pain,
with strong headaches, neck pain, body aches, and dizziness. Because Leslie thought that her
mother was not acting like herself, she took Wilson to the emergency room, where they were told
she had a concussion.
¶ 13 Subsequently, Wilson did not cook as much and had to hire someone to help with her
gardening. Because long car rides hurt Wilson’s back and caused her legs to become numb, she
did not go to Leslie’s Michigan cottage very often after the collision. At the time of trial, Wilson
reported pain in her sacrum and neck and was unable to lift her arm high or to put it behind her
back. Due to those limitations, Wilson had trouble showering and dressing and was unable to do
activities she had normally done, making her life more difficult.
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¶ 14 Wilson’s sister, Consuelo Bedoya-Witt, also testified, stating that she visited Wilson the
day after the accident and observed her in a great deal of pain in her neck and shoulder. After
Wilson’s husband suffered a stroke, Wilson cared for him despite being in pain. Prior to the
collision, Consuelo saw her sister two to three times each week. She stated that Wilson had
always been extremely active before the collision and maintained beautiful vegetable and flower
gardens, activities she could not do after the accident. At the time of trial, Wilson had limited
movement and was afraid of falling and driving.
¶ 15 Wilson took the stand and testified that she was injured when she fell out of bed in July
2016, hurting her head and neck and causing general pain in her body. She was still able to
perform her usual activities, cooking, cleaning, and gardening, however, and would take Tylenol
when needed for pain. Due to her injuries, Wilson was in physical therapy a month before the car
crash.
¶ 16 Wilson described the impact during the collision as “hard,” alternately pushing her body
left and right against her seatbelt. Because her car could not be driven, she called her daughter
Leslie to take her home. Once at home, Wilson began to have significant pain in her neck,
shoulders, and back, and her entire body hurt. She started to have a bad headache and felt dizzy,
with nausea and blurred vision. Due to those symptoms, Leslie took her to the emergency room
that night, where she underwent a CT scan, was told that she had a concussion, and was given
Tylenol for pain. She described the pain as different from what she experienced after falling out
of bed the year before. Her post-accident pain was worse, requiring her to take strong Tylenol,
which made her sleepy. After the crash, she had worse pain in her shoulder, neck, and on the
back of her head and felt disabled. She disliked losing her former independence and needing to
depend on others for help. She described standing as being “bad” and causing tingling down her
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leg and a “sore behind.” She also experienced more soreness in her head and shoulder after the
collision and could no longer move around as she had previously done.
¶ 17 During the jury instruction conference, Wilson’s counsel offered the long form of civil
instruction No. 15.01 on proximate causation (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 15.01
(approved August 2021) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01)). Scott objected to the long
form, arguing that the committee comments made “it clear that the second paragraph should only
be used when there is evidence tending to show the conduct of the defendant was not the
proximate cause of the occurrence. And the conduct of third persons or outside instrumentalities
was the proximate cause of the occurrence.” Because no third parties were at issue, defense
counsel argued that the second paragraph of the instruction should be omitted. The trial court
agreed and gave the jury only the first paragraph of IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01.
¶ 18 During closing arguments, Wilson’s counsel requested damages of $80,000, and Scott’s
counsel argued that her negligence was not the proximate cause of Wilson’s injuries. After the
jury returned a verdict for Scott, Wilson filed a posttrial motion asking the trial court to vacate
the judgment and hold a new trial on the issue of damages because the verdict was against the
manifest weight of the evidence and manifestly erroneous. Alternatively, she requested judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.), contending that the evidence and the reasonable
inferences from it so overwhelmingly favored Wilson that no contrary verdict could stand, even
when viewed in a light most favorable to Scott. Steed v. Rezin Orthopedics & Sports Medicine,
2021 IL 125150. Wilson also asserted that the trial court erred by denying her request for the
long form of IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01. The trial court denied the motion, and Wilson filed a
timely notice of appeal.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 20 Wilson raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to give the
jury the long form of the proximate cause instruction that was proffered by Wilson; (2) whether
the verdict for Scott was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) whether Wilson’s
posttrial request for judgment n.o.v. should have been granted; and (4) whether the verdict was
manifestly inadequate or unfair. We turn first to the issue of whether it was error to give the jury
the short form of IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01 on proximate cause. To be clear, the parties’
arguments on proximate cause address only the question of whether Wilson satisfied her burden
of proving that Scott’s negligence was the proximate cause of Wilson’s enhanced injuries.
