In re S.J. , 2023 IL App (4th) 230188-U ( 2023 )

NOTICE
This Order was filed under
2023 IL App (4th) 230188-U FILED
July 19, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-23-0188, 4-23-0196 cons. Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re S.J. and B.J., Minors ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 19JA237
v. ) 19JA238
Fredderick W., )
Respondent-Appellant.) ) Honorable
) Karen S. Tharp,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court’s finding that respondent
was unfit on the basis that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibility for the minors’ welfare was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence and (2) the court’s finding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the minors’ best interests was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent, Fredderick W., appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental
rights as to his children, S.J. (born in 2015) and B.J. (born in 2010). Specifically, respondent
argues: (1) the court’s finding that he was unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence
and (2) the court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the
minors was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On December 3, 2019, the State filed petitions alleging S.J. and B.J. were
neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act)
(705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2018)) in that they were not receiving the proper care and
supervision necessary for their well-being in that their mother, Pearlitha J., failed to make a
proper care plan for them. The petitions also alleged S.J. and B.J. were abused under section
2-3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)) in that they were at substantial risk of
physical injury as evidenced by Pearlitha’s abuse of and use of excessive corporal punishment on
their sibling. On March 12, 2020, the minors were adjudicated neglected. On June 24, 2020,
dispositional orders were entered finding the minors’ parents unfit, unable, or unwilling to care
for them, making them wards of the court, and granting custody and guardianship of them to the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶5 On December 1, 2021, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental
rights as to S.J. The motion alleged respondent was unfit pursuant to section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)) in that he had (1) failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to S.J.’s welfare (id. § 1(D)(b)); (2) abandoned
S.J. (id. § 1(D)(a)); and (3) deserted S.J. for more than three months prior to the filing of the
motion (id. § 1(D)(c)). Respondent was served via abode service on February 7, 2022, and he
entered his appearance in the case on March 3, 2022. The trial court entered orders on July 6,
2022, stating DNA testing had shown respondent was the biological father of S.J. and B.J.
¶6 On July 11, 2022, the State filed a supplemental motion for termination of
respondent’s parental rights as to S.J. and an initial motion for termination of parental rights as to
B.J. The motions alleged respondent was unfit within the meaning of section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)) in that he failed to make reasonable efforts to
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correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minors (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)) and
failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)) during
three specified nine-month periods after the neglect adjudication. The motion to terminate
respondent’s parental rights as to B.J. also alleged respondent (1) failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to B.J.’s welfare (id. § 1(D)(b)); (2) abandoned
B.J. (id. § 1(D)(a)); and (3) deserted B.J. for more than three months prior to the filing of the
motion (id. § 1(D)(c)).
¶7 At the unfitness hearing on January 5, 2023, the trial court took judicial notice of
the court files in Sangamon County case Nos. 19-JA-237 and 19-JA-238. Elizabeth Lerch
testified that she was previously employed by DCFS and was assigned to the minors’ case from
December 2019 until March 2020 and again from July 2020 until May 2021. Lerch was notified
respondent was the putative father of B.J. and S.J. She saw him at a visit, which she believed
occurred in February 2020. She advised respondent he would not be able to attend future visits
until his paternity was established. She discussed with him the importance of establishing his
paternity and how he could do so. He attended another visit in early March 2020 as well. Lerch
let him stay but reiterated he was not allowed to be at the visits because his paternity had not
been established. Later that month, another caseworker was assigned to the case while Lerch was
on maternity leave.
¶8 Lerch testified she was reassigned to the case on July 1, 2020. At that time,
respondent still had not established his paternity. Lerch “reach[ed] out” to respondent and told
him DCFS could make a referral for him to complete DNA testing. She told him they needed to
establish his paternity so he could visit the minors and complete services to regain custody of
them. Respondent told Lerch he was unsure if he wanted to complete paternity testing because
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“he thought it would change things within his life or within his family.” She left the option of
paternity testing open to him if he decided he wanted to do it. At one point, respondent told
Lerch that he did not want to be involved with DCFS and that Pearlitha would do what she
needed to do to regain custody of the minors. Lerch stopped communicating with respondent
after that conversation, but the contact information for DCFS remained the same. Respondent
had not completed paternity testing as of May 2021.
¶9 Jenny Metzroth testified that she was the caseworker assigned to the minors’ case
from March 2020 through June 2020. During that time, she asked respondent to cooperate with
paternity testing, which was the only service being requested of him. A paternity test was
scheduled for early April 2020, but it was rescheduled for late May or June 2020 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Metzroth informed respondent of the initial scheduled test by text
message and of the rescheduled test by sending a letter to the address she had on file for him.
