People v. Guise , 2023 IL App (5th) 220655-U ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (5th) 220655-UNOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 08/14/23. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0655
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Macon County.
)
v. ) No. 10-CF-1164
)
MICHAEL D. GUISE, ) Honorable
) Thomas E. Griffith,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Barberis and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where defendant cannot establish cause for failing to raise the issue
earlier—because he had, in fact, done so—nor prejudice because Miller was
inapplicable to him, the circuit court properly denied defendant’s motion for leave
to file a successive postconviction petition. Any argument to the contrary lacks
merit and therefore we grant defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal leave to
withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶2 Defendant, Michael D. Guise, appeals the circuit court’s order denying leave to file a
successive postconviction petition. His appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State
Appellate Defender (OSAD), concluded that a reasonably meritorious argument could not be
raised to support a claim that the circuit court erred in its denial. Accordingly, OSAD filed a motion
to withdraw as counsel along with a supporting memorandum. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987). OSAD notified defendant of its motion, and this court has provided him with
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ample opportunity to respond, but no response was filed. After considering the record on appeal
and OSAD’s supporting brief, we agree this appeal presents no reasonably meritorious issue. Thus,
we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 4, 2010, defendant was charged, by information, with four counts of first degree
murder in violation of sections 9-1(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2008)) and two counts of armed robbery in violation of section 18-
2(a) of the Code (id. § 18-2(a)) following the shooting death of Ishmael Adams on July 30, 2010.
The murder counts against defendant alleged that he personally discharged a handgun, resulting in
Adams’s death. Defendant was 15 years old at the time of the murder.
¶5 On November 7, 2011, the parties presented an agreed disposition. By its terms, defendant
would plead guilty to a new murder charge that eliminated the firearm enhancement and give a
statement under oath at the plea hearing. In return, the State would recommend a sentence of 35
years’ imprisonment and dismiss the other charges against defendant.
¶6 Defendant testified about a plan in which he, Bryain Young, Ryan Walker, and Jonathan
Maclin robbed Adams. Following that statement, the circuit court admonished him of the newly
charged offense and the possible penalties. The court also informed him of the rights he was giving
up by pleading guilty. In both cases, defendant said that he understood. He expressed his desire to
plead guilty and signed a jury waiver. In response to the court’s questioning, defendant said that
he was pleading guilty of his own free will, no one had forced or threatened him, and no one had
promised him anything beyond the terms stated. After the State provided a factual basis, the court
accepted the plea. The court also admonished defendant of his appeal rights.
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¶7 On December 6, 2011, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea which provided
no grounds for the requested withdrawal. Counsel explained in the motion that one of defendant’s
relatives called her saying that defendant wanted to withdraw his plea but provided no details.
Counsel was unable to contact defendant to discuss the motion because he was still at the intake
stage in the Department of Corrections. At a subsequent hearing on June 28, 2012, at which
defendant was not present, counsel told the court that defendant advised her in writing that he no
longer wished to pursue withdrawal of his plea, so counsel withdrew the motion.
¶8 On May 4, 2015, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. He alleged that his plea
was coerced by his public defender, who told him that if he did not plead guilty and was found
guilty after trial, he would get a natural-life sentence. Counsel repeatedly told him it would be hard
to convince a jury he was innocent when his three codefendants were claiming that he killed the
victim. Defendant further alleged that, although he had told his public defender that he wanted to
withdraw the plea, she did not file an appropriate motion.
¶9 The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed,
finding the record supported the conclusion that defendant voluntarily gave up his right to appeal.
People v. Guise, 2017 IL App (4th) 150683-U, ¶ 29.
¶ 10 On November 7, 2019, defendant sought leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
In the accompanying proposed petition, he alleged that: (1) his sentence violated the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11); (2) the Truth in
Sentencing Act (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West 2018)), as applied to him and other similarly
situated juvenile defendants tried as adults, was unconstitutional because it required him to serve
100% of his sentence with no possibility for parole; and (3) his guilty plea with a 35-year sentence
was unconstitutional because he was repeatedly threatened that he could get up to life in prison,
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although new caselaw holds that a prison sentence in excess of 40 years could not be validly
imposed upon a juvenile, except under limited circumstances not present in his case.
¶ 11 In support of the first issue, defendant argued that, in response to Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460 (2012), the legislature passed a statute changing the juvenile sentencing laws (730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-105 (West 2018)), and the circuit court, in violation of Miller and the new sentencing
scheme, did not consider his youth and its attendant circumstances when sentencing him. With
respect to his third claim, defendant argued that the case upon which he was relying, People v.
Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, had not been decided at the time he filed his initial postconviction petition.