Because Scott admitted that her negligence was the proximate cause of the collision, that issue
was not before the jury at trial and is not an issue currently pending before this court.
¶ 21 A. IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01
¶ 22 The trial court has discretion to determine whether a requested civil jury instruction may
be properly given. Consequently, we review that determine for an abuse of the court’s discretion.
Hobart v. Shin, 185 Ill. 2d 283, 294 (1998). To be given to the jury, a proffered instruction must
be supported by some evidence, however slight, insubstantial, or unpersuasive. Heastie v.
Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 543 (2007). On appeal, we consider whether, when read as a whole, the
jury instructions both fairly and correctly state the applicable law and are not misleading. Dillon
v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505 (2002).
¶ 23 Here, Wilson requested that the jurors receive the long form of IPI Civil (2021) No.
15.01, an instruction that combines the previous version of IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01 with the
proximate cause instructions formerly found in civil jury instructions Nos. 12.04 and 12.05
(Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos. 12.04, 12.05 (2000) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2000)
8
Nos. 12.04 and 12.05)). After being merged into revised IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01 in August
2021, IPI Civil (2000) Nos. 12.04 and 12.05 were withdrawn from use.
¶ 24 As applicable here, the long form of IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01 states:
“15.01 Proximate Cause—Definition and Use
When I use the expression ‘proximate cause,’ I mean a cause that,
in the natural or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff’s injury.
It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if
it combines with another cause resulting in the injury.
If you decide that the defendant was negligent and that her
negligence was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, it is not a
defense that something else may also have been a cause of the injury.
However, if you decide that the defendant’s conduct was not a proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injury, then your verdict should be for the
defendant.” IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01.
At trial, Scott objected to Wilson’s request for the long form of the instruction, arguing that it
was inapplicable under the relevant facts and arguments. The trial court agreed, concluding that
the second paragraph of the instruction explained the principle of sole proximate causation, an
issue that was “not even an argument” in the case.
¶ 25 Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that Wilson “claims that she was injured and
sustained damages. The defendant denies both that any claimed act or omission on her part was a
proximate cause of her claimed injuries” and “that the plaintiff was injured or sustained damages
to the extent claimed.” The jury received the following explanation of “proximate cause”:
9
“[w]hen I use the expression ‘proximate cause,’ I mean in the–that cause
which in the natural or ordinary course of events produced the plaintiff's
injury. It need not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. *** It is
sufficient if it combines with another cause resulting in the injury.”
¶ 26 Finally, the jurors were told that:
“The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions: First, that she was injured. Second, that the negligence of the
defendant was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. If you find
from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions
has been proved, then your verdict shall be for the plaintiff.
On the other hand, if you find from your consideration of all the
evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then your
verdict shall be for the defendant.
Again, the defendant admits that she was negligent. You need only
decide whether that negligence was a proximate cause of injuries to the
plaintiff. And if so, what amount of money will reasonably and fairly
compensate the plaintiff for those injuries.”
¶ 27 Before this court, Scott repeats her claim that the second paragraph of IPI Civil (2021)
No. 15.01 is inapplicable, maintaining that it is used only “when there are potential joint
tortfeasors and at the time of trial only one tortfeasor is a defendant. This scenario arises when
there are multiple defendants and prior to trial a settlement is reached with all but one
defendant.” Because the instant case involves only one alleged tortfeasor, Scott claims that the
trial court properly declined to give the second paragraph of the instruction. She notes that the
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sole issue at trial “was whether the accident aggravated a pre-existing condition,” a matter that
did not involve “a non-party who was potentially at fault.”