¶ 10 Metzroth was reassigned to the case from May 2021 until May 2022. She
attempted to contact respondent at that time by completing four diligent searches, which all
yielded the same address. She sent letters to that address, but respondent never replied to the
letters. Metzroth stated that, although she initially communicated with respondent via phone calls
and text messages, she lost his phone number when her cell phone broke.
¶ 11 Metzroth testified that she saw respondent in court in March 2022, when the
termination hearing had originally been scheduled. He informed Metzroth that he had not
received her letters because he did not reside at the address where she had sent them. He
indicated the mother of some of his other children resided there, and he received the summons
for the termination hearing because he happened to be at her house when it arrived. Metzroth
testified the contact information for DCFS did not change while she was the caseworker, and
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respondent knew how to contact DCFS. In April 2022, respondent indicated he was willing to
cooperate with paternity testing. He told Metzroth he decided to “step up” when he figured out
Pearlitha was not “going to do what she needed to.”
¶ 12 Rachel Bridges testified that she became the caseworker for the minors’ case in
May 2022. She indicated respondent completed DNA testing on May 31, 2022, and the results
came back showing he was the father of S.J. and B.J. on June 16, 2022. An integrated assessment
was conducted in September 2022, and it was recommended that respondent complete domestic
violence perpetrator services and substance abuse services. DCFS wanted to see respondent
begin to make progress in these services before starting visitation with the minors. Bridges went
on maternity leave in November 2022. At that time, respondent had not engaged in services and
had not had any visits with S.J. and B.J. Bridges stated she believed respondent had not seen S.J.
or B.J. for a year and a half to two years prior to her taking over the case.
¶ 13 The trial court found the State had shown by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to S.J.
and B.J.’s welfare due to his long delay in becoming involved in the case despite having been
told of the importance of completing paternity testing. The court also found the State had shown
respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that brought the children
into care or reasonable progress toward the return of the children during all of the nine-month
periods alleged in the termination motion. The court did not find respondent to be unfit on the
bases of abandonment or desertion.
¶ 14 The trial court held a best interests hearing on March 2, 2023. Pursuant to the
State’s request, the court took judicial notice of the court file and the testimony provided during
the unfitness hearing. Metzroth testified that that, between March 2020 and June 2020, B.J. was
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placed in several different fictive kin foster placements due to behavioral disruptions. When the
case was reassigned to Metzroth in May 2021, B.J. was in a residential facility. Metzroth
arranged for B.J. to live with her aunt after leaving the facility, but she was no longer the
caseworker when B.J. left the facility. Metzroth testified S.J. had been with the same fictive kin
placement since December 2019, and she had been able to view S.J. in that placement. S.J.’s
foster parent provided for all her needs, including her medical, educational, social, and religious
needs. S.J.’s two younger sisters resided there as well. S.J. appeared to be very attached to her
foster parent.
¶ 15 Metzroth stated that, when she ceased being the caseworker in May 2022, she
believed termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minors’ best interests. They had
been in foster care for two and a half years at that time, and respondent had just come forward
and expressed an interest in engaging in services. Metzroth did not think it was fair to the minors
to allow them to stay in foster care and wait for a parent who might or might not complete
services. Metzroth indicated she could not “speak to” whether a bond existed between
respondent and the minors because she never had an opportunity to observe them together. She
stated: “Neither [minor] ever spoke to me about him because the entire time I was the
caseworker, he was not visiting or a part of their lives.”
¶ 16 Bridges testified that, once respondent’s paternity was established, he began
having visitation in late November or early December 2022. Respondent had approximately four
to five visits with S.J. and B.J. The records Bridges had reviewed indicated the visits went well.
Bridges testified that, after “going through the history of the case and reading through
everything,” she believed respondent had “in-and-out involvement” in the minors’ lives before
DCFS became involved.
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¶ 17 Bridges testified that S.J. had been residing in the same foster placement since
December 2019, and it had become her home. She was involved in sports, enjoyed school, and
was “thriving.” Bridges stated B.J. was doing “really well” at her placement with her aunt. B.J.
was happy, was enjoying school, and was not exhibiting any of the behavioral problems she had
in the past. Bridges indicated B.J. was the most stable she had been since the beginning of the
case. Both S.J.’s and B.J.’s foster parents had indicated they were willing to provide permanency
for the minors through adoption. Bridges testified that B.J. knew respondent was her father, but
she did not speak about him much. Bridges was not aware of a bond or attachment between S.J.
and respondent. Bridges indicated that both minors wished to stay in their current placements,
and she opined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in their best interests.