¶ 12 The circuit court denied the motion for leave to file. The court found defendant made an
informed decision to accept a 35-year sentence, obviating the need for the court to make a
sentencing decision. The court further noted that, even under the new juvenile sentencing statute,
defendant could still have received a natural-life sentence had the court made certain findings.
Finally, the court observed that defendant’s 35-year sentence was less than the 40 years found to
amount to a de facto life sentence. Defendant appealed and the Fourth District affirmed finding
the trial court “did not fail to exercise its discretion in accepting the agreement, and defendant has
therefore failed to demonstrate Miller [was] applicable to his case.” People v. Guise, 2022 IL App
(4th) 200093-U, ¶ 29.
¶ 13 On June 21, 2022, defendant filed a second motion requesting leave to file a successive
postconviction petition, which is the subject of this appeal. He again claimed that Miller mandated
sentencing courts consider an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before imposing a
lengthy sentence. He asserted “cause” for not raising the issue sooner claiming Miller did not
become law until after his plea was finalized. He further asserted that he suffered prejudice because
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he was denied the benefit of an individualized sentencing hearing and his 35-year sentence
amounted to a de facto life sentence.
¶ 14 The circuit court denied the motion, noting that defendant “ignores the fact that he entered
into a fully negotiated plea agreement (which removes the need for a sentencing hearing),” and
that under applicable caselaw his 35-year sentence was not a de facto life sentence. Defendant
timely appealed.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 OSAD contends no reasonably meritorious argument can be presented to show the circuit
court erred by denying the motion for leave to file. OSAD argues that defendant cannot establish
cause for failing to raise the issue sooner because both Miller and section 5-4.5-105 existed prior
to his first and second petitions and defendant could—and actually did—raise the issue therein.
Moreover, OSAD asserts defendant cannot establish prejudice because his fully negotiated guilty
plea made it unnecessary for the sentencing court to consider the factors required by Miller and,
in any event, defendant’s sentence was not a de facto life sentence.
¶ 17 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)) provides
a mechanism by which a criminal defendant may assert that the conviction resulted from a
substantial denial of constitutional rights. Id. § 122-1(a); People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 253
(2008). “The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition and provides in
section 122-3 (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2014)) that ‘[a]ny claim of substantial denial of
constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.’ ” People v. Bailey,
2017 IL 121450, ¶ 15. A defendant must first obtain leave of court to file a successive petition
which may be granted if the defendant demonstrates cause for the failure to bring the claim in the
initial postconviction proceedings and prejudice resulting from that failure. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)
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(West 2020). “ ‘[C]ause’ in this context refers to any objective factor, external to the defense,
which impeded the petitioner’s ability to raise a specific claim in the initial post-conviction
proceeding.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 462 (2002). Prejudice is shown “where the
defendant can show that the claimed constitutional error so infected his trial that the resulting
conviction violated due process.” People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 154 (2004).
¶ 18 Here, the only “cause” defendant alleged was that Miller was decided after he entered his
guilty plea. However, Miller was issued in 2012, before defendant’s first and second petitions.
Not only could he have raised a Miller issue in those pleadings, but defendant did actually raise a
Miller claim in the second petition. Accordingly, cause cannot be shown.
¶ 19 Further, defendant’s claim that Miller and its progeny require a sentencing court to consider
a defendant’s youth and attendant characteristics before imposing a lengthy sentence ignores the
factual situation in the case at bar. As noted by the circuit court, defendant refused to acknowledge
that his voluntary guilty plea and agreement to a specific sentence eliminated the necessity of a
sentencing hearing at which time the court would have considered such factors.
¶ 20 The basis of the circuit court’s conclusion is found in People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432. In
Jones, our supreme court considered whether a juvenile petitioner’s guilty plea precluded him from
raising a Miller claim. Id. ¶ 14. The court started its analysis noting it was well established that a
defendant’s “ ‘ “voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or irregularities,
including constitutional ones.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 20 (quoting People v.
Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33, quoting People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 545 (2004)).
The court held that “petitioner’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any constitutional
challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law.” Id. ¶ 26.
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¶ 21 Finally, Jones also required the petitioner’s Miller claims to show “that the de facto life
sentence he received was not entered as a result of the trial court’s use of its discretion.” Id. ¶ 27.
The court noted that Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders applied only when the
trial court lacked, or refused to use, discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to a life, or de facto
life, sentence. Id. ¶ 28.
¶ 22 Here, defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea. Further, as found by the appellate
court in defendant’s previous appeal, the trial court “did not fail to exercise its discretion in
accepting the agreement.” Guise, 2022 IL App (4th) 200093-U, ¶ 29. Thus, defendant’s Miller
claim is foreclosed. However, even if the Miller claim was not precluded for these reasons, Miller
is inapplicable because defendant’s 35-year sentence is below the 40-year threshold held to
constitute a de facto life sentence. See People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and
affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 25 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.
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