¶ 28 Revised IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01 was adopted in August 2021, leading to a paucity of
decisions interpreting it. The most recent “Notes on Use” and Committee Comments to the
instruction, however, provide critical guidance for us on its intent and usage. As the Notes state:
“This instruction in its entirety should be used when there is
evidence of a concurring or contributing cause to the injury or death. ***
The second paragraph should be used only where there is evidence
tending to show that the conduct of the defendant[s] was not a proximate
cause of the occurrence and the conduct of third persons or outside
instrumentalities was the proximate cause of the occurrence.” (Emphases
added.) IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01 (Notes on Use, revised October 2021).
¶ 29 The Committee Comments also address the proper application of the second paragraph of
revised IPI 15.01, stating:
“The second paragraph in this instruction merges the concepts
previously conveyed in IPI 12.04 and 12.05 and combines those concepts
into one proximate cause instruction because ‘Nomenclature aside, the
sole proximate cause theory is simply one way a defendant argues that the
plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proof on proximate cause –
specifically, by arguing that the negligence of another person or entity, not
a party to the lawsuit, was the only proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries.’ Douglas v. Arlington Park Racecourse, LLC, 2018 IL App (1st)
162962, ¶ 36. As such, ‘sole proximate cause’ is not an affirmative
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defense. Leonardi v. Loyola University, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 101 (1995).
Ultimately, the jury is charged with discerning whether plaintiff has
carried its burden, not whether the defense has negated said proof.
The second paragraph in this instruction instructs the jury that
‘[w]here a person is guilty of the negligence charged against him, it is no
defense that some other person, or thing, contributed to bring about the
results for which the damages are claimed.’ [Citations.]” (Emphases
added.) IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01 (Comments, revised October 2021)
(citing cases).
¶ 30 In applying these guidelines, we recognize the distinction they draw between references
to the “occurrence,” as discussed in the Notes, and the “injury” or “results for which the damages
are claimed,” as discussed in the Comments. In her complaint, Wilson alleged that Scott’s
negligence caused the collision that resulted in her “sustain[ing] injuries of a personal and
pecuniary nature.” Here, the “occurrence” was undoubtedly the collision between the parties’
vehicles, for which Scott admits responsibility. Wilson’s complaint also broadly alleged the
“injury” or “results for which the damages are claimed” as her personal and pecuniary injuries.
At trial, Wilson offered evidence that she now alleges established the personal injuries she
incurred consisted of headaches and enhanced neck and back pain, resulting in a loss of her
normal life.
¶ 31 Substituting those allegations into the Notes of Use and Comments yields the following:
“This instruction in its entirety should be used when there is
evidence of a concurring or contributing cause to the [headaches and
enhanced neck and back pain Wilson alleged]. *** The second paragraph
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should be used only where there is evidence tending to show that the
conduct of [Scott] was not a proximate cause of the [collision] and the
conduct of third persons or outside instrumentalities was the proximate
cause of the [collision].” (Emphases added.) See IPI Civil (2021) No.
15.01 (Notes on Use, revised October 2021).
Moreover, the relevant Comment would read:
“The second paragraph in this instruction merges the concepts previously
conveyed in IPI 12.04 and 12.05 and combines those concepts into one
proximate cause instruction because ‘Nomenclature aside, the sole
proximate cause theory is simply one way a defendant argues that the
plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proof on proximate cause –
specifically, by arguing that the negligence of another person or entity, not
a party to the lawsuit, was the only proximate cause of the [headaches and
enhanced neck and back pain Wilson alleged].’ ***
The second paragraph in this instruction instructs the jury that
‘[w]here a person is guilty of the negligence charged against him, it is no
defense that some other person, or thing, contributed to bring about the
[headaches and enhanced neck and back pain Wilson alleged].’ ***.”
(Emphases added.) See IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01 (Comments, revised
October 2021) (citing cases).