¶ 18 Respondent testified he had three visits with S.J. and B.J. in the preceding six
months, and the visits went well. S.J. and B.J. indicated they missed respondent and wanted to
live with him. When asked about his involvement with S.J. and B.J. before DCFS became
involved, respondent indicated he was always “there.” However, he would “coparent from a
distance” when he and Pearlitha were not together. He was not permitted to attend supervised
visits with Pearlitha earlier in the case, but he was sometimes able to speak to the minors via
FaceTime when he was around Pearlitha. Respondent indicated that currently he resided with his
three other children and his “significant other.” S.J. and B.J. had met their three half-siblings
approximately four times before the juvenile case commenced. Respondent indicated he had
suitable housing for S.J. and B.J. and adequate income to support them.
¶ 19 Respondent testified that he did not complete paternity testing right away because
Lerch told him Pearlitha was successfully completing services and that everything would
“basically start over” if he became involved. He did not learn Pearlitha was not successfully
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completing services until he received the summons about the termination proceedings.
Respondent acknowledged he was told he would have to complete paternity testing before he
“could even be considered as a matter in this case.” However, he did not complete paternity
testing because he “felt like DNA being a means to see the children and be a part of their lives
was irrelevant at that moment.”
¶ 20 The trial court stated it had considered all the statutory the best interests factors.
The court noted that S.J. came into care when she was four years old, had been in the same home
for over three years, and was thriving there. The court stated B.J. had been in the same home
since June 2022, and it was the longest she had been in a stable home since she came into care.
The court stated it was “outraged” that respondent thought it was “irrelevant that all that was
asked of him was to do a DNA test.” The court noted that, because respondent refused to do a
DNA test, he went over a year without seeing his children. The court found termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minors. This appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 On appeal, respondent argues: (1) the trial court’s finding that he was unfit was
against the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) the court’s finding that termination of his
parental rights was in the best interests of S.J. and B.J. was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 23 A. Unfitness
¶ 24 Respondent argues the trial court erred by finding he was unfit in that he (1) failed
to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as the minors’ welfare;
(2) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors during the nine-month
periods set forth in the termination motions; and (3) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct
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the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minors during the nine-month periods
set forth in the termination motions. Respondent contends that each of these findings of unfitness
was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 25 A court’s statutory authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is
delineated by the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)) and the Adoption
Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2022)). In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 19. Pursuant to
section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022)), the court must
first find by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is unfit as defined in section 1 of
the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2022)). If the court makes a finding of parental
unfitness, the court then considers whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of
the minor. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022)). See also M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20.
¶ 26 Section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)) sets forth
several grounds for unfitness, each of which provides a discrete basis for a finding of unfitness.
In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 217 (2002). While the State may rely on several grounds in its
termination motion, “a finding adverse to the parent on any one ground is sufficient to support a
subsequent termination of parental rights.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.¶ 27 Pursuant to section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West
2022)), one ground for parental unfitness is “[f]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern or responsibility as to the child’s welfare.” This includes “all situations in which a
parent’s attempts at maintaining a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility are
inadequate, regardless of whether that inadequacy seems to stem from unwillingness or an
inability to comply.” M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 26. The language in section 1(D)(b) is disjunctive
such that “any of its three elements—the failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest or
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concern or responsibility as to the child’s welfare—may be considered on its own as a basis in
determining whether the parent is unfit.” (Emphases in original.) In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App
(1st) 162101, ¶ 24.
¶ 28 In determining whether a parent is unfit under section 1(D)(b), the parent’s
conduct must be considered in the context of circumstances in which it occurred. In re Adoption
of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 278 (1990). A court must “examine the parent’s efforts to communicate
with and show interest in the child, not the success of those efforts.” Id. at 279. However, “a
parent is not fit merely because [he or] she has demonstrated some interest or affection toward
[his or] her child; rather, [his or] her interest, concern and responsibility must be reasonable.”
In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 259 (2004). Noncompliance with an imposed service plan
and infrequent or irregular visitation have been held to warrant a finding of unfitness under
section 1(D)(b). Id.¶ 29 A trial court’s finding of unfitness will not be reversed on review unless it is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21. “A court’s decision
regarding a parent’s fitness is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the
opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.” In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354 (2005).
