in Re a R Duvendeck Minor ( 2017 )


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  •                           STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    UNPUBLISHED
    In re A. R. DUVENDECK, Minor.                                        June 15, 2017
    No. 335894
    Ingham Circuit Court
    Family Division
    LC No. 15-000722-NA
    Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and BOONSTRA, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Respondent appeals as of right the circuit court’s order terminating her parental rights to
    the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (g)
    (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm).1 We affirm.
    The child at issue in this case was removed from respondent’s care in June 2015 based on
    allegations of neglect, substance abuse, and unstable housing. Over the next year-and-a-half,
    respondent was provided a variety of services that were intended to improve parenting skills,
    substance abuse issues, social support, and housing and employment situations. However,
    respondent failed to comply with or benefit from those services. There was testimony presented
    that respondent did not find and maintain suitable housing or employment, continued to use
    marijuana, missed several scheduled drug tests, failed to attend substance abuse treatment
    sessions, did not complete parenting coaching sessions, and struggled to adequately parent the
    child during parenting-time sessions. A supplemental petition seeking the termination of her
    parental rights was thus filed in May 2016, and respondent’s parental rights were terminated in
    November 2016. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, respondent first argues that the prosecutor failed to prove, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j)
    because she has consistently made progress throughout this case. Specifically, she claims that
    she completed parenting classes and obtained suitable housing and employment. Next,
    respondent argues that the circuit court erred in finding that termination of parental rights was in
    the child’s best interest because she and the child shared a bond. We disagree in both respects.
    1
    The trial court also terminated the father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii)
    (desertion).
    -1-
    A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it finds that at least one of the
    statutory grounds set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing
    evidence. Petitioner bears the burden of proving at least one statutory ground. MCR
    3.977(A)(3); In re Trejo Minors, 
    462 Mich. 341
    , 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review a trial
    court’s finding that a statutory ground has been established for clear error. In re Rood, 
    483 Mich. 73
    , 91; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has
    a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial
    court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Moss, 
    301 Mich. App. 76
    , 80; 836
    NW2d 182 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    The circuit court terminated respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL
    712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j), which provide as follows:
    (3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the
    court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
    * * *
    (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
    chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
    dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either
    of the following:
    (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
    no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
    time considering the child’s age.
    * * *
    (g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or
    custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
    able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the
    child’s age.
    * * *
    (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
    the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the
    home of the parent.
    In this case, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the
    circuit court’s decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights under all three statutory
    sections, specifically MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The caseworker testified that respondent lived at
    approximately ten different locations throughout the pendency of this case and that those
    locations were not suitable for a child. In fact, respondent continued to reside in some of those
    locations despite the existence of ongoing domestic violence issues with new boyfriends. There
    was also testimony presented that respondent did not have housing at the time of the final trial
    date. Respondent also lied about past employment at trial and was unable to verify any
    -2-
    employment. The record also reflects that respondent demonstrated a lack of commitment to
    treatment for her substance abuse and behavioral health issues by continuing to use marijuana,
    failing to attend substance abuse treatment sessions, and attending only half of her mental health
    therapy sessions. Moreover, respondent did not demonstrate improvement in her parenting
    skills. She completed only one parenting class in November 2015 and failed to attend 11 of the
    12 coaching sessions with a parenting coach during the following spring. Respondent also failed
    to show up to several of her scheduled visits with the child. When respondent was present at the
    visits, she frequently arrived up to 75 minutes late, left early, fell asleep during visits, used
    profane language, and ignored the child by using her cell phone. Respondent also acted
    aggressively in the child’s presence, which, in one instance, necessitated removal of the child
    from the visitation room and a police officer to escort respondent out of the building.
    Considering all of these factors, the trial court properly found that the conditions that led to the
    adjudication persisted for more than 182 days with no reasonable likelihood of being rectified
    within a reasonable time considering the child’s age under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). See In re LE
    Minor, 
    278 Mich. App. 1
    , 27; 747 NW2d 883 (2008) (finding that termination under MCL
    712A.19b(3)(c)(i) is proper when, despite the opportunity to take advantages of services, the
    parent lacked employment, never obtained adequate housing, missed random drug screens, and is
    at a risk of relapse). 2
    “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
    termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re
    Olive/Metts, 
    297 Mich. App. 35
    , 40; 826 NW2d 144 (2012), citing MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR
    3.977(E)(4). “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be
    proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re 
    Moss, 301 Mich. App. at 90
    . Trial courts
    should consider all available evidence in making this determination. In re 
    Trejo, 462 Mich. at 356
    . Relevant factors to be considered include the bond between the child and the parent, the
    parent’s ability to parent, the child’s need for permanency and stability, the advantages of the
    foster home over the parent’s home, and any other relevant factors. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich
    App at 41-42. We review the trial court’s determination that termination is in the child’s best
    interests for clear error. 
    Id. at 40.
    In this case, we conclude that the circuit court did not err when it found that termination
    of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. The trial court correctly pointed
    out that respondent’s relationship with the child “has been weakening” because the child, who
    was nearly three years old at the close of trial, was six months old when removed from her
    mother. Moreover, the foster care worker testified about the advantages of the foster home,
    agreeing that the child had a healthy bond with the foster parents and that the foster parents
    would be able to meet the child’s needs and provide her permanence through adoption. The
    2
    If we find that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that one statutory ground for
    termination existed, we need not address the additional grounds for termination. In re HRC, 
    286 Mich. App. 444
    , 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). In any event,, we would note that termination under
    MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j) was appropriate for reasons similar to those we discussed with
    respect to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
    -3-
    foster care worker’s description of the child’s response to respondent’s loss of temper during a
    visit in July 2016, when the screaming and crying child ran to her foster parent screaming for
    “mommy[,]” demonstrates the bond between the child and the foster parents. It also supports the
    trial court’s finding that the child’s relationship with respondent has weakened over time.
    Additionally, as discussed above, respondent remained unable to secure consistent housing or
    employment in order to adequately provide for the child. Thus, the circuit court’s best-interests
    determination was not clearly erroneous.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Colleen A. O'Brien
    /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
    /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 335894

Filed Date: 6/15/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/16/2017