¶ 32 Applying the Notes to the facts of the instant case, giving the long form of revised IPI
15.01 was permissible if the evidence showed that Wilson’s alleged injuries were due to “a
concurring or contributing cause” outside of Scott’s admitted negligence. Moreover, the crucial
13
second paragraph of that instruction is used “only” if “there is evidence tending to show that the
conduct of [Scott] was not a proximate cause of the [collision] and the conduct of third persons
or outside instrumentalities was the proximate cause of the [collision].” Because nothing in the
evidentiary record suggests that a factor outside of Scott’s negligence concurrently caused or
contributed to the alleged aggravation of Wilson’s preexisting conditions or tends to show that a
third party was the sole proximate cause of the collision, the Notes on Use supports the trial
court’s denial of the long form of IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01.
¶ 33 In our view, the relevant Committee Comments also support the denial of the long form
of that instruction. As those Comments apply here, giving the second paragraph of IPI Civil
(2021) No. 15.01 was permissible only if Scott had argued “ ‘that some other person, or thing,
contributed to bring about the’ ” aggravated injuries alleged by Wilson. See IPI Civil (2021) No.
15.01 (Comments, revised October 2021) (citing cases). Scott never argued, however, that a third
party’s conduct caused the aggravation of Wilson’s preexisting injuries. Instead, she argued that
Wilson failed to sustain her burden of proving that she suffered any aggravation of her pre-
existing injuries after the collision.
¶ 34 After applying the guidance offered by the relevant Notes of Use and Committee
Comments, we hold that the facts and parties’ argument did not support Wilson’s request for the
long form of IPI Civil (2021) No. 15.01. We affirm the trial court’s refusal to give the jury that
instruction.
¶ 35 B. The Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 36 Wilson next challenges the propriety of the jury’s verdict for Scott, arguing that it was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reviewing that challenge, we must consider
14
whether the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the jury’s verdict is unreasonable, arbitrary,
and not rooted in the trial evidence. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992).
¶ 37 Here, Scott admitted liability for the collision by acknowledging that her negligence
caused the accident. She denied, however, that her negligence was the proximate cause of
Wilson’s injuries and damages. Because Wilson maintained at trial that the collision aggravated
her preexisting injuries, the jury was given Illinois civil jury instruction 30.21 (Illinois Pattern
Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 30.21 (2000) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2000) No. 30.21), addressing the
aggravation of preexisting conditions. That instruction states:
“If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you may
not deny or limit the plaintiff’s right to damages resulting from this
occurrence because any injury resulted from an aggravation of a pre-
existing condition or a pre-existing condition which rendered the plaintiff
more susceptible to injury.” IPI Civil (2000) No. 30.21.
¶ 38 Wilson now argues that, by submitting a verdict for Scott, the jurors ignored both that
instruction and the objective evidence of her injuries presented at trial. She specifically cites only
Dr. Patel’s testimony that she suffered from neck spasms, as indicated by the straightening of her
cervical spine, and a concussion due to the collision.
¶ 39 When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is necessarily limited. The
jury alone is tasked with resolving evidentiary conflicts, assessing the witnesses’ credibility, and
weighing the evidence admitted at trial. Accordingly, a reviewing court “should not usurp the
function of the jury and substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and
determined from the evidence which did not greatly preponderate either way.” Maple, 151 Ill. 2d
at 452-53.
15
¶ 40 Here, the evidence admitted at trial shows significant overlap between the injuries
underlying the need for Wilson’s physical therapy sessions in August 2017, a month before the
car accident, and the sessions she undertook a month after that accident. In both instances,
Wilson suffered various types of neck, shoulder, and back pain. Her focus at trial was on how the
collision aggravated the preexisting conditions she had suffered due to her 2016 fall from bed.
During closing arguments, Wilson’s counsel explained to the jury how the collision was the
proximate cause of those enhanced injuries by analogizing to a procession of dominos:
“So the cause of the fall of the third domino is the second domino.
The cause of the fall of the second domino, is the first domino. The cause
of the fall with the first domino is the push of the finger. Proximate cause.