¶ 30 Here, the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the welfare of the minors was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent’s decision to wait over two years to establish his
paternity so that he could visit his children and participate in services constituted a failure to
maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility for their welfare. The evidence at the unfitness
hearing showed respondent was informed early in the case that he needed to complete paternity
testing before he could attend visits with the minors or participate in services to work toward
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reunification with them. However, respondent indicated that he did not want to be involved with
DCFS and that Pearlitha would do what she needed to do to regain custody of the minors. He
expressed no interest in being involved in the case until March 2022, after receiving a summons
regarding the termination proceedings. He indicated he decided to “step up” at that time because
he determined Pearlitha was not going to do what she needed to do. However, at that point, the
children had been in foster care for over two years, and, according to Bridges’s testimony,
respondent had not seen them for approximately a year and a half to two years.
¶ 31 We reject respondent’s argument that his failure to complete paternity testing was
because the test originally scheduled for April 2020 was rescheduled and he was not advised of
the new date. While Metzroth testified she informed respondent by letter that the test had been
rescheduled for late May or June 2020 and was later told respondent did not receive letters sent
to that address, the record shows respondent’s failure to complete paternity testing in 2020 was
not because he did not receive this letter. Lerch testified that she spoke to respondent after the
case was reassigned to her in July 2020 (after respondent had missed the rescheduled test). At
that time, she offered to make a referral for him to complete paternity testing, and he indicated he
was unsure whether he wanted to do it. He also told Lerch that he did not want to be involved
with DCFS. Moreover, Metzroth and Lerch testified that respondent had the contact information
for DCFS, which did not change during the case. However, respondent did not contact DCFS to
complete paternity testing until over two years after the case commenced.
¶ 32 Because we have found the trial court did not err in finding respondent unfit for
failing to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the children’s
welfare, we need not consider whether he was also unfit based on his failure to make reasonable
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efforts or reasonable progress during the nine-month periods alleged in the termination motions.
See In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 422 (2001).
¶ 33 B. Best Interests
¶ 34 Respondent also argues the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental
rights was in the minors’ best interests was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Respondent contends he was fully capable of providing for the minors’ needs, had suitable
housing and sufficient income to care for the children, was involved in their lives before the
commencement of the juvenile case, and had been having visits with the children that went well.
¶ 35 After a trial court has made a finding that a parent is unfit, the court must then
consider whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the minor. 705 ILCS
405/2-29(2) (West 2022)). See M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20. In making a best interests
determination, the court must consider the following statutory factors:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s
identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural and religious background and ties;
(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity,
continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the
child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s
need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of
relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family
and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the
person available to care for the child.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052,
1072 (2006).
See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022).
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¶ 36 After a finding of unfitness, the focus shifts from the parent to the child. In re
D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). “Accordingly, at a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest
in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving
home life.” Id. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of
parental rights in in the best interest of the minor. Id. at 366. We will not reverse a trial court’s
finding that termination is in the best interest of the minor unless it is against the manifest weight
of the evidence. In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961 (2005).
¶ 37 Here, the trial court’s finding that the State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minors
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record indicates the court considered
the requisite statutory factors in making its determination. The evidence at the best interests
hearing showed that S.J. had been in her foster placement for over three years, was well taken
care of there, and viewed her placement as her home. She was residing with two of her siblings,
and her foster parent was willing to adopt her. The evidence showed B.J. was happy and stable in
her placement with her aunt, which she had been in for approximately nine months at the time of
the best interests hearing. Due to behavioral issues earlier in the case, she had to switch
placements several times and was placed in a residential facility. Bridges testified B.J. was
thriving in her placement with her aunt, who was willing to adopt her. This evidence showed S.J.
and B.J. had strong attachments at their current placements, their current placements provided for
their needs, and their current placements could provide permanence.
¶ 38 While respondent had recently become involved in the case, had begun
participating in services, and had a few visits with the children that had gone well, he previously
had not seen them for over a year due to his failure to complete paternity testing until May 2022.
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Accordingly, his ability to provide permanency for the minors was speculative. Respondent
indicated the children told him they wanted to live with him and that he had always been
involved in their lives before the juvenile case commenced. However, Bridges testified that the
children had expressed that they wished to stay in their current placements. She also testified that
the information she reviewed indicated respondent had “in-and-out involvement” in the minors’
lives before the commencement of the juvenile case. Considering all the evidence at the best
interests hearing and the relevant statutory factors, we conclude the trial court’s finding that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minors’ best interests was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 41 Affirmed.
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