What do we have. We have a person who is susceptible to injury or
already has an existing injury and then the crash comes along, the finger,
and pushes that. It pushes a previously injured person and then it pushes a
back injury and it pushes a neck injury, and it pushes a shoulder injury. It
is the proximate cause.”
¶ 41 Wilson’s closing argument also emphasized the jury instruction on the aggravation of
preexisting conditions, reiterating that “[i]f you decide for the plaintiff on the question of
liability, you may not deny or limit the plaintiff's right to damages resulting from the occurrence
because any injury resulted from an aggravation of a pre-existing condition or a pre-existing
condition which rendered the plaintiff more susceptible to injury.” Wilson’s counsel then
reminded the jurors of Dr. Patel’s testimony on direct examination that stated the car accident
caused Wilson to suffer headache, a concussion, neck pain, and back pain. Counsel recounted
how those injuries resulted in Wilson returning to physical therapy, adding that “going through
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physical therapy is not a pleasant thing.” Counsel asserted that Wilson’s normal life has been
disrupted as a result of the accident and that she must now live with a permanently reduced level
of activity.
¶ 42 For her part, Scott’s closing argument emphasized the similarities between Wilson’s pre-
and post-accident injuries, citing notations in Wilson’s physical therapy records showing that
both before and after the collision, her
“pain level is the same exact number, 8 out of 10. This is before the
accident and this is after the accident. That is the baseline. There is no
aggravation. *** By the time she got to the therapist in October 2017,
after this accident, her disability index numbers went down. And what do
we know about that? The lower the number, the better she is.”
¶ 43 After summarizing the evidence elicited about Wilson’s personality and level of activity,
Scott’s counsel also asserted that her “[l]ife did not change because of this accident. She is too
independent, too active for anything she would allow for that to change.” Defense counsel also
recounted Dr. Patel’s testimony on cross-examination that he had never placed any restrictions
on Wilson or her physical activities. Counsel reminded the jury of Dr. Patel’s statement that he
could not “say or connect the accident to the complaint [Wilson] came to see me in 2020. What
does that mean? That means that the physical therapy that she went back to in 2020 Dr. Patel
can't connect, either. And that is part of the proximate cause issue, the aggravation issue.”
¶ 44 Finally, near the end of her closing argument, Scott’s counsel recapped Wilson’s burden
of proof to demonstrate proximate cause:
“As I told you early in the beginning of this trial, the plaintiff has
the burden of proof to prove two things and both of those things. If he fails
17
to prove one of them, you need to return a verdict in favor of the
defendant.
Now, I will repeat that. If the plaintiff fails to prove one of the
elements, you must return a verdict for the defendant.
He has to prove that his client was negligent—or was injured. And
the last part, he has to prove that that injury resulted [from] defendant's
negligence, okay? And that is where the proximate cause issue discussion
comes.
So keep that in mind when you're looking at the totality of the
evidence here from the witness stand and the video depositions that we
presented to you.”
Scott reiterated that the jurors “do not get to the aggravation issue until you resolve the
proximate cause issue.”
¶ 45 The jury was undoubtedly entitled to weigh the evidence and the reasonable
inferences that flowed from it, as well as the credibility of the witnesses. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at
452-53. Contrary to Wilson’s assertion that the verdict in favor of Scott was necessarily due to
the jury ignoring the evidence establishing that the accident had exacerbated her preexisting
injuries, its verdict could also be supported by the conclusion that Wilson had failed to satisfy
her burden of proving proximate cause. The latter possibility is particularly crucial here because
both parties emphasized the importance of proximate cause to the jury.
¶ 46 After reviewing the evidence adduced at trial as well as the parties’ arguments, we
cannot say that the verdict for Scott is either unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
evidence or that the opposite verdict is clearly evident. See Maple,151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992)
18
(explaining the manifest weight standard of review). We are not entitled to usurp the jury’s
province of assessing the credibility of the witnesses, resolving evidentiary conflicts, and
weighing the evidence by substituting our own judgment. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452. Accordingly,
we are not persuaded by Wilson’s claim that the verdict for Scott was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 47 C. Judgment N.O.V.
¶ 48 Next, Wilson argues that the trial court should have granted her posttrial motion for
judgment n.o.v. because “[t]he evidence and inferences, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the defendant, so overwhelmingly favor the plaintiff that no contrary verdict could ever stand,”
citing Steed, 2021 IL 125150. Wilson contends that she had met her burden of proving that
Scott’s negligence was both the legal cause and the cause-in-fact of the car crash that resulted in
her injuries and that the jury improperly ignored Dr. Patel’s testimony about the scope of those
injuries. Thus, the trial court erred by denying her motion for judgment n.o.v.
¶ 49 Having already concluded that the verdict for Scott was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence and could be properly premised on the jurors’ rejection of Wilson’s claim that
her injuries were proximately caused by the car accident, we must also reject this argument.
Because Scott prevailed with the jury, we must view the trial evidence in the light most favorable
to Scott. Viewed in that light, the evidence did not so overwhelmingly favor Wilson that no
verdict for Scott could ever stand.
¶ 50 D. Manifestly Inadequate or Unfair Verdict
¶ 51 Finally, Wilson asserts that because the evidence of her pain and disability from the
collision was unrebutted and uncontroverted, the jury improperly ignored the proof of her
damages and incorrectly applied the law on proximate cause, resulting in a manifestly inadequate
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and unfair verdict. In support, she relies primarily on three Illinois appellate cases, Obszanski v.
Foster Wheeler Construction, Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d 550 (2002); Torres v. Irving Press, Inc., 303
Ill. App. 3d 151 (1999); and Blevins v. Inland Steel Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 286 (1989).
¶ 52 In Obszanski., 328 Ill. App. 3d at 552, the jury awarded the plaintiff damages for present
and future pain and suffering, as well as for medical expenses and lost earnings, but denied
damages for the plaintiff’s alleged disability. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that the
evidence of the plaintiff’s disability and present and future pain and suffering was
uncontroverted, making the jury’s failure to award any damages for disability contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence. The court noted that a new trial may be granted if a damage
award is manifestly inadequate or bears no relationship to the loss suffered, or if it ignores
damages that were proven at trial. Id. at 554-55.
¶ 53 Similarly, in Torres, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 152, the plaintiff was awarded $405,000 in
damages for pain and suffering, medical expenses, and lost wages for both the past and the future
but was not awarded damages for loss of a normal life. On appeal, the appellate court held that
the jury ignored unrebutted evidence of the plaintiff’s loss of normal life. Accordingly, the denial
of the plaintiff’s posttrial motion asserting that error was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion,
and the appellate court reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. Id. at 161-62.
¶ 54 The appellate court in Blevins, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 291, also reversed a verdict and
remanded the cause for a new trial on damages after it found that no competent evidence was
offered to rebut the plaintiff’s calculation of his lost wages. “[H]ence, the jury was not free to
disregard its instruction to consider all elements of damages.” Id.
¶ 55 After reviewing those decisions, we conclude that they are factually distinguishable from
this case. In each case, the jury awarded at least some damages to the plaintiff, implicitly
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signaling its conclusion that the plaintiff’s damages had been proximately caused by the
defendant. Here, however, the jury did not award any damages to Wilson and, instead, rendered a
verdict for Scott. That verdict is fully consistent with a jury finding that Scott did not
proximately cause Wilson’s alleged damages. Because Wilson failed to establish proximate
cause between her claimed damages and Scott’s negligence, the jury was barred from awarding
Wilson any damages. Thus, unlike the appellate decisions cited by Wilson, this is not a case in
which the jury appeared to selectively ignore elements of the plaintiff’s alleged damages. Here,
the jury’s verdict supports the conclusion that the jury did not believe that Scott was legally
responsible for any of Wilson’s alleged damages. Thus, we reject Wilson’s reliance argument
that the verdict was manifestly inadequate or unfair.
¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.
¶ 58 Affirmed.
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